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Keynote: Vice Admiral David H. Lewis, USN, 
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 
Vice Admiral David H. Lewis, USN, a native of the state of Washington, graduated in 1979 from the 
University of Nebraska with a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and was commissioned 
through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program. He graduated from the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 1988 with a Master of Science in Computer Science. 
At sea, Lewis served aboard USS Spruance (DD 963) as communications officer, where he earned 
his surface warfare qualification; USS Biddle (CG 34) as fire control officer and missile battery officer; 
and USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) as combat systems officer. His major command assignment was 
Aegis Shipbuilding Program manager in Program Executive Office Ships, where he led the delivery of 
seven DDG 51 class ships and procured another 10 ships. 
At shore, Lewis’ assignments included assistant chief of staff for maintenance and engineering; 
commander, Naval Surface Forces; the Navy secretariat staff; Naval Sea Systems Command staff; 
Aegis Shipbuilding Program Office; supervisor of shipbuilding, Bath, ME; and Readiness Support 
Group, San Diego. 
Upon selection to flag rank in 2009, Lewis served as vice commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
and then served four years as program executive officer, Ships, where he directed the delivery of 18 
ships and procurement of another 51 ships. From 2014–2017 he served as commander, Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command, where he led a global workforce of 10,300 civilian and military 
personnel who design, develop, and deploy advanced communications and information capabilities. 
In May 2017 he assumed command as the director, Defense Contract Management Agency, Fort 
Lee, VA. 
Lewis’ personal awards include the Distinguished Service Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit (four 
awards), Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal 
(two awards), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various service and unit awards.
- 1 - 
Plenary Panel 17: State of the Defense Acquisition 
System 
Thursday, May 10, 2018 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. 
Chair: The Honorable David J. Berteau, President and CEO, Professional 
Services Council 
Discussant: Stan Soloway, President & CEO, Celero Strategies, LLC 
Discussant: The Honorable Katrina McFarland, Sehlke Board of Advisors 
Member and President of Blue Oryx LLC, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition) 
Defense Acquisition Trends 2017: A Preliminary Look 
Rhys McCormick, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Greg Sanders, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Andrew Hunter, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
David J. Berteau—became the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Professional Services 
Council (PSC) on March 28, 2016. With nearly 400 members, PSC is the premier advocate of and 
resource for the federal technology and professional services industry. As CEO, Berteau focuses on 
legislative and regulatory issues related to government acquisition, budgets, and requirements, 
helping to shape public policy, lead strategic coalitions, and work to improve communications 
between government and industry. PSC’s member companies represent small, medium, and large 
businesses that provide federal agencies with services of all kinds, including engineering, logistics, 
operations and maintenance, information technology, facilities management, international 
development, scientific, and environmental services. 
Prior to PSC, Berteau was confirmed in December 2014 as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness. He managed logistics policy and processes to provide superior, 
cost effective, joint logistics support to the entire Department of Defense. He oversaw the 
management of the $170 billion in Department of Defense logistics operations.  
Earlier, Berteau served as Senior Vice President and Director of the National Security Program on 
Industry and Resources at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, 
DC. His research and analysis covered national security, management, contracting, logistics, 
acquisition, and industrial base issues. Berteau is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration and has previously served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and at 
the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, a Director of the Procurement Round Table, and an 
Associate at the Robert S. Strauss Center at the University of Texas. 
Before he joined CSIS full time in 2008, he served as a CSIS non-resident Senior Associate for seven 
years. In addition, he was director of national defense and homeland security for Clark & Weinstock, 
director of Syracuse University’s National Security Studies Program and a professor of practice at the 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and senior vice president at Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC). He served a total of 14 years at senior levels in the U.S. Defense 
Department under six defense secretaries.  
Berteau graduated with a BA from Tulane University in 1971 and received his master’s degree in 
1981 from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. 
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Stan Soloway—is President & CEO of Celero Strategies, LLC, a full-service strategic consultancy 
focused on the federal market. Celero Strategies is Soloway’s latest step in a career during which he 
has become widely regarded as one of the nation’s leading experts on the federal market, the factors 
and dynamics that drive it and how to translate that expertise into meaningful strategies and action. 
With Celero, Soloway’s goal is to combine two core passions:  helping good companies bring 
innovative solutions to government and helping government significantly improve its performance and 
delivery of service. 
Prior to founding Celero Strategies in January, 2016, Stan served for 15 years as the President & 
CEO of the Professional Services Council, the largest and most influential national association of 
government technology and professional services firms. While at PSC, Soloway was the industry’s 
leading voice, policy strategist and resource for both government and the private sector. He regularly 
testified before Congress, was a prolific writer, appeared often on radio and television; and was 
routinely sought out by both corporate and government organizations to discuss current market 
trends, dynamics and strategies. He has also been a contributing author for books published by 
Cambridge University, Harvard Law School, the University of Pennsylvania, and the IBM Center for 
the Business of Government. 
Stan was the recipient of the 2016 Consumer Electronics Show (CES) Government Technology 
Leadership Award and, in 2015, was inducted into the Greater Washington Government Contractor 
Hall of Fame. He also was named the IT Industry Executive of the Year in 2013 by Government 
Computer News; has regularly been named one of the 100 most influential business leaders in 
Washington (Washington Business Journal) and one of the 100 most influential figures in national 
defense (Defense News and Gannett). He is a three-time winner of the Federal 100 Award for his 
leadership in federal information technology and is a Fellow of both the National Academy of Public 
Administration and the National Contract Management Association, where he also serves on the 
Executive Advisory Board. He is a principal at the Partnership for Public Service where he serves as 
a Senior Advisor to Government Executives (SAGE) and in 2016 was appointed to the Community 
Advisory Board of WAMU Radio, Washington, DC’s National Public Radio outlet. 
During the second half of the Clinton Administration, Stan served as the Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense and was responsible for wide-ranging reforms to defense acquisition and technology policy 
and practices, and broader department-wide re-engineering.  In recognition of his leadership in the 
department, Stan was awarded both the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service 
and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. 
As passionate believer in the importance and value of public service, Stan also served from 2007 to 
2013 as a Senate-confirmed member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for National and 
Community Service, the federal agency that oversees AmeriCorps and other national service 
programs, and is a major source of funding and leadership for community service organizations 
across the nation. Earlier in his career he was a public policy and public affairs consultant for nearly 
20 years. He also co-produced the acclaimed PBS series “Great Confrontations at the Oxford Union.” 
Katrina McFarland—is currently on the Sehlke Board of Advisors and President of Blue Oryx, LLC, 
and was formerly the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
following designation by President Barack Obama on February 1, 2016. 
As Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) and Army Acquisition 
Executive, McFarland oversaw the execution of the Army’s acquisition function, including life cycle 
management and sustainment of Army weapons systems and research and development programs, 
and manages the Army Acquisition Corps and greater Army Acquisition Workforce. McFarland also 
serves as the science advisor to the Secretary of the Army and as the Army’s senior research and 
development official and senior procurement executive. In addition, McFarland held principal 
responsibility for all Department of the Army matters related to logistics. 
Prior to joining the Department of the Army, McFarland served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition). In this role, she was the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics on matters related to acquisition. 
Previously, she served as the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). Under her 
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leadership, DAU provided practitioner training, career management, and services to enable the 
acquisition, technology, logistics, and requirements community to make smart business decisions and 
deliver timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter. Prior to joining DAU, McFarland was the 
Director for Acquisition for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)—a position she held since May 2006. 
As MDA’s principal acquisition executive, McFarland advised the Director of MDA on all acquisition, 
contracting, and small business decisions. Other core responsibilities included the development of 
process activities and program policy associated with the execution of the single integrated Ballistic 
Missile Defense System research, development, and test program, and the establishment of the 
Baseline Execution Review to ensure that an integrated program execution of the BMDS occurred 
across the baselines of schedule, cost, performance, contracting, test, and operational delivery.  
McFarland began her civil service career in 1986 as a general engineer at Headquarters Marine 
Corps where she was accredited as a Materials, Mechanical, Civil, and Electronics Engineer. She has 
received an Honorary Doctoral of Engineering from the University of Cranfield, United Kingdom, the 
Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious 
Civilian Service Award, the Department of the Navy Civilian Tester of the Year Award, and the Navy 
and United States Marine Corps Commendation Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service. She is DAWIA 
Level-III certified in Program Management, Engineering, and Testing as well as having a professional 
engineer license and having attained her PMP certification. 
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Defense Acquisition Trends 2017: A Preliminary Look 
Rhys McCormick—is an Associate Fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) at 
CSIS. His work focuses on unmanned systems, global defense industrial base issues, and U.S. 
federal and defense contracting trends. Prior to working at DIIG, he interned at the Abshire-Inamori 
Leadership Academy at CSIS and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the U.S. 
Army War College. He holds a bachelor’s degree in security and risk analysis from Pennsylvania 
State University and a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University. 
Greg Sanders—is a Fellow in the International Security Program and Deputy Director of the 
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where he manages a research team that analyzes data 
on U.S. government contract spending and other budget and acquisition issues. In support of these 
goals, he employs SQL Server, as well as the statistical programming language R. Sanders holds a 
master’s degree in international studies from the University of Denver, and he holds a bachelor’s 
degree in government and politics and a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the University of 
Maryland. 
Andrew Hunter—is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program and Director of the 
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. From 2011 to 2014, he served as a senior executive in 
the Department of Defense, serving first as Chief of Staff to Under Secretaries of Defense (AT&L) 
Ashton B. Carter and Frank Kendall, before directing the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. From 2005 to 
2011, Hunter served as a Professional Staff Member of the House Armed Services Committee. 
Hunter holds a master’s degree in applied economics from Johns Hopkins University and a bachelor’s 
degree in social studies from Harvard University. 
Abstract 
This paper presents a preliminary look at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Department of 
Defense (DoD) contracting trends available in the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS). This data provides important insights concerning the defense industrial base 
through analysis of contract characteristics such as defense component, area (products, 
services, R&D), component, level of competition, platform portfolio, and vendor size. These 
trends provide vital information that can inform and highlight critical issues in the defense 
industrial base, such as the historical trough in development pipeline for major weapon 
systems. Given that FY 2016 was the end of seven consecutive years of DoD contract 
obligation drawdown, the trends for FY 2017 are particularly interesting. 
Introduction 
This paper presents a preliminary look at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Department of 
Defense (DoD) contracting trends available in the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS). This data provides important insights concerning the defense industrial base 
through analysis of contract characteristics such as defense component, area (products, 
services, R&D), component, level of competition, platform portfolio, and vendor size. These 
trends provide vital information that can inform and highlight critical issues in the defense 
industrial base, such as the historical trough in the development pipeline for major weapon 
systems. Given that FY 2016 was the end of seven consecutive years of DoD contract 
obligation drawdown, the trends for FY 2017 are particularly interesting. 
This report uses the methodology used in CSIS reports on federal contracting. For 
over a decade, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) has issued a series of 
analytical reports on federal contract spending for national security by the government. 
These reports are built on FPDS data, which is downloaded in bulk from USAspending.gov. 
DIIG now maintains its own database of federal spending, that includes data from 1990–
2017. This database is a composite of FPDS and DD350 data. For this report, the study 
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team relied on FY 2000–FY 2017 data. All dollar figures are in constant FY 2017 dollars, 
using the latest Treasury deflators. For additional information about the CSIS contracting 
data analysis methodology, see https://csis.org/program/methodology.  
For this paper, CSIS focused on the following research questions identified in 
previous DIIG defense contracting reports: 
 DoD Contract Spending in a Budgetary Context: How has the defense 
contracting topline responded to the recent increases in the defense budget? 
 Area: Have the different areas (products, services, and research and 
development) responded differently to the defense contracting rebound? 
 Vendor Size: How did the share of contract obligations change among 
vendors of differing sizes, particularly small vendors? 
 Competition: Did the share of contract obligations awarded after effective 
competition change?1 
 R&D: Has the seven-year trough in the development pipeline for major 
weapon systems continued in FY 2017? 
DoD Contract Spending in a Budgetary Context 
Figure 1 shows that overall DoD contract obligations continued to grow in FY 2017 
as the overall defense budgete increased. Total DoD contract obligations increased from 
$304.1 billion in FY 2016 to $319.8 billion in FY 2017, a 5% increase. Since DoD contracting 
obligations bottomed out in FY 2015, overall DoD contract obligations have increased by 
13% over the past two years. Overall DoD contract obligations have increased as a share of 
DoD Total Obligation Authority (TOA) over the past two years, going from 48% in FY 2015 to 
51% in FY 2016 and 53% in FY 2017. With the defense budget set to increase in FY 2018 
and FY 2019, defense contract obligations are likely to continue to grow in the near future.  




 Effective competition is defined as competitively sourced contracts receiving at least two or more 
offers. 
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Figure 1. Defense Contract Obligations and Total Obligational Authority,  
2000–2017 
(FPDS; OUSD[C], 2017; CSIS analysis) 
Defense Contracting Spent by Area 
Within the overall DoD contracting porfolio, contract obligations for Products has 
increased faster than either Services or Research and Development (R&D). In 2017, overall 
DoD Products obligations increased by 8%, compared to the 3% growth in both Services 
and R&D. Since 2015, overall DoD Products contract obligations have increased by 22% 
compared to the 6% increase in overall DoD R&D contract obligations and the 5% increase 
in overall DoD Services contract obligations.  
Over the past two years, there have been notable shifts in the overall DoD contract 
portfolio as a share of overall DoD contract obligations. Across all of the DoD, the share of 
average contract obligations going to Products increased to 50% in FY 2016 and 51% in FY 
2017. Previously, Products had averaged 46% of overall DoD contract obligations since FY 
2000. Meanwhile, the share of overall DoD contract obligations for Services declined from 
44% in FY 2015 to 41% in FY 2017. Over the past two years, the share of overall DoD R&D 
contract obligations held steady at 8%.  
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Figure 2 shows defense contract obligations by area from FY 2000 to FY 2017.  
 
Figure 2. Defense Contract Obligations by Area, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Overall DoD: Stage of R&D 
Previous CSIS research showed a seven-year trough in the development pipeline for 
major weapon systems. From FY 2009 to FY 2015 overall DoD contract obligations for 
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and System Development & Demonstration (6.5) 
declined by two-thirds as notable MDAPs were either canceled or matured into production 
(Hunter et al., 2017). The eight-year trough in the development pipeline for major weapon 
systems continued into FY 2017, but there are signs that the trough might have reached 
rock-bottom. For the first time since FY 2005, Defense System Development & 
Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations grew compared to the previous year. Defense 
System Development & Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations grew 11% in FY 2017, 
increasing from $3.8 billion in FY 2016 to $4.2 billion. Defense Advanced Technology 
Development (6.3) contract obligations increased 3% from $4.04 billion in FY 2016 to $4.17 
billion in FY 2017.  
Although Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and System Development & 
Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations are still at near-historic lows, the 3% and 11% 
growths respectively in FY 2017 are positive signs that the bleeding has stopped for now.  
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Advanced Component Development & Prototype (6.4) contract obligations in FY 
2017 grew 25% from FY 2015. This rate constitutes a significantly higher rate of growth than 
the 6% overall growth of defense R&D between FY 2015 and FY 2017. Advanced 
Component Development & Prototype (6.4) grew 3% in FY 2017—a significantly lower rate 
of growth when compared to the 22% increase in FY 2016. As a share of the defense R&D 
portfolio, Advanced Component Development & Prototype (6.4) rose from 17% in FY 2015 
to 21% in FY 2017 and are now the second largest R&D category after Applied Research 
(6.2).  
Basic Research (6.1) contract obligations declined slightly in FY 2017 (-2%), but are 
still higher than in FY 2015. Applied Research (6.2) contract obligations, the largest share of 
the defense R&D portfolio (28%), grew 7% in FY 2016 and 1% in FY 2017. 
Operational Systems Development (6.7) grew 1% in FY 2017 after declining 13% in 
FY 2016. 
Figure 3 shows defense R&D contract obligations by stage of R&D from FY 2000 to 
FY 2017. 
 
Figure 3. Defense R&D Contract Obligations by Stage of R&D, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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Overall DoD: Component 
Over the past two years as defense contracting has rebounded, the trends between 
the defense components has varied significantly despite total contract obligations within 
each component rising since FY 2015. Figure 4 shows Defense Contract obligations by 
component from FY 2000 to FY 2017. 
 
Figure 4. Defense Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Air Force contract obligations have increased by 11% since FY 2015, but there has 
been a significant whipsaw effect over the past two years in the Air Force. In FY 2016, Air 
Force contract obligations increased by 21%, rising from $54.6 billion in FY 2015 to $66.3 
billion in FY 2016. However, in FY 2017 Air Force contract obligations declined 9%, falling to 
$60.6 billion, a total slightly above drawdown levels, but still 21% lower than the Air Force’s 
$77.1 billion in FY 2012.  
The Army has seen a gradual increase in contract obligations over the past two 
years, but below the overall rate of growth experienced by the DoD as a whole. In FY 2016, 
Army contract obligations only grew 1%, compared to overall DoD contract obligations 
increasing by 8% that year. In FY 2017, Army contract obligations increased by 4%, a rate 
just below the 5% rate of overall growth. As the Army seeks to accelerate its modernization 
program that effort will require continued steady contracting growth in the near-term.  
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Navy contract obligations have grown 25% over the past two years and have 
rebounded to pre-drawdown levels. In FY 2016, Navy contract obligations grew 9%, a rate 
just above the overall rate of growth of contract obligations. In FY 2017, Navy contract 
obligations grew at a rate significantly higher than the overall rate of growth. Navy contract 
obligations grew 25% from $95.3 billion in FY 2016 to $109.4 billion in FY 2017. Of note, 
Navy contract obligations in FY 2017 were 7% higher than they were in the FY 2012, the 
only component of DoD to not only rebound to pre-drawdown levels but to exceed these 
levels.  
MDA and DLA both experienced a whiplash effect between FY 2016 and FY 2017, 
but in opposite directions. In FY 2016, DLA contract obligations declined by 3% before 
increasing 15% in FY 2017. Meanwhile, MDA contract obligations increased 39% in FY 
2016, before declining 19% in FY 2017.  
Overall DoD: Platform Portfolio 
Except for the Air & Missile Defense, Facilities and Construction, Other Products, 
and Space Systems, contract obligations are up across platforms portfolios since FY 2015.  
Land Vehicles contract obligations increased 10% in FY 2017 after suffering 
“catastrophic” declines during sequestration and the defense drawdown (McCormick, 
Hunter, & Sanders, 2017). Land Vehicles contract obligations rose from $7.5 billion in FY 
2016 to $8.2 billion in FY 2017. The 10% increase was slightly offset by the 3% decline in 
FY 2016, but Land Vehicles contract obligations are up 7% from their low point in FY 2015—
still well below historical averages. 
Ships & Submarines and Air & Missile Defense saw the smallest decline in contract 
obligations during sequestration and the defense drawdown but have faced very different 
trajectories since. Over the past two years, Ships & Submarines have grown at a steady 
rate, increasing by 13% in FY 2016 and 8% in FY 2017. Since FY 2015, Ships & 
Submarines contract obligations increased from $24.2 billion to $27.2 billion in FY 2017, a 
22% increase. Comparatively, Air & Missile Defense contract obligations grew 5% in FY 
2016 before declining 15% in FY 2017. Total Air & Missile Defense contract obligations fell 
11% from $9.7 billion in FY 2015 to $8.6 billion.  
The Aircraft and Ordnance & Missiles platform portfolios have both grown at a 
significantly higher rate than overall DoD topline growth. Aircraft contract obligations 
increased to $77.2 billion in FY 2016 from $63.2 billion in FY 2015, a 22% growth. Aircraft 
contract obligations then grew an additional 10% in FY 2017 to $85.3 billion, a historic high. 
Ordnance & Missiles contract obligations increased 23% in FY 2016 and then an additional 
7% in FY 2017. In total, Aircraft and Ordnance & Missiles contract obligations have grown 
34% and 32% respectively since FY 2015. 
Space Systems and Facilities and Construction have seen slight declines even as 
overall defense contract obligations grew. After increasing by 1% in FY 2016, Space 
Systems contract obligations declined 2% in FY 2017. In total, Space Systems contract 
obligations have fallen from $6.1 in FY 2016 to $6.0 billion in FY 2017, a 1% decline. 
Facilities and Construction contract obligations remained relatively steady in FY 2016 (-0.3% 
decline), before falling 2% in FY 2017. 
Electronics, Comms, and Sensors grew at nearly the same rate as the overall 
defense rate of growth over the past two years. In FY 2016, both Electronics, Comms, and 
Sensors and overall defense contract obligations increased by 8%. In FY 2017, Electronics, 
Comms, and Sensors, increased 4%, just slightly less than the 5% overall growth.  
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Figure 5 shows defense contract obligations by platform portfolio from FY 2000 to FY 
2017.  
 
Figure 5. Defense Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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Overall DoD: Vendor Size  
Figure 6 shows defense contract obligations by size of vendor from FY 2000 to FY 
2017. 
 
Figure 6. Defense Contract Obligations by Size of Vendor, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
The Big Five have benefited the most from the rebound of defense contracting. Since 
FY 2015, Big 5 contract obligations have increased by 33%.2 Big 5 contract obligations have 
grown 25% from $84.3 billion in FY 2015 to $105.2 billion in FY 2016. In FY 2017, Big 5 
contract obligations grew to $111.8 billion, a 6% increase from FY 2017. As a share of 
defense contract obligations, the Big 5 have risen from 30% in FY 2015 to 35% in FY 2016 
and FY 2017. 
Small vendors have been the second largest beneficiary of the defense contracting 
rebound growing 10% since FY 2015. Defense contract obligations going to Small vendors 




 The Big 5 are the largest defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman, and General Dynamics. 
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rose to $60 billion in FY 2016 from $54.6 billion in FY 2015, a 6% increase. In FY 2017, 
Small vendors’ contract obligations totaled $59.8 billion, a 3% increase. However, despite 
absolute growth in the amount of contract obligation held by Small vendors, as a share of 
total defense contract obligations, Small vendors have remained steady at 19%.  
Medium vendors’ contract obligations have increased by 9% since FY 2015. Medium 
vendors only grew 1% in FY 2016, before increasing sharply in FY 2017. Last year, Medium 
vendors’ contract obligations grew 8% from FY 2016, the largest percentage growth 
amongst vendors of all sizes. As a share of defense contract obligations, Medium vendors 
fell slightly from 20% in FY 2015 to 19% in FY 2016 and FY 2017.  
Large vendors have seen the least benefit from the defense contracting rebound. 
Since FY 2015, contract obligations held by Large vendors declined 1%. Large vendors 
continued their decline, which started in FY 2011, in FY 2016, falling by 4%. Large vendors 
fared better in FY 2017, as contract obligations awarded to Large vendors rose from $83.9 
billion to $86.7 billion, a 3% increase. As a share of defense contract obligations, Large 
vendors fell from 31% in FY 2015 to 28% in FY 2016 and 27% in FY 2017. 
Overall DoD: Vendor Size by Area 
Previous CSIS research has shown that beyond the topline vendor size trends, 
sequestraiton and the defense drawdown impacted “vendors of differing sizes depending on 
what area (products, services, or R&D) vendors are contracted for.” For example, Big 5 R&D 
contract obligations fell nearly three and a half times faster than Small, Medium, and Large 
vendors R&D contract obligations (McCormick et al., 2017).  
Big 5 contract obligations have increased for Products, Services, and R&D since FY 
2015, but Products has significantly outpaced the other two categories. Since FY 2015, Big 
5 Products contract obligations have increased by 43% compared to 15% growth in R&D 
and 10% growth in Services. Big 5 Products contract obligations increased by 32% in FY 
2016 and 8% in FY 2017. Big 5 R&D contract obligations increased 2% in FY 2016 and 12% 
in FY 2017 but remain well below historical averages. Big 5 Service contract obligations 
declined 1% in FY 2017 after having grown 11% in FY 2016. 
Contract obligations increases have been closer among all three categories for Small 
vendors since FY 2015. Small vendors’ Products and Services contract obligations have 
both grown 9%, while R&D contract obligations have increased slightly faster, growing 14%. 
Small vendors’ Products contract obligations increased 3% in FY 2016 and 6% in FY 2017. 
Small vendors R&D contract obligations grew 10% in FY 2016 before slowing to a 3% 
growth in FY 2017. Small vendors Services contract obligations grew 7% in FY 2016 and 
2% in FY 2017. Of note, Small vendors’ $35.7 billion in defense services contract obligations 
is 2% higher than the $34.9 billion obligated in FY 2012.  
Medium vendors’ trends were comparable to those seen by Small vendors. Since FY 
2015, Medium vendors’ contract obligations for Products grew 8%, R&D grew 7%, and 
Services grew 11%. Medium vendors’ Products obligations declined 2% in FY 2016 but 
grew 11% in FY 2017. Medium vendors’ R&D contracts have grown steadily over the past 
two years, increasing 3% in FY 2016 and 4% in FY 2017. Finally, Medium vendors’ Services 
contract obligations increased 3% in FY 2016 and 7% in FY 2017. 
Finally, trends within Large vendors’ portfolios varied significantly as contract 
obligations declined 1% overall. Since FY 2015, Large vendors’ R&D contract obligations 
have declined by 16% compared to the 4% decline in Services, and 4% growth in Products. 
Large vendors’ R&D contract obligations declined 4% in FY 2016 before declining 12% in 
FY 2017. Large vendors’ Services contract obligations declined 6% in FY 2016 but 
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increased 4% in FY 2017. Finally, Large vendors’ Products contract obligations declined 2% 
in FY 2017, but increased 6% in FY 2017. 
Figure 7 shows defense contract obligations by size of vendor by area from FY 2000 
to FY 2017.  
 
Figure 7. Defense Contract Obligations by Size of Vendor by Area, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
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Overall DoD: Competition 
Previous CSIS research has shown that the rate of effective competition has 
remained relatively steady since 2000 despite policy guidance favoring increased 
competition (Ellman et al., 2016; McCormick et al., 2015). Figure 8 shows the rate of 
effective competition for defense contract obligations from FY 2000 to FY 2017. 
 
Figure 8. Defense Contract Obligations by Level of Competition, 2000–2017 
(FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
The data show that the rate of effective competition has fallen slightly over the past 
two years. In FY 2015, 47% of contract obligations were awarded after effective competition 
compared to 51% awarded without effective competition. In FY 2016, the share of contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition fell to 45%. The effective competition rate 
continued its decline in FY 2017, falling to 44%. 
The declining effective competition rate in the rate of effective competition has been 
driven by significant increases in the total sum of contract obligations awarded without 
effective competition. Since FY 2015, contract obligations awarded with no competition has 
grown from $124.4 billion to $152 billion, a 22% increase. Comparatively, contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition has grown from $133.2 billion to $142.2 
billion, a 7% increase. Of note, policy guidance issued to reduce the number of contracts 
awarded after receiving only one offers seems to be working. Over the past four years, 
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contract obligations awarded after receiving only one offer has held relatively steady in 
terms of both raw dollars and share of defense dollars. 
Conclusion 
Products contract obligations growth has significantly outpaced R&D and 
Services. 
Over the past two years, defense Products contract obligations have grown 22% 
compared to R&D and Services increasing by 6% and 5% respectively. Whereas Services 
and R&D have grown between 2 to 3% annually, Products contract obligations increased 
13% in FY 2016 and 8% in FY 2017. It is likely that Products contract obligations growth 
continues to outpace Services and R&D given the considerable number of new legacy 
weapon system platforms purchases in the recent budget deal.  
Navy’s anchors aweigh; Air Force does a barrel roll; and the Army goes rolling 
along.  
There were notable differences in the contracting trends between the military 
components.  
The Navy fared best amongst all DoD components, growing 25% since FY 2015. 
Navy contract obligations increased 9% in FY 2015 and 15% in FY 2016. In FY 2017, the 
Navy accounted for 34% of Defense contract obligations, 10% higher than the next closest 
component and a high-water mark for this century. 
Although Air Force contract obligations are up 11% since FY 2015, there has been a 
significant whipsaw effect over the past two years. The Air Force was the biggest beneficiary 
of the FY 2016 defense contracting rebound in absolute dollar terms, increasing 21% from 
FY 2015 totals. However, in FY 2017 Air Force contract obligations declined 9%. It remains 
to be seen whether the Air Force’s long-term trajectory will resemble FY 2016 or FY 2017 
trends or somewhere between the two.  
The Army, the largest bill-payer during sequestration and the defense drawdown, 
has rolled along these past two years seeing slow, but steady growth. Over the past two 
years, Army contract obligations grew 1% in FY 2016 and 4% in FY 2017. Continued steady 
growth is critical as the Army seeks to recover from its modernization triple whammy 
(McCormick & Hunter, 2017). 
Weapon system development pipeline trough might have bottomed out.  
The seven-year trough in the weapon systems development pipeline appears to 
have hit its lowermost point. For the first time in years, contract obligations for System 
Development & Demonstration (6.5) and Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
(6.4) increased from the previous year. Although System Development & Demonstration 
(6.5) and Advanced Component Development & Prototypes (6.4) contract obligations 
increased 11% and 3% respectively, it is too early to declare that the trough in the weapon 
systems development pipeline is over. Even after seeing positive news for the first time in 
years, System Development & Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations are still just above 
historic lows. It will likely take a few years of growth before it is possible to declare the end of 
the weapon system development pipeline trough. 
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Land Vehicles starts bounce back; Aircraft and Ordnance & Missiles up; Air & 
Missile Defense down.  
The Land Vehicles platform portfolio started to bounce back in FY 2017 after 
suffering catastrophic cuts during sequestration and the budget drawdown. In FY 2017, 
Land Vehicles contract obligations increased from $7.5 billion in FY 2016 to $8.2 billion in 
FY 2017, a 10% increase.  
Aircraft and Ordnance & Missiles were the two platforms that experienced the 
greatest growth during the defense contracting rebound. Aircraft contract obligations 
increased 34% since FY 2015, while Ordnance & Missiles increased 32%. Of note, Aircraft 
accounted for 27% of defense contract obligations (In FY 2017?), Aircraft’s highest share of 
the defense budget since FY 2000.  
Four platform portfolios experienced declines over the past two years: Air & Missile 
Defense; Facilities and Construction; Other Products; and Space Systems. Amongst those 
four platform portfolios, Air & Missile Defense experienced the greatest declines, falling by 
11%. Interestingly, Air & Missile had been amongst the platform portfolios that fared best 
during sequestration and the drawdown. 
Big 5 winner, but all up except Large. 
The Big 5 were the big winners from the defense contracting rebound, while Large 
vendors have fared the worst. Big 5 defense contract obligations have grown 33% since FY 
2015. This has largely been driven by the 43% increase in Products contract obligations 
going to the growth, but the Big 5 have also seen increases in Services (10%) and R&D 
(15%). Additionally, the Big 5 increased their overall share of defense contract obligations 
from 30% to 35%, largely at the expense of Large vendors. 
Large vendors were the only vendor size category to decline since FY 2015, falling 
1%. However, the trends suggest that Large vendors could fare better in future years as 
Large contract obligations increased 3% in FY 2017 compared to FY 2016’s 4% decline.  
Small (10%) and Medium (9%) vendors have grown at roughly equivalent rates since 
FY 2015. Small vendors’ greatest increase came in R&D, which was up 14% compared to 
Products and Services, which both increased 9%. For Medium vendors, Services were the 
greatest source of growth, increasing 14%, compared to 7% growth for R&D and 8% growth 
for Products. 
Rate of effective competition is down across the DoD. 
Worryingly, over the past two years, the rate of effective competition for DoD contract 
obligations has declined. Whereas the rate of effective competition had held steady at 
around 50% over the past decade, FY 2016 and FY 2017 have departed from the trend. The 
share of contract obligations awarded after effective competition fell to 45% in FY 2016 and 
then 44% in FY 2017. This trend is troublesome given the importance of competition and 
given the previous imperviousness of the rate of effective competition to previous policy 
guidance. CSIS will explore potential reasons for these declining competition rates in a 
future report. 
On a positive note, the share of contract obligations awarded after receiving one 
offer has continued to remain steady. 
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Final Thoughts 
Defense contract obligations continued to grow in FY 2017 after rebounding in FY 
2016, albeit at a slower pace than last year. With the defense budget set to continue rising 
for at least the next two years, defense contract obligations are poised to continue growing 
for the near-future. Beyond the next two years, the long-term forecast for the defense 
budget is unclear, making the DoD’s decisions about where to spend that money critically 
important especially given the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s focus on great power 
competition. The most recent budget and recent contracting trends show the prioritization of 
procurement over RDT&E, but the DoD’s greatest challenge in the coming years will be 
finding the proper balance its investment portfolio. The DoD will need to balance 
procurement of upgraded versions of systems already in production that help tackle the 
current readiness challenge with RDT&E investments in future capabilities like artificial 
intelligence, hypersonics, and autonomy. Overinvestment in either direction could be 
detrimental to the DoD as over-emphasis on current platforms could increase existing 
readiness at the expense of the future fighting force, while overinvestment in future 
capabilities could create a death spiral for parts of the force like the F/A-18 Super Hornet 
fleet that are facing potential breaking points.  
These investment dynamics present a critical follow-on challenge: resourcing and 
accessing innovation from nontraditional defense suppliers and the broader research 
community. The advances being made in the critical warfighting capabilities of the future are 
not being driven by the DoD or the traditional defense industrial base, but instead by 
commercial firms, universities, and other research entities globally. If the DoD hopes to gain 
access to these firms, it will need to create clear resourcing opportunities in the budget, yet 
the latest trends in both procurement and RDT&E have heavily favored the traditional 
defense industrial base. As policymakers tackle the difficult challenge of balancing current 
readiness and future capabilities, it must be careful not to crowd out resourcing for sources 
of innovation outside the traditional defense industrial base if the DoD is to succeed at 
accomplishing the National Defense Strategy’s goal of refocusing on great power 
competition. Understanding the trends of what, how, and from whom the DoD has been 
buying can provide important insights into how the acquisition system responds to these and 
other challenges.  
This paper presents only the preliminary findings of CSIS’s analysis of the FY 2017 
defense contracting trends. CSIS will further analyze the trends discussed in this paper and 
more in future reports.  
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Abstract 
The DoD faces pressure to sustain its competitive advantages in national security. 
Enduring budget pressures, a record-long high operations tempo, the blitzing pace of 
technology, and adversaries that are leveraging commercial technology compound the 
challenge. The adoption of COTS products into defense acquisitions has been offered to 
help meet these challenges. A literature review of 62 sources was conducted with the 
objectives of better understanding COTS product implementation performance. It explored 
(1) characteristics of the research, (2) policies, laws, regulations, and directives that govern 
the use of COTS, (3) the known barriers to COTS implementations, (4) the known success 
factors to COTS implementations, (5) the recommendations have previously been made 
with respect to COTS implementations, and (6) recommendations for more timely and more 
effective COTS implementations. From the literature emerged a framework of COTS product 
usage and a scale to measure COTS product appropriateness that should help to guide 
COTS product adoption decisions and to help manage COTS product implementations ex 
post. 
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Introduction 
The United States positions itself as the global leader in national defense, power 
projection, and the defense of its allies. To attain that vision, the U.S. must stay on the 
leading edge of technology; that is, it must maintain a competitive advantage in each 
domain—land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. However, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) is not unbound by its resources. There are ceilings on the number of ships, soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and fighter squadrons—to name a few. And the annual allocation of 
dollars—the ability to acquire resources—is constrained. The provisions of the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 linger as a reminder of the exploded national deficit, the need for a 
balanced budget, and sequestration. The estimated budget deficit for fiscal year (FY) 2017 
is $577 billion (Amadeo, 2017), while the cumulative national debt is $19.968 trillion, or 
$61,554 per citizen (USDebtClock.org, 2017).  
According to the GAO (2017),  
the Department of Defense faces five key challenges that significantly affect 
the department's ability to accomplish its mission. These include the need to 
(1) rebalance forces and rebuild readiness; (2) mitigate threats to cyberspace 
and expand cyber capabilities; (3) control the escalating costs of programs, 
such as certain weapon systems acquisitions and military health care, and 
better manage its finances; (4) strategically manage its human capital; and 
(5) achieve greater efficiencies in defense business operations. (p. 8)  
These challenges are not expected to wane any time soon. Hence, the DoD must continue 
to innovate in a way other than just technology and weapons—it must figure out how to do 
even more with less. 
Notwithstanding, technology is advancing at a breakneck pace. New developments 
in autonomous units, light-bending hyper stealth, electromagnetic rail guns, hypersonic 
missiles, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, big data, lasers, and social media—to name a 
few—cost money to develop and to harness. Hence, it is very expensive to remain on the 
leading edge versus current and potential adversaries and against different types of 
adversaries—conventional and asymmetric. Coupled with the demand on funds is the 
demand for faster response time. Yet time is no friend to a defense acquisition system that 
consumes, on average, 8.25 years to field a system from program initiation to initial 
operating capability (Riposo et al., 2014). Drastic change is needed in the DoD (Garber et 
al., 2011). 
Additionally, adversaries and potential adversaries have expanded into 
unconventional domains posing threats via space and cyberspace. Even adversaries such 
as ISIS and Hezbollah have figured out the benefits of commercial technology and have 
adopted them (Hambling, 2017). They have also expanded into some of the most 
complicated domains by leveraging commercial technology. This is not surprising since 
many developments no longer originate in government-owned or contracted laboratories. 
Rapidly advancing commercial capabilities are deteriorating the United States’ advantage 
(Tucker, 2017). 
The use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products is one strategy to help the DoD 
overcome its challenges. The implementation of COTS products offers faster development 
time, reduced cost, and higher quality compared to custom development (Torchiano et al., 
2002). Yet in some settings, actually achieving those desired outcomes has been fleeting. 
COTS usage is no panacea (Carney & Oberndorf, n.d.), and is fraught with complexity, 
difficulty, and risk. According to Ben FitzGerald, a senior fellow at the Center for a New 
American Security, the DoD consistently struggles with the insertion of commercial 
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technology (Erwin, 2016). Based on a review of approximately 40 programs, defense 
acquisitions continue to be plagued by immature architectures, COTS integration, 
interoperability, and obsolescence (Baldwin, 2007). 
While some attention was afforded buying commercial items as far back as five 
decades, the brunt of the thrust occurred in the mid-1990s with the Perry Memorandum and 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. Pockets of success implementing COTS 
products exist, as do spectacular failures. With greater attention recently on the budget 
resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011, coupled with the realization of that the pace 
of technology is accelerating and that adversaries are leveraging commercial technology, 
there has been recent renewed attention on accelerating the infusion of COTS products into 
defense acquisition.  
Though the use of COTS products has been widely researched, as apparent from 
the DoD’s struggles to harness it, COTS product usage is not completely understood. The 
literature on the use of COTS across various contexts is fragmented. There are some DoD-
specific case studies of COTS product usage and numerous non-DoD studies—albeit mostly 
concentrated in the COTS software realm. It has been 17 years since the last 
comprehensive synthesis of COTS implementations—then conducted by the Air Force 
Scientific Advisory Board (Grant, 2000). There is no known comprehensive synthesis of 
COTS usage research. 
Scope and Objectives 
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to review the literature surrounding the 
use of COTS technology to better understand COTS product implementation performance. 
Such a research synthesis seeks to bring together previously disparate streams of work 
(Webster & Watson, 2002), namely DoD system acquisition, software engineering, supply 
chain management, marketing (new product development), and knowledge management. 
The scope of this review includes hardware and software. The following research questions 
will be explored:  
1. What are the known barriers to COTS implementations? 
2. What are the known success factors to COTS implementations?  
3. What policies, laws, regulations, and directives govern the use of COTS? 
4. What recommendations have been made with respect to COTS 
implementations?  
5. What are the typical research types, contexts, research methods, target 
markets, and foundational theories utilized in COTS-based research?  
6. What is recommended for more timely and more effective COTS 
implementations? 
The answers to these six questions are crucial; they should help reduce program 
risks of poor performance, failure, cost growth, and schedule slippage. The gained 
knowledge should also help the DoD acquisition community to more effectively and more 
efficiently leverage COTS products in order to meet its mission mandates and retain a 
competitive advantage against existing and potential foes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. First, the study 
presents the review methodology. Following the synthesis of the literature, results are then 
presented. Lastly, discussion, limitations, implications, future research directions, and 
conclusions are offered.  
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Methodology 
To address the research questions, this research employed a literature review,  
the selection of available documents (both published and unpublished) on the 
topic, which contain information, ideas, data and evidence written from a 
particular standpoint to fulfil (sic) certain aims or express certain views on the 
nature of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective 
evaluation of these documents in relation to the research being proposed. 
(Hart, 1998, p. 13)  
The process for a systematic literature review outlined by Tranfield et al. (2003) was 
followed. This process consists of three stages: planning the review, conducting the review, 
and reporting and dissemination. In the planning stage, the need for the review is identified 
and a review protocol is developed. In stage two, the relevant literature is searched, 
identified, and selected. Additionally, particular data is extracted and synthesized. In the final 
stage, a report is drafted that includes recommendations. It is then disseminated.  
There exists a mountain of information surrounding the implementation of COTS 
technologies. A simple Google search of “commercial off-the-shelf” yielded 512,000 hits. 
Academic databases searched included ProQuest ABI/Inform Global, LexisNexis Academic, 
JSTOR, and EBSCOHost. Publications by the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) were 
reviewed. GAO reports were found on the GAO’s website. Regulations were found from the 
Navy’s repository found at: https://doni.daps.dla.mil/default.aspx; 1,140 regulations were 
scanned for COTS applicability. Academic courseware was obtained from the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU). Sources were also traced backward from reference lists 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). Sources searched included peer-reviewed journals, conference 
proceedings, Acquisition Research Program reports, case studies, GAO reports, DoD 
reports, search engine (Google and Google Scholar), DAU Acquisition Community 
Connection, GAO bid protests (on the basis of COTS), U.S. Court of Federal Claims bid 
protests (on the basis of COTS), books, trade press, white papers, guidebooks/handbooks, 
patents, and conferences/practitioner organizations. 
The massive number of sources found was narrowed by inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (Table 1). The scope of the knowledge base was expanded beyond the DoD context 
since there is very little rigorous, peer-reviewed academic research examining only DoD 
acquisitions involving the use of COTS products. However, the exemplar case studies and 
the summary of prior recommendations were constrained to DoD COTS product 
implementations. The literature search terminated when no new viewpoints emerged (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2005). 
Table 1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
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Once the literature was accumulated, the data extraction form was used to construct 
concept matrices of barriers and success factors (Webster & Watson, 2002). These 
tabulations depict the most prevalent antecedents to COTS implementation performance—
the key dependent variable in the emerged framework. Looking across sources, patterns 
and themes were sought (Webster & Watson, 2002). A pattern was considered to exist 
when a concept appeared in four or more sources as barriers and as enablers (i.e., success 
factors).  
Each article was categorized according to its theory type using Gregor’s (2006) 
typology. Gregor classified information systems theories according to their four objectives: 
analyzing, explaining, predicting, and prescribing. The resultant typology included five types: 
analyzing, explaining, predicting, explaining and predicting, and design and action. 
Analyzing theories simply describes what is. They sometimes take the form of classifications 
or taxonomies. The analyzing theory makes no causal inferences or predictions. Explaining 
theories do just that; they explain how, what, why, when, and where. Yet, the explaining 
theories do not posit testable hypotheses. Conceptual models and theory development fit 
this type. Many case studies fit this classification. Predicting theory says what is and what 
will be in the future. While the theory makes predictions and includes testable hypotheses, it 
does not very well explain why the hypotheses should be (or are) so. In contrast, explaining 
and predicting theories make predictions, offer testable hypotheses, and explain the 
causality. Finally, design and action theories explicate how to do something. They are 
prescriptive in nature.  
Then, each article was classified by its stage in the knowledge management process 
per the framework of Beesley and Cooper (2008). Process stages include knowledge 
creation, dissemination, knowledge transfer, knowledge adoption, and innovation.  
To assess the quality of each article, several methodological aspects were evaluated 
for academic rigor. In Appendix A, this assessment appears in the column labeled Scholarly 
Academic Evidence. Each article is coded as yes (Y) or no (N). Yes indicates that the article 
was published in a peer-reviewed source, provides sufficient evidence of validity and 
reliability, explains type of data, data source, and data collection method with confidence 
that error is mitigated, and describes an appropriate data analysis method. Otherwise, the 
article was coded no.  
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Results 
Emerged Constructs and Relationships 
From the literature, concepts were coded as individual barriers and enablers to 
COTS product usage. For the barriers, 86 concepts were identified. For the enablers, 89 
concepts were identified. Looking across concepts for commonality and repetition, themes 
rose to the surface. The central theme seemed to address the fitness of COTS products to 
the situation, henceforth termed COTS appropriateness. The following discussion will 
explain COTS appropriateness and each of its antecedent factors. See Figure 1 for a 
depiction of the comprehensive COTS product usage framework.  
 
Figure 1. COTS Product Usage Framework 
COTS Appropriateness 
COTS appropriateness is the focal construct in the emerged COTS framework. Grant 
(2000) concluded, “Not enough emphasis has been placed on understanding and 
implementing the process to determine the applicability (that is, the appropriateness) of 
COTS” (p. 31). The DoDIG (2006a) mentions the inappropriateness of COTS 
implementation on numerous occasions by the Air Force, then links the inappropriateness to 
performance failures (e.g., excess costs). Academicians have also taken notice of the 
importance of COTS appropriateness. Jilani (2008) mentions the selection of inappropriate 
COTS components. Keil and Tiwana (2005) also mention the disastrous ramifications of 
selecting inappropriate COTS software. Couts and Gerdes (2010) question the 
appropriateness of COTS to meet the needs of some integrations. Cechich and Piattini 
(2007) offer a procedure for detecting the suitability of COTS candidates. 
COTS appropriateness is herein defined as the extent to which a COTS product—
adopted for use as-is or integrated into another product or system—can meet the program 
objectives with very little or no modification without introducing excess risk to cost, schedule, 
performance, safety, or security. It considers the fit between the COTS product functionality 
and that desired by the DoD user for a particular intended mission effect.  
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In order to assist researchers studying COTS implementations and to assist 
practitioners in assessing COTS usage opportunities, a scale is developed to measure 
COTS appropriateness (See full Technical Report.). This scale is intended to assess the 
degree of appropriateness, measured on an interval scale of 1 to 7, as determined by the 
presence (or absence) of the following antecedent conditions. 
Antecedents to COTS Appropriateness 
Certain situations lend themselves to COTS product usage while others do the 
opposite. From the DoD case studies and the at-large literature, the following attributes (i.e., 
factors) determine, at least partially, whether a COTS product should be adopted. These 
antecedent factors are listed in order of expected strength of the relationship, with the 
strongest predictors listed first. The Technical Report elaborates on rationales for inclusion 
with citations from the supporting literature.  
RQ1: What are the known barriers to COTS implementations? 
There are several antecedent factors that decrease COTS product use 
appropriateness, as discussed above. These factors, once a COTS product is adopted and 
as implementation is attempted, reappear as barriers to success. They include a “black box” 
design, organizational resistance to change, intellectual property constraints, short product 
life cycles, and complexity. 
DoD Examples of Barriers to COTS Implementations 
The following 15 DoD programs exemplify barriers to COTS product usage for 
various reasons. Each program is followed by a citation enabling the reader to trace back 
the details. As mentioned previously, there is substantial variance in the rigor and details 
provided for each case.  
 Navy Littoral Combat Ship (DoD, 2009) 
 USMC Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71) (DoD, 2009) 
 Army Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) (DoD, 2009) 
 Air Force F-22 (Grant, 2000) 
 Air Force Depot Maintenance Management Information System (Grant, 2000) 
 Air Force Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) (Charette, 2013) 
 Air Force KC-767A Tanker Lease (DoDIG, 2006a; DoDIG, 2004a; GAO, 
2006) 
 Air Force C-130J (DoDIG, 2006a; DoDIG, 2004b)  
 Air Force and Navy T-6A Texan II, Joint Primary Aircraft Training System 
(JPATS) (DoDIG, 2006b)  
 Air Force Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (DoDIG, 2006a) 
 Navy and Air Force MV/CV-22 Osprey engines (DoDIG, 2006a)  
 Air Force C-17A engines (DoDIG, 2006a) 
 Army High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) (DoDIG, 
2006a) 
 Air Force T-3 Firefly (Baker, 2002) 
 Army DCGS-A (Brill, 2017) 
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RQ2: What are the known success factors to COTS implementations? 
There are several antecedent factors that increase COTS product use 
appropriateness, as previously discussed above. These factors, once a COTS product is 
adopted and as implementation is initiated, reappear as enablers to success. They include 
the fit between requirements and COTS product capabilities, requirements flexibility, COTS 
product experience, open systems architecture, a robust COTS product evaluation and 
selection process, post-adoption COTS product change preparedness, COTS product 
training, communication, evaluating total cost of ownership, a priori and post hoc testing, 
marketplace knowledge, leadership, stakeholder buy-in, and contractual financial incentives.  
DoD Examples of Effective COTS Implementations 
The following 23 DoD programs exemplify enablers of COTS product usage. Like the 
aforementioned barriers, each program is followed by a citation enabling the reader to trace 
back the details. 
 DoD Common Access Card (GlobalPlatform, 2003)  
 Air Force Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRP) (Grant, 2000) 
 Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) (Grant, 2000) 
 New Attack Submarine and Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARC-I) (DoD, 
2009; Grant, 2000; Boudreau, 2006; Ford & Dillard, 2009)  
 Navy Sea Fighter (FSF-1) (DoD, 2009) 
 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) (Grant, 2000) 
 Navy E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning Program (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008) 
 Army Light Utility Helicopter (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008) 
 DLA Business System Modernization (BSM) (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2008) 
 Army’s General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) (Kendall, 2015) 
 Lightweight Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) (Incze, 2011) 
 Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (DoD, 2009; 
Naegle & Petross, 2010) 
 Air Force C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) 
(Lorell et al., 2017)  
 Air Force and Navy Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) (Grant, 2000; Lorell 
et al., 2017)  
 Air Force Small Diameter Bomb (SDB I) (Lorell et al., 2017)  
 Air Force Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) System (Lorell et al., 2017) 
 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles (Morrow, 2010) 
 Army M-ATV (Morrow, 2010) 
 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Lockheed-Martin, 2017) 
 Defense Healthcare Management Systems Modernization (DHMSM) (DoDIG, 
2016b; Landi et al., 2017) 
 Army’s Single Stock Fund (SSF) program (Alcide, 2006) 
 USMC utility task vehicle (UTV) program (Tadjdeh, 2017) 
 Army Ka-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive System, AN-GSC-70(V) (Stein, 
2006) 
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RQ3: What policies, laws, regulations, and directives govern the use of COTS? 
Most of the attention to buying commercial items occurred in the mid-1990s with the 
Perry Memorandum and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. There has been 
recent renewed activity in the amount of COTS-related law, policy, regulation, and 
directives. The Technical Report lists the relevant laws, policies, regulations, and directives.  
RQ4: What recommendations have been made with respect to COTS 
implementations? 
Over the years, several oversight authorities and researchers have made 
recommendations for practitioners in order to improve their management of COTS product 
implementations. A list of those recommendations is provided in the Technical Report. 
RQ5: What are the typical research types, contexts, research methods, target 
markets, and foundational theories utilized in COTS-based research? 
The Technical Report shows the data collection methods and data analysis methods 
employed. It lists the publications from which COTS product usage literature was found. The 
report also shows the types of research and the process steps of Beesley and Cooper’s 
(2008) knowledge management framework in which each reviewed article fits. 
Discussion 
Managerial Implications 
COTS product implementation is complex and difficult to successfully navigate. This 
is evident in simply the number of antecedent factors that affect COTS usage 
appropriateness that emerged from the literature. Additionally, some additional factors are 
likely to be significant actors, yet may not have risen to the top as a pattern due to the 
limited number of published case studies. 
While there appears to be a desire to use COTS products (evidenced by statutory 
requirements and policy directives), the actual integration of COTS products into systems is 
easier said than done. It introduces one more risk to programs that is unlikely to be 
welcomed by program managers who spend their days anticipating and defending against 
risks. What has the DoD structurally infused to alleviate those perceived risks from program 
managers? The emerged framework, based on findings from academic studies and case 
studies of DoD COTS product implementations—coupled with knowledge management 
literature—clearly indicate the importance of monitoring the commercial marketplace. An 
organization must possess the ability to recognize the value of new external information 
(Grandinetti, 2016). In order to recognize the value, marketplace observers must know the 
technical and scientific details, know the DoD’s existing infrastructure, and be familiar with 
user needs and desired effects. This not a novel idea; market intelligence cells were 
recommended in 2014 (Finkenstadt et al., 2014). The number of available organic personnel 
with these skills, experience, and education—that is, with the requisite knowledge—is scant. 
Thus, it is likely that, without intervention, the DoD will continue to rely on systems 
integrators to conduct the commercial marketplace monitoring. This outsourcing of sorts 
raises serious implications of agency theory. In whose interest is the monitor working, and 
how is knowledge transformation (aka, assimilation or transfer) being manipulated or 
withheld? Since the ability to take on new knowledge to some extent depends on the 
amount and type of knowledge already possessed, how is the integrator’s knowledge being 
managed such that it is not lost? 
Commercial off the shelf, as a topic, appears to be waning since the 2005–2009 
timeframe. The quantity of source hits resulting from the search term “commercial off the 
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shelf” in the ProQuest ABI/Inform Global database has modestly decreased recently. The 
quantities of hits are distinguished between peer-reviewed journals (PRJ) and all COTS-
related articles. This decrease has not gone unnoticed (Maras et al., 2012). This trend is 
somewhat corroborated by examining the number of patents (Google, 2017) using the term 
commercial off the shelf. The quantity of COTS-related patents also seems to have peaked 
and is now waning. These trends could suggest that the practice of using COTS products is 
in decline, or it could simply mean that labeling COTS usages as such may be in retreat as 
the practices become rather standard (Maras et al., 2012). This reduction would be 
expected as the usage of COTS becomes ubiquitous; thus, perhaps authors perceive the 
term COTS to be implied and therefore, unnecessary to mention. 
“There is a failure to assure correct, predictable, safe, secure execution of complex 
software in distributed environments” (Baldwin, 2007, p. 8). Research does not address the 
issue of security involved with adopting COTS products (Grant, 2000). The new DFARS 
clause 252.204.7012 requiring the protection of defense information and cyber incident 
reporting applies to systems that integrate COTS, but not to purely purchased commercial 
items (Cassidy & Stanton, 2017). Included within the realm of security is counterfeiting. Very 
little research addresses counterfeiting though it clearly poses a risk to system performance 
and to security. Supply chain risks with respect to IT may include insertion of counterfeits, 
unauthorized production, tampering, theft, insertion of malicious software and hardware, and 
poor manufacturing and development practices (Gump et al., 2015); thus, grey market 
products—those distributed beyond the manufacturer’s intended channel—should be 
avoided. But gaining control of a free-market supply chain is daunting, as indicated by the 
Aerospace Industry Association’s concern over recent DFARS changes (AIA, 2014). The 
security of COTS-based systems is and will continue to be a serious issue (DoDIG, 2016a). 
And the DFARS requirements for counterfeit electronic part detection and avoidance 
(DFARS 252.246-7007) that flow down to suppliers might repel viable COTS product 
sources. 
Research hardly addressed the issue of intellectual property (IP) involved with 
adopting COTS products (Grant, 2000). However, the literature since 2000 suggests that 
intellectual property rights is a formidable barrier. This is logical particularly in systems that 
have to reconcile the IP rights of multiple pieces of hardware or multiple software 
components. One component repository, ComponentSource, currently makes available 
1,933 components, 705 applications, and 384 add-ins to systems integrators and 
developers available from 343 publishers (ComponentSource, 2017). Imagine keeping track 
of the use restrictions, access rights, royalties, warranties, and liabilities of only 10 
components. Then imagine that each of those sets of 10 terms and conditions is different.  
Commercial firms rapidly update their products to keep pace with technology and in 
the pursuit of new avenues of differentiation and, thereby, competitive advantage. Short 
product life cycles and short time-to-market make design and acquisition time critical. 
Experimentations of new ways to quickly access new commercial technology will be 
important. One example is the DoD’s pilot program called Commercial Solutions Opening 
(CSO) established by Section 879 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 
2017 (Public Law 114-328) and implemented by DFARS Case 2017-D029. A CSO is a 
merit-based source selection strategy that utilizes Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) 
rather than contracts pursuant to the FAR. Under the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 
(DIUx) program (https://diux.mil/), 25 OTAs have been awarded valued at $48.4 million 
(Defense Innovation Unit Experimental [DIUx], 2017). This program is drawing private 
investment from venture capitalists and participation from firms that normally do not transact 
with the DoD. Recent initiatives include autonomy, personal aerial vehicle, tactical 
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autonomous indoor drone expansion, human cooling, digitally aided close air support 
platform, hardened network defense, knowledge management, multifactor authentication for 
network access, and advanced analytics from synthetic aperture radar imagery. 
While COTS software has been researched extensively, COTS hardware receives 
very little scholarly attention. This could be attributed to the newness and magnitude of 
software issues. It could also be due to the expectation that the commercial sector will favor 
commercial hardware integration when it is cost effective.  
From the literature, user satisfaction is a key measure of information systems COTS 
success (Kakar, 2013); however, user satisfaction did not appear from the DoD case studies 
as a key to successful COTS implementation. This could be attributed to a top-down 
paradigm that the user gets what the program office delivers. Hence, while system 
performance defines success, the literature shows ambivalence toward the user’s 
perception. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989) shows 
that IT system adoption is driven by perceived ease of use and by perceived usefulness.  
The DoD struggles to use COTS products to create a military advantage (Erwin, 
2016). Clearly, some commercial products are not designed and built to meet the rugged 
needs of military applications. Nonetheless, the DoD’s struggle is perhaps most brightly 
illuminated by the Palantir case—a commercial analytics product which soldiers have lauded 
as life critical but which was refused by the Army somewhat arbitrarily (U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, 2016). Thus, antecedent factors for COTS product adoption beyond functional 
capability deserve special attention. 
The relevant literatures surrounding COTS implementations is severely lacking in 
theoretical grounding (Hall & Rapanotti, 2016). This void can stymie understanding and the 
pace of progress. Other business-oriented, applied disciplines have also struggled to find 
unique theoretical foundations explaining and predicting their phenomena, such as supply 
chain management (Defee et al., 2010) and information systems (Gregor, 2006). Few 
studies dig into causal relationships explaining or predicting phenomena. Yet, such studies 
yield the strongest evidence answering why things are the way they are and how things 
might be expected to be in the future. Hence, explaining and predicting is the essence of 
theory and discovery. Since knowledge is cumulative (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), more 
research attention should explore causal relationships.  
Few case studies of COTS product usage would qualify as scholarly contributions. 
Thus, it is difficult to discern between truth and conjecture, or more likely, to get beyond the 
visible symptoms and discover the underlying causes. Therefore, consumers of information 
in many of the existing case studies may be forming beliefs and making decisions based on 
anecdotal evidence and hasty conclusions. Most “case studies” lack methodological rigor 
and sufficient detail explaining how findings were determined, what type of data was 
collected, how data was collected, how data was analyzed, and how validity and reliability 
were assured. Very few case studies involving interviews mentioned the location of 
interviews or whether they were conducted face-to-face, over the phone, or online. Few 
cases mentioned recording the interviews, transcribing them, interview durations, transcript 
lengths, and sending transcripts to informants for validity. Few cases summarized the 
demographics of who was interviewed such as duty title, industry, organization, years of 
experience, nationality, location, etc. Likewise, few case studies mentioned triangulating 
data with other sources (e.g., archival records—how many and what type) to corroborate 
data and analyses. Few case studies mentioned the qualitative data analysis methodology 
such as coding qualitative text, seeking themes, the number of themes identified, identifying 
patterns, and unveiling associations among themes via constant comparison—a process of 
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continuously returning back to all text once a new theme or pattern emerged and via code 
matrices (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Few case studies offered any information about validity 
and reliability such as using multiple coders of themes and measuring inter-rater reliability 
and conducting member checking sessions (Yin, 2009) to validate findings and analyses. 
Few cases reconciled the findings with the relevant literature as evidence of further validity. 
Some have called for a new defense acquisition process tailored to COTS product 
usage. The literature reviewed herein, while offering a substantial number of considerations 
when adopting COTS products, does not compellingly suggest that the DoD’s 5000 series 
cannot effectively integrate COTS products. Perhaps some changes could be made to 
provide guidance and consistency to the field to account for some of the nuances and 
complications of COTS product adoption. Horowitz and Lambert (2006) offer some insight: 
An assembly sequence (components to be assembled, corresponding dates 
and costs) has several risks including: 1) technical risk: successful (or not) 
function of assembled components by planned schedule milestones; 2) 
operational risk: achieving (or not) the desired business value by using the 
new system of assembled components; and 3) programmatic (schedule and 
cost) risks: accomplishing the assembly within time and budget constraints. 
(p. 286)  
They thus presented a framework (called “learn as you go”) for planning and 
adjusting milestone sequences in assembling off-the-shelf software components. Principles 
from this framework could be borrowed to tweak, or allow for special cases within, the DoD 
5000 series of directives and instructions.  
RQ6: What is recommended for more timely and more effective COTS 
implementations? 
1. Apply the proposed COTS Product Appropriateness scale (see Technical 
Report) to prospective programs when contemplating integrating major COTS 
components. This scale captures the emerged antecedent factors (from 
barriers and enablers), and therefore, should serve as a helpful indicator of 
the prospect.  
2. To facilitate knowledge management, DoD activities should record COTS 
product implementations in contract action reports. This will enable future 
program managers, technical authorities, and contract managers a single, 
reliable source from which to search for prior COTS implementations by 
similarity of COTS technology type (e.g., software components, avionics, 
land-based robots, etc.). This knowledge can rapidly inform decision-makers 
of where to go to gather additional detailed information on lessons learned, 
market research, and suppliers to facilitate knowledge dissemination.  
3. Expounding on the previous recommendation, COTS product 
implementations should be catalogued in a central repository in order to 
make detailed lessons learned available to future acquisition teams. Since no 
single, optimal solution to knowledge management can be developed 
(Bjornson & Dingsoyr, 2008), this central repository could complement other 
knowledge management practices. For example, the deposited lessons 
learned could be pushed to educators and trainers at DAU, NPS, AFIT, ICAF, 
senior service shools, and interested university centers. 
4. Since tacit knowledge resides with people, organizations should set, via 
policy, maximum program employee turnover rates. Turnover has repeatedly 
been found a culprit in failed and low performing programs (Charette, 2013).  
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5. Over the years, several oversight authorities and researchers have made 
recommendations for practitioners in order to improve their management of 
COTS product implementations such that desired, and in some cases 
mandated, outcomes are achieved. However, the extent to which all of these 
recommendations have been implemented is unknown. Therefore, an audit of 
the recommendations would be useful to reconcile the deficiencies and 
weaknesses of current practice with required and helpful practices (i.e., the 
recommendations). The audit results would provide a gauge of the extent that 
current processes and policies are sufficient and that COTS product usage is 
sufficiently managed. 
6. It appears that, in the realm of software, the use of COTS products is such a 
pervasive commercial practice that products involving software nearly cannot 
be developed without at least some integration of COTS products. This is 
undoubtledly due to the significant savings in costs and time. Nevertheless, 
what is not as ubiquitous is the extent of reuse of physical COTS products 
(i.e., hardware). Thus, a study should be conducted to quantify the extent of 
COTS implementation, and quantitatively validate the positive and negative 
antecedents to COTS implementation performance.  
7. The DoD should not establish quotas for COTS implementations. Quotas 
have, in the past, manifested in percentage goals (i.e., COTS products have 
to constitute a certain percentage of a system). Extrinsic forcing mechanisms 
could result in gaming and unnecessary risk-taking. 
8. Set policy that requires a technical evaluation sub-factor in all source 
selections that: (1) requires offerors to submit their plan for making their 
deliverables (including components of them) open to competition during 
sustainment, and (2) allows for meaningful evaluation credit (i.e., ratings, 
strengths, and reduced risk ratings) for superior plans. These plans, in turn, 
should become part of the resultant contract. 
9. In contracts involving award fees, consider making the extent of COTS 
implementation one of the criterion for award fee determination.  
10. For all contracts requiring the use of COTS products, add an assessment of: 
(1) the extent of COTS product usage and (2) COTS product implementation 
effectiveness to the contractor performance assessment reporting (CPAR). 
This follows recommendations by Rendon (2007). It should motivate 
contractors to pursue the integration of COTS products since many suppliers 
place significant attention on achieving desired CPAR scores (Hawkins, 
2016). 
11. Expand the scope of the DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (CSO) organized 
as a Janus-facing orgnization around desired effects and simultaneously 
around commercial industries. Within the CSO, technology expert councils 
(i.e., industry-facing organization) would need to matrix to the revolutionary 
effects council (i.e., warfighter-facing organization). A sufficient number of 
standing councils would be needed to adequately cover the various high-
potential industries and the most-impactful effects.  
12. The DoD should build structure to facilitate knowledge management and 
absorptive capacity. This means that resources such as people, time, and 
technology should be allocated to monitoring the marketplace for commercial 
products and new technology capabilities. There are pockets of excellence 
such as the CSO and DIUx; however, their scope and capacity is likely too 
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small to assist all current and yet-to-be-discovered needs. Those monitoring 
the marketplace must be technically adept so that they will be able to 
recognize valuable information when they see it. Additionally, the curb on 
travel should be lifted for the defense acquisition workforce. If anything, these 
technical and business professionals need more exposure to commercial 
knowledge, not less. Conferences are efficient forums to interact with 
numerous experts in a short amount of time. Finally, discovered knowledge 
should be codified (i.e., made explicit) and be available to future market 
monitors since absorptive capacity depends on the amount of knowledge 
previously acquired. 
13. In developing the COTS implementation framework, a scale to measure the 
focal construct, COTS appropriateness, was developed. This scale, in its 
current form, should be considered exploratory. Hence, it should be 
empirically tested to ensure reliability and all types of validity (i.e., content, 
construct, discriminant, convergent, nomological, and external). Once 
validated, the scale should be used by practitioners to assist in their decisions 
whether to adopt COTS products. The scale can also be used by 
academicians to empricially study COTS implementations. 
14. Researchers pursuing COTS-based inquiry should ground their research in 
relevant theory. Journals and academic conferences publishing COTS-based 
works should add to their requirements a review of the relevant literature and 
an explicit positioning of the work into that body of knowledge.  
15. Case studies of COTS product usage should demonstrate greater 
methodological rigor and provide more detail explaining how findings were 
determined, how data was collected and analyzed, and how validity and 
reliability were assured. This will prevent the adoption of anecdotal evidence 
and hasty conclusions. A commonly-adopted method is provided in Case 
Study Research: Design and Methods by R. K. Yin (2009).  
16. The DoD should leverage its commercial business internships, such as the 
Air Force’s Education With Industry program and the Navy’s Supply Corps 
Training With Industry program, to glean commercial practices with respect to 
new product design, development, manufacturing, and sustainment. A 
specific focus could be placed on gaining knowledge of COTS product 
insertion and accompanying intellectual property rights. These uniformed 
officer interns can then return to the DoD to help implement the practices.  
Conclusion 
This literature review was commissioned with the objectives of better understanding 
COTS product implementation performance. It explored (1) the typical research types, 
contexts, research methods, target markets, and foundational theories utilized in COTS-
based research, (2) policies, laws, regulations, and directives that govern the use of COTS, 
(3) the known barriers to COTS implementations, (4) the known success factors to COTS 
implementations, (5) the recommendations have previously been made with respect to 
COTS implementations, and (6) recommendations for more timely and more effective COTS 
implementations. From the literature emerged a framework of COTS product usage that 
should help to guide COTS product adoption decisions and to help manage COTS product 
implementations ex post. 
These six aspects of COTS product implementations are crucial; they should help 
reduce program risks of poor performance, failure, cost growth, and schedule slippage. The 
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gained knowledge should also help the DoD acquisition community to more effectively and 
more efficiently leverage COTS products in order to meet its mission mandates and retain a 
competitive advantage against existing and potential foes. 
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Abstract 
Technology transition from research to “programs of record” (a.k.a. crossing the 
valley of death) has often been challenging, especially when new capabilities emerge that 
weren’t originally envisioned, such as next-generation aircraft, fighting vehicles, and so forth. 
The recent evolution of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is a good example of 
extemporaneous proliferation of new capabilities. These technology-driven advances may 
not fit into conventional paradigms of warfighting concepts and may have organizational and 
infrastructure impacts. The Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel 
(ACTUV) project by DARPA built a prototype surface ship, christened Sea Hunter, that was 
tested in San Diego and then transitioned to the Office of Naval Research (ONR) at the end 
of 2017. It endeavored 70-day missions of up to 7000nm without a manned crew aboard. To 
cross the valley of death and transition to a Program of Record, a validated requirement 
must exist, along with funding for development/procurement across the Future Years 
Defense Program. The current research proposes and applies a framework for planning 
successful crossing of the valley of death to the current version of the ACTUV program, 
Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel (MDUSV). Results include important 
specific challenges, behaviors, methods, recommendations, and impacts on practice and 
research. 
Context 
Innovation is required to remain competitive in many domains, including commercial 
enterprises and national defense. Innovations are often classified as either incremental 
(e.g., increasing computer speed or sonar offset distance) or disruptive (e.g., smartphones, 
aircraft carriers). Disruptive innovations are distinguished from incremental innovations by 
their causing changes in the fundamental behavior of communities. Innovation of 
technologies is a knowledge development and technology application process that typically 
moves from understanding concepts and causal relationships in basic research through a 
series of discovery and development phases to a useful application of the technology.  
Technology innovation is critical to the DoD fulfilling its mission “to provide the 
military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country” (DoD, n.d.) by 
keeping American warfighters armed with materiel solutions that maintain competitive 
advantage over adversaries. Maintaining a steady stream of innovative materiel solutions 
requires the effective and efficient design and management of the technology innovation 
process. The technology transition “valley of death” (a.k.a. herein as “the valley”) describes 
a particularly difficult part of the innovation process that lies near the middle of the journey 
from basic research to application.  
The innovation process can be pulled forward by unmet needs, pushed forward by 
new technologies and capabilities, or both. In their study of innovation failure in the 
acquisition of the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) 
system, Turner and Wickert (2016) describe the three DoD offset strategies based on their 
needs and development of technologies:  
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 The First Offset Strategy (Eisenhower’s New Look) was driven by 
technologies being pulled forward to meet nuclear deterrence needs. 
Requirements preceded and defined innovation.  
 The Second Offset Strategy (Cold War era) was driven by technology push 
as technologies, e.g., in stealth and precision strike, were developed 
independently and then integrated into a strategy. Innovation preceded 
requirements.  
 The current Third Offset Strategy (autonomy1 and artificial intelligence) 
reflects both the need to address current emerging threats from near-peer 
adversaries and also the fast evolution of new technologies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The valley of death is 
introduced, followed by a description of the challenges it creates and relevant extant 
theories and recommendations for crossing the valley successfully in the form of a 
framework that will be used to analyze the MDUSV program. The MDUSV program is then 
described as it relates to crossing the valley. The framework is applied to the program by 
specifying program challenges, behaviors, and methods. This leads to the recommendation 
of a new and unique organization which can address the MDUSV needs for crossing the 
valley. Finally, implications of the formation and use of the recommended organization are 
discussed.  
Background 
The Valley of Death 
The valley of death is a metaphor for the difficulty experienced by innovators in 
transitioning technologies that have been successfully researched and initially developed 
into successful applications. The valley most often includes a lack of funding and other 
forms of development support to progress from late research and pre-materiel decision-
making, through technology development, to application (Pusateri et al., 2015). The 
metaphor is applied to the experiences of a wide range of products, including both 
incremental improvements and disruptive innovations, in many industrial and public settings. 
As a major developer and user of new technologies, the DoD suffers greatly from the valley 
of death (National Research Council, 2004).  
Graphical descriptions of the valley of death abound. One example of a simple 
depiction is from a Canadian natural resources agency (Figure 1). 




 As defined by the DoD (2017, p. 15), autonomous vehicles and remotely controlled vehicles are 
mutually exclusive categories. 
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Figure 1. The Valley of Death in Technology Development 
(Natural Resources Canada, n.d.) 
Gunderson (2014) suggests that the “Hype Curves” developed by Gartner, Inc. also 
depict the valley. Generically, hype curves describe innovation life cycles with five phases: 
Innovation Trigger, Peak of Inflated Expectations, the Trough of Disillusionment (the valley 
of death), Slope of Enlightenment, and Plateau of Productivity. Figure 2 illustrates Gartner, 
Inc.’s hype cycle for emerging technologies. 
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Figure 2. The Gartner Hype Curve for Emerging Technologies 
(Panetta, 2017) 
Much has also been written about the difficulties of technology transition in public 
(DoD) sectors, where successful transition is often elusive. The concept of a valley of death 
applies commercially as well, wherein products fail to be fully commercialized or adopted 
sufficiently by the market place. Products sometimes fail to successfully cross the valley of 
death to meet user needs. Newman (2018) notes that the iPad succeeded in 2010 only after 
the failure or much more limited success of the Microsoft Tablet PC in 2002, Microsoft 
Pocket PC 2000 in 2000, Intel Web Tablet in 1999, NewsPad in 1997, Palmpilot in 1996, 
Fujitsu Stylistic 1000 tablet in 1996, Apple Newton MessagePad in 1993, Compaq Concerto 
in 1993, EO Personal Communicator in 1991, GRIDPad tablet in 1989, Letterbug in1986, 
and others. Being able to describe the valley of death and efforts to facilitate crossing it is 
critical for Navy and DoD materiel acquisition. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have brought many capabilities to U.S. forces without going through the slow, disciplined, 
and burdened processes necessitated in peacetime. Developed and purchased with 
Overseas Contingency Operations funding, some of these discrete line items that are 
already distributed in the force are now having challenges getting fully authorized and 
resourced for sustainment as the DoD returns to normal peacetime operations. Similar 
challenges can face the development of new technologies and reuse of existing 
technologies in projects such as ACTUV/MDSUV. 
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The Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) Program  
Program History 
Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel (MDUSV) is the current moniker 
for the U.S. Navy’s effort in autonomous technology demonstration, as it evolves toward a 
more fully defined set of capabilities. Formerly called the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), implying early recognition for potential 
primary missions, it has completed its first phase of prototyping and experimentation, as an 
outgrowth of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project.  
In 2016–2017, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
demonstrated autonomous operation of a naval surface vessel in the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) project. This project had three 
primary goals (Littlefield, 2017):  
 Explore the performance potential of a surface platform conceived from 
concept to field demonstration under the premise that a human is never 
intended to step aboard at any point in its operating mission cycle.  
 Advance unmanned maritime system autonomy to enable independently 
deploying systems capable of missions spanning thousands of kilometers of 
range and months of endurance under a sparse remote supervisory control 
model. 
 Demonstrate the capability of the ACTUV system to use its unique 
characteristics to employ nonconventional sensor technologies that achieve 
robust continuous track of the quietest submarine targets over their entire 
operating envelope. 
The project was also structured to explore and advance the potential of autonomous 
vessel performance, to include independent multi-mission operations over time and 
distance, with varying payloads. The prototype vessel DARPA produced, named Sea 
Hunter, was focused initially upon the anti-submarine (ASW) mission (thus its name). 
However, a wider range of missions and configurations came into view and are already 
envisioned for future experimentation and exploitation. Key questions to be answered going 
forward are not only within the business and technical realm of acquisition, but also the 
operational framework of future surface combatant operations covering a myriad of missions 
and concepts of operations (CONOPS). Not at all (to date) deemed an “orphan technology” 
in search of utility, the capability and cost savings perceived as apparent from autonomy, 
both in the near and far term, have already given rise to strong OPNAV advocacy and 
resource sponsorship, suggesting that MDUSV’s successful crossing of the valley of death 
can make a significant contribution to naval surface warfare capabilities. In addition to the 
benefits of human life risk reduction and obvious life-cycle cost savings, perhaps the most 
compelling aspects of the autonomy concepts that are at the heart of the MDUSV are the 
opportunities to contribute to the yet-to-be-fully-defined Third Offset Strategy. A shrinking 
U.S. military force structure with declining technological superiority faces a current era of 
near-peer threats and military power competition. How can autonomy, and the MDUSV 
specifically, help to deliver a large quantity of relatively inexpensive, though technologically 
advanced, surface vessels to better augment and distribute U.S. forces and maximize 
survivability?  
The first vessel to emerge from the MDUSV program was designated as the Sea 
Hunter, a Class III vessel (displacement of approximately 145 tons), of several displacement 
size classes, launched in 2016. Sea Hunter has since been undergoing sea trials and 
experiments along the western U.S. coast and throughout areas of the Pacific Ocean. 
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Transitioning this year to the Office of Naval Research for two years of further tests, Sea 
Hunter had completed its demonstration of over-water speed and stability, with system 
reliability during extended operations throughout 2017. Perhaps chief among these was 
compliance with maritime collision regulations (COLREGS). Prior to and during this period, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff began their analysis of required 
capabilities that might be performed by multiple classes of autonomous surface vessels. 
MDUSV Approaches the Valley of Death 
Like the recent history of unmanned aerial vehicles, there are organizational, cultural, 
and doctrinal, as well as business and technological barriers to the acceptance and 
employment of new technologies like autonomy. Autonomy actually represents a spectrum 
of unmanned systems spanning those under human remote control to systems with sparse 
or no human supervision. Having one prototype built for testing and experimentation, the 
ACTUV working group has successfully brought together the appropriate stakeholders to 
ensure a successful crossing of the technology transition “chasm,” or valley of death. 
However, substantial uncertainty lies ahead for them and the larger naval force it seeks to 
serve. 
In response to this need, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) hosted an ACTUV 
Workshop on February 14–15, 2017, to host representatives from practically every 
community that might constitute stakeholders. Organizations represented were the Office of 
Naval Research, DARPA, Leidos Corporation (DARPA’s ACTUV prime contractor), PEO 
Littoral Combat Ships, OPNAV N96, N9I, SPAWAR, and multiple departments of NPS. The 
workgroup was fortunate to have actual “owners” participate, as is necessary for successful 
technology transition. The resource sponsor, N96, is perhaps the most important of these. 
But also important are members of the Science and Technology (S&T) community, who 
must transition the outputs of the DARPA project seamlessly into an extended phase of 
testing, and then their eventual transfer to an existing program office structure such as PMS 
406, Unmanned Maritime Systems. An author of this research served, along with N96, as 
co-leads of the Acquisition Breakout Session, whose task it was to brief the 2017 workshop 
on progress made with identification of challenges for technology transition (i.e., in crossing 
the valley of death). The acquisition strategy breakout session of the two-day work group 
sought to identify technical and business challenges associated with the technology 
transition of ACTUV from its current status as a DARPA project to become an official 
“Program of Record.” (This term refers to a program with its own line of funding in the Future 
Years Defense Plan, a database of programmed funds, and denotes also that it has been 
formally initiated with a Milestone B decision (thus necessarily having a validated 
requirement in the form of a Capability Development Document).) History is replete with 
examples of promising technologies not being able to cross a mythical valley of death or 
technology transition or commercial marketing “chasm.” Over a dozen of these typical 
challenges were pulled from existing literature about DoD tech transfer and used for a group 
discussion on a later breakout session.  
The first output of this breakout session’s work was recognition that a substantial 
number of accomplishments had occurred to date. Not only has technology been 
demonstrated with obvious revolutionary capabilities, but opportunities are easily envisioned 
for cost savings as well within a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned naval service 
vessels. Significant is the amount of user interest and support already evident, extending to 
the highest levels of the Navy. Depending upon outputs from other working groups to further 
develop operational concepts, roles, and missions, it is already apparent that autonomous 
vessels such as ACTUV, now MDSUV, can become a force multiplier. 
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Developing capabilities is a critical part of crossing the valley of death. The initial 
configuration of ACTUV already allowed for multi-mission payloads. Besides anti-submarine 
warfare, other “dull and dirty” missions are emerging, such as mine/countermine operations, 
long-haul resupply, etc. During the 2017 workshop, an N96 representative revealed that the 
Navy staff had conducted Capabilities Based Analyses (CBA) to verify the need for 
unmanned and autonomous vessels, with follow-on analyses of alternatives (AoA) 
proceeding through FY19, and then development of an overarching Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD) to follow. This formalization of a validated requirement document is key in 
establishing service needs, which drive the acquisition process, and help establish programs 
of record. He also described plans for a “development squadron” (DEVRON) to be in place 
by FY20 to further demonstrate technologies for basic missions to at least levels of 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 4–5.  
Lastly, the resource sponsor assured that continued funding will be reflected in the 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), Future Service Combatant (FSC) line. From an 
acquisition process point of view, intellectual property should not be a substantial issue 
when later development efforts are ready for competitive procurement, as the ACTUV 
source code and other technical data are believed to be either nonproprietary or otherwise 
in-house within the government.  
Important results from this 2017 workshop were the introduction of key players and 
cementing of their partnerships and respective responsibilities for the near future. However, 
while technology transition was discussed, much remained, and still remains, to fully 
develop a technology transition plan. Challenges include the need for a validated Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirement and full funding for 
development and procurement across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Entering 
advanced development and low/full rate production will necessarily include potential 
paradigm shifts regarding system autonomy in the Navy as it ascertains missions and 
operational concepts for integration into a mixed fleet of future surface combatant vessels.  
A Framework for Crossing the Valley of Death 
The proposed framework herein structures the relevant literature on the crossing of 
the valley of death into three perspectives: (1) challenges faced in crossing the valley, (2) 
behavior modes in crossing the valley, and (3) methods for crossing the valley. Specifying 
the components of the framework for individual technology transition programs can facilitate 
crossing the valley.  
Challenges in Crossing the Valley of Death 
Many challenges make crossing the valley of death difficult. In addition to the 
development of the underlying technologies, Newman (2018) identifies the development of 
the technologies, manufacturing readiness, which addresses the feasibility and affordability 
of producing the technology at the required scale and rate, and the integration of the 
technology into other, larger systems. Within the DoD, the Manager’s Guide to Technology 
Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment (DoD, 2005) describes technology 
transition challenges, many that apply to crossing the valley of death. These challenges are 
organized around the three types of problems: (1) technology transition, (2) cultural barriers, 
and (3) knowledge management. More specific challenges identified in the Manager’s Guide 
include the following:  
 The technology may not develop rapidly enough to be ready when it is 
needed (p. 4-23) 
 A focus on a preferred solution may prevent the adoption of better solutions 
- 43 - 
 Designs may not adequately incorporate needed future upgrades (p. 4-6)  
 A suboptimal technology may be chosen (pp. 4-11–4-12) 
 Teaming is critical (p. 4-22) 
Resistance from within innovating organizations can make also crossing the valley 
difficult. Established organizations and systems often tend to support retaining the status 
quo by opposing the development and adoption of disruptive technologies. For example, 
Turner and Wickert (2016) describe the erosion of requirements of the Navy’s Unmanned 
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system, a potentially-
disruptive next-generation unmanned combat system, until the system was diluted into a 
tanker for traditional manned missions. Other challenges can include users not being ready 
for a mature-enough technology (e.g., inline skates were available in 1972, but Rollerblades 
did not become popular until 15 years later; Newman, 2018) or regulatory approvals lagging 
technology and demand (e.g., UAV pizza delivery).  
The proposed framework structures these challenges of crossing the valley of death 
into three potential bottlenecks:  
 Technology development, including performance, speed of development 
and phasing of development, and costs. 
 Application development, including identifying and developing needs and 
uses and capabilities, individually and with other systems, and matching 
technologies to uses.  
 Overcoming social resistance, including addressing inertia and support of 
the status quo in users, sponsors, and regulators, providing adequate 
knowledge transfer communication and partnering to no constrain progress, 
and maintaining forward momentum. 
Identifying which of three types of challenges best describes a specific issue or need 
can assist in identifying what organization or persons has the knowledge, skills, capabilities, 
and capacity to best address the issue or need.  
Behavior Modes of Crossing the Valley of Death 
Gulbrandsen (2009) described two behavior modes of crossing the valley, a linear 
process and a social process. They refer to the linear approach as “Mode 1” and the social 
approach as “Mode 2.” 
Crossing the Valley as a Linear Process 
The linear behavior model of crossing the valley of death (Mode 1) is process-based 
and objective. In this behavior mode, the transition from research to application moves 
through a sequence of phases, evolving from basic science to applied science to 
“development” to production (Mirowski and Sent, as cited in Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 20). 
Gulbrandsen quotes Gibbons et al.’s (1994) description of this behavior mode:  
Mode 1 is discipline-based and carries a distinction between what is 
fundamental and what is applied; this implies an operational distinction 
between a theoretical core and other areas of knowledge such as the 
engineering sciences, where the theoretical insights are translated into 
applications. (as cited in Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 4) 
Although the linear behavior mode includes negotiations about the evolution of 
solutions, participants are (in theory) objective, and all participants are guided by meeting 
the goals of the project. 
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The successful use of the linear process for crossing the valley of death requires 
clear, specific, shared, and enforced methods and measures of how technologies will be 
developed and how other aspects of innovation will be managed.  
Crossing the Valley as a Social Process 
In contrast to the linear behavior mode, the social behavior mode (Mode 2) is a 
highly interactive process in which a trans-disciplinary team negotiates and renegotiates the 
technology. For example, an inter-disciplinary project team (IPT) may re-conceptualize a 
solution, move to a different technology if progress on the first technology chosen stalls, or 
change how the technology will be used, thereby redefining the nature of the materiel 
solution. In the social process, knowledge production is characterized by a diffuse trans-
disciplinarity that can blur the lines between disciplines and the traditional stages of 
acquisition. Progress within the social process can interrupt progress within the linear 
process. An example is if discussions with users were to identify a previously unidentified 
but very valuable potential use (the social process) that requires changes in the 
performance targets for technology development (the linear process).  
Successful use of the social process for crossing the valley of death requires the 
socializing of ideas across the various and diverse organizational participants in the 
innovation effort. This requires the establishment and maintenance of linkages and 
relationships across organizational boundaries and between participants with differing local 
objectives (e.g., cost control vs. speed of innovation vs. risk reduction), and methods. Social 
processes are notoriously challenging and the failure to manage them can slow and stop 
momentum in innovation. Therefore, crossing the valley successfully using a social process 
is based on relationships within an IPT and others (e.g., contractors, research organizations) 
and collaboration among stakeholders who hold varied interests. According to Doheny-
Farina (1992), 
At their core these processes involve individuals and groups negotiating their 
visions of technologies and applications, markets and users in what they all 
hope is a common enterprise. This means that the reality of a transfer does 
not exist apart from the perceptions of the participants. Instead, the reality—
what the transfer means to the participants—is the result of continual 
conceptualizing, negotiating, and reconceptualizing. (as cited in Gulbrandsen, 
2009) 
Posen (1984) supports the need for a social process in military innovation by 
suggesting that it requires internal champions and pressure from commercial stakeholders. 
The Manager’s Guide (p. 4-5) says that crossing the valley requires a partnership among 
communities such as S&T, R&D, PM, capability needs, T&E, sustainment, and financial.  
A superficial understanding of innovation reveals the need for a combination of linear 
and social processes to successfully cross the valley of death. The proposed framework 
describes the following aspects of behavior modes for crossing the valley of death: 
 The linear processes used for crossing the valley, including identifying 
and describing actual practice vs. espoused processes and gaps between 
(resource constrained) practice and needed practices.  
 The social processes used for crossing the valley, including identifying 
and describing practice vs. espoused processes and gaps between social 
practices within the IPT and practices needed, and places where the social 
process is likely to interfere with linear process. 
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 Interactions of the linear and social processes in crossing the valley, 
including identifying and describing places where the linear process is likely 
to interfere with social processes, identifying and describing places where the 
social process is likely to interfere with linear process, and means of 
managing those interfaces. 
Identifying which of three types of behavior modes best describes the actual or 
desired process for addressing a specific issue or need can assist in identifying what 
organization or persons has the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and capacity to best address 
the issue or need.  
Methods for Crossing the Valley of Death 
Many commercial and military innovation accomplishments demonstrate that 
innovative organizations can successfully cross the valley of death. See the DoD’s 
Manager’s Guide (DoD, 2005), Pusateri et al. (2015), and “The latest unmanned drone” 
(2017) for military examples. The literature also recommends how to do so.  
Christensen (2003) recommends three strategies for crossing the valley in the case 
of disruptive technologies:  
 Targeting underserved early adopters who are less committed to legacy 
systems, thereby gaining adoption without threatening the status quo. 
Williams and Gibson (1990) refer to this approach as “dissemination.” 
 Provide solutions that are superior to the status quo (the “better mousetrap” 
approach). Williams and Gibson (1990) refer to this approach as 
“appropriability.”  
 Introduce the innovation gradually, first through familiar methods and settings 
to accelerate adoption and reduce resistance from those defending the status 
quo. In addition, Williams and Gibson (1990) observed facilitation of the 
interfaces among stakeholders through communication as a means of 
crossing the valley.  
Tippens (2004) contrasted “high-velocity” technology firms that successfully cross 
the valley of death with those that hold onto technologies into obsolescence. The former had 
the following:  
 Short, iterative processes 
 Collaborative concurrent development 
 A passionate focus on user needs 
 A willingness to take risks 
 Early and rapid prototyping 
Within the DoD, Pusateri et al. (2015) developed a Joint Transition Planning Process 
with supporting meetings and a working group for crossing the valley in DoD medical 
development. Their process positions products in late-stage S&T for successful transition to 
AD, thereby facilitating, without replacing, current processes. Meetings structure and 
improve IPT communication, particularly awareness of progress and technology transition 
issues. The working group is like a temporary IPT that focuses on technology transition. Its 
activities can include assessments of status, analysis of alternatives, and program 
management. They emphasize communication across parts of the IPT and processes and 
document multiple successes using this Joint Transition Planning. 
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Lewis, in his analysis of the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy (Lewis, 2017) recommends 
that DoD be a “fast follower” (of commercial efforts) instead of a first mover in acquiring 
autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. First movers are organizations that 
initially invest in and develop a new technology. History has shown that first movers are 
often overtaken by fast-followers, organizations that refine a technology based on the work 
of the first mover and quickly adapts them for application. Lewis provides examples of 
information technology (IT) products that became dominated by fast followers, including 
Google (fast follower) superseding AltaVista in search engines and Excel superseding Lotus 
123 in spreadsheets. Fast followers are particularly likely to move past first movers in 
environments characterized by rapid innovation, such as autonomy and AI. Lewis suggests 
how the DoD can be an effective fast follower of autonomy and AI technology to accelerate 
acquisition, including crossing the valley of death. Critical acquisition capabilities for doing 
this include deep learning about specific technologies (effective following) and judiciously 
increasing government risk-taking to accelerate acquisition processes (move faster). Lewis’s 
specific recommendations that can help in crossing the valley include the following:  
 Develop internal autonomy and AI expertise 
 Track and use specific commercial technologies 
 Track technology develop by others 
 Learn from other related DoD efforts  
 Build interoperability into autonomous and AI systems 
Although the need to be a leader in the application of autonomy and AI in the 
MDUSV program may preclude the adoption of a fast follower strategy, some of Lewis’s 
recommendations may be effectively applied to MDUSV crossing the valley of death.  
The proposed framework structures the recommended methods for successfully 
crossing the valley of death described above according to how they address the three types 
of challenges described above:  
Technology Development 
 Provide better solutions 
 Collaborate and facilitate stakeholder interfaces  
 Iterate early and fast  
 Be willing to take risks 
 Hold and keep deep knowledge of technologies  
Application Development 
 Target underserved users and needs 
 Collaborate and facilitate stakeholder interfaces  
 Iterate early and fast 
 Focus on user needs 
 Be willing to take risks 
Overcoming social resistance 
 Introduce innovations gradually  
 Focus on user needs 
Identifying which type of method can best address a specific issue or need can assist 
in identifying what organization or person has the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and 
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capacity to best address the issue or need. In addition, recommendations can be further 
disaggregated for analysis into those that apply the linear behavior mode, the social 
behavior mode, or are at an interface between the linear and social behavior modes, 
thereby integrating the first and second part of the framework.  
Summary of Proposed Framework for Crossing the Valley of Death 
Challenges of crossing the valley of death 
 Technology development 
 Application development  
 Overcoming social resistance  
Behavior modes for crossing the valley of death 
 The linear processes used 
 The social processes used 
 Interactions of the linear and social processes in crossing the valley 
Methods for crossing the valley of death 
Technology Development 
 Provide better solutions 
 Collaborate and facilitate stakeholder interfaces  
 Iterate early and fast  
 Be willing to take risks 
 Hold and keep deep knowledge of technologies  
Application Development 
 Target underserved users and needs 
 Collaborate and facilitate stakeholder interfaces  
 Iterate early and fast 
 Focus on user needs 
 Be willing to take risks 
Overcoming Social Resistance 
 Introduce innovations gradually  
 Focus on user needs 
Disaggregate recommended actions into those aspects that apply the linear behavior 
mode, social behavior mode, or interface between those modes.  
Application of the Framework to the MDUSV Program 
MDUSV Challenges in Crossing the Valley of Death 
The previously described 2017 ACTUV workshop and the successive 
interdisciplinary MDSUV working group series of sessions at NPS in 2018 continues to 
identify what these authors see as eight primary groups of challenges, incomplete work, or 
simply important things that needed to be accomplished. They are summarized and further 
disaggregated into 14 more challenges in our framework of categorization.  
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Technology Development 
Processes 
 Four different milestone decision documents need to be produced along with 
a Navy roadmap for future service combatants.  
 Upon completion of S&T activities, the PMO will construct a full acquisition 
strategy for what will probably be a traditional acquisition approach to 
development. If technology enablers have not at that point been 
demonstrated to TRL 6-7, a Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction 
phase may be needed before Engineering and Manufacturing Development.  
 Moving to a common test and evaluation “scorecard” is a challenge with 
regards to safety etc.  
 Traditional acquisition strategies contain a myriad of elements including life-
cycle cost estimate, contractual competition, cyber security, etc. This all feeds 
into the contractual scope and type of transaction vehicle for continued 
industry efforts.  
 Quantities of initial and final on buys for full operational capability must be 
planned and programmed.  
 Specific feature sets for a completely configured system are needed to drive 
technical specifications and requirements. 
 There was no way to ascertain even a rough order of magnitude for the cost 
of a follow-on prototypes. But it could be presumed that at least initial buys 
would be analogous to the first vessel of $20 million, with an added payload 
of $3 million, spanning 24 months of time to produce.  
 Future costs will rise with complexity, but production quantities and 
production schedules should certainly achieve some economies of scale 
commensurate with what we see across other systems/platforms. 
Products 
 Autonomous tactics and behaviors are still conceptual and not fully mature.  
 Endurance and reliability of autonomous vessels, amounts of corrective 
maintenance actions, etc. are yet to be proven 
 Several more years of development are needed for the maturation of 
autonomous technologies, especially for more complex missions.  
 The resource sponsor should avoid a hiatus or loss of momentum by 
providing continuous funding for FY 18 and beyond. 
Application Development  
 Four different milestone decision documents need to be produced along with 
a Navy roadmap for future service combatants.  
 A documented and validated requirement must be developed with missions 
and operational concepts fully identified.  
 The need for interoperability with other systems and platforms demand that 
some top level requirements emerge for common command and control. 
 The resource sponsor should avoid a hiatus or loss of momentum by 
providing continuous funding for FY 18 and beyond. 
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 Moving to a common test and evaluation “scorecard” is a challenge with 
regards to safety etc.  
Overcoming Social Resistance  
 Key to the development of the four different milestone decision documents is 
the maintenance of dialogue amongst key players previously mentioned. The 
idea of a Tech Transfer Agreement (TTA) might facilitate this as a formal 
memorandum of sorts. 
 The need for interoperability with other systems and platforms demand that 
some top level requirements emerge for common command and control. 
MDUSV Innovation Behavior Modes 
The MDUSV program is next described based the three portions of the “behavior 
modes for crossing the valley of death” portion of the framework: (1) a linear innovation 
process, (2) a social innovation process, and (3) interactions between linear and social 
innovation processes. 
The Linear Innovation Behavior Mode Used in the MDUSV Program 
The DoD acquisition process (Figure 3) is an example of a linear behavior mode of 
innovation. In this process work is done to add knowledge about materiel solutions to move 
those solutions from S&T and Major Decision A, through Technology Maturation & Risk 
Reduction, Major Decision B, Engineering & Manufacturing Development, and into 
Production. 
 
Figure 3. The DoD Acquisition Process 
The MDUSV program will implement the DoD acquisition process and thereby be 
deeply embedded in a linear behavior mode. Comments at the 2017 workshop and the 2018 
series of working group sessions that have continued at NPS also strongly support the use 
of a linear process in MDUSV innovation, primarily in discussions of the design and 
management of the DoD acquisition process for the MDUSV program. These addressed 
milestone decision-making, the development of an acquisition strategy and requirements, 
metrics (the “scorecard”), and purchase quantities.  
- 50 - 
The Social Innovation Behavior Mode Used in MDUSV Program 
The NPS working group sessions have provided an important means of exploiting 
social innovation in the MDUSV by introducing the key players to each other and providing a 
setting within which they could openly discuss program issues, including crossing the valley 
of death. 2017 Workshop products described the need for and role of a social innovation 
process in the MDUSV program. For example, the considerations included the following 
questions:  
 Any joint or Interoperability/interdependency aspects of the system? 
 Who is the likely Navy sponsor of ACTUV?  
 Where should the JCIDS CDD/CPD be initiated? 
 Risk Areas (Programmatic/Technical, Need, Funding)? 
These are areas where decisions will be based largely on discussions among 
program stakeholders, making the social processes critical to program success. Some of 
these have emergent resolutions underway already. 
Interactions of the Linear and Social Innovation Behavior Modes in the MDUSV 
Program 
Interactions between the linear and social innovation processes will likely be one of 
the most critical requirements for MDUSV successfully crossing the valley of death. 
Participants have noted that “Key to the development of the four different milestone decision 
documents is the maintenance of dialogue amongst key players previously mentioned,” and 
suggested a solution in “the idea of a Tech Transfer Agreement (TTA) might facilitate this as 
a formal memorandum of sorts.” This illustrates that participating stakeholders understand 
and appreciate the importance and challenges of designing and managing the interfaces 
between linear and social innovation in MDUSV. Notwithstanding the necessary adherence 
to linear processes inherent in the DoD acquisition management structure, it will be the 
social communication and coordination among stakeholders that, if maintained, will ensure 
safe passage across the valley of death.” 
MDUSV Methods for Crossing the Valley of Death 
The 2017 workshop and follow-on sessions have also generated recommendations, 
including the following:  
 Leverage the S&T community’s time and efforts as much as possible to flesh 
out requirements, doctrinal concepts and to perhaps resolve other legal and 
ethical concerns.  
 Use this time to explore innovative contracting methods (such as the use of 
development/production options) and anything else that will alleviate 
bureaucracy and allow development to continue.  
 Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRL) are also an aspect to be considered, 
given the relative certainty about the type of vessel this will be.  
 Prepare for the use of prudent business practices, commensurate with an 
investment of this size, will be required under the DoD 5000 series 
instructions and Federal Acquisition Regulation, etc. due to the program 
becoming a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP).  
 Address where such vessels will fit within the operational architecture of 
doctrinal war fighting. These vessels have great potential for lower unit cost, 
huge savings during their operation and support phase, and the saving of 
lives that aren’t placed into harm’s way for missions performed by them.  
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 Legislative changes in acquisition reform over the past year afford several 
new areas of relief to challenges identified. 
o Investment Decision Authority—Lowest level Milestone Decision 
Authority is another recent legislative change that can speed the 
attainment of autonomous surface vessel capability. Service-level 
Decision Reviews can be minimized, along with the costly multi-level 
and adjacent agency preparatory briefings that have added off-core 
scope activities to program managers and hindered timely progress in 
the past. 
o Abbreviated Documentation—Along with a lowered threshold for 
decision-making, the dozens of bureaucratic documents traditionally 
required for milestone review should be consolidated and abbreviated 
where possible to fulfill the steps necessary for sensible but pragmatic 
satisfaction of information needs for decision-making. 
o Simplified Contracting—Recent legislation now allows Other 
Transaction Authority (OTA) in lieu of Federal Acquisition Regulation 
contracting instruments from prototyping through production phases of 
acquisition. However, care must be taken in the exercise of prudence 
for legal compliance regarding competition, rewards and incentives 
structuring, scope of work specification, performance measurement, 
etc. to avoid pitfalls already being seen in acquisitions attempting to 
exploit this method of shortening transaction timelines. Cautions are in 
the areas of proprietary hardware and software from the selected 
industry partner. Modular Open Systems Architecture should be 
emphasized in both business as well as technological functions. 
o Tailored Acquisition Strategy—Leveraging of the DARPA project 
results, along with ONR’s experimentation and sea trials should 
alleviate the necessity for a Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction Phase in the traditional model of acquisition. With validated 
need statement (CDD) and FYDP funding programmed, transition 
directly into Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase, with 
concurrent Low Rate Initial Production should be approved by 
Milestone Decision Authority, given match exists between 
requirements and resources, and finalized designs giving assurance 
of capability attainment. 
o Streamlined Test and Evaluation—As with contracting instruments, 
a balance must be struck among elements of good prudence and due 
diligence versus testing to the point of unnecessary extremes. That 
MDUSV is unmanned, except for occasional maintenance and back-
up functions that may become necessary, justifies a lesser 
expenditure of resources for suitability factors such as safety and 
survivability, while nonetheless stressing system performance and 
reliability. 
Notwithstanding these changes that could facilitate crossing the valley, a few 
acquisition imperatives remain. The recommendations for activities to be conducted in 
parallel, as the remaining months of sea trials and experimentation continue, under the 
auspices of ONR, before the hand-off to PMS 406 are as follows: 
o Requirements Capture and Refinement—Requirements definition 
should be better informed from experimentation efforts, with 
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evolutionary growth of capabilities planned for the technology 
enablers that are identified as not yet fully mature, especially when 
such are defined along a range or spectrum (versus binary 
attainment) of performance. The Sea Hunter now afloat will give 
insights into multiple capability payload packages for various missions 
and concepts of operations (CONOPS). Prototyping and sea trials that 
are now moving along in parallel with JCIDS efforts for Initial 
Capability Development documentation and formal validation already 
constitute a large advantage in the transitioning of technology across 
the valley of death.  
o Maximize Modeling and Simulation—For early requirements and 
product realization ranging from Force-on-Force simulations to 
computerized design and platform integration, M&S efforts will pay 
dividends along the entire path of MDUSV development for 
operational employment utility, anomaly discovery and test scope or 
sample size reduction. 
o Disciplined Systems Engineering—There are seldom shortcuts with 
regard to the necessarily disciplined engineering efforts at system and 
sub-system level. And systems engineering processes have proven 
their value for issue discovery venues, risk management, 
configuration control and technical performance measurement along 
the iterative development path that attacks complexity and resolves 
uncertainty. However, such need not impede progress in technology 
transition. 
To apply the framework, these recommendations and other characteristics of the 
program and acquisition process were organized into a two dimensional matrix that 
aggregates recommendations from the literature according to the type of challenge 
addressed and identifies which behavior mode is used to apply specific recommendations 
for MDUSV (Table 1). The result facilitates analysis of the program plan for crossing the 
valley and the identification of methods and behavior modes that may not be being applied 
but could facilitate crossing the valley.  
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Table 1. Application of Crossing the Valley Framework to MDUSV 
Recommendations 
 
The matrix provides a starting point for the analysis and design of the MDUSV 
program’s preparation for crossing the valley of death. Through review and revision, key 
players can improve the description by adding information. Blank cells can be used to 
identify methods (rows) and means (columns) that are not currently being used to consider 
additional efforts to accelerate innovation. Descriptions within specific cells can be the basis 
of discussions among relevant program participants about challenges, behavior modes, and 
methods of crossing the valley of death.  
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Recommendations for MDUSV Crossing the Valley of Death 
The application of the framework to the MDUSV program suggests several aspects 
of the program’s crossing of the valley of death that may be improved.  
These improvements could take many forms. Typically they will cross the process 
categories of linear, social, and interfaces between linear and social innovation processes. 
As an example, Gallup, Trask, MacKinnon, Wood, and Dillard (2018) proposed a specific 
method for managing the critical interfaces during innovation of MDUSV under the title 
“Coordinating a Multi-Organization Research and Development Program to Enable MDUSV 
Acquisition.” After describing the program and the roles of its primary organizations in 
general, they describe a coordination challenge that threatens to prevent the program from 
crossing the valley of death and provide an illustration: 
All {primary organizations} agree with the need to incorporate unmanned 
systems in the future naval force but no one office is in charge of putting all 
the pieces together to provide a solution at a known point in time. Because 
the operational community has not documented and validated specific 
mission requirements for the design parameters of MDUSV, the acquisition 
community is not yet able to initiate a program to acquire MDUSV. The 
overall effort lacks organization, strategic alignment and an understanding of 
the inherent roles each organization must play to bring the MDUSV concept 
to fruition. 
These complexities are illustrated by the recent investment of $120M 
by the Special Capabilities Office (SCO) in Project Overlord, with the intention 
of creating one ship that will demonstrate some autonomy. This objective has 
already been proven and is being tested through the DARPA ACTUV/ONR 
MDUSV program which is being further enhanced by the commitment to build 
a second hull for testing and development. Expending resources on Project 
Overlord provides the illusion of progress while treading ground already 
covered. More could have been accomplished if SCO had invested these 
funds in the MDUSV program. 
Gallup et al. (2018) then propose a realistic means of overcoming this challenge: 
The solution proposed is to create a SECNAV-approved consortium of 
organizations, cross-functionally responsible for conducting research and 
development activities so that each is solving an essential element necessary 
to make MDUSV operational at the earliest possible date. The organizational 
structure should be headed by a SECNAV-level office with the following 
organizations participating: 
 N96, N2/N6, ONR, SPAWAR, NPS, Naval War College, NRL, SCO, 
and universities funded to pursue technical, operational, and 
acquisition research as directed. 
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 The coordinating office at SECNAV would grant authority to member 
organizations to use “other transaction authority” to secure contracts 
with commercial vendors such as Boeing, Leidos, IBM, and others.2  
 SECNAV office would take responsibility for coordinating the effort 
and protecting/adding funds as necessary to achieve goals and stay 
on schedule. 
Tool and methods such as the one proposed by Gallup et al. (2018) can greatly 
facilitate crossing the valley of death by creating and maintaining linkages across diverse 
parts of the innovation effort (users, developers, funders; challenges, behaviors, and 
solutions; technology development, application development, social resistance). Such a 
method would facilitate the purposeful and planned incorporation of platform flexibility that 
would allow fast adoption of existing technologies, near adoption (e.g., in 10–15 years) of 
developing technologies, and the adoption of currently-unknown technologies in out years. 
Doing so would provide the justification for continued development and realistic bases for 
forecasted cost savings and operational improvements in the future.  
Conclusions 
The current work describes the technology transition valley of death and the 
challenges in crossing it based on the literature and background on the ACTUV/MDUSV 
program as relative to same. A three-part framework for the analysis and design of crossing 
the valley is proposed and then applied to the current MDUSV program. Potential uses of 
the framework products are described. A specific example of a recommendation, as viewed 
through the lens of the framework, is provided, and how it can facilitate the program 
crossing the valley. Additional development of the framework for describing, analyzing, and 
designing program’s crossing of the valley of death is recommended.  
The current work can impact practice through the MDUSV program. It provides an 
initial evaluation of the MDUSV plan for crossing the valley of death. This predicts where the 
program may encounter challenges and suggests underlying causes such as coordination 
across linear and social innovation behavior modes. Those challenges and underlying 
causes can be used by program leaders to identify, design, and implement solutions, 
thereby speeding the crossing of the valley.  
The current work impacts research on the crossing of the valley of death by 
proposing and initially testing a framework for analyzing and designing a DoN program’s 
crossing of the valley of death. This framework can be expanded and improved based on 
other programs and tested through application to other programs. By doing so, a valuable 
tool for acquisition can be developed and applied.  




 “Other transactions” is the term commonly used to refer to the 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority to enter into 
transactions other than contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements. The Department currently has 
temporary authority to award ‘other transactions’ (OTs) in certain circumstances for prototype projects 
that are directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed by 
the Department” (Under Secretary of Defense [AT&L], 2000, p. 7). OT is used by DARPA to speed 
contracting necessary for rapid prototyping. 
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Seven Tips to Support Rapid Product Deployment:  
Lessons Learned 
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Abstract 
Navy leadership has tasked its workforce to respond to an urgent need of identifying 
good ideas that fulfill immediate warfighter gaps in offensive and defensive capability. This 
paper describes how following seven tips gave a 3.5-person team the ability to develop a 
working prototype demonstrating the framework of a cutting-edge, counter Unmanned Aerial 
System (cUAS) technology, supporting a complete kill chain solution. When good ideas are 
accepted by Navy leadership for feasibility investigation, budgets are tight, teams are small, 
and expectations are high. This necessitates an environment that introduces a need for 
rapid product prototyping of a working system/framework that will inspire additional monies 
to support rapid deployment. Seven tips describe detailed lessons learned involving project 
management, resource management, system engineering, and architectural analysis, 
including the use of Open System Architecture (OSA). Specific best practice techniques 
applied to the rapidly prototyped cUAS technology example, including generic discussions of 
Program of Record technologies, are used as case studies emphasizing the benefits of each 
tip described. By considering the seven tips, the workforce is given guidance, examples, and 
food-for-thought as to how to meet Navy leadership’s urgent need for rapid deployment of 
cutting-edge technology. 
Background 
“Months not years” is now the leadership’s call for urgency in getting products out to 
the fleet in a shorter period of time. This call has become a mantra regarding the need for 
new ideas taking advantage of existing technology in creative ways. 
“Easier said than done” is one phrase heard by frustrated acquisition professionals. 
For example, a reader’s response as annotated in a blog of the AirTALKs’ recipe (recited in 
the previous introduction) was, “what bureaucratic barriers were eliminated?” 
The current “recipe for success” described by AIRTalks on August 15, 2017, to 
deliver products more rapidly to the fleet is as follows: 
 Leadership set a clear and urgent goal  
 Focused on schedule and outcomes; tailored in only what was critical 
 Empowered the team to manage risk and make decisions; and  
 Eliminated bureaucratic barriers to speed  
Another initiative supported by the DoD’s MD5 National Security Technology 
Accelerator focuses on teaching employees how to deliver a well-crafted elevator pitch and 
interview stakeholders in support of future adaptation.  
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The above points are valuable to heed and the related training is important, but the 
recipe misses a key ingredient: educating the workforce on how to deliver products more 
rapidly to the fleet. This paper does not attempt to reinvent the acquisition cycle, but to more 
effectively work with it to provide an approach to support rapid prototyping by using more 
effective Open Systems Architectures (OSAs) and standards supported by industry best 
practices associated with project management, system engineering, architectural analysis, 
and resource management. The lessons learned described in this document also include 
creating a constructive workforce environment—using a common-sense best practice, as 
will be described. 
The need to begin the birth of a program by rapid prototyping that uses more 
effective OSAs and proper application of best practices ensures that the system of systems 
architecture will support a rapid product deployment. This document describes examples 
and related approaches associated with project management, system engineering, 
architectural analysis, and resource management to ensure the proper selection of OSA and 
application of best practices. Using the tips provided, a team can have a better chance to 
take a “good idea” and get it funded, proving out concepts through the use of rapid 
prototyping. Rapid prototyping, in the counter Unmanned Aerial System (cUAS) case 
provided as the primary example within this document, means delivering a working system 
of systems that demonstrates the concept and validates the selection of OSA that enables 
cost reduction, productivity improvement, and product reliability.  
In today’s urgent need to maintain technical superiority within a theater of operations, 
rapidly deployable good ideas, using the proper OSAs through the use of best practices, are 
more likely to gain attention and get funded. Most ideas are supported with limited funding, 
therefore rapid prototyping, minimizing cost but emphasizing capability, becomes a 
necessity. 
The Necessity to Rapidly Prototype a Good Idea 
It is logical to any acquisition professional to be concerned about rapid deployment 
and its potentially adverse effects on the quality and reliability of product. Will the product 
suffer if pushed into the hands of the warfighter too soon? That is certainly one of the 
reasons why the acquisition cycle is so structured and rigorous. What emphasizes this 
concern of a poorly developed product from skipping steps is that warfighters need highly 
reliable, quality products because their lives might be in jeopardy and they are dependent on 
the technology they are using. In most commercial products, this level of rigor or 
dependability isn’t required. For example, if a smartphone breaks, the user is without a 
phone until he or she takes it to the store for a replacement. If a warfighter’s communication 
device stops working within a battle engagement, his lifeline for fire support may not be 
available, creating a potentially life-threatening situation. 
The main challenge is that the acquisition turnaround time for a new technology 
consists of many approval cycles and gates, sometimes consuming a decade of reviews 
and meetings before the proposed product is seen by the fleet. Within this same period of 
time, the commercial market may have produced hundreds of components that might have 
affected the performance, cost, and quality of the product under development.  
The obvious answer is to focus on OSA and use of industry best practices that make 
going through the acquisition cycle faster, but still allow for highly reliable, quality results. A 
popular analogy is to be able to create a system of systems architecture in a similar manner 
as putting together Legos, where the OSA associated with best practice interface standards 
represent the nubs on each Lego block. Therefore, in the simplest of explanations, this 
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paper describes lessons learned in terms of using best practices based on specific, proven 
tips and sound engineering practices supporting the proper use of OSA.  
The goal of the paper is to offer seven tips for consideration in helping acquisition 
professionals more easily create an effective Lego-based system of systems prototype 
products.  
The tips are centered on rapid prototyping to ensure that the selected OSA through 
use of best practices is tested to be practical, economically feasible, and reliable in terms of 
meeting goals. Examples in this document will be provided in which the wrong OSA 
selection created increased acquisition issues. Specific solutions to this dilemma will be 
described in terms of best practice approaches. 
If rapid prototyping is done properly using the “right” OSA and following effective best 
practices, then the benefit will more likely be a rapidly developed prototype, using minimal 
cost over a short period of time. With regard to the cUAS example used to support tip 
development, the technology was developed within two months using a team of 3.5 
developers.  
An additional benefit is that as new commercial technologies are created during the 
acquisition cycle, the prototyped architecture, following the tips offered in this document, will 
have proven to allow for a plug-and-play development environment. This will offer the 
product, under the acquisition cycle, greater opportunities to keep in pace with technology 
advancements, naturally reducing the acquisition cycle, increasing the reliability of the 
product, and significantly decreasing overall program cost.  
Seven tips will be discussed in the form of lessons learned to share how to 
practically use OSA and industry best practices to answer Navy leadership’s “months not 
years” call for urgency.  
Seven Tips 
Tip 1: “A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words!”—Use a Storyboard to Clarify the 
Problem and Solution 
This tip supports the first step of gaining clarity regarding the problem and solution. 
To gain this clarity, four questions need to be answered: 
1. What specific problem does the Navy need to solve?  
2. What assumptions are being made about the problem domain, and do those 
assumptions still support Navy needs? 
3. Is someone already solving this problem using the same assumptions? If so, 
was this group contacted and solutions compared? 
4. With regard to the proposed solution, is a complete kill chain scenario 
described? 
This first tip has to do with how the problem can be qualified to be a viable candidate 
for funding. It avoids spending time solving a problem that lacks interest from potential 
stakeholders willing to provide funds for the proposed solution. As stated, a cUAS project is 
offered as an example to illustrate the value this tip offers in clearly defining a problem and 
describing a complete solution.  
A short background regarding cUAS: An effective cUAS solution is becoming an 
important goal for all armed services, especially because of recent events in the news. From 
a Navy perspective, the issue is potential threats to naval facilities from small, hard-to-spot 
drones. 
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Because of this Navy focus, the problem defined was limited to an attack from sea. 
The imagined attack involved a small boat, a small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and a 
sinister intent. The problem definition naturally eliminated many solutions developed by the 
Army or other branches. The Navy needs to be worried about sea attacks, more than other 
government agencies. In this project, the assumptions were that the UAV could be launched 
miles away from an ocean launch site. Depending on the distance, land-based sensors may 
have difficulty identifying small objects from long distances away. The small object would be 
a group 1 UAV with autonomous capability, designed as a fixed wing drone. The drone’s 
performance would be typical of any fixed wing autonomous vehicle purchased on some 
popular website that could fly long distances without operator intervention. 
Again, to adequately address the third question regarding this tip, it was important to 
investigate if there was already a solution to identify a group 1 UAV from far distances, 
launched from the sea platform, and then eliminate this threat, if needed. It seemed that a 
solution to support this water-based attack using the approach described would add to an 
arsenal of Navy capabilities. Although, the Army supported a detailed cUAS solution and 
because of this, a Technical Interchange Meeting was held to ensure the Navy cUAS 
solution related to its unique problem was not already solved. 
Once it was determined that the solution was unique, where no other groups were 
providing similar solutions, the next step was defining a complete kill chain or mission 
scenario. The goal was not to just define a piece of the solution, but to support the entire kill 
chain scenario. The solution ranged from how the UAV was identified when approaching to 
its elimination.  
To capture these ideas, Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
Operational View-1 (OV-1) view was used in a unique way. Two OV-1s were combined to 
make up a storyboard. OV-1 views are commonly used. A two-frame storyboard, as shown 
in Figure 1, is a creative use of OV-1s. The point is that DoDAF views allow for creative 
license. In Figure 1, the cUAS example is described from supporting identification using 
video to a kamikaze defense solution. 
 
Figure 1. A Simplified Version of Two Related DoDAF OV-1s Used as a Two-
Frame Storyboard 
Figure 1 represents assumptions regarding both the problem and solution, which 
allowed stakeholders and the development team to understand what type of subsystem 
elements might be needed. “A picture is worth a thousand words,” but it is still 
recommended that words provide the details behind each OV-1 views. With one sheet of 
paper, the views along with dialogue can now communicate both solution and assumptions 
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to verify if both still support Navy needs. The goal is to use the OV-1 to ensure that there is 
a clear definition of the problem and a complete solution. “Complete” refers to including all 
parts of the kill chain scenario, from identification to elimination, as described in Figure 1. 
Therefore, in following the approach described in this tip using OV-1s, all four 
questions were more easily answered and explained to others. 
Tip 2: Apply Assembly Line Thinking to Make “Months Not Years” a Possibility 
This tip illustrates how DoDAF views can greatly enhance the ability to meet the 
“months not years” goal without hindering productivity. 
For review, an assembly line consists of a series of already prepared parts that are 
integrated over a set period of time, normally defined by the speed of the assembly line 
process. Using this analogy, consider platforms or subsystem elements to be the already 
prepared parts. The schedule defines the assembly line time period. Each of these parts are 
welded together via software interfaces or hardware constructs, like Ethernet cable. Note: 
Even if the assembly line’s purpose is to only develop one item, the assembly line process is 
still valid. 
In the project mentioned above involving cUAS, the assembly line subsystem 
elements/platforms were as follows: 
 Kinetic Integrated Low-Cost Software Integrated Tactical Combat Handheld 
(KILSWITCH), which has been used by the Marine Corps to support 
situational awareness and other combat-related goals. 
 Navy Unmanned Common Control System (CCS) Science and Technology 
(S&T) version using the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR’s) Topside. 
Topside is a multi-dimensional ground control station. The combination of 
using CCS and Topside has been successfully demonstrated over the last 
three years with a variety of demonstrations, including Large Displacement 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV), Autonomous Aerial Cargo/Utility 
System (AACUS), and Common Mission Command Center (CMCC) with the 
K-MAX Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). 
 Maneuver Aviation Fires Integrated Application (MAFIA), Joint Multi-Platform 
Advanced Combat (JMAC), and MAFIA Association System (MAS), which is 
currently fielded as cUAS technology. 
 Maneuver Aviation Fires Integrated Application (MFOCS), which is currently 
fielded. 
 Standardized Payload Management Systems (SPMS), which has been 
demonstrated to manage a variety of weapons and payload systems on Navy 
UAVs and is currently being enhanced using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Control Segment (UCS) service interface. 
The main interface, a common bridge, to connect these elements together was 
determined to be UCS, a Navy supported standard. For the subsystem elements selected, 
the bridges/interfaces to the UCS standard would therefore be 
 Cursor on Target (COT) supporting KILSWITCH communication to UCS 
 Tactical Counter-Unmanned Technologies (TCUT) supporting MFOCS 
communication to UCS  
This common bridge ensured interoperability while keeping communication under a 
single bridge standard. The need for a common standard connecting all system elements is 
described in Tip 3. 
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To implement an assembly line paradigm, a series of sequence diagrams were 
chosen. The first diagram type started with operational sequence diagrams (DoDAF OV-6c; 
see Figure 2) and then moved to system sequence diagrams supporting a system view 
(SV). Figure 3 describes a DoDAF SV-10c which translated platforms in OV-6c to sub-
elements within those platforms. Figure 2 describes the use of various types of radars to 
support various needs in identifying small targets. The Joint Integrated Fire Control System 
(JIFCS) was the technology developed within months using the tips described in this paper. 
Figure 2 describes how JIFCS needed to interface with sensor data, handheld devices, and 
a group 1 UAV to implement the desired cUAS solution. The goal of both Figures 2 and 3 is 
not to describe the JIFCS technology, but to show how assembly line thinking was applied 
to rapidly develop a new product. 
 
Figure 2. OV-6c View Regarding One Part of the cUAS Solution 
The final suggestion related to Tip 2 is make sure the pieces to be assembled are 
mature enough to be used within the project’s schedule. This pitfall was realized in a rocket 
development project, where one of the main elements relied on a rocket engine that was still 
in the experimental phase. The rocket engine needed several years to mature before it 
could be considered to be realistically used in a combat environment. In this case, because 
this element made the assembly line process take years, and not months, the project was 
rejected. Redesigns were eventually investigated, but the project’s focus was lost. This type 
of rocket development project became a very low priority for funding and eventually was 
forgotten. Be careful: If an element takes several years to mature, it obviously should not be 
used as part of the assembly line process when attempting to support leadership’s “months 
not years” call for urgency. 
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Figure 3. SV-10c View Regarding One Part of the cUAS Solution 
Tip 3: “To Be or Not to Be?”—Analyze the Layers of Interfaces to Determine What 
Should or Should Not Be Used 
Tip 3 provides a “rule of thumb” on how to determine whether it makes architectural 
engineering sense to proceed with regard to interfaces between subsystem elements.  
In the cUAS example, there were subsystem elements that required the use of three 
to five protocols to exchange needed data. This caused an over-complication of the 
architecture and implementation, resulting in integration and performance issues. This came 
about because each of the original subsystems were developed using different interface 
standards. To create even more complications, some of the elements were developed in a 
Linux Operating System (OS) and others in Windows OS, causing additional enterprise 
gluing issues. 
Although the protocol associated with each subsystem involved well-known and 
popular standards, the need to use many standards to support straightforward 
communication caused installation and performance issues.  
As a tip, if a straightforward bridge cannot be used between standards of different 
subsystem elements, then consider reevaluating the subsystem elements. If there are no 
other choices, then consider new development instead of forcing a square peg to fit a round 
hole. 
In the cUAS example, the UCS standard was determined to be able to bridge all 
subsystem elements. The other elements were assessed as to whether straightforward 
bridges could be produced, and the assessment came out positive. If it didn’t, then a 
different architecture would have been investigated. 
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Figure 4 is an example of multiple protocols used through a thread of information in 
the cUAS project. The upper thread represents four translator services that would potentially 
be needed for communication between subsystem elements and a system that shouldn’t be 
put together. The lower thread in Figure 4 represents an ability to architecturally reduce 
subsystem communication to one translator service, creating a good system. The 
architecture introduced an Air Force standard named Unmanned Command and Control 
Initiative (UCI); however, the ongoing challenge was to ensure UCI and UCS efficiently 
talked to each other. 
 
Figure 4. Translator Service Designs Used for Communication Between 
Subsystem Elements 
Tip 4: Focus More on Integration, Less on New Development, to Create a “Months Not 
Years” Project Plan 
Once it has been agreed to proceed with the project, Tip 4 provides suggestions on 
how to quickly create the first demo within the “months not years” timeframe. It provides 
examples of system engineering techniques that support rapid development. 
In the case of the cUAS project, using Tip 4’s technique showed that the 
demonstration could be done within four two-week sprints, which included architectural 
analysis, implementation, and test. 
If the first three tips are already completed, then this tip will naturally follow and be 
easier to achieve. The Tip 4 technique suggests using the time it takes to do the 
integration/assembly of each primary element, including data usage, to determine the 
shortest timeline to release a demo. If the “right” primary elements aren’t correctly identified 
from your assembly line, it’s difficult to successfully use this tip. Primary elements are 
identified by understanding how the key platforms are used. Sometimes the best way to 
identify primary elements is to identify non-primary elements. Non-primary elements are 
subsystems that use primary elements as their hosted platforms. 
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In the cUAS example, the primary elements were the MFOCS emulator, JIFCS 
emulator, and KILSWITCH. Using the technique just described, the timeline for connecting 
the primary elements first involved the development of two bridges/interfaces: 
1. From the COT message standard to the UCS message standard between 
KILSWITCH and JFICS 
2. From the TCUT message standard to the UCS message standard between 
MFOCS and JIFCS 
It should also be noted that the timeline also included the time it took to develop the 
software necessary to display the related data. Therefore, the completion of the demo was 
principally based on two time related factors: 
1. The time it took to develop the bridges that connected the standards (and 
therefore connected these primary elements) 
2. The time it took to display the related data on non-primary elements (e.g., for 
JIFCS, non-primary elements would be the Topside display) 
Additional features were determined based on whether they could be done in parallel 
to bridge development or support bridge development, while keeping the main focus of the 
project on bridge development or data that used the messages translated by the bridge. 
Notice that the UCS message standard was the common connectivity between the primary 
elements. The reason for having a common standard for connectivity was described in the 
previous tip. If this technique is followed properly, there should be little to no lag time within 
the assembly line timeline associated with connecting these primary elements. 
After identifying this primary element assembly line timeline, the next key question 
was what non-primary element features could be integrated without adding any time to the 
schedule? Understandably, sometimes it is necessary to require additional time, above and 
beyond the primary element timeline.  
Figure 5, the cUAS project schedule, emphasizes that the timeline focused on bridge 
development or relate data management/display. This meant that most times, these tasks 
were on the critical path, meaning the smallest (to no) lag time between tasking. The 
purpose of putting emphasis on the primary element assembly line timeline means that the 
tasking is mainly focused on assembling primary and non-primary elements instead of 
creating technology to integrate. 
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Figure 5. Schedule to Ensure Bridge Work Is on Critical Path and Not Added 
Features 
The tasking “Track Data Transfer/Communication” described in Figure 5 was the 
incremental development of the bridges. Most of the tasks in Figure 5 containing the words 
“track data” and “track displays” involved bridge development for primary elements to share 
data, data management, or data display. 
Again, Tip 4’s technique allowed the cUAS project team to maintain the goal of 
reducing the schedule as much as possible to support a rapid demonstration. This technique 
also supported a scheduling discipline when assessing how much added feature 
development the timeline could permit without taking the focus away from bridge 
development or related use of the messages translated. 
In general, once a project’s original concept is demonstrated, then the next phase of 
the project would be to add features to the existing framework, knowing the bridge 
development and message use were working properly. This technique allows the project to 
lay a foundation, like a solid chassis in a car assembly line. The only difference is that in this 
assembly line, only one product is being created. This technique also allows the project to 
identify the “ideal” shortest period of time. In following this technique, future development 
risk is reduced, and potential customers are given a better understanding of value.  
Tip 5: Constantly Remember—It Takes a Village to Raise a … Product 
During implementation of a project, Tip 5 can help ensure that the support network is 
adequately defined and that everyone remains “willingly helpful” during the development 
cycle. This tip also provides a suggestion on how to deal with folks who may not have time 
to be in a support network, but need to be available and willing in order for the project to 
succeed. 
Although subtle, this tip should be followed, maybe before all other tips suggested in 
this paper: Be nice and help everyone as much as possible, because one day a challenging 
task may need a helping hand and the money to pay for it may not be available. With regard 
to the cUAS project being discussed, from video folks to weapons pairing experts, 15 to 20 
minutes of conversational help about key problems became invaluable. 
If individuals on a project team can sincerely promote another group’s work or help 
out, even in small ways, great dividends are received. So, when the time comes that a 
project team member needs help, someone will probably show up, without a need for a 
charge object.  
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In the case of the cUAS project, a kind videographer took a few minutes to do some 
editing. Yet, those few minutes made a significant difference in the realism of the demo. 
Figure 6 is a snapshot of the video that took minutes to edit. Another example was a 
weapons pairing expert who provided a check and balance for related algorithms that were 
being developed regarding automated weapons pairing. These and other folks provided 
invaluable support for the success of the cUAS project. 
 
Figure 6. Snapshot of Picture Related to cUAS Project 
It’s the old saying, “what goes around, comes around.” Tip 5: Help when possible, 
and one day the rewards will appear. 
Tip 6: Consider the 80/20 Rule to Support New Talent Growth and Challenging 
Schedule Goals 
There is a temptation to have only experienced people do the work when a short 
timeframe is involved. Tip 6 describes how to use a version of the 80/20 rule regarding 
developers and resource management.  
In the cUAS example, the project team size was fairly small. Everyone had to pull 
their own weight. The team consisted of 80% (or four) seasoned developers, and allowed for 
20% (one) highly energetic, highly motivated person to work on the project. This meant that 
the new developer would be allowed more scheduled time to accomplish the assigned 
tasks. It was important that the new developer was not put under the pressure of being on 
the critical path. Additionally, workarounds needed to be readily available. “Months not 
years” is a short-term philosophy, but developing people within the organization provides 
long-lasting results. 
There’s no substitute for experience, but there is no greater reward than giving a new 
developer a chance to shine. As stated, the cUAS development team consisted of five 
people, represented on the left side of Figure 7. There were senior people on and off of the 
project and “in the wings” ready to help all the developers, which goes back to following Tip 
5: Be sincerely helpful to others and good things will become available. 
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Figure 7. 80/20 Resource Mix to Support Professional Development 
As an important note, in addition to providing a successful demonstration of a 
needed technology, the project also had the privilege to support the development of one 
who became a much more capable and seasoned software developer—a significant win for 
the organization. 
Again to reemphasize per the cUAS project example, the development of junior 
personnel is still possible within a rapid development project in which timelines are tight. 
Tip 7: Share Lessons Learned—Know That Sharing Experience Creates a Village of 
“Smart People” 
Along with the “months not years” call for urgency, there is another popular 
leadership phrase offered: “Take risks!” In some people’s mind, that means potential failure. 
Tip 7 is about sharing knowledge so others learn how to overcome risks and succeed. In 
other words, it describes the best way to make “lemonade out of lemons.” This paper was 
written to share lessons learned and hopefully help some other project team create an 
urgently needed product in a shorter period of time for the warfighter. 
Lessons learned described via the previous tips came in two popular categories: (1) 
what worked and (2) what didn’t work. Table 1 represents how the previous tips were 
categorized in terms of what worked and didn’t work. During the previous description of 
each tip, greater detail was included as to why the suggestion worked or why it didn’t work. 
If one of the seven tips proves to support the ability of someone launching a good 
idea to support warfighter supremacy, then the cUAS project described has had a significant 
additional success, beyond cUAS. In other words, this tip suggests that success also 
includes sharing lessons learned for others to have successes. 
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Table 1. Lessons Learned: What Worked and What Didn’t Work 
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Conclusions 
These are exciting times because the U.S. Navy is looking for solutions to warfighter 
needs, and the need to rapidly deploy a good idea is vital. Good ideas that can be rapidly 
deployed are more likely to receive funding. The goal of sharing these tips is to provide 
guidance to help navigate the challenges of assessing, designing, and planning a successful 
project using OSA and best practices. “Months not years” is a hard mantra to follow. But 
also consider the phrase, “Take risks!” With the myriad of technology currently developed, 
putting these elements together to create a new system of systems can be an exciting 
adventure. Yet, in an ironic way, the excitement is also associated with and sometimes 
driven by the risk. Prototyping through the use of the proper OSA by applying the 
appropriate best practices ensures greater rapid deployment success. 
In the cUAS project, lessons learned showed the need to focus on sequence 
diagrams to help determine whether a demonstration was possible within months. The 
analysis showed how different elements could be integrated rather easily to fit within a 
months’ timeframe. It showed the need to get as many people involved (within the village) 
as possible. It doesn’t mean everyone needs to be on the payroll either. Fifteen minutes 
here and there from various experts regarding key areas associated with your project pays 
off in big dividends. These lessons learned also describe why a new programmer in the 
learning phase using the “right” resource management schema can add value, both short 
and long term, to an organization. Finally, whether a project is successful or not, sharing 
lessons learned is an important aspect to the rapid development process. 
Consider the seven tips described when a good idea pops up and the assessment as 
to how to begin becomes an inviting next step. Table 2 describes a checklist based on the 
seven previous tips suggested to help determine if any good idea qualifies to be a “months 
not years” candidate. Answer the questions in this table using a product prototype. 
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Table 2. Checklist to Support “Months Not Years” Development Effort 
 
If the answers to the questions in the checklist in Table 2 are predominately “yes” 
based on a prototype, not just a paper exercise, then those good ideas are more likely to be 
a good candidate for rapid product deployment. And rapidly deployable good ideas are more 
likely to get funded. And if funded, those good ideas are more likely to be deployed in time, 
proven through your prototype, to ensure U.S. combat superiority is maintained, saving lives 
and eliminating enemy threats. 
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Abstract 
This research has two objectives. First, using DoD acquisition data, the study details 
the process developed to mine, convert, and use DoD acquisition schedule data, including a 
discussion on how the data was refined. Part of this effort was an identification of the factors 
that caused delays. This data is used to describe a method for project managers to use in 
their project planning process. 
Introduction 
Department of Defense (DoD) project management is focused on awareness, 
anticipation, and decision-making. In order to address these three imperatives, project and 
program managers in the DoD must plan in detail the expected path and duration of 
development projects as senior leadership requires reports on progress relative to a plan. 
However, since the nature of the weapons development process (R&D) is so uncertain and 
the scheduling tools provided are, at best, stochastic, there is a need for better 
understanding of the many factors that influence activity/task planning, network 
development and project execution. This understanding includes ways to estimate schedule 
beyond the stochastic methods of today. This research has two objectives. First, using the 
OSD acquisition information databases, determine and develop ways to extract and make 
that information on scheduling available to DoD project managers. The second goal is to 
identify important delay factors, so those factors can be considered in project planning.  
This research uses DoD acquisition data to inform the schedule planning process. 
Specifically, it identifies the many factors that have historically led to schedule delays and 
provides a methodology for PMOs to use when they plan and schedule their weapons 
system program. This study has three parts. First is an examination of the literature on the 
current state of schedule estimating. The second part describes the process developed for 
this study to mine, convert, and use DoD acquisition data, including a discussion on how the 
data was refined. The last section presents some initial findings from this research and 
proposes some uses for the information.  
The widely used definition of a project includes the assumption that each project is 
something unique: “[a] project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service or result” (Project Management Institute [PMI], 2017). Perhaps it is not. 
Instead, perhaps a project is not unique, and perhaps we can use the experience the DoD 
has in project management to our benefit. That is the value of using data in defense 
acquisition.  
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As long ago as 1988, Morris and Hough were critical of the practice of project 
management: 
Curiously, despite the enormous attention project management and analysis 
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally 
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are 
common. Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. 
Projects are often completed late or over budget, do not perform in the way 
expected, involve severe strain on participating institutions or are cancelled 
prior to their completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money. 
(Morris & Hough, 1988) 
Instead, the basic premise of this study is to address this criticism head-on and 
suggest instead, that maybe … when problems persist, practitioners and scholars are 
getting something wrong (Christensen & Bartman, 2016). Therefore, this study explores how 
to find and use data to help PMs understand the dynamic nature of weapon system 
development.  
Managing defense acquisition schedules has become even more important in recent 
years for many reasons including the following: 
 Longer “cycle times” for defense acquisition programs, especially for high-
priority combat systems—in both absolute and relative terms 
 The rise of competitor nations with greatly increased capabilities, 
sophistication, and agility—threatening U.S. national interests (getting inside 
our development cycle) 
 Significantly limited resources available for defense modernization programs, 
which makes management of funding profiles especially important 
This research explores one of the available sources of acquisition data, the Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR). SAR data is collected and stored in the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of 
selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). SARs are required by Title 10 USC 
§ 2432 to be submitted to Congress periodically.  
Weapons system development projects are infamous for exceeding time and cost 
constraints. Study of this time phenomena however, generally focuses on the resultant time 
it takes to develop a weapon system, not the front-end planning necessary to address 
schedule overruns. We examine this topic first by reviewing the basics of project scheduling, 
then examining the project planning process and how scheduling is currently done, what is 
considered in the development of project schedules, as well as what should be considered.  
Project Scheduling 
The concept of time in project management can be divided into two major categories: 
task duration estimation, and task sequencing and project scheduling. First, the technical 
process of estimating the duration of the project task must be determined. Once duration is 
established, the management process of project sequencing and scheduling must be 
defined.  
Broad review of the literature on project scheduling reveals research roughly divided 
into three areas. First, the bulk of literature on scheduling is devoted to the networking and 
probabilistic techniques which have dominated schedule estimation since the 1960s. This 
focus is logical in that the “science” of scheduling originated with the almost simultaneous 
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development of the critical path method (CPM), and the Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT). CPM or critical path method places activities in a logical network 
sequence. When completed, this sequence is expressed as a network and provides the total 
time necessary to accomplish the project, as well as the total time of the individual activities 
which is expressed as the critical path. PERT also used in building the network provides a 
probabilistic assessment of the actual schedule time. PERT (also known as three-point 
estimation) uses the weighted average of three measures of task duration, the most likely 
duration (M), the pessimistic duration (P), and the optimistic duration (O).  
The strength of CPM and PERT (apart from the fact they are used almost exclusively 
in schedule development, and in most enterprise project management software packages) is 
it allows management focus by identifying the critical path, thus, the key activities that must 
be monitored and controlled. Monitoring provides a means to oversee costs including, 
among others, anticipating personnel changes. Controlling allows the PM to determine 
whether the project is on schedule, as well as ensuring the defined length of the project is 
met.  
Disadvantages include project management being unable to react to instability and 
changes, as well as managing resources to “feed” the critical path and not being able to 
“see” and comprehend the overall effort. This is because CPM and PERT take a static view 
of project activities—which fails to account for the relationships and interdependencies 
inherent in complex projects (Balaji & James, 2005).  
Second is the basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network—that 
there is a direct flow from work to be done, to work accomplished. That is, every task has a 
discrete start and end—work is either started or not, finished or not. More importantly, there 
is no accommodation for work that might not be done correctly or to the required quality. 
Further, the subjective nature of defining not only the most likely time duration, but also the 
optimistic and pessimistic durations potentially magnifies schedule uncertainty especially in 
large, complex projects (Franck et al., 2017). A last disadvantage of the current scheduling 
method is that it does not recognize management decisions and the feedback from those 
decisions. 
The next major area in the schedule literature examines project schedule from the 
perspective of the time it takes to develop weapons systems. This research focus assesses 
schedules by asking the question, “Why does weapon system development take so long?” 
Central to this line of research is the idea of “cycle time,” also referred to as “schedule 
interval.” The issue examined is how to provide weapons systems to the operational force 
as soon as possible. Research questions ask, “Has the time to develop weapons systems 
increased?” (Van Atta et al., 2015). 
The final area of research interest is that of software project estimation. This area 
represents the focus of the most recent research. Some suggest that because of the 
complexity of software, as well as the degree of software in most modern weapons systems, 
software schedule estimation most closely resembles weapons system development 
scheduling. 
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Estimating Activity Duration 
Surprisingly, little information is available in the literature on the “how” to estimate the 
measures of a schedule—the task duration. While the major defense contractors have 
formal in-company processes, little formal literature is available on the specifics of task 
estimation. Further, most available information on estimating task duration is found in project 
management textbooks, but even then, the specifics are scarce.  
There are however, similarities between cost estimating and activity duration 
estimating. This is because accurate cost estimates require the insight into scope and 
schedule that only duration estimating can provide. Both processes use similar techniques. 
Both depend on expert judgment, both use parametric methods, and both employ a 
bottoms-up methodology as one of the techniques is estimated at the task level, then rolled 
up. Central, however, to schedule estimation is the idea of sequencing. The network is a 
central element of determining duration.  
The PMBOK (Project Management Body of Knowledge) lists five methods for 
estimating project activity duration. These methods include the following (PMI, 2017): 
 Expert Judgment  
 Alternatives Analysis  
 Published Estimating Data  
 Project Management Software  
 Bottoms-Up Estimating 
Expert judgment acknowledges that technical and engineering experts should be 
able to estimate the effort necessary to accomplish tasks and translate those estimates to 
duration. This assumes the chosen experts have significant experience in the execution of 
those tasks and are therefore competent to judge time required (Hughes, 1996). 
Alternatives analysis recognizes that activities or tasks can be accomplished in 
different ways—alternatives. These different ways include defining different techniques, 
differing levels of resources, and using different machines. 
Published estimates are databanks that gather resources measures. These 
measures include hourly rates by skill level, acknowledged production rates for various 
development and manufacturing activities. In most cases, this data is available internal to 
the organization. However, there are data companies that track and report this data. An 
example is the IEEE-USA Salary & Benefits Survey. This data is often available for different 
locations in the United States, as well as worldwide.  
Project management software is not really an estimation method. Instead, it provides 
a means to identify and organize information necessary for resource estimates.  
Finally, an engineering or bottoms-up estimate is a comprehensive schedule (and 
cost) process that starts at the work package level and aggregates costs to build a complete 
estimate. Bottoms-up estimates are necessary when schedule activities cannot be 
accurately estimated using another technique. As the name implies, bottoms-up estimates 
start at a level of activity or task that can be confidently estimated. The activities are then 
rolled-up to the required level. These estimates are extremely work-intensive but are also 
the most accurate.  
Other recognized methods include parametric techniques. A parametric or top-down 
estimate builds an activity estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. All the methods listed are used to 
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estimate the length of time each of the activities or Work Breakdown Structure tasks lists. 
“Simply stated, the duration of an activity is the scope of the work (quantity) divided by a 
measure of productivity” (Hendrickson et al., 1987, p. 278). 
Thus, activity duration estimation establishes the actual time required to complete 
discrete tasks in an overall project, while project scheduling fixes the start and end dates, as 
well as execution approaches of the project. Once the overall schedule is established, 
management activities driven by either time or resource constraints will determine the actual 
execution of the project (Schwindt & Zimmerman, 2015). The analogy that comes to mind is 
that of an orchestra. The individual instruments (and of course, the musicians) are the 
discrete tasks of the project. The orchestra leader is the project manager, and the music 
score is the “plan” the orchestra leader uses to execute the “project.” Building on this 
information, the next step in this effort is to identify schedule data that can be used to 
augment these estimating activities. 
Data Methodology 
While there is significant information available on DoD procurements, the 
overwhelming majority of that information is on cost. Cost is tracked and reported in detail at 
both the service as well as DoD level, and there is significant numerical-type data available 
on cost. Cost is also reported in a format that lends itself to analysis (spreadsheets). In fact, 
both in government and industry, cost is significantly more frequently reviewed than 
schedule (Smith & Friedman, 1980). 
Schedule information, on the other hand, is reported by DoD program managers, but 
normally in prose or tables in reports such as the SARs and others. The challenge for this 
effort was to identify schedule data and render it into a form that can be mathematically 
compared and examined. This section discusses the process developed to convert schedule 
information into schedule data. 
Data for this research was obtained from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of selected Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). SARs are required by Title 10 USC § 2432 which 
states, 
The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress at the end of each fiscal-
year quarter a report on current major defense acquisition programs. Except 
as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), each such report shall include a status 
report on each defense acquisition program that at the end of such quarter is 
a major defense acquisition program. Reports under this section shall be 
known as Selected Acquisition Reports.  
The available DAMIR database includes SARs from 1997 to 2017. The schedule 
section of the report consists of a Gantt chart and table showing the major milestones and 
current estimates. Figure 1 is an example of the schedule data found in a SAR. The section 
titled Change Explanations (CE) provides a description of the schedule changes. Both the 
graphic and the change explanation sections are rendered as unformatted text. 
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Figure 1. SAR Schedule of Data Example 
The information reported by the program managers in the SAR consists of an 
executive summary, a brief description of the overall program with separate sections for 
major subprograms and identification of threshold breaches and discussions on cost, 
schedule, and/or performance issues. The database can be searched by program and year. 
Data accessibility work by OSD now provides the possibility of extracting SAR data from 
PDF forms into a spreadsheet. Specific queries allow an analyst to mine particular sections 
of the SAR, to include that used for this effort—schedule. The extracted data for schedule 
includes program information, key dates (milestones) and other identifying information. 
However, the data describing what changed and by how much is provided as text. Thus, a 
process needed to be developed to convert textual explanations to normalized, measurable 
data.  
The total number of schedule records in the available SAR database was 3,969. The 
data used in this study are a subset of the SAR reports of 1,224 programs from 1997 to 
2017. Each program potentially had between one and 20 entries (corresponding to the 20-
years period and depending on when the program was initiated, and whether any schedule 
changes were reported). Of those 1224 programs, the available SAR schedule data 
consisted of 1,948 entries in the “change explanation” (CE) field of the database. In this 
preliminary study, those systems with no entries in the CE field were not examined. Table 1 
details the overall data.  
Table 1. Overall SAR Data Information, 1997–2017 
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Central to an understanding of weapon system scheduling (and as a way of 
converting change explanation text to data) is an examination of those factors that 
historically have led to increases in weapon system development times. The major studies 
of the past two decades have identified a number of factors that have contributed to 
increased duration. Thus, the next step was to identify these factors. A literature review 
revealed several studies that have classified weapon system development delay factors. An 
example of the explanations includes budget, funding, complexity, technical difficulty, and 
requirements stability (Drezner & Smith, 1990; Smith & Friedman, 1980; Van Atta et al., 
2015). A list of these project delay factors is at Table 2. Not all these previously identified 
delay factors were evident in this study; however these factors provided a starting point for 
this analysis. 
Table 2. Identified Generic Factors Causing Delays in Weapons System 
Development 
 
The classification of the change explanation (CE) entries was a two-step process. 
First, each change explanation was examined and a determination on causality made. Using 
the abovementioned factors as a classification mechanism, in the first pass, the project 
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office change explanations were examined, and an initial determination of the schedule 
factor(s) was identified. It became clear in this preliminary analysis that in many cases, there 
was more than one cause of the delay. Those explanations with more than one cause were 
initially classified, then further refined. Those entries that required further analysis were 
flagged in order to return and further refine the classification. Some data were not assigned 
a code because of either duplicative information, or because of what appeared to be 
arbitrary schedule updates that appeared to be no real changes in schedule activities. Table 
3 shows the delay factors identified/determined in this analysis, and the number of identified 
cases of each factor. Numbers do not total because of more than one factor identified on 
some of the programs. 
Table 3. Minimum and Maximum Schedule Delays (Months) 
 
The last step in the analytical process was to record the actual reported delays. The 
delays were listed in the SAR as dates. That required conversion from dates into a uniform 
format (months). Delays ranged from one month at the low end to 168 months on the high 
end. The delays were tracked to the identified factors. There were 1,216 instances of 
increases in time, and 150 instances of decreases in time. The delay factors, minimum and 
maximum delays, are shown in Table 3. Note that in some cases, dates were brought 
forward. In this case, those dates were noted as minus (-) numbers, representing a possible 
decrease in the schedule. In practice, however, a decrease in schedule captured in this 
manner is misleading since it is taken out of the context of the overall project. Over 95% of 
deceases noted were administrative in nature and either were corrections to mistakes 
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recorded in previous SARs, or a reflection of actual dates versus planned dates. For 
purposes of this initial analysis, decreases were not examined. 
Delay Factor Explanations 
 Administrative changes include schedule updates because of APB and ADM 
changes, as well as changes including program restructuring as a function of 
decisions driven by Nunn-McCurdy results and program restructuring.  
 Schedule changes identified those changes reported as a result of 
acknowledgement of the actual date of occurrence. These changes are also 
the result of receipt of approval documents from Milestone Decision 
Authorities to change specific dates. 
 Technical schedule changes are a result of specific setbacks in technical 
development.  
 Testing delays include both the ability to meet scheduled test dates, as well 
as technical issues discovered in the conduct of testing. When the testing 
discovered a technical issue, that technical issue was also counted as a 
technical problem. 
 Explanations that produced no apparent changes in the schedule data reflect 
comments in the change explanation, but do not produce an actual change in 
the schedule. Examples include cases of achievement of IOC/FOC, as well 
as re-designations of milestones driven by ADM decisions. 
 Delay in availability of key capabilities/facilities are a result of weather delays 
including satellite launches. 
 Budget/Funding Delays are tied to specific notes on lack of budget, decrease 
in budget or changes by Congress to the specific program. 
 Delays attributed to the Contractor result from construction and delivery 
delays as well as delays attributed to delivery of subcontractor materials. 
 Delays because of Rework reflect both quality issues where the budgeted 
work must be redone in order to make it functional, as well as the 
feedback/follow-on problems caused throughout the development. 
 Force Majeure are external events such as inflation, earthquakes, labor 
strikes, etc.  
 Delays due to Contracting/Contract Negotiation stem from either problems in 
negotiation, delays in approvals for RFP releases, modification to contracts, 
or delays in awarding contracts. 
 Actuals are the language used to describe simple updates to previously 
reported dates. 
The CE section included the table described above; however the information was 
unformatted. In some cases, numerous dates for different events had changed and were 
reported. For purposes of this initial research effort, the date captured was the longest 
duration activity shown. Future efforts will identify and report all events. 
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Analysis 
One of the objectives of this research was to identify, analyze, and provide those 
schedule factors causing delays in weapons system development. The final aspect of this 
study is to explore how the data extracted from this SAR analysis can be used to assist in 
schedule planning and development. The tools of scheduling (currently based on the CPM 
and PERT techniques discussed above) apply a network approach to define critical 
activities, slack, and the overall time required to complete the development. The network 
approach also provides the basis for cost estimation, resource allocation, management 
focus and risk assessment, and provides a visual flow of the effort. However, 
notwithstanding decades of study and countless man-years of experience, we are still 
missing something. One of those things we are missing is an acknowledgement of the 
dynamic nature of projects. Our current static view starting with planning has to change. A 
first step is to review the delay factors evident in the past 20 years of DoD Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP). As a minimum, incorporating factors identified in both the 
planning and execution process could be a start. 
The delay factors suggest PMs should attempt to plan for the time necessary to deal 
with oversight, information reporting and both the time takes, as well as the impacts of 
decisions—internal and external to the program. As the GAO pointed out in a 2015 study, 
the program office overheads associated with administrative activities added on an average 
of two years to complete: 
Programs we surveyed spent on average over 2 years completing the steps 
necessary to document up to 49 information requirements for their most 
recent acquisition milestone. This includes the time for the program office to 
develop the documentation and for various stakeholders to review and 
approve the documentation. (GAO, 2015) 
For example, the GAO found that the F-22 Increment $3.2 billion Modernization 
spent 3,800 staff days to prepare 33 milestone documents and present 74 briefings for the 
Milestone B process (GAO, 2015). This work had a cost of some $10 million. Those 3,800 
staff days obviously would also have impacts on the schedule, potentially more significant 
than on cost. This is not to argue the necessity for the program office to gather this 
information. Instead, it is a factor that should be accounted for in the program scheduling 
plan.  
Figure 2 shows the cumulative schedule overrun hours for all programs analyzed in 
the period of 1997 to 2017. Of note are years 2010 and 2011 where the year-to-year 
increase in time is an order of magnitude larger than that any other year. This particular 
jump in delay was caused by the CVN-78 program.   
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Figure 2. Sum of Schedule Delays by Year, 1998–2017 
Figure 3 provides a trend line and forecast of the delay. Using this data, the forecast 
total delay hours across all programs in 2019 equals 712 hours, and in 2020 that forecast 
increases to 729 hours.  
 
Figure 3. Forecast Total Hours for 2019 and 2020 
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Figure 4 shows the hours overrun by program for the same period. While there is no 
real proven correlation between schedule and cost overruns, the fact that the overruns are 
significant in this representative group of programs emphasizes the scope of the problem. 
And cost is not the only aspect involved. The delays also reflect added time before the 
systems are in the hands of the warfighters. 
 
Figure 4. Total Hours Overrun by Program, 1997–2017 
Using the Data 
The last step in this research is to suggest a way for DoD program managers to use 
the data that comes from this examination of delay factors. As noted above, the CPM/ PERT 
approach to scheduling precludes the use of historical data at the program schedule level. 
And, while some companies track task estimation data, that data is often proprietary, and 
more focused on technical process estimation.  
The basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network from start to 
finish is naïve at best (Franck et al., 2017). This static view provided by traditional project 
scheduling ignores the reality of project management that the work might not be done 
correctly or to the necessary quality (Cooper, 1993c). This same view also fails to consider 
that the results of decisions, whether good or bad, cause reactions in the project, much as 
inputs results in outputs in any system. Weapon system development reality using classical 
network analysis cannot delineate the progress of a project (Williams et al., 1994). 
Therefore, we should consider alternate ways of examining these problems. 
System dynamics “deals with the time-dependent behavior of managed systems with 
the aim of describing the system and understanding through quantitative and qualitative 
models” (Coyle, 1996). Instead of the static view we are used to seeing in defense 
acquisition projects, system dynamics considers weapon systems development as a system, 
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with inputs and outputs. Further, the rework cycle proposed by Cooper, also helps explain 
one of the project dynamics present in every development (Cooper, 1993a). Figure 5 shows 
the rework cycle. The concept is simple: Not all work attempted is completed correctly the 
first time. And, that work not completed correctly is not recognized. That work, initially 
undiscovered is at some point discovered and then moves into the “known rework” block. 
That known rework must be redone, both delaying completion of the overall project, and 
costing more. In practice, this effectively represents an increase in the work to be done. 
 
Figure 5. The Rework Cycle 
The notations “people” and “productivity” flow into a valve that further controls the 
flow of work from that needing to be done to that work completed. People are the number of 
workers, and their level of training and expertise. Productivity is a measure of their 
efficiency. Simple scheduling in this instance takes the number of people times their 
efficiency and applies that to the number of tasks in the Work to be Done stock. 
The rework cycle is a fundamental system dynamics concept first articulated by 
Cooper (Cooper, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). The basic flow of work in a development is from 
work to be done (tasks or work packages) to work completed. Connecting that flow is a 
“valve” that regulates the flow. In the rework cycle, that flow is determined by people 
(numbers, skills, availability) and productivity. People times productivity provides a flow rate, 
for example: tasks per month. Quality is another modulator of the flow of work. Quality is 
simply a measure of whether the task was accomplished correctly and completely. Given the 
exploratory nature of research and development efforts, it is entirely possible that a planned 
development task fails to accomplish the task goal, and the task must be redone. Similarly, 
people may be operating at a high level of productivity, but not producing quality work. 
There are two types of rework, known and undiscovered. These categories are 
integral to the nature of weapons system development. Developmental test does identify 
some of the work that needs to be redone, and that work flows to the known rework stock. 
However, there is work that may pass developmental test, but is later found to be deficient 
(software “bugs” are a good example). Those deficiencies may not be discovered for 
significant amounts of time and may also cause follow-on developmental efforts to slow or 
fail until they are finally discovered. Rework is generally a known issue for experienced 
project managers and was reported in some of the SAR data used in this study. 
Understanding the impact of the rework cycle coupled with the effects of other delay factors 
can provide project managers a tool to develop better schedule estimates. 
Figure 6 shows a simplified, generic project with 1,000 tasks, executed by 10 people 
at a notional 90% productivity rate. The X-axis shows months, and the Y-axis shows the 
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number of tasks. The graph shows both a steady reduction in work to be done, and an 
equally steady increase in the work completed. The graph shows completion of these 1,000 
tasks at month 117.5. This representation of a CPM type schedule represents a 
deterministic view of a project that doesn’t allow for delays or changes. This is one of the 
limitations of CPM and PERT and is recognized. Adding probability calculations to these 
schedules attempt to make them more realistic, but the root problem remains (Kerzner, 
2013; Moder et al., 1983).  
 
Figure 6. Model Showing the Effects of Rework 
Figure 7 shows the results from the same generic model used in Figure 6, but this 
time incorporates the impact of the rework cycle. The X-axis shows time, and the Y-axis 
indicates number of tasks. Line A shows the Work Completed, line B shows Work to be 
Done, and line C shows a generic calculation of Rework. Comparing line A in this graph to 
that of work completed plot in Figure 6, demonstrates the effects of rework. In this case 
rework peaks at week 48 (line C) and is estimated at 75%. This means three of every four 
tasks must be redone, by some measures a conservative estimate especially when 
considering software development projects (Cooper & Mullen, 1993). Similarly, line B (Work 
to be Done) shows a much longer completion time than that of Figure 6. Completion time in 
this model run is 229 weeks, an increase of 111.5 weeks over the generic model in Figure 1, 
an almost 100% increase in schedule. Another way of considering the impact of rework is 
that instead of the 1000 tasks originally required, the number of tasks completed was 
1,437—a significant increase in work requiring more time and money.  
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Figure 7. Model Showing the Effects of Rework 
While this is an elementary model, it demonstrates that something as simple as 
rework can have a significant effect on project schedules.  
A tool used in system dynamics to capture cause and effect is a causal map. The 
causal map becomes a tool used for the development of a model of the delay factors 
identified. Figure 8 is an initial causal loop diagram capturing some of the identified factors 
in weapons system program schedule delays. The factors shown are a subset of those 
identified for brevity in this paper.  
 
Figure 8. Delay Factors Triggers for Project Delays 
(Howick, 2003) 
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Delay factors plus the effects of rework, decision wait time, tasks start delay, and 
other disruptions result in the PM (or PMO) recognizing a schedule problem (delay in the 
critical path). Invariably, the PM must take action to attempt to return the project to the 
equilibrium expressed as being on schedule. This, the PM could approve overtime, 
reschedule, or take some other mitigation. The pressure to get back on schedule is driven 
by many factors including cost considerations, pressure from the oversight organizations, 
and in weapons systems development, the necessity of delivering capability to the 
warfighter in the most efficient time. Regardless of the reason, the PM “does something.” 
The plus and minus signs indicate the effect of the actions taken.  
The project is a dynamic system with feedback loops, and invariably decisions taken 
to address one problem have impact on or create new problems. For example, approving 
overtime does initially address schedule issues as more work is being done in shorter 
periods. However, a recognized problem of overtime is fatigue. Fatigue causes workers to 
make mistakes, and those mistakes result in having to redo the work, thus perpetuating 
problems that were thought solved.  
Similarly, hiring more workers causes more problems. Assuming the new workers 
have the requisite skills, they need to be trained/ acclimated to the actual project situation. In 
the Mythical Man Month, Brooks (1995) explained how this concept works in software 
development. In reality, it is universal (Brooks, 1995).  
Finally, while many of the delay factors identified from the SAR analysis can be 
explained in Figure 4, others require further examination. One of the biggest challenges is 
the area of decisions, both internal and external. The internal decisions drive many of the 
actors discussed above. However, the PM must also deal with external decisions that can 
eventually impact the development.  
Figure 9 is a notional graphic that represents a generic decision cycle in the context 
of the rework cycle. While the results of this data analysis included rework, the majority of 
the identified delay factors were decision-focused. Those decision centric factors included 
represent this decision cycle. The notation is shown between the work to be done and work 
completed boxes because many of the decisions identified occur outside the project 
manager’s purview. The exogenous factors identified cause either reactions to those factors, 
or force other internal decisions. While not normally a part of the rework cycle, we suggest 
that a formal appreciation of a decision cycle, and the time it takes for decisions to be made 
both internal as well as external to the program management cycle must be considered.  
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Figure 9. Notional Decision Cycle Added to Rework Cycle Diagram 
Conclusion 
No program manager sets out to overrun a schedule. “However, clients increasingly 
value not only cost and schedule control but cost and schedule certainty” (Godlewski et al., 
2012, p. 18). Those clients for defense acquisition products seek certainty as well, both in 
cost and schedule. It is no secret that current methods for estimating and executing 
schedule are insufficient. In fact, certainty is one of the potential benefits of this examination 
of schedule factors. Project certainty starts in effective schedule planning.  
This study presented a methodology to extract and identify schedule information 
from Selected Acquisition Reports, as well as a process for identifying classifying delay 
factors in weapons system acquisition programs. Finally, the study presented a suggested 
adjunct to the current scheduling methods that would allow project managers to use 
historically accurate delay factors to augment their decision processes. 
This exploration of the big data aspects of defense acquisition is the first step in a 
continuing effort to explore not only details of schedule, but broader details and insights on 
the way we manage defense acquisition programs. The next step is to link the insights 
gained from this look at the scheduling part of the SAR to the Acquisition Program baseline 
(APB). The APB, oft referenced in this effort, is the vehicle to explore the entire scheduling 
history of an acquisition. This, we believe, could provide a better understanding of the 
causes of the delays by establishing a trace between results reported in a SAR, to the factor 
that caused the delay. 
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Abstract 
It is challenging to standardize data; yet, the capabilities to draw upon data across 
information systems hold huge potential for improving defense acquisition and procurement. 
Acquisition planning and management involves many decision-making and action-taking 
processes that cover a complex environment including actual acquisition, contracting, fiscal, 
legal, personnel, and regulatory requirements. A sound decision-making process has to rely 
on data—high quality data. Often the available data is dirty, outdated, incomplete, or 
insufficient for the expert to make a decision. On the other hand, there are enormous 
amounts of data on the web that can be utilized to crystalize the needed information. These 
data repositories are often publicly accessible and from a variety of sources including 
websites, government reports, news, wikis, blogs, online forums, and social media. This 
paper investigates how to leverage the information in public data sources to complement the 
internal data in order to support effective acquisition planning and management. This 
research is based on publicly available government acquisition databases at 
usaspending.gov and fpds.gov. It takes a data science approach for analyzing acquisition 
databases and focuses on two major tasks: (1) research on leveraging the web data for 
quality assessment and improvement of federal acquisition data and (2) research on 
appropriate data analytic techniques to discover useful information that can potentially help 
federal acquisition management and planning process. 
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Introduction 
Military agencies collect, store, and integrate data from various sources in their 
acquisition and procurement decisions and management processes. However, data 
complexity is profound. Often, data are publicly available, but can be dirty, and become 
even dirtier due to biases during collection. Furthermore, acquisition, procurement, and 
contract data have varying data quality problems and can thus be difficult or even 
impossible to integrate.  
Across the Department of Defense (DoD), there are hundreds of information systems 
that are drawn upon for defense acquisition and procurement tasks. It is challenging to 
standardize data across all of these information systems; yet, the capabilities to draw upon 
data from these systems not only are essential, but also hold huge potential for improving 
acquisition and procurement and reducing substantial costs across various acquisition and 
procurement programs. A critical challenge facing the DoD, and federal agencies in general, 
is how to develop data visibility capabilities to support various acquisition and procurement 
tasks without enforcing a single data standard across these hundreds of systems.  
On the other hand, the vast quantity of online information provides great 
opportunities for us to harvest and enrich our data and knowledge. There are a variety of 
sources for the data including company and government websites and reports, news outlets, 
wikis, blogs, online forums, and social media. These sources contain rich information about 
almost everything and any subject we can think of. Indeed, searching for the needed 
information on the web has become a common practice for Internet users nowadays, thanks 
to the advancement of search engines and web technologies. If properly utilized, online 
information may help us assess and even improve the quality of the data we have. For 
instance, if a record contains a contractor’s name but the address information is missing, we 
can fill the missing address by googling the contractor’s address on the Internet. Similarly, if 
a contractor’s DUNS number is found incorrect, then we may be able to find the right DUNS 
number by querying the websites that host DUNS number database.  
A recent study by the Rand Corporation titled Issues With Access Acquisition Data 
and Information in the Department of Defense recommends several options for improving 
the DoD’s acquisition data (McKernan et al., 2016). One option is to improve the quality and 
analytic value of acquisition data. It stated that according to information managers, data 
verification and validation are top priorities and the practice of building both manual and 
automated checks should be continued and expanded to other systems. Another option is to 
improve data analytic capabilities by continuing to collect both structured and unstructured 
data. It recommends that the DoD should try to come up with better ways of utilizing the 
unstructured data it collects.  
This research aims to investigate appropriate data science approaches to improving 
the quality of federal acquisition data as well as discovering useful patterns that can further 
acquisition research. It will examine the feasibility of leveraging the information on the 
Internet for verification and validation of acquisition data. Utilizing online information faces 
several challenges. One of the key challenges is how to find the information that is credible 
and accurate from often an enormous amount of unstructured documents returned by a 
search. For instance, the information of an entity may spread out on various websites that 
have collected data from different sources and at different times. When searching the entity 
on the web, we may end up with thousands of if not millions of hits. Some of them may be 
incorrect and some out-of-date. Thus identifying the hits that contain both accurate and 
current information becomes a challenge. To make the problem even worse, the majority of 
online information is non-structured and textual. Thus, the question of how to extract the 
needed information from non-structured text becomes another challenge. 
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Research Issues 
The web has greatly changed our ways of sharing and seeking information. At the 
same time, it has also altered traditional notions of trust due to the fact that the information 
can be published anywhere by anyone for any purpose, and there is no authority to certify 
the correctness of the information. It is up to the information consumers to make their own 
judgement about the credibility and accuracy of information they encountered online. To 
utilize online information effectively, this research needs to investigate appropriate methods 
to acquire valuable and reliable information online. Reliability of information can be 
measured from different aspects such as accuracy, timeliness, authority of information, 
trustworthiness of websites, and so forth. Consistency is another common issue with web 
data because the data on same subject might be different, or represented in different 
formats, scales, or metrics. Thus, resolving inconsistency of data from different sources and 
identifying the most accurate information become other key topics of this research. 
As the majority of data on the web are unstructured text documents, it is challenging 
to identify, retrieve, and integrate the needed information from the web documents. Retrieval 
of desired information is not a trivial task and involves natural language processing, 
computational linguistics, text analysis, and entity identification and resolution. Other 
challenges of text analysis include complex and subtle relationships between concepts in 
text as well as ambiguity and context sensitivity of terms in text. The research will examine 
ways to identify and collectively integrate the needed information from both public and 
internal sources, and to leverage them for further acquisition research.  
Research Methodology 
This study is based on Federal Acquisition databases at USAspending.gov, which 
contains spending information of all U.S. departments between the years 2000 and 2018 for 
a selected state or all states. The data can be downloaded in different formats, such as 
CSV, TSV, and XML. Spending data are further categorized under prime award and sub-
award. The types of spending include contracts, grants, loans, and other financial 
assistance. Our downloaded data contains 47GB data in total, covers the DoD budget 
between 2000 and 2017 including each type of spending data for both prime award and sub-
award. We set up a database system to host the data. 
Figure 1 shows the framework of the proposed Data Enhancement and Analytics 
System. The system has four major components, namely Quality Assessment engine (QA), 
Data Cleaning engine (DC), Data Enhancement and Analytics engine (DAE), and Text 
Retrieval and Analysis engine (TRA). The key component is Text Retrieval and Analysis 
engine as it supports the functionalities of the rest three components. TRA is responsible for 
four tasks: (1) performing searches on the Internet, (2) identifying the websites that contain 
the most reliable data, (3) extracting the desired information from the text, and (4) 
information fusion by collectively integrating information from multiple sources. When 
information needed for quality assessment and data cleaning is not available, TRA will 
search and extract the needed information online. Data Analytics and Enhancement engine 
aims to enhance our knowledge about data by discovering hidden and interesting patterns in 
the data as well as complementing the internal data with the information that is not found in 
the database but is potentially useful for advanced data analytics. 
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Figure 1. Framework of Data Enhancement and Analytics System 
Our research methodology contains following steps: 
 Assess the quality of the sample acquisition database in terms of accuracy, 
consistency, and completeness. Assessment on completeness is rather 
straightforward; however, assessment on accuracy and consistency is not, as 
it requires the extra knowledge about data and their semantics. For instance, 
to decide whether a value is accurate or not, we need to know what the 
expected correct value is. To evaluate whether the two values are consistent, 
we need to know their semantics and relationship. If they are not consistent, 
then we need to know which value is wrong and causing the inconsistency 
issue. Unfortunately, we do not always have the information we need for the 
quality assessment.  
 Based on the quality assessment findings obtained in step 1, identify the 
fields for quality improvement. The key task of this step is to investigate the 
feasibility of leveraging the information online for both quality assessment and 
improvement. It will research on effective ways to evaluate the credibility of 
websites and to extract reliable information from a large amount of web 
pages.  
 Apply appropriate data analytics methods to discover useful patterns from the 
data. 
 Utilize online data to complement the information of the sample database. 
The primary objective of this step is to research appropriate text mining 
methods to retrieve the information for the purpose of advanced data 
analytics. Examples of information may include a business’s product/service 
information, location, business type, business size, business relationship 
networks. This information can help us estimate the uniqueness of a business 
as well as the level of risk it might potentially pose to a project if it fails. The 
findings of this step can further acquisition research by identifying the room 
for improvement of a project. 
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Preliminary Research Findings 
Quality Assessment 
The data in sample database are organized into four tables: primeContracts, 
subContracts, PrimeGrants, and SubGrants. Table 1 shows general information about the 
tables, where RecCnt and ColCnt represent the number of records and number of columns 
in a table respectively; CompleteCols and SingleValCols represent the number of columns 
with no missing values and number of columns with only a single value across all records; 
and EmptyCols and IncompleteCols represent the number of empty columns and the 
number of columns with missing values respectively. 
Table 1. Table Information of the Sample Database 
Table Name RecCnt ColCnt CompleteCols/ 
SingleValCols 
EmtpyCols IncompleteCols 
PrimeContracts 23,677,787 212 50/1 0 162 
SubContracts 395,569 101 41/0 3 57 
PrimGrants 202,166 67 32/5 2 33 
SubAGrants 11,115 101 29/4 25 47 
For the quality assessment purpose, attributes are classified into two categories: 
identity attributes and non-identity attributes. Identity attributes provide identifier information 
for a contract or a contractor including project identifiers, contractor identifiers, address, 
telephone, and so forth. The rest attributes are non-identity attributes that do not provide 
identifier information. This study focuses on the quality assessment of only identity attributes 
on three dimensions: column completeness, accuracy, and field length consistency. Only 
PrimeContracts and SubContracts tables are used in this study as they have relatively more 
quality issues. 
Column Completeness 
Completeness can be measured in different aspects including column completeness, 
schema completeness, and population completeness. Column completeness measures the 
degree to which there exist missing values in a column of a table. Schema completeness 
measures the degree to which entities and attributes are missing from the schema. 
Population completeness measures the degree to which members of the population that 
should be present but are not present. Since there is not enough information for assessing 
schema and population completeness, the study will focus only on column completeness, 
which is measured by the percentage of non-missing values in the column.  
Figures 2 and 3 show the completeness measures for identity attributes of 
PrimeContracts and SubContracts tables respectively. PrimeContracts table has perfect or 
near perfect completeness on three attributes. SubContracts table has 100% completeness 
on prime_award_piid and subawardee_dunsnumber, but it has missing values on both 
prime awardee’s and subawardee’s parent dunsnumbers. A possible reason might be some 
contractors may not have a parent company. 
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Figure 2. Completeness Measure of Identity Attributes for PrimeContracts Table 
 
Figure 3. Completeness Measures of Identity Attributes for SubContracts Table 
Attribute Length Consistency 
Attribute length consistency measures how consistent lengths of an attribute’s values 
are. Each identity attribute of the PrimeContrats table is supposed to have fixed-length 
values, as are the identity attributes of the SubContracts table. For example, a DUNS 
number, provided by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), is a unique nine-digit identification number for 
each physical location of a business. Thus a DUNs number of other than nine digits is 
problematic. Figures 4 and 5 show the assessment of attribute length consistency of both 
tables. DUNS numbers in PrimeContracts table have a variety lengths; while DUNS 
numbers in SubContracts are consistently of nine digits. 
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Figure 4. Field Length Consistency Assessment of PrimeContracts Table 
 
Figure 5. Field Length Consistency Assessment of SubContracts Table 
Accuracy  
Data is accurate if it is free of error and conforms to gold standards of data. 
Accessing accuracy is not an easy task as it requires the knowledge of correct data and 
needs to compare each data item with the known correct value, which is often not available. 
The accuracy assessment of this study will focus on the DUNS numbers first, because we 
can use the free service provided by Duns & Bradstreet database to search a business’s 
DUNS number based on its name.  
Quality Improvement 
For proof of concept, the first phase of this research will focus on fixing incorrect 
DUNS numbers, and the online Duns & Bradstreet database will be used for this purpose. 
Duns & Bradstreet database contains DUNS numbers of 285 million commercial entities and 
100 million associated contacts. It provides the services that allow users to search a 
company’s information by name, telephone number, or DUNS number. When searching for 
a DUNS number, the database doesn’t return the query results immediately, instead the 
results are sent through email. This somehow discourages the use of a script program to 
automatically submit a query and retrieve the results. 
Given a business’s DUNS number, the Duns & Bradstreet database can be queried 
for the corresponding business name, address, and telephone number. It is a bit tricky when 
querying the DUNS number based on the company name, as a company may have more 
than one DUNs number with one for each branch. To identify the right DUNS number for a 
branch, extra information such as the street address, zip code, and telephone number is 
needed. 
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The research started with the dunsnumber attribute of the PrimeContracts table. 
There are a total of 26 records in the table, all with a 10-digit dusnumber. A closer study on 
those DUNS numbers revealed that most of them are actually the phone numbers. Among 
those records, only three have information on vendorname attribute. The rest of the records 
misplace the vendor names into other fields. Since a company may have multiple branches 
with each located at a different address, searching the DUNs database by a business name 
may result in multiple matches. Thus address information is critical for finding the best 
match. Unfortunately, address information is misplaced in all 26 records. Figure 6 shows a 
few columns of the 26 records with misplaced values for vendor name and address. 
 
Figure 6. Partial View of Records With Misplaced Values 
Figure 7 shows an example of using online database to retrieve the DUNS number 
for the business with a single DUNS number. Figure 8 shows an example of extracting the 
DUNS numbers of companies that have multiple DUNS numbers. The vendor name, 
address, zip code, and telephone numbers are used to identify the highlighted best match, 
then the corresponding DUNS number is retrieved. 
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Figure 7. Examples of DUNS Number Extraction Using Online DUNS Database 
 
Figure 8. Examples of Identifying the Best Match in Online DUNS Database 
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For records with both incorrect DUNS number and missing vendor name, it is still 
possible to find the correct DUNS information if those records have correct and current 
phone numbers and address information. 
Figure 9 shows the DUNS numbers, addresses, and telephone numbers that are 
retrieved from Duns & Bradstreet database for all 26 records. Both old and new DUNS 
numbers are displayed. For records with IDs 2 and 16, Duns & Bradstreet returns only a 
single match based on the business name; however, the returned street address is different 
from the one in the acquisition database. For records with IDs 8 and 11, Duns & Bradstreet 
returns multiple matches, all with the identical address and business name. So the DUNs 
number of the headquarters branch is chosen. Overall, 22 out of 26 records have 
dunsnumber filled by using the online DUNS database. The next phase of this study will be 
the validation and verification of the DUNS numbers and address information. 
We are in the process of automating the DUNS number retrieval process, which is 
also a component of the Text Retrieval and Analysis engine. The Duns & Bradstreet 
database will be used due to its authority and reputation. The main challenge of DUNS 
number retrieval is to identify the best match for a company in the online database. This is 
indeed an entity resolution problem. Due to possible data quality problems in the sample 
database such as misplaced fields, typos, and missing and dirty values, identification of an 
exact match in DUNS database might not always be possible. The probabilistic matching 
methods appears promising as they can handle fuzzy matches more effectively. Another 
challenge is to identify the misplaced attribute values. The research will explore the methods 
for automatically sensing the semantics of a field based on its syntactic features and 
relationship with other fields and records. 
 
Figure 9. DUNs Numbers and Addresses Retrieved From Duns & Bradstreet 
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Data Mining  
Data mining is the process of examining large data sets to uncover hidden but 
interesting patterns such as unknown correlations, market trends, customer preferences, 
and other useful business information. The analytical findings can shed significant insights 
to help add perspective to use the data and to lead to more effective decision makings. 
Some major data mining techniques include association discovery, classification, clustering, 
regression, sequence or path analysis, and structure and network analysis.  
Association discovery aims to find frequent patterns that represent the inherent 
regularities in the datasets. Applications of association discovery include association, 
correlation, and causality analysis; basket data analysis; and cross-marketing, and so forth. 
Classification, also called supervised learning, is the task of inferring a function from labeled 
training dataset. The function can then be used to classify new data instances. Decision 
tree, Bayesian networks, support vector machine, and neural networks are some of the 
commonly used models for classification. Clustering, also called non-supervised learning, 
group a collection of data objects into groups according a predefined distance function. 
Clustering can be employed as a stand-alone tool to get insights about data or as a 
preprocessing tool for other algorithms. Sequence analysis discovers patterns among 
sequences of ordered events or elements. Application of sequence patterns include 
customer shopping sequence, DNA sequences and gene structures, sequences of stock 
market changes, and so forth. Graph and network analysis aims to discover frequent 
subgraphs, trees, or substructures. It has been used for social networks analysis and web 
mining.  
Cluster and Network Analysis 
As the first phase of the research, network analysis is performed on prime 
contractors and their subcontractors of the sample database in a hope to discover the 
business networks among contractors. Figure 10 visualizes some findings from the network 
analysis. It shows the top three big contractors that have the largest number of 
subcontractors, and top three highly demanded subcontractors who are working for the 
largest number of different contractors. 
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Figure 10. Cluster Analysis of Contractors 
Figure 11 shows the clustering results of only contractors that worked with at least 
five subcontractors. Figure 11(a) shows overall clustering result, where each dot represents 
a primary contractor. The dots in orange are “big” primary contractors with many 
subcontractors. The dots in purple are relatively “small” primary contractors. Figure 11(b) 
shows zoomed-in clusters for two big prime contractors. 
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Figure 11. Clustering Results for Contractors Involved in More Than Five Projects 
Figure 12 shows the analysis of the relationship between contractors and 
subcontractors by state. Each dot represents a state. The size of a dot is determined by the 
number of contracts awarded to a state. A directed edge represents the relationship 
between primary contractors and their subcontractors (pointed by an arrow). The thicker an 
edge is, the more contracts there are between the primary contractors and their 
subcontractors. The figure shows that some states, like California, get more contracts than 
others, and some states, like Illinois, tend to subcontract their projects to the other states. 
 
Figure 12. Clustering Results by State 
Figure 13 shows the relationship of contractors of different business types. Each dot 
represents contractors of the same business type. A line between two dots indicates 
companies of two different business types are related by a contract. The figure reveals that 
companies tend to give subcontracts to the companies of the same business type. There 
are only two outliers that relate companies of different types. 
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Figure 13. Relationship of Companies of Different Business Types 
Pattern Discovery 
A preliminary data analysis was performed and aimed to discovery patterns that may 
shed insights into possible areas for improvement in acquisition projects. For instance, small 
contractors are usually less robust and easier to fail compared to large contractors when 
facing natural or man-made disasters. Projects with subcontractors located in places that 
have a high risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes may have risks of a potential delay 
in delivery time. By taking into account of the risk factors in planning a project can help 
identify the room for improvement to ensure the successful and prompt delivery of the 
project. 
The first round of analysis focused on finding the following patterns in the existing 
projects: (1) small-business subcontractors that are involved in different projects led by 
some key primary contractors and (2) projects that have multiple subcontractors located in a 
place that has a high risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, or 
wild fires. The following section discusses two examples of our findings. 
Finding 1  
PTB is a small, single-location company with less than 200 employees. It was 
involved in six different projects led by some key primary contractors including Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, and L-3 Communications. The average award amount is about $5,400. A 
close study of the company’s website, shown as Figure 14, revealed it may provide some 
important services to its primary contractors. Since company websites and the acquisition 
database are all publicly accessible, they might be used by enemies for inferring sensitive 
information on a project or planning attacks to make the project fail. 
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Figure 14. Snapshot of PTB Webpages 
Finding 2 
We retrieved locations of 7.0-magnitude quake epicenters in United States from the 
U.S. Geological Survey website, www.usgs.gov, and identified 118 subcontractors located 
nearby an epicenter of 7.0-magnitude quake. In SubContracts table, 984 awards have at 
least one subcontractor located in the high-risk earthquake areas; 41 of them have at least 
two subcontractors located in the high-risk areas. Table 3 shows the top five contracts with 
the most number of subcontractors in high-risk earthquake areas. 
Table 2. Top Five Contracts With the Most Number of Subcontractors in High 
Risk Earthquake Areas 







We did a preliminary exploration of whether a correlation exists between 
procurement data and employment information. The result shows that large reductions in 
federal contracts are correlated in a majority of cases (66% or 75%, depending on the metric 
used) to drops in employment in a given region and industry. This finding shows that it is 
possible to determine the location of an undisclosed contractor by examining public 
employment data at the times when large contracts are reduced or simply reach the end of 
their period. Such undisclosed contractors are typically employed by larger government 
contractors to achieve confidentiality, security, or a competitive advantage. Depending on 
the situation, acquisition experts may need additional planning to protect such hidden 
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contractors if security is desired, or may rely on data science to identify these contractors 
and avoid them becoming a weak link in the acquisition process. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The paper proposed a Data Enhancement and Analytics framework that is designed 
to use public data for improving quality and data analytic capabilities of the acquisition data. 
A proof of concept analysis was conducted to show the feasibility of using web information 
for quality assessment and improvement of the sample database. Still more needs to be 
done to implement the framework.  
The future work will focus on the following two directions. First, we will research 
effective text analysis and trust evaluation techniques to identify credible and valuable 
information from the web. Second, we will research appropriate big data analytic techniques 
that can help enhance decision-making capabilities for acquisition management and 
planning. 
Literature Review 
This section summarizes some related work in the fields of federal acquisition data 
analysis, trust in web information, and Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE).  
Federal Acquisition Data Analysis 
Apte, Rendon, and Dixon (2015) explored the use of big data analytic techniques to 
explore and analyze large dataset that are used to capture information about DoD services 
acquisitions. The paper described how big data analytics could potentially be used in 
acquisition research. As the proof of concept, the paper tested the application of big data 
analytic techniques by applying them to a dataset of Contractor Performance Assessment 
Report System (CPARS) ratings of 715 acquired services. It also created predictive models 
to explore the causes of failed services contracts. Since the dataset used in the research 
was rather small and far from the scope of big data, the techniques explored by the paper 
mainly focus on traditional data mining techniques without taking into account of big data 
properties. 
Black, Henley, and Clute (2014) studied the quality of narratives in Contract 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) and their value to the acquisition 
process. The research used statistical analysis to examine 715 Army service contractor 
performance reports in CPARS in order to understand three major questions: (1) To what 
degree are government contracting professionals submitting to CPARS contractor 
performance narratives in accordance with the guidelines provided in the CPARS user’s 
manual? (2) What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives beyond the 
value of the objective scores for performance? (3) What is the statistical relationship 
between the sentiment contained in the narratives and the objective scores for contractor 
evaluations?  
Our proposed research focuses on a much broader scope of acquisition projects. 
The research starts with cleaning and enhancing the acquisition data first. Once data is 
clean enough and has sufficient information, then advanced data analytic techniques will be 
applied in hopes of discovering interesting patterns that can be used to further acquisition 
management and planning research. 
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Trust in Web Information 
Extensive research has been conducted on evaluating credibility and trust of online 
information, primarily textual information. The research by Corritore, Kracher, and 
Wiedenbeck (2003) identified three factors that impact trust in online environment: 
perception of credibility, ease of use, and risk. Cheskin (1999) identified six major features 
that encouraged trust in websites. The features are brand (the reputation of a company), 
seals of approval (icons from companies that certify a site as following security measures), 
ease of navigation, fulfillment (trust or distrust developed in using the web), presentation, 
and technology. In addition to the six features, the trust is expected to develop over time. 
The more interaction between the user and a website, the more information the user would 
gain to decide how much to trust it. Fogg et al. (2001) studied what makes a website 
credible. It defined credibility as believability and considered trustworthiness a major 
component of credibility. The paper also identified four factors as contributing to 
trustworthiness, namely linking (where the user was linked from and where the site links), 
policy statement, social recommendations, and business interest.  
The commonly recommended approaches to online information evaluation include 
five criteria, including checking the accuracy, authority, objectivity, currency, and coverage 
or scope of the information and/or its source (Metzger, 2007). Accuracy refers to the degree 
to which a website is error free. The authority can be about a website or an author of 
information. The authority of a website is usually measured by its reputation and authority. 
The authority of an author is measured by the author’s credentials and qualifications on the 
specific subject of information. Objectivity measures whether the information is fact or 
opinion. Currency refers to how up-to-date the information is, and coverage refers to the 
comprehensiveness or depth of the information provided. 
Recent research shows that people tend to use verification strategies that require the 
least effort to perform. For instance, instead of using the recommended five criteria in 
evaluation, they opted to base decisions on factors like website design and navigability 
(Fogg et al., 2003). These findings are consistent with some recent credibility studies 
(Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008) and with theories from information processing and cognitive science 
(Sundar, 2008; Taraborelli, 2008). These theories stipulate that people have constraints on 
their ability to process information, and they tend to use cognitive resource that is just 
enough for a sufficiently optimal outcome for the evaluation task (Lang, 2000; Fogg et al., 
2003). 
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Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) 
Acquisition Visibility (AV) is the concept of providing the DoD with data and analysis 
support capabilities to inform the acquisition community. DAVE establishes a framework for 
improved and expanded support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). As shown in Figure 15, DAVE employs a three-
tiered architecture that contains the DAVE portal, DAVE Platform, and AV Data Framework. 
 
Figure 15. Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) 
The DAVE portal is a synthesis of interactive infrastructure including data 
visualizations, calendars, and project management tools that are set to continue to grow in 
scope and capability as DAVE expands. These diverse tools with analysis capabilities will 
help users answer such questions as, “Are we solving a business problem by assessing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the project?” and “What value does the project add to 
acquisitions in the Department of Defense?” 
The DAVE platform includes the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for data 
management, data storage, metrics, and security. The DAVE platform determines the APIs 
for facilitating data access, and determines to which party the information can be shared. 
The APIs are the building blocks that allow for the integration of features or data, and the 
platform itself processes the data to get it to the state users require, as well as coordinating 
internal processes.  
The AV Data Framework is the foundation on which the portal and platform are built 
and provides a number of essential elements including use cases, data elements and 
definitions, business rules, guidelines and markers regarding ownership of data, and data 
sensitivity classifications.  
The proposed Data Cleansing and Enhancement System in this research can be 
used to support part of the functionalities of the DAVE platform as it prepares the data to the 
state that is suitable for user consumption or further analysis by the data leaning and 
enhance processes.  
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Abstract 
The impetus of this work is to develop a complete and ubiquitous approach to 
augment the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) decision process 
quantitatively. The proposed solution provides a methodology that emphasizes the ontology 
of senior leadership questions, highlights those data sets that are relevant, and leverages a 
suite of methodologies that meet the ontological requirements. We propose a data 
democratization and utilization platform (Laniakea) as well as a four-stage analytical engine 
(QuANTUM) to achieve this objective. We posit that tethering these approaches to the 
PPBE problem set will enhance the derived solutions through a technologically-scalable, 
mathematically-flexible, and factually-rigid solution and that this will enhance leadership’s 
overall awareness, and to understand and chart a way toward cognitive supremacy. 
Introduction 
To achieve victory, an adversary with fewer resources must neutralize their 
disadvantage. This economic pressure will likely require an evolution in their strategy which 
maneuvers around these disadvantages. As the U.S. military retains its dominance over 
certain domains while pursuing others, it causes evolutionary pressures to its adversaries to 
adapt accordingly. Given the U.S. military’s current trajectory, these evolutionary pressures 
are showing beyond traditional battle spaces, such as with Unrestricted Warfare (UW)1, 
hybrid warfare, sub rosa,2 or casus fortuitus3 operations. To prepare for these types of 




 From the Chinese phrase 超限战 and directly translates to “warfare beyond bounds.” Its core tenets 
include financial and economic warfare, lawfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, and terrorism 
(Xiangsui & Qiao, 1999). 
2
 Translated from Latin and means “under the rose.” It is used to describe clandestine types of 
operations (Libicki, n.d.). 
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challenges, we must modify our approach to plan, program, budget, and execute with these 
in mind. By augmenting our decision processes quantitatively and with appropriate analytical 
techniques and technologies, we can attempt to achieve praxeological optimization toward 
cognitive supremacy to help counter these emerging and exotic types of threats as well as 
continue to hedge against classical sorts as well. 
The intent of this initiative is to integrate scientific and analytical precision in the 
DoD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process while 
appreciating the ontological differences that the questions leadership propose may exhibit, 
demonstrating the power of authoritative data sources (ADS)4 under correct conditions, and 
fully leveraging the full suite of analytical methodologies that exist. The PPBE process spans 
each domain and functional area, involves multiple stakeholders, and is constrained to limit 
objective information toward logical and feasible solutions. There is a critical need to provide 
pertinent facts, identify interdependencies, and understand historical rationale to ensure the 
highest probability of success while making investment and divestiture decisions for DoD 
force structure. A cause of these challenges listed above is the lack of adequate access to 
pertinent data to substantiate their decision process quantitatively due to the federated style 
of data management that currently exists, consequently causing inefficiencies in the “Data-
to-Decisions” paradigm. The DoD requires a change to address this problem toward a 
technologically-scalable, mathematically-flexible, and factually-rigid methodology to replace 
the current monopoly via subjective interpretation. 
We define the following four concepts specifically as they provide the necessary 
terminology for this paper: Cognitive Supremacy (CS), Quantitative Augmentation (QuA), 
Ubiquitous Modeling (UM), and Question Class (QC). 
 Cognitive Supremacy is the ability to hold complete control in the decision 
space over an adversary. 
 Quantitative Augmentation is a process which provides technologically-
scalable, mathematically-flexible, and factually-rigid methodologies to 
enhance the decision process scientifically.  
 Ubiquitous Modeling is the ability to describe any system using appropriate 
ontological methodologies.  
 A Question Class is a set of questions which are ontologically5 equivalent.  




 Translated from Latin and means “an inevitable accident.” It is used to describe non-reputable 
operations which may be carried out on an adversary. An example would be financial market 
manipulation and then attributing those effects to normal market fluctuations. 
4
 “[A] recognized or official data production source with a designated mission statement or 
source/product to publish reliable and accurate data for subsequent use by customers. An 
authoritative data source may be the functional combination of multiple, separate data sources” (DoD, 
2007). 
5
 An ontology is the compartmentalization of problem solving techniques based on complexity, 
approach, computation, and variables that are required (O’Connor & Wong, 2012). 
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Question Classes 
A typical methodology to problem-solving is to dissect it into its causes. Once we 
identify these causes, then we are in a position to influence the aggregate behavior by 
affecting one or many of these causes. Several process improvement initiatives over the 
years, such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Air Force Smart Operations for the 
21st Century (AFSO21), have provided helpful tools and mechanisms to do so. However, 
using their standard techniques implies that the problems we wish to understand in more 
detail and dissect into their causes lend themselves to a deconstructable approach. As we 
will illustrate, this assumption does not hold true for many PPBE-level types of problems, 
and so this strategy has conditioned the community to persist in an ill-fated strategy. 
We propose an alternative to the typical process improvement problem solving by 
categorizing the types of questions based on their ontology. Once we establish a question’s 
ontology, then we may apply those methodologies which meet the ontological assumptions. 
Figure 1 illustrates the alternative view of problem-solving based on the concept of an 
ontology. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the Hierarchical Structure for the Four Proposed QC With 
Pertinent USAF Examples to Provide the Reader Context: Personnel 
Recruitment and Retention (PR&R),6 Agile Combat Support (ACS),7 
Readiness,8 and Cost-Effective Modernization (CEM)9 




 Represents the process that selects the personnel for the most appropriate Air Force Specialty 
Codes (AFSCs) based on their aptitude and preferences (Recruitment) and to optimize their dwelling 
within the enterprise (Retention). 
7
 Represents the support tail of the USAF enterprise and comprises approximately 40% of Total 
Obligation Authority (TOA). 
8
 The measure associated with efficiently allocating personnel and equipment to combat packets to 
meet operational objectives. 
9
 A USAF priority to revamp aging aircraft, satellite, and nuclear fleets in a manner to maximize 
lethality and utility for a given cost structure. 
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Type I: Query 
A query is a precise request for information retrieval from a database (DB) or 
information system (IS). The emphasis is on the content of the DB or IS and not on any 
ontology that may exist within the DB or IS. Queries require only the ADS on which we wish 
to run the query and require the least amount of technical expertise to do so. An example 
would be to list all females with the first name “Trista” from MilPDS.10 
Type II: Statistics 
A statistic condenses relationships which are stored in a DB or IS into parameters of 
a known statistical technique. There is an information transfer that occurs here from content 
to context. An example would be to test whether or not a normal distribution can accurately 
represent USAF entry test scores for enlisted members.  
Type III: Ontologically Reducible Behavior 
Deduced behavior based on the content of one or many DB or IS under 
consideration. We can dissect these relationships via one or several multivariate techniques 
and apply the typical cause analysis processes. An example would be how the fuel prices 
may constrain the number of sorties flown and may cause currency problems for fighter 
pilots. 
Type IV: Ontologically Irreducible or Emergent Behavior 
The resultant phenomenon where defined systems with clearly defined relationships 
may produce unpredictable and even unanticipated behaviors that are also more complex 
than any subsystem could produce in isolation. Therefore, we may not understand the 
etiological path as a set of few distinct and manageable factors. Furthermore, nearly all 
emergent-types of systems are ontologically irreducible to the lower levels (O’Connor & 
Wong, 2015). These systems include, but are not limited to, complex adaptive systems 
(CAS)11 which many DoD systems and processes seem to be. This class will likely apply to 
all senior level questions that include “effectiveness,” “agility,” and “lethality.”  
We propose a very simple example to illustrate how simple systems can become 
intractable to deconstruct. The output of a system we wish to model follows the logistic map 
in Equation 1, where 𝑥𝑛 is a number between null and unity and 𝜆 represents a value 
between null and 4. This is a relatively simple system, and the future value is dependent on 
the prior value. However, we obtain very different behavior from this system depending on 
the value of 𝜆 that we choose. For some values of 𝜆, this system will reach a steady-state; 
for other values, it will enter into oscillations, and for some values of 𝜆, the system will enter 
a state with no clear pattern.  
𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝜆 𝑥𝑛(1 − 𝑥𝑛)                                                                     (1) 




 “MilPDS is the single integrated ‘Total Force’ AF Human Resource system and authoritative data 
source for Total Force military records supporting all Active Duty, Guard, Reserve and retired AF 
members. MilPDS is the system of record that manages every aspect of an Airman’s career, including 
accessions, assignments, career management, separation and retirement. MilPDS was the selected 
platform to realize the AF/A1 AF Integrated Personnel and Pay capability” (U.S. Air Force, 2017). 
11
 A system in which a perfect information about each system subcomponent does not imply perfect 
information about the dynamics of all subcomponents in aggregate (Miller & Page, 2007). 
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As the analysts, we do not assume we know this relationship a priori, but wish to 
deduce this behavior from an ADS which captures observations from this system. Figure 2 
illustrates an observation subset. 
 
Note. We notice the erratic and unpredictable behavior that the system presents and which is 
difficult to predict or to deduce the underlying relationship analytically. 
Figure 2. Illustration of the First 200 Observations From the Logistic Map With 
𝒙𝟎 = 𝟎.𝟓 and 𝝀 = 𝟑. 𝟕 
Even with relatively simple systems such as in Equation 1, it may be difficult or 
impossible to deduce that these observations originate from a logistic map. A further 
complication is that the more complex the system is, the more observations you will likely 
require to validate a deduced relationship. However, there are likely insufficient observations 
necessary in a combination of ADS to sufficiently represent USAF questions of Type IV, and 
so we require a different approach which we will discuss later in this paper. 
We posit that understanding and appreciating the class in which a question resides is 
a necessary but not sufficient step to articulating the question quantitatively. It provides a 
glimpse into the level of effort and the types of methodologies that you will likely require to 
answer it in a scientifically-rigorous way, and this is a focus later in this article. By 
understanding which class in which a question resides will help the analyst understand 
which types of approaches they will have to use to formulate the question in the Specific, 
Measurable, Attainable, Results-based, and Time-bound (SMART) framework (O’Neil & 
Conzemius, 2006). When taking the QC into account, then several Lean Six Sigma12 
techniques such as Ishikawa diagrams, 5 Whys, and so forth can assist an analyst in 
dissecting a question into pertinent and quantifiable sub-questions.  
The query logic for Type I questions are a codified representation of the original 
question, and so as long as the data is available, this class is easy to answer. The answers 
we seek are only in the content of the data. For Type II questions, we seek the relationships, 
or the context, of specific data elements. Since the data content is available, we may run 
descriptive analytics against it and so arrive at specific statistics. These two QCs are nearly 




 A process improvement methodology which leverages collaborative team efforts to improve a 
system’s or process’s performance by removing waste and variation (Mills, Carnell, & Wheat, 2001). 
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trivial due to an analyst’s ability to obtain an answer directly from the data. However, with 
Type III questions, an analyst is now interested in the interrelationships between disparate 
ADS. There may be some hidden behavior that an analyst may not understand or observe, 
and this may lead to missing ADS that we should have included or the introduction of an 
ADS into the solution that provides no additional utility. Type III questions will likely require 
an iterative process with question formulation and ADS selection. Lastly, there is no 
guarantee that any combination of ADS may sufficiently address Type III and IV questions. It 
is very easy to construct a scenario in which an infinite amount of data may not provide an 
adequate understanding of the underlying system behavior. For Type IV questions, we may 
be able to understand broad behavior, but it remains an open question if we may achieve a 
more granular level of understanding.  
M3-Space 
The second component is to determine the fields in which ADS pertain to the 
question of interest. How to standardize and automate this approach remains an open 
question since there may be certain underlying behaviors present in the data that are not 
readily apparent and may involve fields that an analyst may overlook.  
We propose a first step in developing a solution strategy. By analyzing many senior-
level types of questions, a common theme becomes apparent. Many questions involve a 
combination of three core tenets: Manpower, Materiel, and Money, or M3. Therefore, it 
seems advantageous to map each ADS (and then later map each field within each ADS) to 
the region between these core tenets to gain insight to which ADS may provide utility to 
certain types of questions once they, too, are mapped to the M3-space. Figure 3 provides a 
notional example of several USAF core and external ADS and certain questions mentioned 
previously which are currently of interest to senior USAF leadership. 
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Note. The dashed lines represent the altitudes and represent locations where an ADS or 
question has equal representation for those core tenants on which it lies. Notionally, OLVIMS 
lies between M1 and M2 core tenants for example. 
Figure 3. Illustration of the Proposed M3-Space With Several USAF-Specific ADSs 
Such as GAFS,13 MiLPDS, and REMIS;14 Several External ADSs to the DoD 
Such as Bloomberg,15 CoreLogic,16 and Janes;17 as Well as Several USAF 
Enterprise-Wide Questions 
With this paradigm, we may chart the ADS locations between these three core 
tenets. This location will give us an idea of how likely an ADS may support a particular 
question of interest. Furthermore, if we map ADS which we have yet to obtain, then such an 




 “General Accounting & Finance System (GAFS) is owned and functionally managed by DFAS-
Columbus. It is used to process more than 3.2M accounting transactions totaling $3.4B monthly. 
GAFS-DTS processes more than$4.4M traveler payments annually; more than $4.5B in DoD travel 
payments” (U.S. Air Force, 2017). 
14
 Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) is the primary USAF data system for 
collecting, validating, editing, processing, integrating, standardizing, and reporting equipment 
maintenance data, including reliability and maintainability data, on a global, world-wide basis (U.S. Air 
Force, 2017). 
15
 One of the leading financial data vendors and brokers worldwide. 
16
 CoreLogic is a data broker which specializes in U.S. economic, housing, and personnel data. 
17
 Jane’s Information Group was a British publishing company which specialized in military, 
aerospace, and transportation topics. It was acquired in 2007 by IHS Inc. which continues to sell their 
data products. 
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approach may assist in determining which ADS we should prioritize next. We will likely wish 
to have a balanced mix of ADS that may contribute to all three core tenets at any given time, 
and so this approach may assist in that objective. 
Although the mapping of ADS is conceptually helpful, it only provides limited utility. 
Preferably, we require a granularity that is at the attribute level. The granularity will enable 
us to map each attribute to each core tenet or a combination of them. Unlike with the ADS 
mapping, an attribute mapping provides an added benefit that any attribute which maps to 
any altitude within the M3 is a key ID across those core tenets. Furthermore, an attribute that 
maps to the centroid is a key ID for all three core tenets and would be of high value to tie 
multiple ADSs together.  
Data Landscape 
Data Policy 
Standard practice for data analytics is to amass the necessary ADS locally or in the 
locally-owned and regulated environment. Each party signs some agreement to acquire one 
or more ADS to gain access or obtain a copy of one or more ADS. For DoD personnel and 
DoD organizations, this is usually via a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) or via a System 
Authorization Access Request (SAAR) or DD2875. The MoA is a binding agreement 
between the parties involved and establishes which ADS the parties will access, how the 
customer will access, store, and use this data; what data protection measures they will 
enforce; and what their procedures will be to eliminate the data once the agreement has 
expired. Parties typically use an MoA when one or more customers request more than one 
ADS. Customers typically submit the variation DD2875 via their chain of command and then 
on to the specific ADS owner to gain approval to access or obtain a copy of a particular 
ADS.  
Data Situation 
A general observation is that ADS are heterogeneous over multiple operating 
systems (primarily Windows, Linux, and Solaris) and utilize several DB environments 
including but not limited to Actian, DB2, Ingres,18 MS SQL Server, and Oracle as well as a 
variety of IS dating as early as the 1970s. In some cases, non-U.S. government third parties 
maintain these ADS outside of any DoD installation and are geographically disparate. 
Observations and Challenges 
The lack of a consistent DoD data acquisition process requires a considerable level 
of time investment to ascertain and comply with the nuances of any particular ADS. 
Typically, there is a low probability of establishing a relationship successfully with the 
owning organization if there is no potential for a symbiotic relationship or no higher authority 
mandates cooperation. A compounding factor to this challenge is that the DoD has little or 
no situational awareness about the number or location of DB or IS it possesses. Therefore, 
it can be difficult to request an ADS if it is arduous to locate the proper authority to request 
access. Furthermore, system administrators or database administrators (DBA) often are 
extremely specialized and therefore are no longer experts on an entire IS or DB. Therefore, 




 The INteractive Graphics REtrieval System is an open-source SQL relational database which was 
developed at the University of California, Berkeley, in the 1970s and is still in use in the DoD today. 
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we may require several teams of individuals for a single ADS. A particularly concerning 
observation is the compliance with outdated data management policies. Some data owners 
retain data for a couple of years and then purge or overwrite them with new data. This 
practice is particularly troublesome since we are unable to provide meaningful analytics 
within a problem set that requires this data once this data no longer exists. The rationale for 
these policies was a cost savings measure when electronic storage costs were considerably 
higher than only a few years ago. However, it is not sufficient to gain access or to obtain a 
copy of an ADS to conduct a meaningful analysis. One potentially overlooked, yet critical, 
item is a legend or explanation of the attributes and values contained in any ADS—or data 
dictionary. There are many instances where data dictionaries are either outdated, 
incomplete, or in some cases nonexistent. Lastly, there is a systemic lack of continuity to 
explain the changes a DB, IS, or ADS have undergone since their inception. The lack of 
continuity provides difficulties in interpreting changes within these systems or data sources 
and which may have significant implications on the analytical quality which an analyst can 
produce.  
Proposed Solution 
We offer a potential strategy to address these challenges by bifurcating, yet 
tethering, the problem into a data approach and analytics approach, as shown in Figure 4. 
To provide high-quality analytics that are useful to the larger community, we require a 
standardized process and framework to access and leverage many ADS. Since ADS within 
the DoD are heterogeneous, we require a considerable level of effort to Extract, Transform, 
and Load (ETL) them into a common environment. To leverage a large number of feasible 
tools, a cloud environment in the private sector is likely an improved solution over 
purchasing a suite of licenses for different ETL tools. A cloud solution would enable the ETL 
process to utilize tools that may also not possess the requisite approval for installation on 
machines connected to a U.S. government network. The Enterprise Information Model (EIM) 
provides the aggregation of knowledge for all data dictionaries, their commonalities, and 
combinations of cross-ADS attributes which analysts have used in the past. The 
environment that enables the ETL process, storing of ADS, and provides an overarching 
cloud solution for the AF and possibly DoD, is Laniakea.19 
We also suggest a common analytical base for the larger DoD community. The 
original intent of this analytical base was to have the ability to access and utilize ADS within 
Laniakea easily and so provide a more useful analytical toolset to the communities which 
wish to conduct analytics on a wide span of ADS. As previously argued, any analytical 
approach must provide sufficient flexibility to address each of the four types of QC. The 
platform that provides accessibility to Laniakea while providing a suite of analytical tools to 
the DoD community is the Quantitative Augmentation via Neuro-evolutionary Technologies 
toward Ubiquitous Modeling or QuANTUM. 




 The word Laniakea is Hawaiian and means ``immeasurable heaven.’’ It is the galaxy supercluster 
which contains the Milky Way and an estimated 100,000 other galaxies and spans approximately 520 
million light years. In this context, Laniakea refers to the USAF’s galactic data supercluster which 
seems appropriate due to the vastness of the USAF’s and DoD’s ADS. 
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The solution connects to the DoD Information Network (DoDIN)20 via an Internet 
Access Point (IAP), internet gateways, and Virtual Private Clouds (VPC). Each component, 
the web application firewalls, the bastion hosts, Laniakea, and QuANTUM, are physically 
and virtually distinct entities which connect with VPC peering which would enable added 
levels of security and inhibit transitivity of access to each isolated component in the chance 
an adversary exploited a vulnerability. Also, both Laniakea and QuANTUM have persistent 
monitoring to protect against threats or anomalous activity actively. 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the QuA Ecosystem as Conceived by the Authors 




 “The set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support 
personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and 
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other 
associated services, and national security systems” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2003; 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010). 
- 124 - 
The Analytical Engine—QuANTUM 
We require an analytical approach which would enable us to leverage the scientific 
process and, concerning the questions above, classes and ADS since there are multiple 
types of QCs and these classes require different strategies to address them adequately. 
Providing a common platform to access ADS and analytics is preferable since it would 
provide the opportunity to develop a common terminology throughout many communities. 
We posit that one of the difficulties in explaining a viewpoint is that the terminology is 
defined in disparate colloquialisms and human language and not on mathematics.  
We illustrate the example of Fully-Burdened Cost (FBC). The first challenge to using 
a definition is to locate one that is accepted by the larger DoD community. The definition for 
FBC seems to vary based on Service, organization, and experience. Typically, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) publishes lists periodically of general terms for the 
PPBE and other processes (GAO, 2005). There are three types of FBC listed in the 
Financial Management Regulation (FMR), namely cost for fuel, the unit cost of contractor-
acquired property, and composite rate of pay, allowances, taxes, and accruals (Under 
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, n.d.). Each of these definitions is not quantitatively well-
defined, and so the DoD guides estimate these types of fully-burdened costs (DoD, 2013). 
Since the DoD only provides not completely quantifiable guidance on how to interpret these 
definitions, it leaves the opportunity for variability in the calculation of these costs. This 
variability may provide confusion and inconsistencies in planning, programming, budgeting, 
and execution, and these inconsistencies may compound and result in suboptimal choices. 
An alternative approach would be to define these terms using a query language, such as 
Structured Query Language (SQL) that can access many records within ADS and so 
calculate a value that we can tether to fact. This proposed approach would incentivize many 
DoD communities which use similar terms such as FBC to develop common definitions so 
they may communicate with one another more intelligibly. This unprecedented clarity would 
be of additional benefit to higher levels of leadership, such as the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) since it would no longer need to interpret many inconsistent definitions of 
the same terminology. 
The next logical step after creating a standard data repository, such as Laniakea, 
and providing quantitative definitions for common terminology, would be to provide an 
analytical environment that may augment the decision process quantitatively and for varying 
QCs. The typical approach to conducting analysis is to amass those necessary ADS which 
are most pertinent to answering a question locally and then to devise an approach with 
those analytical tools which an analyst has at their disposal. Often the analyst is limited to 
the types of analytics they can perform since they have very few tools, and so they must 
create a toolset. This limitation is typical since many organizations cannot afford analytical 
suites of tools that would allow them to answer their questions more swiftly and rigorously. 
Also, the authorities for DoD IS have not yet cleared many formidable tools for installation 
on computers connected to government networks. This primary approach to conduct 
analytics is no longer feasible given financial, security, and other constraints. Therefore, we 
posit that an alternative solution exists that provides a higher level of accommodation for 
these concerns. We observe that the primary approach involves aggregating ADS to where 
the analytics reside. The alternative approach, or dual, would push the analytics to where 
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the ADS reside. This alternative would enable an analyst to generate a virtual machine 
(VM)21 in the cloud solution we mentioned and to virtually install an instance of many types 
of analytical products that would not be allowed otherwise. Although this provides an 
improved solution, the difficulty remains with having a sufficient number of licenses or 
proprietary products for the communities. 
An improvement would be an analytical platform which functions as a Platform-as-a-
Service (PaaS) and utilizes the ADS stored in Laniakea as a Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) 
approach. Therefore, this platform would function as a utility such as water, electricity, 
natural gas, or internet. This framework leverages economies of scale in that the cost per 
user declines as the number of users rises. Therefore, the incentive is for the developmental 
teams to maintain a viable and demonstrably superior platform for the communities to use. 
Therefore, this paper proposes a Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS)-owned platform that 
leverages a suite of ADS, provides common terminology via a query language, and provides 
a suite of analytical methodologies from which to choose. The platform takes advantage of 
computing at multiple classification levels and the ability to scale with its compute 
infrastructure.  
QuANTUM is an analytical engine that is comprised of four stages and is in parallel 
development with Laniakea as its data source. Each stage addresses and enhances the 
efforts of the prior stages and addresses their potential limitations. Stage I, Argos,22 is the 
analytical platform that provides a suite of tools ranging from simple queries from ADS to 
multivariate and advanced approaches such as topological data analytics (TDA), machine 
learning (ML), forecasting, and optimization. However, Argos can only address Types I 
through III. The reason is that we require historical observations to address these questions. 
With historical data, Argos is incapable of adequately addressing Type IV questions due to 
those reasons we discussed.  
To address the Type IV QC, we require an ontologically distinct methodology from 
that of Type I through III, and this difference is the focus of Stage II, Krishna.23 Since this is 
an approach to address the challenges as discussed briefly with the logistic map, we require 
a methodology that would provide some level of insight that lies beyond both internal and 
external ADS but can still leverage these ADS when appropriate. One possible methodology 
would be to utilize modeling and simulation (M&S) and so attempt to gain insights into the 
emergent behavior that may exist as simpler systems interact with one another. We may 
wish to compute many simulations with different initial conditions to get a general sense of 
how the system under consideration may behave. If there are significant deviations from the 
baseline system, then this might provide evidence to suggest that the system may require 
additional modifications to align both real and simulated systems more closely. The M&S 
environment that the Type IV QC concerning the DoD would require is a physics-based, 
continuous-time, imperfect information multi-agent framework at the campaign or multi-
campaign level. A physics-based approach is necessary to provide realism to the 




 An emulator of an IS. It is a software substitute for a physical machine. 
22
 Also known as Argus, Panoptes is a many-eyed, all-seeing giant in Greek mythology 
23
 The eighth avatar of Vishnu. He is the central figure in the Mahabharata, Bhagavata Puana, and 
the Bhagavad Gita. The impetus of the name is due to verse 32 in the Bhagavad Gita which also 
drew Robert Oppenheimer’s attention: “Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds” (Mascaro, 
1962). 
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environment. The model includes the application of physical laws and constraints within the 
environment such as gravity for munitions or aircraft and Line of Sight (LoS) for 
communication links. The feature of continuous time is important since complex systems 
may behave very differently when discretized. Also, providing the correct approach to the 
flow of time will provide an improved model concerning other types of flows (e.g., 
information) within the framework. A common feature many wargames fail to appreciate fully 
is the limitation of timely and perfect information about the situation on the battlefield, and is 
analogous to von Clausewitz’s (1832) “fog of war.” By limiting the fidelity and flow of 
information, we introduce risk into the decision space and thereby provide the framework to 
learn how to operate in these degraded conditions. The intent is to introduce these features 
in an environment that remains scale-invariant and therefore provides utility to leadership at 
any level. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the introduction of allied and adversarial 
adaptive systems. We may begin to develop this environment by utilizing Reinforcement 
Learning (RL)24 and then exploring the utility of Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN).25 
These types of approaches provide evolving solution strategies given a complex 
environment and with minimal rules provided a priori. Also, these types of approaches may 
find novel ways to interact with a complex environment that someone may not anticipate. 
Those types of strategies which exploit indirect and cascading effects are those which the 
authors feel may be of importance in future conflicts and require further research to explore 
adequately.26 If we provide this system flexibility with determining which assets to locate 
where given a certain set of campaigns, we may also gain insights into how our asset 
portfolio should be allocated to achieve the highest probability of victory given those 
campaigns (or any other objective function we choose). Finally, we wish that this framework 
exploit advances in massively parallel computational platforms and that these 
methodologies may learn from many environments simultaneously, thereby providing a 
richer awareness of the solution space to leadership in less time.  
Krishna is no panacea. One of its major limitations is that it provides feasible 
strategies given the current weapon systems and infrastructure that exist. Allied and 
adversarial weapons portfolios are dynamic, and systems with enhanced, even new, 
capabilities arrive with some regularity. Stage III, or Oracle,27 provides the framework 
necessary to address Krishna’s limitations. It introduces degrees of freedom (DoF) to those 
weapon system specifications (e.g., maximum range, maximum altitude, maximum 
munitions capacity, etc. for aircraft, and so forth) that may change with new weapon systems 
or modifications of older systems. However, any analysis which provides modifications to 




 One of the three main types of learning: supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning. 
Over successive iterations, an RL model will learn based on the environment in which it is introduced. 
If the aggregate behavior of the RL system is desirable, then it is rewarded and so reinforced 
otherwise it is not (Russell & Norvig, 2015). 
25
 Two unsupervised artificial neural networks which contest in a zero-sum test space (Goodfellow et 
al., 2014). 
26
 A possible scenario may involve targeting several seemingly ancillary and unguarded power 
substations simultaneously. Their cumulative effect may introduce a rolling blackout which may 
degrade an adversarial military installation communications network and so degrade the adversary’s 
command and control.  
27
 Named after the Oracle of Delphi and not to be confused with the company that bears the same 
name. 
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specifications alone is inherently flawed, as we would also need to consider the trade-offs 
which we incur with these modifications and how these new or modified systems should 
interact with the rest of the portfolio in a given a set of campaigns. One of the main trade-
offs is that we incur Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) costs for any given 
modification. These need to be captured into the specification changes as well. 
We may observe that in this framework there may arise common strategies and 
themes within the behavior of the systems that may confirm or repudiate a commonly-held 
belief. These observations would provide a level of substantiation not yet reached via 
alternative methods. The intent would be to augment policies and strategies at the Service, 
Joint, Department, and coalition levels where and when appropriate. Furthermore, the 
advantage of this approach is that it does not rely on the analysis of the levels above to 
obtain a solution. This approach might be advantageous since each of these levels attempts 
to achieve optimality within their sphere of influence, and this effect might result in many 
local optima rather than an optimum solution for all actors at the same time.28 Referring to 
Type IV types of questions, models of subsystems may also not provide an accurate 
description of aggregate behavior, and therefore an overarching model may also be more 
appropriate here.  
Unlike Argos and Krishna, Oracle is a composite stage, and therefore Oracle draws 
on specific capabilities that the prior stages deliver. We may leverage certain methodologies 
incorporated into Argos to develop a set of relationships between the cost of a certain 
specification set and attempt to infer an overall relationship between cost and specifications. 
We define this as the COst-to-Specifications Manifold (COSM). Although we may apply 
multivariate techniques such as Response Surface Methodologies (RSM)29 to capture this 
relationship accurately, there is a growing trend to leverage alternative techniques such as 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)30 over RSM (Himmel & May, 1991; Carpenter & 
Barthelemy, 1993; Hussain, Xuanqiang, & Johnson, 1991). This realization enables us to 
recycle techniques present in Argos and utilize them for Oracle. Figure 5 provides an 
overview of the process discussed in this section. 




 We can never guarantee reaching a global optimum when utilizing heuristics, and so the argument 
is that we need to traverse the solution space given all actor constraints simultaneously. 
29
 The approach to utilize mechanistic models, empirical, and response surface models to identify and 
fit factors and experimental data to an appropriate mathematical representation (Myers, 
Montgomerey, & Anderson-Cook, 2009). 
30
 A synthetic analog to biological learning which is also robust against errors and incomplete input 
(Mitchell, 1997). 
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Figure 5. Illustration of the Scientific Process Utilizing the QC to Help Frame 
SMART Questions and to Shape Hypotheses While Leveraging the Galactic 
Data Supercluster, Laniakea, and the Analytical Engine, QuANTUM  
Once we have established an acceptable COSM model, we can then provide some 
insight into the trade space between these two factors. The COSM functional approximation 
now provides the necessary cost penalty to any proposed improvement by an M&S solution, 
such as Krishna. As the agents within Krishna hypothesize what improvements to make to 
existing systems, they will incur the necessary cost penalties of making certain specification 
modifications. Therefore, their resultant strategies will account for these nuances as they try 
to achieve their overall objectives.  
No change can happen instantaneously to a weapons plan, strategy, or weapons 
portfolio. These changes will require appropriate planning for these modifications, 
reprogramming funds, budgeting resources within future years, and executing these 
resources in a manner that remains feasible within political, policy, fiscal, and other types of 
constraints. We therefore require feasible scheduling trajectories for these improvements 
given their constraint set. This problem is a classic resource-constrained weighted 
scheduling optimization problem (RCWSOP) for which Genetic Algorithms (GA),31 among 




 A synthetic analog to Darwinian evolution at the genetic level. Information is encoded within 
artificial chromosomes and scored based on a supplied objective. As in biology, these chromosomes 
undergo crossover and mutations to provide variety and so traverse the solution space more 
completely. The chromosomes which provide the best fit are likely to carry that information on into 
successive generations (Mitchell, 1998). 
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other heuristics, have been used successfully to provide acceptable solutions. These 
approaches are highly parallelizable, and so if we supply additional computational 
resources, we may traverse a larger portion of the solution space and so attempt to find and 
improve on those feasible solutions we have obtained. Since the RCSOP is Type III 
ontologically, we may define Kronos as a derivative stage based on methodologies within 
Argos. Figure 6 provides a detailed overview of the QuANTUM analytical engine. 
 
Figure 6. Proposed QuANTUM Analytical Engine Process 
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The Galactic Synthetic Data Supercluster—Perseus32 
Currently, most DoD Data Democratization (DoD3) and analysis efforts face 
limitations due to the nature of data (or observation) classification. The impetus of these 
classification guidelines is to protect data specific to an individual, such as Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) and Personal Health Information (PHI), as well as data about 
national security which exists at levels such as secret and top secret. Proper automated and 
consistent classification methods of aggregated ADS remain an open question and an active 
field of research. The lower bound of a classification process is seemingly trivial, as any 
aggregation would inherit the highest classification level of the individually aggregated ADS. 
However, it is unclear how to determine the upper bound at aggregation, as well as after the 
implementation of specific analytical methods on those ADS. Therefore, the analytical 
communities require a feasible way forward as an interim solution as the defense community 
continues to tackle this question. 
The classification of those ADS post-aggregation depends on their information. DB 
and IS store information in the content and the encoded in the relationships within and 
between those ADS. Ergo, if we can regulate the information of the ADS, then we may 
adjust their classification levels as necessary. Different classification levels require different 
levels of emphasis within these two core tenets. Specifically, about PII and PHI-types of 
data, any method must eliminate the possibility of direct targeting of an individual if the data 
set remains intact. However, it is not necessary to eliminate relationships within the data as 
these amongst individuals are not PII or PHI. About operational data, there are 
circumstances where the content of the ADS, as well as the relationships within the ADS 
may be at the same or higher classification level, and so both tenets require consideration. 
We assume the following: 
1. The utilized ADS are sufficiently complete and of sufficient dimension to 
imitate given some methodology. 
2. The underlying ontology is Probably Approximately Correct (PAC)33–
learnable. 
About Assumption 1, to effectively use real observations to derive synthetic 
observations, we require observations that are sufficiently complete to do so. We assume 
that the data is usable and does not require considerable preparation, interpolation, or any 
other approach for its use. Many of the ADS within the DoD have not yet reached a 
sufficient level of completeness to derive synthetic observations. Furthermore, and based on 
prior data extraction observations, many DoD data sets do not necessarily possess 
sufficient depth for the level of width. Therefore, there will likely be challenges with the 
generation of synthetic data if there are a sufficient number of observations available for 
their ontology. We posit that most systems are likely to exhibit highly nonlinear behavior and 
so would require many more observations to imitate the underlying behavior better. About 




 The Perseus-Pisces supercluster (SCI 40) stretches approximately 250 million lightyears and is 
one of the largest known structures in the nearby universe, while the other is Laniakea, in which the 
Milky Way resides. 
33
 Proposed by Leslie Valiant in 1984 and is an aspect in machine learning which provides a 
framework for mathematical analysis. The objective is to define a system that has low generalization 
error of the selected generalization function (or hypothesis) which is bounded in polynomial time. 
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Assumption 2, we assume that there is sufficient ontological information encoded within the 
real observations under consideration. This assumption would imply that some methodology 
exists which can approximate the content and context within the data sets under 
consideration.  
This capability is exceedingly important, as aggregation will likely increase the overall 
classification level and so will likely diminish the number of organizations which may be privy 
to using this data. In many cases, the DoD relies on academic institutions, government 
contractors, or other government organizations or agencies to enhance their understanding 
and so increase their potential capability. Providing a mechanism to pre-select how closely 
synthetic observations may imitate real observations would enable an organization to retain 
these relationships without having to sacrifice aggregation. The underlying mechanism to 
generate synthetic observations in a meaningful way and the necessary halting criteria can 
be found in other works (Smalenberger, 2018). 
Data Security—A Flawed Concept 
Systems that contain or transmit data (and so transmit information) have always 
been prone to attack. We may attribute attacks to the fourth general principle of economics: 
“People respond to incentives” (Miller, Benjamin, & North, 2002). The typical approach has 
always been to focus on enhanced security features, including physical security, firewalls, 
limiting access to the data, and more exotic encryption techniques. Each of these 
approaches ultimately fails, and it is only a function of time until they do. It seems likely that 
a better version of the same old approaches is insufficient to diminish the incentive structure 
for the adversary.  
These older strategies originated when data storage and processing on that data 
was at a premium. Therefore, the only data you wished to store was that data which was 
meaningful. Any user would delete the rest. Today, however, data storage and IS are orders 
of magnitude cheaper than they were previously. We propose a strategy to take advantage 
of that. 
Assume that the synthetic observations stored in Perseus are not degraded in any 
form to provide them to academia, etc., but imitate the observations stored in Laniakea in a 
way that is no longer distinguishable between the two. If we derive the entire Perseus data 
supercluster in this way, we could generate a fully synthetic version of Laniakea within 
Perseus. This tactic would mean that given both data superclusters, it would not be possible 
to distinguish between the two which one contains real observations and which one contains 
synthetic observations. However, this approach still provides a large incentive for an 
adversary since a 50% chance remains that they select the correct data supercluster. Also, 
they could select both and provide contingency plans in the 50% chance that they selected 
the incorrect one.  
A possibly improved approach would be to introduce the synthetic observations into 
Laniakea at tracked but seemingly random locations. Using this approach, we may introduce 
a much larger number of synthetic observations into Laniakea that remain indistinguishable 
from the real observations. Therefore, it would be increasingly difficult to know which 
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observations are real and which observations are synthetic to exploit them. This 
stenographic34 approach limits the incentive structure of an adversary.  
However, the tradeoff with using this alternative approach is that certain attributes 
will need to be flagged and duplicated across the synthetic data fields as well. These are 
typically those key fields such as a person’s name, social security number, and so forth. 
Once these are duplicated across the synthetic observations as well, it will be extremely 
arduous to classify real from synthetic observations. Additional research needs to be 
conducted to validate this as a feasible approach.  
Summary 
Due to adversarial evolutionary pressures, the DoD requires an improved approach 
to conduct the PPBE process which is technologically-scalable, mathematically-flexible, and 
factually-rigid. The proposed methodology in this paper provided a potential approach to 
determine the ontology of important senior leadership questions, develop a strategy to map 
these to pertinent ADS via M3 and Laniakea, and leverage analytical techniques that meet 
their assumptions and solution requirements via QuANTUM. The paper also indicated how 
someone might generate synthetic data via Perseus which would enable communities to 
participate in the platform’s future development while addressing classification concerns with 
ADS aggregation. Lastly, the paper addressed a potential approach to addressing the 
critical flaws with data security by using stenographic encryption. 
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Abstract 
The approach of the Department of Defense (DoD) to acquisition programs is 
strongly based on systems engineering. DoD Directive 5000.01 calls for “the application of a 
systems engineering approach that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total 
ownership costs” (DoD, 2007). Even when systems engineering best practices are 
employed, the cost of large systems is always increasing, and a large part of this increase is 
due to system complexity (Arena et al., 2008). 
Part of this system complexity comes from the functionalities of the system, and is 
thus justified when these functionalities are required. The remaining contribution is due to 
unnecessary intricacies in the design, to local optimization, and to oversight in the system-
level design. This complexity can lead to rising cost and schedule delays, and should be 
addressed properly. To overcome these issues regarding cost and schedule overruns, 
researchers have advocated for the adoption of a complexity budget (Sinha, 2014), which 
can help identify the effects of unintended interfaces between system elements. While most 
literature seems to agree about the existence of this issue, the solutions to the 
measurement of complexity are various and based on different approaches. 
The purpose of this research is to develop metrics that will allow the DoD to evaluate 
a complexity budget, particularly in the phases of architecture and design development. The 
metrics are developed using a set of axioms that can be applied to cyber-physical systems, 
and they assume that the architecture of the system is known. Knowledge of the system 
architecture allows for a graph representation of the system and uses graph-theoretic 
approaches to the evaluation of the topology of the system. Concepts such as graph density 
and graph energy can be used to build metrics that allow to rank architectures, thus helping 
identify possible sources of complexity. Additionally, this approach allows engineers to look 
external to the system to identify the complexity required to interoperate with legacy DoD 
systems and systems under development. This research effort is limited to a snapshot of the 
- 137 - 
state of the system, but can be extended to a dynamical approach with a system changing 
state or changing its structure. 
Introduction 
Complexity in engineered systems is a double-edged sword. Part of it is due to the 
functionalities of the system, and part of it to the unnecessary intricacies which deviate the 
final design from an elegant solution, the optimal one. The excess complexity in engineered 
systems can potentially contribute to increased partial or systemic risks and increased 
fragility of the system in face of various shocks and environmental changes. 
The first attempts at heavier-than-air flight were carried out by small teams of people 
that we would today call innovators. The goal of those systems was to achieve leveled flight 
over a relatively short distance. As time passed, the requirements for airplanes increased in 
almost all the applications, from military to commercial flight. The need to carry cargo, 
payloads, or passengers over increasing distances, in shorter time, at a viable cost, safely, 
and reliably has led to an increase in the complexity of these systems over the last 100 
years. As a result, today's airplane manufacturers employ tens of thousands of people, and 
have a hierarchy of suppliers with an even larger total workforce. In addition, the 
development time for a new program has also increased due to the overall increase in 
complexity. 
Airplanes are only one of the many examples of engineered systems where an 
increase in complexity is connected to an increase in cost as well as increased fragility and 
risks of the system. The costs associated with larger complexity are justified only when they 
are dictated by system requirements. These design decisions can contribute to the 
functionality of the system (i.e., functional requirements), or increase system-level 
characteristics such as resilience, reliability, or safety (i.e., non-functional requirements). 
According to Carlson and Doyle (2002), robustness is the maintenance of desired 
characteristics despite the failure or partial performance of some components of the system, 
and is correlated with complexity. As long as there is a reason for a design decision, and 
there cannot be a simpler solution obtaining the same effect at the system level, the 
increase in complexity is justified. When the increase in complexity is unintended and 
contributes to system fragility, then the design solution is not optimal and should be avoided 
or modified. Unfortunately, to determine the optimality of a design solution, it is necessary to 
have a deep knowledge of the specific application field, and to have a large set of possible 
solutions for comparison. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces challenges in managing complexity, 
integration, and management of the complex network of systems that it has developed over 
the past 30 years. In 1996, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed 
warfighting capability would be more reliant on systems of systems (SoS) and network 
centric operations (Owens, 1996). As such, DoD systems are becoming more and more 
complex, interconnected, and reliant on other systems to provide capability to the user. This 
creates a complex environment in which systems connect to each other through a variety of 
means that may not be initially evident to systems engineers. When these systems operate 
on the battlefield, they often cross service boundaries, but their development within the 
service makes collaboration difficult in traditionally hierarchal military structures (Dahmann & 
Baldwin, 2008). Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2015) found that 
the DoD lacked methods and tools for conducting portfolio management at the enterprise 
level for capabilities, and noted that there were gaps in the DoD’s ability to identify, 
understand, and assess the capability portfolio. 
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This paper presents and builds on a complexity theory, network analysis, and 
systems engineering to propose a method to understand the complexity budget of a network 
of systems. It examines how the addition of a new system to a network of legacy systems 
affects the complexity of the network. As an example, the paper examines the addition of 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to the network of DoD systems and its effect on the 
complexity of the network. It examines the complexity of the network before the DoD fielded 
F 35A/B/Cs, during the transition to the JSF, and post deployment after the DoD replaced 
the legacy systems with the F-35 variants. 
Literature Review 
This section presents a review of the relevant literature to include a discussion on 
systems engineering, complexity theory, and network analysis. The portion on systems 
engineering focuses on the foundation of systems engineering and the application of the 
ilities to help engineers manage complexity and the non-functional attributes of engineered 
systems. Additionally, the literature review includes a discussion on complexity theory and 
the impact of increases in technology and reliance on other systems. Finally, the literature 
provides an overview of network analysis techniques that serve as a basis for the 
quantification of complexity and analysis of the network of DoD systems. 
Systems Engineering 
As a discipline, systems engineering faces increased complexity of systems as 
technology progress and systems are more interconnected. In 2006, a workshop consisting 
of thought leaders from a variety of disciplines met to discuss the issue of complex systems, 
and one area that received substantial attention was the modeling of complex systems with 
an emphasis on the dynamic, networked nature of systems (Rouse, 2007). International 
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines Systems Engineering as “an 
interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems. It 
focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the development 
cycle, documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and system 
validation while considering the complete problem” (INCOSE, 2007).  
Systems engineers differ from traditional engineers in that they consider the system 
in its entirety, lead the conceptual design of systems, and bridge the gaps between 
traditional engineering (Kossiakoff et al., 2011). As such, systems engineers have 
developed a variety of means—system architecture, system of systems analysis, and 
enterprise architecture—to deal with complexity. To manage complexity and the qualitative 
nature of systems engineering, systems engineers have developed the ilities as a construct 
for assessing nonfunctional attributes of a system. Systems engineers have begun to 
recognize the criticality of these non-traditional design criteria and have begun to include 
them in the design of systems (McManus et al., 2009). However, these properties and 
attributes of a system often manifest themselves after engineers have designed and put the 
system into operation (de Weck et al., 2012). Further study of the ilities examines how 
system-level ilities begin to emerge from the subsystem level, where systems engineers can 
design in these non-functional attributes (Lee & Collins, 2017). 
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Complexity Theory 
Wade and Heydari (2014) categorized complexity definition into three major groups, 
according to the point of view of the observer. When the observer is external to the system 
and can only interact with it as a black box, then the type of complexity that can be 
measured is called behavioral complexity, since it looks at the overall behavior of the 
system. When the observer has access to the internal structure of the system, such as 
blueprints and source code for engineered systems or scientific knowledge for natural 
systems, then the structural complexity of the system is what is being measured. If the 
process of constructing the entity is under observation, then it is the constructive complexity 
being measured, which is the complexity of the building process. This definition relates 
complexity to the difficulty of determining the output of the system. 
Sheard and Mostashari (2011) developed a framework for the categorization of 
complexity types. Engineered systems have two types of complexity: structural and 
dynamic. Dynamic complexity can be short term or long term. Short term complexity is 
related to the operation of the system. System behavior can be unpredictable due to non-
linear relationships among the system components. The environment can also play a major 
role on system behavior. Long-term complexity is related with the evolution of the system, its 
growth, and its adaptation to its environment which plays an important role in shaping the 
new generations. Structural complexity is instead interested in a snapshot of the system 
architecture and can be divided into three components: size, connectivity, and topology. 
Metrics of structural complexity have been proposed in literature. The most common 
type of metrics is based on the concepts of entropy (Akundi, 2016; Gell-Mann & 
Lloyd,1996), information content, or logical depth (Fischi, Nilchiani, & Wade, 2016). Another 
common type of structural complexity metrics considers the spectrum (the set of 
eigenvalues) of the graph representation of the system. These metrics are known as 
spectral metrics and are the ones adopted in this research. The fist spectral metric, 





                                                                                       (1) 
where 𝜆𝑖 are the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of the graph G. A variation of this 
metric, proposed by Gutman as well (Gutman & Zhou, 2006), is the Laplacian Graph 
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where 𝜇𝑖 are the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix, 𝑛 the number of nodes and 𝑚 the 
number of edges of the graph G. Cavers, Fallat, and Kirkland (2010) provided a 
generalization of these two metrics that can be applied to any matrix representing a graph, 







                                                                (3) 
where 𝜆𝑖(𝑀) are the eigenvalues of the matrix M, and 𝑡𝑟(𝑀) its trace. 
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Graph energy has been embedded in a structural complexity metric provided by 















                                          (4) 
where 𝛼𝑖 represents the inner complexity of each node, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 the complexity of the edges, 
is based on the idea that structural complexity has three contributions: components, 
connections, and topology (Sheard & Mostashari, 2011). 
Another type of spectral structural metric has been proposed by Wu et al. (2010) 
considers the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix as an exponential function, and adjusts 
the value through a logarithmic scale 






)                                                                         (5) 
The coefficient 1/𝑛 is a way of normalizing the graph according to the number of 
nodes, which allows one to compare graphs of different sizes. This approach has been used 
by Sinha as well with the coefficient 𝛾 = 1/𝑛. These metrics have been used as a starting 
point for the development of 12 metrics that consider the system as a graph and are based 
on the eigenvalues of a certain matrix representing this graph. 
Capability Development in the DoD 
The DoD generates requirements through the Joint Capability Integration and 
Development (JCIDS) process, which they then pass to the acquisitions community to 
develop and procure warfighting systems. As a part of this process, DoD systems engineers 
analyze the current state of legacy systems and determine how the new capability will 
integrate with these systems. The DoD designed the system to ensure validated military 
capability requirements support resourcing decisions for programs. The 2003 Joint Defense 
Capability Study first presented the concept of JCIDS and proposed a transition from 
requirements-based acquisition to a capability-based approach (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004). 
The JCIDS process supports the Chairman’s and the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Committee’s (JROC) statutory responsibilities to identify, assess, validate, and prioritize joint 
military capability requirements (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012a). The JCIDS process requires 
sponsors to generate three main documents—Initial Capability Document (ICD), Capability 
Development Document (CDD), and the Capability Production Document (CPD)—that 
support different phases in the development and acquisition process by providing 
traceability from warfighter capability requirements to fielded systems (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012b). 
As part of the JCIDS process, the Joint Staff requires several DoD Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) viewpoints to support the development of warfighter capabilities. 
Architecture frameworks assist decision makers by serving as a communication tool by 
presenting a manageable amount of information from a set of data to assist stakeholders in 
managing complex systems (Richards et al., 2006). System architects use DoDAF, one of 
several common frameworks, to capture multiple perspectives of a warfighting capability’s 
system architecture. All architecture frameworks include specific taxonomies, artifacts, and 
terminologies for describing a system to ensure standardization across multiple individual 
architectures (Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2012). DoDAF includes eight different 
viewpoints that capture data relevant capability requirements, integration, military 
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operations, and program management aspects of a system (DoD Chief Information Officer, 
2010). The DoD designed DoDAF to meet the needs of a diverse set of stakeholders and 
decision makers by abstracting essential pieces of information and presenting them in 
manageable pieces depending on their perspective (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2010). 
The required DoDAF products provide valuable data at the individual system level; however, 
they do not provide much insight into the larger, aggregated network of systems. 
One shortfall of the DoDAF architectures used in capability development is that they 
do not capture a DoD-wide perspective of the interactions between individual systems. 
Several efforts have attempted to aggregate independent DoDAF products along mission 
threads; however, they still limit their approach to a subset of the entire DoD capability 
network of systems. Ring et al. (2009) proposed the Activity-Based Methodology, which 
aggregates DoDAF architectures into an integrated architecture that captures the 
organization, system, and role aspects of DoD systems. Another effort proposed 
aggregating independent architectures through a system, capability, and mission 
perspective by utilizing independent DoDAF viewpoints (Enos, 2014). 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
The F-35 JSF is a joint, multi-role fighter and attack aircraft that is entering service 
with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines to replace a variety of legacy systems. The F-35 is a 
fifth-generation fighter aircraft that incorporates stealth technology into the design of the 
aircraft and uses a common airframe across all three versions of the aircraft (Church, 2015). 
The F-35A is the conventional take-off and landing version of the JSF that incorporates an 
advanced sensor package and situational awareness capability to drastically improve the 
effectiveness of the aircraft (U.S. Air Force, 2014). The Air Force plans to replace both the 
F-16 and A-10 with the F 35A beginning in 2016 as it fields their version of the F-35 in air-
superiority, suppression of enemy air defense, and close air support roles (Church, 2015). 
The Marine Corps began fielding the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) 
version of the JSF in that provides the capability to take off and land on extremely short 
runways. The Marine Corps plans to use the F-35B to replace both the F/A-18 Hornet and 
the A/V-8B Harrier II with the JSF (JSF Program Office, 2017). The Navy’s version of the 
JSF, the F-35C, includes increased wing area and structural enhancements to support 
carrier landings and take offs. The Navy plans to replace the F/A-18 with the JSF to serve as 
its primary air superiority and attack aircraft (JSF Program Office, 2017).  
Methodology 
This section presents the methodology that the authors adopted in the formulation of 
new spectral structural complexity metrics, and the data collection strategy for the 
characterization of the complex tactical aircraft system of systems. 
Development of Complexity Metrics 
The metrics presented in this paper are all spectral complexity metrics, meaning that 
they are based on the eigenvalues of a certain graph representation of the system. To 
represent the graphs, three different matrices are used: the adjacency matrix, the Laplacian 
matrix, and the normalized Laplacian matrix. The adjacency matrix is the most frequently 
used representation of an architecture within the systems engineering domain. Also known 
as Design Structure Matrix (DSM; Yassine & Braha, 2003), or 𝑁2 matrix, it is used to 
represent the interfaces and their arrangement, and allows one to make considerations on 
architectural modularity and clustering of components. The Laplacian matrix includes 
additional information with respect to the adjacency one, specifically regarding the degree of 
each component. The normalized Laplacian matrix has an interesting spectrum that is 
related to other graph invariants more than the spectra of the other two matrices (Chung, 
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1997). These three matrices are considered in their weighted variations, where edges and 
vertices of the graph carry different weights. The metrics are based on two similar concepts, 
graph energy and natural connectivity, which as seen in the previous section are both 
functions of the eigenvalues of the matrix representation of the system. A corrective 
coefficient 𝛾 = 1/𝑛 to compare graphs with different number of nodes is included in the 
definition of natural connectivity (Wu et al., 2010) and in Sinha’s (2014) structural complexity 
metric. 
The metrics are applied to two sets of random graphs, generated through Erdõs-
Rényi (ER) and Barabási Albert (BA) algorithms. The values of each metric are plotted 
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for directed graphs, where 𝑛 is the number of nodes and 𝑚 is the number of edges in the 
graph G. 
Another graph indicator used in this research is graph diameter, defined as the 
maximum shortest path between all pairs of nodes in the graph. In absence of accurate 
information regarding the internal structure of nodes, which is usually the case in system of 
systems applications, where one organization cannot access data belonging to external 
actors, the complexity of the nodes can be approximated with the degree of the node 
𝛼𝑖 = deg 𝑣𝑖, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = √𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗. 
Metrics such as graph energy and natural connectivity, which have been introduced 
in the previous section, can be represented through the following formula 






)                                                     (8) 
where 𝑓1(𝑥) = 𝑥, 𝑔1(𝑦) = |𝑦|, 𝑓2(𝑥) = ln 𝑥 , 𝑔2(𝑦) = 𝑒
𝑦 are the possible values for the 
functions 𝑓 and 𝑔, the coefficient 𝛾 can be 𝛾1 = 1, 𝛾2 = 𝑛
−1, and the matrix representation of 
the graph can be either 𝑀1 = 𝐴,𝑀2 = 𝐿,𝑀3 = ℒ, which have been defined in our previous 
publication (Nilchiani & Pugliese, 2016). 
Table 1 shows the metrics that can be derived from this formula through 
combinations of these parameters. Two sets of functions, two values for the coefficient 𝛾, 
and three matrices, give 12 possible metrics. Throughout this paper, the metrics are referred 
to using acronyms: graph energy (GE), Laplacian graph energy (LGE), normalized 
Laplacian graph energy (NLGE), natural connectivity (NC), Laplacian natural connectivity 
(LNC), normalized Laplacian natural connectivity (NLNC), and where 𝛾 = 1/𝑛, the acronym 
has a trailing n, such as in (GEn). These metrics will be applied in the next section to sets of 
random graphs, and to the TACAIR system of systems. 
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Table 1. Twelve Examples of Spectral Structural Complexity Metrics 
 
TACAIR System of Systems 
This section presents an overview of the methodology to develop three individual 
networks of systems that capture the “as-is,” “transitional,” and “to-be” networks. A variety of 
publicly available sources provide the necessary data to develop the network of systems 
and identify connections between the systems (Church, 2015; JSF Program Office, 2017). 
The network captures interoperability connections between the systems that include 
information flows, shared resources, and physical connections (Enos & Nilchiani, 2017). 
Table 2 presents an excerpt from the entire adjacency matrix for the tactical aircraft network 
of systems. A complete matrix for each of the networks captures the data required to 
analyze the complexity of the network. 
Table 2. Excerpt From Adjacency Matrix 
 
The “as-is” network captures the systems that comprise the DoD’s tactical aircraft 
system and consists of aircraft, munitions, sensors, and communication systems prior to the 
fielding of the F-35. The “transitional” includes all the legacy aircraft as well as the JSF and 
its connections that represents the DoD network as the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 
transition to the F-35 from their legacy aircraft. Finally, the “to-be” network depicts the DoD’s 
network of tactical aircraft and systems after the three services retire the systems the F-35 is 
scheduled to replace.  
- 144 - 
Figure 1 presents the graphical depiction of the “as-is” network of DoD tactical 
aircraft systems and represents the past version of the network prior to the deployment of 
the F-35 JSF variants. This network captures various types of systems that operate together 
to provide the DoD with tactical aircraft capability to include the aircraft, munitions, sensors, 
satellites, weapons, and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence 
(C4I) systems. In the graph, the colors represent the various services, the shapes of the 
nodes represent the type of system, and the size of the node represents its degree. This 
network represents the DoD’s tactical aircraft systems prior to the development of the JSF 
and provides the baseline for analyzing the complexity of the network. 
 
Figure 1. As-Is Network of DoD Tactical Aircraft Systems 
Figure 2 presents the graphical depiction of the network and the connections that will 
be present during the transition from the legacy aircraft to the JSF variants. In this case, 
both the JSF and the aircraft the services plan to replace with the F-35 variants are included 
in the network along with any of their connections to other systems in the network. This 
version of the network provides a means to evaluate the complexity of the network during 
the transition period to the JSF which could impact resource expenditures, maintenance, 
supply operations, and tactical operations of the DoD. 
Figure 3 presents the final version of the network and represents the “to-be” tactical 
aircraft network after the services retire the legacy systems that they are replacing with the 
F-35. In this case, the network does not include the retired A-10, F-16, F/A-18, and AV-8B 
systems from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to the four retired systems, 
the network removes systems that may not be retired but no longer connect to the network 
to include the Hydra Rockets, AN/APG-79 AESA Radar, and Mk 63 Sea Mine. This does not 
indicate that these systems could also be retired as they may be used by other systems; 
however, it does affect the complexity of the tactical aircraft network. This version of the 
network provides the means to calculate the complexity of the network after a complete 
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transition to the JSF and can determine if the DoD increased or decreased the complexity of 
its tactical aircraft network. 
 
Figure 2. “Transitional” Network of DoD Tactical Aircraft Systems 
 
Figure 3. “To-Be” Network of Tactical Aircraft Systems 
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Analysis and Results 
The metrics have been applied to two sets of random graphs, generated with ER and 
BA models respectively. The sets of graphs contain approximately 23,000 and 38,000 
unique labeled graphs. 
Figure 4 represents the values that the 12 spectral structural metrics assume when 
applied to the ER set of random graphs. Most of the metrics have a positive correlation with 
the number of nodes in the graph, meaning that the metric value is higher when the number 
of nodes is higher. This is the expected behavior for a complexity metric, and the two 
metrics that do not follow it, NLGEn and NLNCn, are not suitable as complexity metrics. 
 
Figure 4. Metric vs. Density Plots With Color Scale According to Number of 
Nodes, for Each Metric, for Graphs Generated Using the Erdõs-Rényi 
Algorithm 
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From Figure 5 it is possible to see that for ER random graphs the diameter is high 
with low density graphs, and low when the density is high. This relationship is expected 
since the complete graph has diameter one and removing edges creates an increase of the 
shortest path between pairs of nodes. Although valid for ER graphs, the relationship 
between density and diameter is not general, since star graphs and path graphs with the 
same number of nodes have the same density, but the former have diameter 2 while the 
latter have diameter 𝑛 − 1. This means that for high 𝑛, the diameter of these two types of 
graphs is very different. This is one limitation of the ER algorithm, which will not generate 
star graphs, or graphs with highly skewed degree distributions, given its uniform probability 
of edge creation. 
To overcome the limitations of the ER model, and to better mimic the topology of 
engineered systems with heterogeneous components, a set of graphs has been generated 
using the BA model. These graphs have a more skewed degree distribution, given by the 
preferential attachment strategy. 
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Figure 5. Metric vs. Density Plots With Color Scale According to Diameter, for 
Each Metric, for Graphs Generated Using the Erdõs-Rényi Algorithm 
Figure 6 shows the metrics evaluated for the set of BA random graphs. Given the 
way the algorithm works, these graphs do not span the whole density range, but stop at 
𝑑 = 0.57. The main feature of these point clouds is a folding, a bifurcation, so that graphs 
with the same density will belong to two distinct sets with a high and low value of each 
metric respectively. This bifurcation gives meaning to the metrics, highlighting the fact that 
they are responsive to topological changes. 
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Figure 6. Metric vs. Density Plots With Color Scale According to Number of 
Nodes, for Each Metric, for Graphs Generated Using the Barabási-Albert 
Algorithm 
Figure 7 shows that this bifurcation in BA random graphs is related to the diameter of 
the graphs. The diameter does not have the same trend as in ER graphs. Graphs with low 
density which have high diameter and low diameter exist. These two sets are represented 
by trees with high depth and stars, respectively. While a star topology is not common in 
engineered systems, since it is subject to bottlenecks and the complexity of the central node 
would tend to be too high, trees are common structures for engineered systems, where a 
certain level of decentralization is in order. Even in the presence of cycles, when the graph 
is not a tree anymore, a diameter value of 10 in a graph of 25 nodes is representative of 
engineered systems. 
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Figure 7. Metric vs. Density Plots With Color Scale According to Diameter, for 
Each Metric, for Graphs Generated Using the Barabási-Albert Algorithm 
Analysis of the TACAIR System of Systems 
The TACAIR system of system, in its three versions presented earlier, is undergoing 
radical changes. The introduction of the F-35 in the operational scenario and the 
subsequent retirement of legacy systems is causing modifications to the network topology. 
The number of nodes went from 82 to 85 and will go down to 77, and the number of 
interfaces went from 384 to 466 and will be 347 once the transition is complete. This leads 
to a density value going from 0.115 to 0.130, and to 0.118 in future. This density variation is 
not accompanied by a change in diameter which remains constant to 5, due to the centrality 
of the nodes that are being added and removed from the network. In this case, the metrics 
are beneficial to the network analysis, since they can tell more than the diameter about the 
topology of the network. 
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Figure 8 shows the metrics applied to the TACAIR system of systems. Other than 
NLGEn and NLNCn, which we have already ruled out as reliable complexity metrics, and 
NLGE, the other metrics agree that the introduction of the F-35 represents an increase in 
the complexity of the network. Most of the metrics, other than NC and NCn, also agree that 
the retirement of the legacy systems is beneficial for the network and will lead to a 
simplification of the overall network. 
 
Figure 8. Evaluation of Spectral Structural Complexity Metrics With the Evolving 
Versions of the TACAIR System of Systems 
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Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper presented an approach to the measurement of structural complexity that 
involves the measurement of the eigenvalues of a matrix representation of the system. 
Twelve spectral metrics have been created, based on features of existing metrics. The 
metrics have been applied to two sets of graphs, generated using the Erdõs-Rényi (ER) and 
Barabási Albert (BA) algorithms respectively. It is argued how the application of these 
algorithms to the generation of graphs representing engineered systems should be carried 
out together with considerations about the heterogeneity of the components of the system 
and the expected distribution of node degree. ER models having a close to uniform 
distribution of node degree are applicable to the representation of homogeneous graphs, 
such as networks of routers, in which all the components have the same tasks and 
functionalities. When specialization arises, and the components of a system are wildly 
heterogeneous, the degree distribution is highly skewed, and BA models are more 
appropriate. 
The application to the TACAIR system of systems is an example of how the 
operational scenario can become complex thanks to the relationships between different 
types of systems, and how the introduction of new systems and the retirement of legacy 
ones can be beneficial to the management of the network, by streamlining the supplying of 
common resources and reducing the diversity of systems that achieve the same 
functionalities. Of course, this type of analysis can be improved when details about the 
architecture of each system are available, and the interfaces can be modeled with high 
fidelity regarding the timing and range of connections. 
Limiting the approach to publicly available data allowed us to assume the point of 
view of an external actor who is interested in introducing a new system in an already 
existing environment. Examples of such systems can be the introduction of a new type of 
transportation system, such as the hyperloop concept, within the already existing network of 
air, sea, and land transportation systems, or the introduction of a new surgical tool to be 
used in conjunction with the existing set of operation room equipment. 
In the future, if detailed data is available regarding one of the existing systems in the 
network, it would be possible to analyze the network and yield more insightful considerations 
about the retirement of such systems and the effect on the overall network. 
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Abstract 
How leaders make decisions in complex and chaotic environments could have a 
significant impact on organizational performance. This study of leaders from across the 
Department of Defense (DoD) provides the foundation by which a more informed 
understanding of how program managers’ sense of situational reality ultimately leads to 
timely and relevant decisions. This study specifically focuses on the emergence of four 
aggregate categories—sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge—that 
seem to shape the leader’s reality and subsequent decision-making process in highly 
complex environments. I refer to the integrated nature of these categories as nousmaking, 
or making reality of the situation and choices based on one’s sense of the reality. Ultimately, 
these factors determine the velocity and quality of the decisions leading to overall 
organizational effectiveness. Understanding the underlying nature by which leaders gain a 
sense of reality within the decision-making environment will help shape future organizational 
structures and processes as well as leader development. 
Introduction 
Despite the many Department of Defense (DoD) successes, many of the DoD’s 
programs and operations are still vulnerable to underperformance and excessive cost 
growth during times of increasingly constrained budgets. Since 1975, there have been an 
annual array of studies, beginning with the Packard Commission, that have had virtually no 
impact on the ever-increasing trend of cost growth and substandard program performance. 
Successfully addressing these challenges can yield fiscal dividends that the Department 
could use to meet priorities such as readiness and modernization needs.  
The DoD continues to struggle to overcome the many problems brought about by 
more than a decade of war and the need to accelerate the procurement of capability, while 
fighting on several fronts around the world. Often, the necessity of speed of delivery, 
resulting in underperforming programs, has spuriously suggested that program management 
is the root cause of program underperformance. The consequence of this assumption has 
been legislative language that tends to address program leaders’ motivations and 
incentives, rather than the root causes of program managers making decisions that often 
have little impact on program performance.  
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Although the DoD has increased its procurement budget over the years, it 
consistently pays more and takes longer than planned to develop systems that do not 
perform as anticipated. The DoD spends over $100 billion a year in contracting for goods 
and services. Over the last few years, the DoD has made several broad-based changes to 
its acquisition and contracting processes to improve DoD–contractor relationships and rules 
and has given attention to acquisition reform initiatives with little real improvement. The most 
glaring example of this failure is the termination of the DoD’s Joint Tactical Radio System, 
which cost more than $17 billion, with little return for the investment. 
It is time to examine the root causes of DoD program challenges from a more 
scientific perspective, rather than from the traditional organizational theory and policy view. 
The policy changes that have attempted to create efficiencies by using commercial best 
practices, portfolio management, and additional oversight have failed to produce their 
intended results. A deeper understanding of how leaders make decisions and the mitigating 
impacts of those decisions is necessary to truly change the acquisition framework in a way 
that will result in an improved return on investment for defense materiel development 
programs. The problem this research seeks to understand is the underlying nature of why a 
program manager’s decision making does not consistently manifest in improved program 
performance. This study is being conducted in two phases. Phase I of this study is a 
qualitative research effort based upon grounded theory. The results of this study will provide 
the basis for a quantitative study in which measurable factors such as organizational 
structure and policy will be examined with regard to the leader’s ability to link a sense of 
situational understanding with the structural realities of the business environment. 
Commensurate with this problem are the questions that help guide this research, presented 
in the following section. 
Phase I 
This research is focused on the first two questions: 
a. What is the underlying nature of how decision makers gain a sense of 
reality by which their decisions are subsequently informed within the 
unique construct of their functional framework? 
b. How do program managers of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) make sense of complex and chaotic program environments, 
and does this differ from other professions that operate in complex 
environments? 
This study is predicated on the basic assumption that there is an inherent process by 
which an individual makes decisions. This process involves a deliberate problem-solving 
methodology and a less-well-defined cognitive and interactive process that influences the 
ability of the decision maker to gain a sense of reality. While the overall research effort will 
be a mixed methods approach, the initial study is a qualitative descriptive approach based 
upon grounded theory. This report begins to address the first question in Phase I and will 
support subsequent research through which the initial theory will emerge in support of 
Phase II. 
Phase I is grounded in the naturalistic tradition and using a longitudinal qualitative, 
ethnographic approach to better understand the dynamics and processes of individuals 
making decisions in a group environment under volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous 
(VUCA) conditions. By understanding the constructs from with which a program manager 
derives a sense of reality and understanding of the nature of the world perhaps we can gain 
insight into how to better inform that reality, leading to more effective judgements and 
decisions. 
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We will focus on programs that are at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) six or 
higher, as defined by the DoD TRL Guide (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, 2011). This study will examine many complex decision-making environments 
and compare the fundamental nature of these environments with each other and their 
relative effectiveness. By exploring a wide variety of complex and chaotic leadership 
environments, and ultimately cross-coding them, perhaps we can gain a more informed view 
of how individuals respond to adversity. Ultimately, this insight can lead to better 
organizational understanding and the changes that will have a greater chance of success. 
Phase I leverages previous studies on decision makers in complex and chaotic 
environments such as Operational Detachment A (ODA) team leaders in highly volatile and 
ambiguous situations. While the scenarios are different than procurement environments, 
there are common themes which will help us to better understand why some decisions result 
in success and some in failure when they are eventually shaped by the functional construct 
within which they are made. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal a deeper 
understanding of the very nature of how individuals establish a sense of reality within the 
context of a complex ambiguous decision-making environment. 
Driskell and Salas (1991) presented two conclusions that are extremely relevant to 
this research. First, “under stress, group members will defer more to the opinions, ideas, and 
actions of the group leader” (pp. 473–478). This implies that in a stressful time, support 
staffs will begin to defer more to the leader instead of being the unbiased and objective 
voice for the leader that informs the leader of the cost of operations, in terms of the 
manpower, resources, time, and risk involved. Driskell and Salas’s conclusions could help 
us to understand how fundamental confidence is shaped based upon the leader support 
structure. Driskell and Salas (1991) also explained that “at the same time, the leader will be 
more likely to reject input from group members” (p. 473). This implies that if the staff were to 
remain impartial and act as a voice of reason for the leader, the leader who is under stress 
would disregard the guidance and counsel of the staff and make a decision based on either 
inadequate information (ignored or discounted information) or intuition (Riabacke, 2006). 
Hence, the dynamics of external influences become a factor in how leaders perceive and 
respond to their environment, possibly influencing their sense of reality within the construct 
of their situation. 
Understanding how the complexity of the situation influences the decision maker at a 
base level will lead us to a richer understanding of the decision process as we begin to 
contextualize it within a functional context such as program management. The culture of an 
organization will influence how the organization makes decisions (Riabacke, 2006). 
Organizations can predict outcomes by examining the epistemic motivation of the staff. With 
a higher pro-social motivation, the staff or team will be more likely to search, encode, and 
retrieve information that is more conducive and consistent with group goals (De Dreu, 
Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Furthermore, the research of Kruglanski and Webster in 
1996 shows that the staff is likely to “seize and freeze” when it comes to a quick solution, 
rather than an accurate one, and that once the staff reaches closure, they are usually 
unmovable (De Dreu et al., 2008).  
- 158 - 
What Is Decision Making?  
Research on decision making has focused more on the organizational and 
environmental influence of the leader and less on the inherent contextual interaction by 
which leaders make decisions. For example, models such as the Cynefin Framework 
(Snowden & Boone, 2007) are used to better understand the decision-making process in 
environments that range from simple to chaotic. This model describes chaotic environments 
as those in which relationships between cause and effect are impossible to determine 
because they are constantly changing and never develop a manageable pattern. Hence, 
Snowden and Boone (2007) suggest that the leader is simply reacting with the intent of 
eventually creating the conditions by which a pattern can emerge, migrating the environment 
into one of complexity rather than chaos.  
Complexity tends to be viewed as something with many parts that interact with each 
other in many ways (“Complexity,” n.d.). More specifically, complex decision environments 
tend to involve many interacting and non-linear elements, and can be retrospective when 
viewed from a historical perspective, resulting in agents that tend to constrain themselves 
over time (Snowden & Boone, 2007). While these definitions are important to understanding 
the environment within which the leader makes decisions, the research has not provided an 
understanding the cognitive processes by which the decision maker formulates a sense of 
perspective and understanding of the situational reality and subsequently translates this 
reality into effective decisions. 
Kathleen Eisenhardt (1989) suggests in her study, Making Fast Strategic Decisions 
in High Velocity Environments, that performance (or effective decisions) is a function of 
speed which results from a number of key mediating processes, including accelerated 
cognitive processing. The ability to make “speedy” decisions of sufficient quality is directly 
related to the effectiveness of the decision. The notion that effective decisions are related to 
confidence in the decisions is the basis upon which this study is focused. How decision 
makers create the reality within which they develop a sense of confidence and conviction in 
their choices is fundamental to understanding the relative relationship between effective and 
non-effective outcomes. 
Nousmaking 
Initial findings indicate that there are four basic categories that decision makers 
seem to consistently exhibit when confronted with chaotic and complex problems. These 
emerging categories were observed in our initial round of interviews with Special Operations 
(ODA) soldiers and will be the basis of subsequent interviews of program managers’ 
decision making in complex and chaotic environments. These four categories include 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. Because of the strong 
interaction of these four categories with regard to influencing the ability of the decision 
maker to interpret and come to a state of reality (Nous), I refer to this interaction as 
Nousmaking, a necessary process for “speedy” and quality decisions that lead to enhanced 
performance or effective decision outcomes. Within Eisenhardt’s (1989) model of decision 
making, Nousmaking would encompass the key mediating process, in particular cognitive 
processing. The interaction of these four aggregate categories was shown to be present in 
all of the decision environments described by the ODA leaders. 
A situation can consist of random, unordered events that cloud judgment and may 
impact the problem-solving ability of the decision maker. While the defense program 
environment may not have the same immediate impact to life, the random and inconsistent 
nature of events can be just as relevant to the decision maker and can lead to second- and 
third-order effects, which can then lead to major adverse programmatic impacts. The 
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increasingly complex nature of today’s technical and programmatic environment, coupled 
with the uncertainty of future security threats to the nation, provide for a complex and 
chaotic environment, similar to other fields at their base level that are trying to understand 
the stimulus under which the decision maker is formulating a sense of perspective or reality. 
Additionally, the value of the decisions made in context with the environmental inputs and 
preferred outcomes can be a seemingly random series of events influenced by the VUCA 
nature of the environment.  
Being able to arrive at a true meaning of the environment and see the reality of a 
situation is referred to as Nous, which in classical philosophy refers to the ability to 
understand what is true or real (“Nous,” 1973). Nous is often referred to as the equivalent of 
perception that works within the mind (Rorty, 1979). This paper illustrates that in order to 
achieve a level of perception necessary to translate into an effective decision, there is an 
inherent level of understanding and processing that must occur, which includes 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
Theoretical Framework  
This research leverages the data, information, knowledge, wisdom (DIKW) 
framework as a loose model upon which to understand the evolution of insight within the 
decision-making process (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) Framework 
The DIKW pyramid—also known as the DIKW hierarchy, wisdom hierarchy, 
knowledge hierarchy, information hierarchy, or data pyramid (Rowley, 2007)—refers loosely 
to a class of models for representing purported structural and/or functional relationships. 
This basic model proves useful in our research, in that it reflects the insight gained through a 
deliberate evolution from the “lifeless” unknown of pure data, to the novel insight of wisdom. 
As one is immersed in a situationally complex environment, making sense of it is predicated 
on the “data” one internalizes. Lacking any other context, this initial source of input is just as 
lifeless as the data described in the DIKW model. It is not until a higher level of context is 
applied to the data that the situation begins to come alive with regard to context. 
Additionally, this model makes no dispersions on the type of data or the functional 
environment in which it resides. This definitization begins to occur as the consumer of the 
data begins to shape it within the context of their environment and derives value and insight 
as the data transforms along the DIKW framework. 
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With this as a point of reference, Figure 2 represents a loosely constructed 
hierarchical model that represents the evolution of “knowing” in the decision-making 
process, which I refer to as the Decision Clarity Model (DCM). 
 
Figure 2. Decision Clarity Model 
The DCM represents an evolution of knowing in that at the base level, there exists 
simply a random, context-free environment consisting of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, 
and ambiguity. The specific context at this point is not yet relevant other than to say that this 
environment can exist across many functional domains. It is not until the participant in this 
environment begins to perceive the environment and applies it to a particular functional 
construct that the decision-making context becomes relevant. 
Conceptual Nousmaking is the point at which the participant begins to make sense of 
the complex environment through an internal struggle of what is real and relevant. This 
brings us to our first hypothesis: that there are four key attributes that influence how a 
decision maker understands and reacts to a particular complex environment.  
Hypothesis 1: There are four aggregate categories that shape and influence a 
program manager’s understanding of a complex environment, consisting of 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
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Table 1 summarizes the four categories and the respective attributes associated with 
each specific category. 
Table 1. Conceptual Nousmaking Categories 
 
Hypothesis 1 will be explored in subsequent interviews with program managers and 
other leaders that operate in complex environments. Continuous coding will be conducted 
from subsequent interviews of program managers. This will allow refinement and validation 
of the initial categories until we have reached a point of saturation. At this point, theory can 
be proposed upon which Phase II will be quantitatively assessed using the hypothetical 
deductive process.  
The following definitions for the four categories show the inherent relationship with 
their associated attributes. The initial data collected during initial interviews correlates to the 
attributes that were derived from initial coding of interviews. 
1. Sensemaking is the process by which people give meaning to experience 
and is characterized by the following properties (Weick, 1995): 
a. Identity—helps people identify who they are and shapes what they 
enact and how they interpret events (Currie, & Brown, 2003; Thurlow 
& Mills, 2009; Watson, 2009; Weick, Sutcliff, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
b. Retrospection—provides the conditions for sensemaking, such as 
attention and interruptions, which impact what people notice (Dunford 
& Jones, 2000). 
c. Organizing—is where individuals simultaneously shape and react to 
the environment they face. Thurlow and Mills (2009) suggest that 
individuals will project themselves into an environment and observe 
the consequences they learn about their identities and the accuracy of 
their understanding of the event. 
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d. Plausibility—is more relevant to sensemaking than accuracy since the 
world is filled with people who have multiple shifting identities (Weick, 
1995). This reinforces the value of a larger study group and allows the 
researcher to explore the possibility of theoretical perspectives. 
2. Trust is the willingness of an individual to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another based upon the expectations that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
the other party. While there are several terms associated with trust, three 
characteristics tend to appear frequently in studies associated with trust 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995): 
a. Ability—is a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that 
enable a party to have influence within some specific domain (Zand, 
1972). 
b. Benevolence—is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to 
do good to the trustor, independent of personal profit motive (Mayer et 
al., 1995). Additionally, Rosen and Jerdee (1977) considered the 
likelihood that the trustee would put the organization’s goals ahead of 
his or her own goals. 
c. Integrity—is the trustor’s perception that the trustee will adhere to a 
set of principles the trustor finds acceptable (McFall, 1987). 
3. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another individual 
by means of writing or verbalization (Polanyi, 1958). Effectively, it is 
knowledge that one seems to have acquired and that cannot easily be 
transferred to another individual, even for extremely complex tasks or 
situations. Polanyi refers to tacit knowledge as “we can know more than we 
can tell” (Polanyi, 1966). Tacit knowledge can be characterized by the 
following: 
a. Know-how—involves learning and skill that was acquired through 
means other than writing them down. Knowing how, or embodied 
knowledge, is characteristic of an expert who acts and makes 
judgements without explicitly reflecting on the principles or rules 
involved (Schmidt & Hunter, 1993) 
b. Experience—is a key to tacit knowledge in that without some form of 
shared experience, it would be difficult for people to share each 
other’s thinking processes (Lam, 2000), and thus it would be difficult 
to anticipate the actions of others, given a common framework and 
understanding. 
4. Explicit knowledge can be readily articulated, codified, and accessed (Helie & 
Sun, 2010). Thus, explicit knowledge can be generated through logical 
deduction and acquired through both formal and informal means, such as 
practical experience within a relevant context. 
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Interfield Theory 
Interfield theory is a cross disciplinary study that explores the common relationships 
between various fields (Darden & Maull, 1977). It is this theory upon which we are able to 
explore how the volatile environment and conceptual decision making in one discipline 
relates to another discipline. While the intent is to understand what influences the decision 
making of program managers in complex situations, this paper predominately explores the 
first two layers of the Decision Clarity Model, recognizing that the functional clarity level 
introduces a specific context to the Nousmaking within different disciplines. For example, the 
functional clarity a program manager experiences is based upon the defense acquisition 
framework, while the functional clarity for Special Operations soldiers is grounded in the 
combat framework. The DCM assumes that the first two layers of the process are neutral 
with regard to the situation. Within our definition of Nousmaking, the four categories of 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge support theoretical discussions 
within other disciplines, such as organizational theory, psychology, behavioral science, and 
so forth.  
Interfield theory allows us to identify common patterns at the subconscious level of 
decision making that can subsequently lead us to a richer understanding of how decisions 
are made independent of policy and regulation. Introducing the functional clarity of the 
participant’s unique operational framework, we will be able to separate the influence of the 
environmental framework from the innate process of rationalizing a situation. Once the 
Deliberate Decision Making and Decision Outcome layers are introduced into the scenario, it 
will become clear how nousmaking shapes the outcome of decisions and their relative 
impact. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Nousmaking is independent of the functional clarity of the 
operational environment in which choices are formulated. 
Hypothesis 2 does not presume that the individual’s personal experiences and bias 
are not relevant to formulating a sense of reality. We are simply suggesting that the 
aggregate categories that make up the Nousmaking process influence the individual’s 
objective reality similarly, regardless of disciplines, and that the subsequent decision making 
and outcome are influenced and can be altered by the exigent factors of the functional 
environment in which the individual’s reality has previously been established.  
By establishing a demarcation between Nousmaking and decision making within a 
functional construct, a leader’s ability to formulate a speedy high-quality decision is 
impacted by the ability to both establish a sense of reality as well as respond to the unique 
constructs of a particular functional setting, and one informs the other. This line of reasoning 
could lead us to a better understanding of why some leaders prevail and some do not, given 
the same functional constraints. 
A large portion of a leader’s ability to make a decision is his or her reliance on past 
experiences. Leaders are selected after a careful scrutiny of records and evaluations by a 
centralized panel of senior officers. Research shows that in an experienced-based choice, 
decisions are made from memories of past outcomes, concluding that memory biases may 
play a role in the overweighting of extreme outcomes and causing more risk seeking 
behavior, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraph (Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2013). 
Ludvig et al. (2013) cite five studies that conclude that a bias exists in which “highly salient 
and emotional events are over weighted in memory tasks.” Another conclusion reached is 
that extreme outcomes are more likely to be retrieved at the time of a decision and that this 
may be a heuristic used to simplify the situation at hand and to limit the number of outcomes 
considered (Ludvig et al., 2013). Ludvig et al.’s research would suggest that there are core 
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processes at work at the base layer at which reality is created that may influence a leader’s 
perspective and will necessarily influence or predetermine the decision strategy within the 
functional environmental constraint. Studying emergent patterns in transition from a 
predictable normal routine–centric environment to one of chaos and unpredictability may 
have significant relevance across various functional domains. The appreciation for the 
potential of chaos in decision making may have potential relevance in the understanding of 
both the nonlinearity of making decisions as well as the functional aspects of instability as a 
means for adapting to new situations in any VUCA environment. Understanding the chaotic 
and volatile decision-making environment of the battlefield may yield an increased clarity 
and potential for interpreting decision making in a variety of dynamic and nonlinear decision-
making environments. According to Keil (1995), nonlinearity refers to behavior in which the 
relationships between variables in a system are dynamic and disproportionate, whose 
outcomes are subject to high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability.  
Method 
Interpretive Approach to Understanding Decision Making in Complex Environments 
This study was predicated on the basic assumption that there is an inherent process 
by which an individual makes decisions and that this process involves a deliberate problem-
solving methodology (Drucker, 1967) and a less-well-defined cognitive and interactive 
process, which influences the ability of the decision maker to arrive at a sense of clarity in 
ambiguous conditions. Similar to the Buddhist understanding of self and environment in 
which everything around us is a reflection of our inner lives and is perceived through the self 
and alters according to the inner state (SGI Quarterly, 1995), this study explored the notion 
that there are other intrinsic factors involved in decision making that influence the 
effectiveness of these decisions. Phase I research adopts a qualitative descriptive approach 
based upon grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), in which the interpretations and 
experiences of the participants remained in the foreground, notwithstanding the fact that 
some of the interviewers tended to have similar backgrounds and experiences as those 
being interviewed. During the initial interviews, it was important to maintain a sense of 
separation from the interviewee in order to limit the bias toward preconceived understanding 
of the specific events being discussed. In keeping with the approach described by Gioia with 
regard to giving voice to the informants, it was important to recognize the researcher’s 
expertise, and interpret this pattern in the data, thus providing the best opportunity for 
discovering new concepts or relationships between existing concepts (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2012). 
While the overall research is focused on program manager decision making in 
complex and chaotic environments, I was initially interested in a variety of decision-making 
environments in order to begin to address both hypotheses presented in this paper. The first 
unit of measure was special operations forces in complex and chaotic conditions and how 
they developed a sense of reality within the context of these situations. This analysis 
supports the categorical definitization of the elements within which reality is shaped, or what 
we are calling Nousmaking.  
This initial research study selected participants from a pool of available graduate 
students within the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Candidates were solicited from the student body enrolled in the Defense Analysis program 
via email. Respondents were screened and selected based on a required set of criteria, 
resulting in the identification of 20 research participants. Each participant was interviewed 
for approximately 60–90 minutes during a semi-structured interview conducted in-person by 
one of nine identified researchers.  
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In order to participate in the research study, participants needed to satisfy a number 
of selection criteria. First, they had to be United States military officers who had served in a 
leadership position in Iraq or Afghanistan. Second, they had to have experienced complex 
decision-making situations while in a position of leadership. The final selection focused on 
Army Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA) and Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) team leaders. 
These team leaders tended to have significant exposure to chaotic combat environments, 
and were in positions to make critical decisions affecting both themselves and their teams. 
Team leaders from these units were in the rank of O3–O5, the equivalent of captains, 
majors, and lieutenant colonels in the Army or lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and 
commanders in the Navy. This selection of personnel resulted in an exclusively male 
research pool, and excluded military officers from the Air Force and Marines, due to either 
inconsistent exposure to similar ground combat operations or lack of availability within the 
current student body.  
Data 
The intent of Phase I of this research was to interview a broad spectrum of leaders 
from varying complex environments and to build a baseline of common categories that exist 
between the various disciplines. While this initial study leveraged interviews from Special 
Operations leaders, follow-on interviews will look at a minimum of at least 30 program 
managers from a broad spectrum of programs that include both challenged programs as 
well as programs that are performing well against their predetermined baseline. 
Data collection for this first round of interviews included three primary sources: (1) 
tapes and transcripts of the subject interviews; (2) briefings from subject matter experts 
regarding the operational concepts of ODA teams; and (3) interview debriefing with the 
entire research team as well as self-debrief and analysis of the data. As part of this 
research, we used conventional ethnographic analysis methods through the use of memos, 
notes, and subjective interpretations of the subject’s experience depictions. The focus was 
mainly on the description of events through language by the interviewees to gain meaning to 
support the experimental interpretation. Analysis of the interviews in a group setting 
provided varying perspectives of the data, allowing me to explore alternative interpretations 
and category development. This provided the basis upon which a theoretical direction could 
be established. The interviews and subsequent interpretation provided a rich basis of data 
from which to begin to establish a theoretical understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in decision making in VUCA environments.  
Understanding and subsequent theory requires plausibility, direction, centrality, and 
adequacy (Charmaz, 2014). It was important to ensure that the descriptive data provided by 
the interviewees was plausible, lending itself to the development of emerging categories. 
Throughout this process, a method of constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was 
used from the many different subject interviews. The data from the interviews was coded, 
categorized, and evaluated until a systemic pattern began to emerge. The first order coding 
was the critical link to developing the emergent theory. Incident-by-incident coding was used 
to compare the relevant ideas identified in the various interviews (Charmaz, 2014). The 
initial coding helped to establish correlation between the incidents and was the basis from 
which a framework of understanding evolved. 
In order to establish emerging themes, the informants’ initial incident coding was put 
into context and compared against each other. As themes began to emerge, theoretical 
sampling was used to further elaborate and refine the initial categories. Initially, 
sensemaking seemed to have a significant effect on the participant’s ability to shape the 
reality of the situation, but it became clear through further research and the memos that 
there might be a more complex set of variables helping to shape the participant’s reality and 
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subsequent decision-making process. Throughout the interviews, I kept asking myself why 
an individual with relatively few years of experience generally made the “right” decision 
under seemingly life-altering situations. This question will be critical to further examine as 
program managers begin to be interviewed and cross coded with the results from other 
leader’s experiences. Understanding the basis of this phenomenon could have significant 
impact in helping to shape the conditions for other complex decision-making environments.  
While the respondents kept attributing their successes to their formal training, this 
simply did not reveal itself as the primary causal factor in the data. Through theoretical 
sampling from the various interviews, I was able to develop the properties of my categories 
until I reached a point of saturation, the point at which I was not able to develop new 
information from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Subsequent interviews of project 
managers will follow the same method, providing an even richer body of knowledge, which 
will add validity to the process of determining the overall aggregate categories of 
Nousmaking. 
Data Analysis 
Initial respondent coding began to reveal 12 second-order analytical codes that 
seemed to be interacting throughout the incidents under investigation. These included 
retrospection, plausibility, social identity, organizing, ability, benevolence, integrity, 
experience, know-how, codified knowledge, logical knowledge, and deductive knowledge. 
Through theoretical sampling and continuous probing of the data from all of the interviews, 
these 12 areas continued to emerge, leading me to four aggregate categories—
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge—as characteristics influencing 
the decision maker during the events being described. These categories seemed to have 
the closest alignment with the emergent themes and, upon further research, revealed 
themselves as the most plausible description of the process characteristics being described. 
Second-order analytic codes (Table 1) are characteristics associated with the 
aggregate categories and were revealed during the specific events being described by the 
participant. As the second-order analytic codes began to emerge, it was useful to begin to 
search for categories that helped to explain my observations. The four categories—
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge—seemed to align with the 
emerging data. 
While the timelines and circumstances for the various chaotic events varied across 
all of the subject interviews, the general nature was similar in that the respondents 
described chaotic and complex circumstances in which they had to make deliberate 
decisions based upon limited information. As I decomposed their situations and began to 
code their narratives, there seemed to be a finite set of characteristics emerging and 
interacting that helped to shape their actions. The decisions they made were both conscious 
and subconscious, in that often their deliberate actions without apparent deliberation 
seemed to be second nature. While virtually all of the respondents attributed this to “good 
training,” further analysis suggests the presence of more than just training.  
The respondents consistently displayed the influence of all four aggregate categories 
during the time frame in which they were responding to immediate chaotic circumstance. 
While training manifested as explicit knowledge and allowed the respondents to perform 
certain actions with little thought, tacit knowledge and trust reinforced this knowledge with 
the sense that they simply “knew” what to do based upon their instincts. Charging an 
ambush, for example, in Scenario 2 was reflective of this innate knowledge: The decision 
was shaped by trust in self, perceived trust from superiors, and trust in the team that was 
reinforced by training and an evolved sense of the current situation, indicating the 
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continuous interaction of sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
Figure 3 shows a summary of the number of times I was able to identify the influence of the 
four aggregate categories during the specific chaotic decision-making window for each of 
the interviewees. 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the Total Number of Observations  
Sensemaking and trust seem to be the most prominent categories influencing the 
respondent during the specific decision-making events, with tacit and explicit knowledge 
manifesting significantly across all of the chaotic events in relatively equal value. Figure 4 
further shows the distribution and number of observations of the second-order codes that 
emerged during the coding process that helped to define the aggregate categories. 
Examining the individual second-order codes in relation to each other, there appears to be a 
higher influence of trust and sensemaking when compared to the other attributes. 
 
Figure 4. Second-Order Code Summary by Number of Observations for All 
Interviewees 
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Discussion 
Sonenshein (2007) begins to address the notion that individuals make intuitive 
judgements in their construction of ethical decisions and suggests that responses to ethical 
issues are not always based on deliberate and extensive moral reasoning. One can 
extrapolate from his research that individuals also make intuitive judgements in ambiguous 
decision-making environments, which ultimately involve ethical and logical choices. While 
Sonenshein (2007) suggests that individuals are engaging in sensemaking (Weick, 1979) 
under conditions of equivocality, I further suggest that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, initial 
findings from these interviews reinforce the notion that decision makers are inherently 
influenced by the four aggregate categories of sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and 
explicit knowledge.  
What remains to be seen is whether or not these same categories manifest 
themselves across leaders from different functional environments. If individuals develop 
their sense of reality similarly, regardless of the functional environment in which they make 
decisions, this could lead us to questioning the emphasis of focusing on leadership issues 
as a root cause of defense program failure. One has to then turn to the actual functional 
constraints of the environment and assess the impact of the actual decision-making 
environment on program outcomes. If leaders develop their foundation and sense of clarity 
in similar ways, yet perform differently in different functional constructs, this might even 
suggest that leaders that are successful in one complex environment may be less 
successful in others such as the program environment. 
The second round of interviews will consist primarily of current and former program 
managers. Their results will be compared to current data in an effort to establish a sense of 
validity to the theoretical construct. If data reveals itself as consistent with the emerging 
results of the Special Operations Forces interviews, this will reinforce the preliminary 
findings in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and set the conditions for Phase II, in which the 
functional construct of the individual’s environment is compared with the conceptual 
Nousmaking. 
There does seem to be a relationship emerging between speed and quality of 
decision making. From the initial round of interviews, speed and quality seemed to manifest 
itself and have some relation to performance. It is still unclear what the relationship between 
speed, quality, and Nousmaking are with regard to the overall decision-making process. As 
more data is collected and the functional environmental constraints are applied to the 
process, this relationship will gain additional clarity. By understanding how an individual 
establishes a sense of reality and how the functional constructs of the individual’s 
environment interact with this sense of reality, we hope to better understand how individuals 
make effective decisions and how the outcomes of these decisions are impacted by speed 
and quality. This leads us to yet a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Speed and quality of decision making have a direct relationship 
with the positive or negative impact of the decision and are influenced by the 
aggregate categories of Nousmaking. 
The velocity and quality of the decision is influenced by the decision maker’s sense 
of reality and perceived outcome based upon the functional construct and clarity. Figure 5 
represents the relationship between Nousmaking and decision effectiveness, as 
hypothesized above. 
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Figure 5. Interactive Relationship Between Four Aggregate Categories and 
Decision Effectiveness 
If decisions are made rapidly but are not reinforced with a level of clarity that informs 
the quality of the decision, then the overall effectiveness of the decision could be 
compromised. Additionally, if the quality of the choices is sufficiently high, but the decision 
comes late, then the effectiveness is also hampered. For example, in the case of Sample 
Scenario 1, although the respondent could have reached a level of understanding regarding 
the choice to be made, his overall reality of the situation with regard to the urgency was not 
sufficiently realized. In this case, I suggest that the combined effect of the four categories, in 
which a reality of the environment due to the interaction of the four categories resulted in a 
high velocity and high quality decision, ultimately led to an effective decision and outcome. 
Kathleen Eisenhardt (1989) revealed in her article, Making Fast Strategic Decisions 
in High-Velocity Environments, that fast decision makers use more, not less, information 
than slow decision makers. Additionally, the greater the number of alternatives that are 
considered simultaneously, the greater the speed of the strategic decision. Her research 
showed that executives immersed themselves in real-time information about their 
environment and their firm’s operations. The result of this, according to Eisenhardt, was a 
deep personal knowledge of the enterprise that allowed for rapid decision making. 
Consequently, the greater the speed of the strategic decision process, the greater the 
performance in high-velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The relationship between performance and speed is illustrated in Figure 6, in which 
Eisenhardt illustrates the interdependencies of the mediating processes necessary for 
speedy high performance decisions. The data presented in this paper takes Eisenhardt’s 
reasoning a bit further by offering a definitive relationship between the tangible and 
intangible qualities of decision making in high velocity and chaotic environments and their 
relationship to effective decisions. Within the context of Eisenhardt’s model, this would 
further explain the key mediating processes to reflect the relationship between the key 
mediating processes and the aggregate categories process described in this paper. 
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Figure 6. Relationship Between Eisenhardt (1989) Model of Strategic Decision 
Speed in High-Velocity Environments, With Aggregate Categories 
In essence, the decision maker is determining what is real through the interaction of 
the four aggregate categories that emerged from the respondent data, and subsequently 
acting on this understanding. The degree to which the decision maker optimizes the 
aggregate categories and is able to make a timely and high quality decision determines the 
overall effectiveness of the decision. As we examine more interview data for project 
managers, we will be able to establish a theoretical basis from which to begin Phase II. 
Phase II will examine the causal relationship between Nousmaking and the functional 
environmental construct in which the individual makes decisions. The interdependent nature 
of Nousmaking and decision making within a functional environment will be revealed, 
allowing us to design subsequent experiments that examine the effects of varying either the 
Nousmaking or functional environment and the subsequent impact on the speed and quality 
of the decision-making process. 
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Conclusion 
The theory presented in this paper represents a qualitative ethnographic study of a 
group that has the propensity to be required to make life-altering decisions in time-
constrained chaotic and complex environments. While this data focused on SoF soldiers, 
the underlying factors of Nousmaking are presumed to be independent of the functional 
environmental construct of the participants. While one could dismiss their ability to operate 
in these environments successfully as a function of their significant training, the results of 
this study reflect a higher level of cognitive processing that leads to effective decisions and 
subsequent performance. Using the grounded theory approach to qualitative analysis, 
interviewees were asked to describe chaotic events during combat situations, in which they 
were required to make critical decisions. From their stories, I was able to conduct first- and 
second-order coding from which a theoretical construct emerged to help understand the 
nature of decision making in these environments. 
Four aggregate categories emerged as being relevant to almost all of the scenarios 
described by the interviewees. These four categories included sensemaking, trust, tacit 
knowledge, and explicit knowledge. At some point during the decision-making windows, the 
interviewee exhibited signs that at least one of these categories was at play and facilitated 
the actions at the moment. Recognizing that decision making is a dynamic process, the 
interaction of these categories likely played a significant role in helping to shape the 
interviewee’s reality of the environment, involving a perception of the current conditions; 
trust relationships with subordinates, peers, and superiors; and an innate self-confidence 
and confidence in their own skills. For the purposes of helping to describe this interactive 
relationship, I termed this process Nousmaking, or perhaps more simply, reality making that 
provides a sense of clarity in action and purpose. 
Practical Impact and Future Research Opportunity 
Chaotic and complex decision-making environments are not limited to combat 
scenarios. Disasters and emergency situations are examples of decision-making 
environments that have potentially similar characteristics as combat environments in that 
they reflect the unpredictability and nonlinearity of the situation relative to a more predictable 
steady state environment. The nonlinearity of these events in which human decision making 
is predicated by chaos may have certain similarities and patterns that can be studied with 
regard to their association with the individuals involved in the decision-making process. 
Complex and high risk business environments can also manifest themselves in a chaotic or 
unpredictable nature and could be subject to the same cognitive processes as combat. 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) study of high tech companies began to explore the relationship between 
fast and slow decision making and their potential outcomes. If we better understood the 
internal influencers that lead to making effective decisions in ambiguous environments, 
perhaps future organizational and leadership theory and methods could be better tailored to 
the environment, leading to more predictable outcomes. 
Future research should examine in much greater depth the theoretical nature of the 
Nousmaking process with the goal of mapping these interactions to their relative inputs and 
desired outputs. Although we will likely never accurately predict the nature of human 
decision making, better understanding of the integrated parts and their relationships to each 
other could provide greater insight into the ability to improving decision making across a full 
spectrum of complex environments. 
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Abstract 
The development, testing, and fielding of combat helmets for United States (U.S.) 
Soldiers offers project management (PM) professionals an opportunity to analyze how 
programs begin, how they progress through development and testing, and finally, how new 
capability is fielded within the U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution. The case study centers 
on the U.S. Army’s adoption of the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) for Soldiers stationed 
in war zones around the world. The case study is applicable broadly to project managers, 
business managers, engineers, testers, and logicians involved in project management within 
the private sector, as well as specifically targeting acquisition professionals within the 
Government Defense Departments. The case study can develop critical thinking and 
analysis skills in the areas of project initiation, stakeholder management and decision-
making with ambiguous and contradicting testing/field data. The ECH case is in two distinct 
parts: Part I allows PM professionals to analyze how to initiate a program with an increased 
chance of success of meeting desired objectives. Part II allows PM professionals to analyze 
how to determine a procurement and fielding recommendation without stakeholder 
consensus and with ambiguous data. 
Executive Summary 
This Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) case study encourages critical analysis of a 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) project at two key decision points: project start and 
production. The case centers on the development, testing, and procurement (also referred 
to as acquisition) of the ECH for U.S. Army Soldiers and U.S. Marines. Two things make this 
case study particularly interesting. First is that key project stakeholders are passionate 
about helmets because they save lives in combat, and all Soldiers and Marines consider 
themselves subject matter experts on helmets—resulting in wide applicability. Second is that 
the key decisions involved with the ECH effort involved ambiguous data within a complex 
acquisition environment—requiring decision-making under uncertainty. The ECH case study 
reinforces critical thinking in uncertain environments, documents lessons learned for sound 
project management for future application, and provides wide private sector exposure to the 
complexities of public sector acquisition and helmet manufacture in particular. The following 
are the learning objectives for this case study: 
 Develop the ability to critically analyze a project at key decision points—
critical thinking. 
 Identify key stakeholders and outline their contribution to the pending 
decision—stakeholder management. 
 Develop alternative recommended strategies or courses of action for the 
decision-maker—decision-making with uncertainty or ambiguous data. 
 Compare alternative strategies and identify decision criteria used for the 
comparison—decision-making with uncertainty or ambiguous data. 
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 Identify second-order considerations or consequences of the recommended 
strategies—strategic management/leadership.  
Part 1 of the case focuses on the decision to initiate the ECH program. Guidance 
from the warfighting community and senior leaders was clear: The top priorities are 
maximum protection and weight reduction. Specifically, the ECH had to address the rifle 
threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce the weight on Soldiers and Marines in 
combat. In this part of the case, program management professionals can compare the 
various courses of actions developed for the initiation of an ECH effort with the actual ECH 
program. Valuable insights can be gleaned as lessons learned. It may be possible to avoid 
strategy pitfalls, and project management teams may be better able to manage cost, 
schedule, and performance trade-offs—and ultimately deliver capability more successfully. 
Questions to consider include the following: 
 Who are the key stakeholders in the ECH program initiation decision and how 
does he manage their expectations? 
 Would the ECH program be considered a “technology push” or “capability 
pull” program, and what are the implications? 
 How should the ECH requirements be set? Should increased protection or 
weight reduction be emphasized? What is the right balance between 
reductions of Soldier load (combat weight) versus greater Soldier protection? 
 How does the Army set testing protocols for the ECH prior to development 
and manufacturing of a helmet based on a new technology? 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acquisition 
approaches for the development, testing, procurement and fielding of the 
ECH? What are the criteria used to compare the alternative approaches?  
Part 1 of the ECH case study offers key fundamental defense acquisition and 
program management lessons, which include the following: 
 All programs are held to the constraints of cost, schedule, and performance. 
However, programs that involve the application of a new technology 
inherently include high levels of integration, manufacturability, producibility, 
and quality risk. These programs should guard against being primarily 
schedule-driven. Time is required to optimize the requirements and testing 
protocols and to allow the widest possible participation in the program by 
interested and innovative manufacturers. In this case, an effort that originally 
planned to field helmets within a year was seeking a production decision 
almost fours year later. The industrial base suffered as the program settled 
on a sole-source contracting strategy without the benefits of competition to 
keep costs and schedule in check. A program that is knowledge-driven from a 
research and development effort that includes many competitors from the 
industrial base may have proven more beneficial and had a similar actual 
schedule timeline. 
 PMs, decision-makers, and senior leaders should be realistic about the risks 
associated with development efforts that are primarily schedule-driven rather 
than knowledge-driven. 
Part 2 of the ECH case study focuses on the decision to actually procure and field 
the helmets to Soldiers and Marines despite the objections of the testing and medical 
communities. The Army and the Marine Corps approved urgent requirements based on 
combat operations and the need for increased protection against enemy rifle threats. After 
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passing testing and four years after program initiation, the ECH was ready for a full rate 
production decision. Despite passing testing against the requirements, senior leaders faced 
a difficult decision because not all key stakeholders interpreted the test results similarly, 
raising significant safety concerns. Specifically, the testing and medical communities 
believed that the ECH was not operationally effective or operationally suitable for fielding 
and that the risk of injury to Soldiers and Marines was unacceptable—Soldiers and Marines 
wearing the ECH could suffer life-threatening skull fractures. Questions to consider include 
the following: 
 Who were the key stakeholders and how would he manage their 
expectations?  
 How does the Army balance the importance of development test data versus 
field data from helmets that were battle damaged? Should developmental test 
results or field data carry more weight in decision-making? How can the same 
development test data be interpreted differently by stakeholders? 
 Are the concerns of the testing and medical communities warranted? 
 How should the Army address these concerns with Congress, the media, and 
the American public?  
 What are the advantages, disadvantages, and second-order implications of 
various courses of actions for the path forward? What are the decision 
criteria? 
 How do you quantify benefits such as saving a Soldier’s life and compare 
these benefits with long-term, potential health problems like concussions or 
muscle-skeletal neck injuries from the weight of helmets? 
Part 2 of the case study offers key fundamental defense acquisition and program 
management lessons, which include the following: 
 Test data can be interpreted differently by key stakeholders—leading to 
ambiguity in the decision-making process. The PM is in a position to 
understand not only the business side of the project (cost and schedule), but 
also the engineering side of the project (technology, testing, and risks). With 
this knowledge, the PM needs to try to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
the test data and present an interpretation in an unbiased, rational manner. 
 The extension of test data obtained in a controlled test environment to 
relevance in an operational setting needs to be viewed with caution about its 
applicability and viewed from the proper perspective—from the perspective of 
the ultimate customer, in this case the warfighter.  
 The cost constraints of projects should not be minimized, which is particularly 
hard to do in schedule-driven projects with urgent requirements. 
 The recommendation is easier for the decision-maker if all the stakeholders 
are engaged early and often in the process, if their concerns are addressed, 
and if they have some ownership and buy-in in the path forward. The PM is 
key to making this happen successfully through effective leadership and 
communication.  
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Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) Case Study 
Coverage of returns of battle-damaged helmets (as shown in Figure 1) to Soldiers is 
a good news story. It underscores the importance of Soldier protective equipment for 
combat effectiveness and Soldier force protection. Soldiers are wearing the very best 
combat helmets that industry can produce. However, the efforts to modernize helmets, and 
all protective combat gear for that matter, face the same defense acquisition challenges that 
all programs within the DoD face: a complex, bureaucratic Defense Acquisition Institution. 
The accelerated pace of technology innovation, rapidly evolving threats, and declining 
defense budgets make program management within the DoD challenging but even more 
critical than ever. Defense acquisition operates in an uncertain, complex, and ambiguous 
environment but maintains a simple focus: develop, procure, and field advanced warfighting 
capability to Soldiers to enable technological superiority on the modern battlefield. 
 
Note. The photo on the right is a photo taken by U.S. Army Program Executive Office (PEO) 
Soldier of a battle-damaged helmet returned to a Soldier in a ceremony at Fort Belvoir in 
2016. In news coverage entitled “U.S. Army Soldier Reunited With Equipment That Saved 
His Life in Afghanistan,” the reporter covers the Soldier’s description of how his helmet saved 
his life. The photo on the left is another photo taken by PEO Soldier of a recovered helmet 
damaged by enemy fire in Afghanistan. 
Figure 1. Why Are Stakeholders So Passionate About Helmets?  
(Aubert, 2016) 
Current Situation, Summer 2013 
Monday Morning Project Management Office Staff Meeting 
Chief Engineer, Project Office for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment (PM 
SPIE): “Sir, we have an Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) update. We just learned that 
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) sent Congress the ECH Beyond Low Rate 
Initial Production (BLRIP) Report, and recommended that the Army not buy or field the ECH. 
The report says the unit cost is too high and that Soldiers wearing the ECH would have an 
unacceptably high risk of dying from excessive backface transient deformation from threat 
bullets.” 
Project Manager, Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment (PM SPIE): “Hmm … 
that puts us right in the middle between the warfighters and the operational testers. Both 
Army Senior leaders and Congress rely on the independent assessment of DOT&E for good 
reasons. DOT&E has a lot of influence.”  
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. Also, DOT&E received concurrence from the Army Surgeon 
General with their assessments and recommendations.” 
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PM SPIE: “So, after a four-year joint development and testing effort with the USMC 
in which the ECH finally passed its requirements, now we have to get an Army decision on 
whether to buy and field the ECH against the recommendations of the testing and medical 
communities, who have legitimate safety concerns?” 
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. However, the warfighters and Army combat developers 
have been very involved in this effort, and they remain adamant that the ECH should be 
fielded to deploying Soldiers. The requirement remains over 35,000 helmets. The USMC is 
strongly in favor of buying and fielding the ECH as well.” 
PM SPIE: “What’s the funding situation?” 
Chief Engineer: “We have over $35 million in operations & maintenance (O&M) 
overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding reserved for the buy that must be obligated 
by the end of the fiscal year (FY).” 
PM SPIE: “Okay. Well, you know the drill. DOT&E probably already has the ear of 
the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). Because the ECH was a wartime directed 
requirement with high visibility, the AAE is the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Let’s get 
together a solid briefing to review, and let’s start scheduling the pre-briefs to the AAE staff. 
Also, we need to be prepared to provide the congressional committees an update with the 
Army’s decision. There are many stakeholders involved with the ECH, and some will not be 
happy. So, we need to think about how this will play out with the media and senior leaders 
from all the stakeholders with a solid strategic communications plan.”  
Background 
The protection of American Soldiers in combat remains a top priority for senior 
leaders in the U.S. Army, the DoD, and Congress. The DoD has committed considerable 
resources and funding over the years in research & development, resulting in advanced 
materials and manufacturing processes. These investments have paid off. The American 
Soldier going into battle today has technologically advanced, rigorously tested combat 
equipment. Soldiers know that their combat equipment works as intended. In the end, this 
increases the combat effectiveness of the Soldiers and their units. One can consider the 
force protection of Soldiers as a layered approach. The outer force protection layer for 
Soldiers is situational awareness. The middle force protection layer is concealment. The 
inner force protection layer is personal protective equipment, like helmets, eyewear, and 
ballistic vests with ceramic plate inserts. This case study centers on combat helmets, which 
provide Soldiers skull and brain protection against both ballistic threats (i.e., bullets) and 
blunt impact forces, and prevent mild traumatic brain injury and concussions. 
Army Combat Helmet Evolution 
Figure 2 graphically displays the evolution of Army combat helmets and shows the 
tradeoff between increased performance and cost over time (Mortlock, 2014). The combat 
helmets that Soldiers wear into battle show a constant improvement in performance over 
time. This improvement in performance has been the result of advances in material research 
and manufacturing techniques. Soldiers wore the M1 helmet, nicknamed the “steel pot,” 
from the 1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 provided ballistic protection largely because 
steel is hard. The M1 helmet consisted of a pressed manganese steel shell with a webbing 
suspension that Soldiers fitted to their heads. However, the M1 helmet was heavy and 
uncomfortable, and it provided little blunt trauma protection.  
Advances in material research provided the opportunity to increase ballistic 
protection at a reduced weight. The maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-aramid 
polymer technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Personnel Armor System 
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for Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in the mid-1980s. The PASGT helmets were in the 3–4 
pound range (lighter than the M1) and provided increased ballistic protection. The shell of 
the helmet consisted of layers of ballistic aramid fabric, the most famous of which is 
DuPont’s Kevlar®. Thus, the PASGT was nicknamed simply “Kevlar” or “K-pot.” The ballistic 
aramid technology allowed helmets to provide not only fragmentation protection from 
explosions but also small caliber hand gun protection at a reasonable weight. Eventually, 
the Modular Integrated Communication Helmet (MICH) replaced the PASGT helmet on a 
limited basis. By the mid-2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) was the Army’s 
primary helmet. The basis for both the MICH and ACH is para-aramid polymer technology. 
These helmets provided Soldiers important performance improvements like reduced weight 
and better blunt impact protection through an interior suspension system using foam pads 
versus webbing.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Army Research Lab, the U.S. Army 
Research Development and Engineering Command, and commercial industry teamed to 
mature the next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the development of high 
molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE) ballistics fibers that could be weaved into fabrics 
with application to combat helmets. HMWPE are polymer materials with different 
performance characteristics than para-aramid polymer materials. Para-aramids are a 
thermoset polymer, which means that above certain temperatures the polymer breaks down, 
loses its properties and cannot be remolded back into its original state when cooled. On the 
other hand, HMWPE are thermoplastics, which means that above a certain temperature the 
polymer breaks down but it can be remolded into its original state when cooled. The 
application of HMWPE fiber material in helmets created the misperception that helmets 
made with HMWPE materials might easily lose their form under ballistic events and 
potentially jeopardize Soldiers’ safety. Ultimately, the advantages of HMWPE helmets for 
reduced weight and greater ballistic capability outweighed this concern. The basis of future 
Army helmets, both the ECH and its eventual replacement, the Soldier Protection System 
(SPS) Integrated Head Protection System (IHPS), is HMWPE technology.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of Combat Helmets 
(Mortlock, 2014)  
Helmet Testing Basics1 (Zheng, 2002) 
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by Soldiers against protocols to 
ensure they conform to stringent requirements to protect Soldiers against both blunt trauma 
and ballistic threats. Three ballistic properties particularly important for describing impacts to 
helmets are complete penetration (the bullet goes completely through the helmet), partial 
penetration (the bullet does not go completely through the helmet) and backface transient 
deformation (BTD—a measure for the amount the round’s impact dents the helmet material; 
Zheng, 2002). The final performance of the helmet in testing and in combat depends both on 
the inherent properties of the materials used to develop the helmet and the processing 
techniques used to manufacture the helmet. Helmet requirements are performance-based. 
Each helmet manufacturer optimizes its design over time using a combination of materials 
(layers of polymer fibers woven into sheets with chemical binders) and different processes 
based on temperature, pressure, and time. The use of statistics is important in testing 
because testing simulates live combat, and the warfighter requires a high confidence that 
the helmets will perform as advertised. The testing must balance the need for statistical 
confidence with the costly and destructive nature of the testing. 




 Refer to Appendix 2 for a helmet-testing tutorial. 
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Operational Field Data 
As was presented previously, the Army collects battle-damaged helmets from 
Soldiers. Before returning them, the Army conducts forensic studies to better understand 
enemy threats and analyze the performance of the helmets to improve future designs. 
Figure 3 presents the data collected from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from 
77 helmets hit by small arms bullets (Mortlock, 2013). When the bullet completely 
penetrated the helmet, the Soldiers died nearly 75% of the time. When the bullets did not 
completely penetrate the helmet (partial penetration), the average permanent helmet 
deformation was about 9mm and the Soldiers all survived with relatively minor head/neck 
injuries and eventually returned to duty. 
 
Figure 3. Recovered Protective Helmet Data 
(Mortlock, 2013) 
Part I: Project Initiation Decision, Early 2009 Timeframe 
Colonel Bob Smith was recently assigned as the Project Manager (PM), Soldier 
Protection and Individual Equipment—the office responsible for developing, testing, 
procuring, and fielding helmets to Soldiers. Colonel Smith was a seasoned defense 
acquisition veteran with over 15 years of project management experience. During his 
preparation for this position, the guidance from the warfighting community and senior 
leaders was clear: the top priorities are maximum protection and weight reduction.  
Colonel Smith was preparing for a key decision in the Pentagon regarding the start of 
a new helmet program, named the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH). Luckily, Colonel 
Smith’s chief engineer for the program office was an armor expert, Dr. James Suchez. Dr. 
Suchez led the efforts to mature HMWPE technologies across the DoD and with commercial 
industry for the last decade. Dr. Suchez explained that the application of HMWPE to helmets 
allowed the Army to consider the following basic options for the new helmet requirements: 
(1) Maintain the protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight of up to 20% 
or (2) increase the protection levels but maintain (or increase) the weight of the helmet.  
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Colonel Smith knew that the Army senior leaders would rely on the advice and 
recommendations of the PM during the meeting. The final decision would be made by the 
Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). However, the AAE would likely turn to key stakeholders 
before making the final decision. The first stakeholder was the PM, and Bob was well 
prepared to discuss key considerations from a cost, schedule, performance, and technology 
perspective.  
The second stakeholder was the warfighter representative, also called the “user” 
representative. The warfighter representative was a crusty old officer named Colonel Billy 
Johnson from Fort Benning, home of the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Colonel 
Johnson spent most of his time in the Army leading Soldiers in combat. Colonel Johnson 
took his job seriously as the approver of the requirements. He was passionate about the 
possibility for a new helmet because he believed that the current helmets were too heavy 
and uncomfortable. He also represented the warfighters currently downrange in combat, and 
was under extreme pressure to approve requirements for a new helmet to protect Soldiers 
not only against fragmentation and handgun rounds, but also against enemy rifle threats. 
Another key stakeholder was Colonel Harry Crisp, the representative from DOT&E. Any new 
helmet development program would fall under DOT&E oversight to approve the testing 
protocols used to ensure the requirements were met. DOT&E would also provide an 
independent assessment of the helmet’s operational effectiveness and suitability for 
Soldiers to Army senior leaders and document that assessment in reports to Congress. 
Colonel Harry Crisp had years of experience as a tester and evaluator of Army systems. The 
importance, influence, and visibility of DOT&E’s independent assessment were increased by 
the recent congressional and public concerns calling into question the adequacy of Soldiers’ 
protective equipment. 
Colonel Smith knew that each of the stakeholders was passionate about a new 
helmet program. He realized that his role as the PM was not to advocate for a new program 
but to give advice about the underpinning technological possibilities; additionally, he needed 
to lay out the cost, schedule, and performance implications of various strategies for the 
development, testing, and procurement of the new helmet.  
Two important determinants of program success are requirements definition and 
alignment of those requirements against capability gaps. Simply put, poorly defined 
requirements will set a project’s initial trajectory that will be difficult to fix later in the 
development cycle. Project initiation can be the result of a need from the warfighters 
generically called capability pull. Alternatively, the project might be the result of an 
innovative new technology without a specific identified warfighting application generically 
called technology push. The question of technology push or capability pull at program 
initiation often delays efforts and creates perception challenges among key stakeholders. 
The ECH effort was driven by the urgent need for a new helmet to address protection for 
Soldiers against rifle threats in combat, and enabled by the maturation of HMWPE 
technologies. The ECH requirements must balance acceptable minimum risk versus 
maximum safety for protective equipment, and weight reduction (Soldier load) versus 
protection (ballistic and blunt force). Colonel Smith knew that this balance would not be an 
easy compromise for any of the stakeholders. 
 During the meeting hosted by the AAE, Colonel Johnson was adamant that the ECH 
had to address the rifle threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce the weight on 
Soldiers in combat. Colonel Smith laid out the basic options that he had discussed with Dr. 
Suchez; the ECH would not be able to address the rifle threat and also reduce the helmet 
weight. Colonel Johnson was not happy, and doubted the validity of the technology 
assessment. He stated that, just a week prior, he received an industry brief from a company 
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that claimed they could develop a helmet at reduced weights that also addressed increased 
threats. Dr. Suchez, also in attendance, spoke up and said that it was not unusual for 
industry to make claims that they could not back up, and that the application of a new 
technology into helmets is technically challenging from a manufacturing perspective. “It’s 
one thing to produce a prototype helmet in a controlled laboratory,” he said, “but completely 
different to produce many helmets from a manufacturing line that consistently perform 
against rigorous testing requirements.”  
To address the schedule aspect of the program, Colonel Smith next laid out the 
options of pursuing a program of record (PoR) through the deliberate acquisition process 
versus pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed or urgent requirement. 
Establishing formal ECH PoR would involve a four-year time period. Year 1 would allow 
refinement, analysis, and approval of formal requirement documents and the development 
of testing protocols. Year 1 would also allow the Army to request development and 
procurement funding from Congress in the Army’s base budget for the program. Years 2 
and 3 would involve development and testing of ECH prototypes resulting from competitively 
awarded contracts (probably cost-plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry companies. 
Year 4 would allow the Army to award procurement contracts to the successful companies 
for the manufacture and production of ECHs. Again, Colonel Johnson was not happy that it 
would take four years to get the ECH to Soldiers. The alternative to a PoR was to use the 
rapid acquisition process. In rapid acquisition, the Army could write a directed requirement 
(probably within a month) for the ECH, and the Army could award competitive contracts 
(probably fixed-price contracts for certain quantities with production options) to industry 
within six months. A rapid acquisition effort could be funded with overseas contingency 
operations (OCO) money, which was limited to procurement money and no development 
money. Another six months would be required to test the helmets. So, ECHs could be on 
Soldiers in just over a year. Colonel Johnson was much happier with the second strategy. 
But, Colonel Crisp was quick to point out that for the rapid acquisition options, the ECH 
requirements would not be underpinned by analysis, and the test protocols would have to 
rely on the protocols for current helmets because there would be no time to develop test 
protocols specifically for the ECH. Colonel Crisp noted this was particularly important for the 
ECH, which would rely on thermoplastic polymers. The ECH based on HMWPE might 
perform much differently than the current para-aramid based helmets. For example, ECHs 
might lose their rigidity after being shot once and offer much less protection from multiple 
shots. Also, the ECH may deform excessively, leading to head trauma and skull fractures. 
There were legitimate testing and safety concerns that would have to be addressed.  
Colonel Smith tried to remain neutral. Both strategies had advantages and 
disadvantages. Decision-making involves defining and analyzing alternative approaches. It 
came down to the level of risk the Army was willing to accept. The ECH project initiation 
decision also encompassed setting future funding levels and procurement quantities, as well 
as addressing industrial base concerns, competition, and testing implications. From past 
experience, Colonel Smith understood that stakeholder management would be key to the 
success of the ECH program and that proper communication and collaboration increased 
the chances of program success. 
The AAE was pleased with the frank dialogue between the key stakeholders and 
stated that enough information was presented for an informed decision on whether or not to 
initiate the ECH program. Before prioritizing resources for the ECH program, the ECH would 
need to be considered through the lens of the defense acquisition institutional framework 
presented in Figure 4 (refer to Appendix 1 for a description of the U.S. Defense Acquisition 
Institution). The PM has cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities, and manages the 
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effort with the Defense Acquisition Management System. The PM’s official chain of 
command is in the executive branch, but the PM also reports to Congress with program 
status updates and works through contracts with industry. The requirements generation 
system provides requirements and the resource allocation system provides funding. 
Depending on the program, the public and media perceptions may be important 
considerations.  
 
Figure 4. U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution 
The ECH Program 
The ECH program began in early 2009 (“Marine Corps Notice,” 2009). Figure 5 
depicts the ECH program timeline. The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) approved 
urgent requirements based on combat operations and the need for increased protection 
against enemy rifle threats. The overseas contingency operations (OCO) account funded 
the ECH program. The acquisition procurement objectives were set based on the predicted 
numbers of deploying Soldiers. The Army and USMC set broad requirements to include a 
35% increase in fragmentation protection, increased 9mm pistol protection, and rifle threat 
protection—all at the same weight of the ACH (Mortlock, 2013). The acquisition strategy was 
a single-step development in which competition was encouraged among industry 
manufacturers. The original request for proposal asked for each ECH vendor to deliver test 
data validating their claim that their ECH design met the combat helmet test protocols used 
at the time for the ACH and the new ECH requirements for rifle protection. Four vendors 
submitted proposals. However, only one vendor’s design was acceptable. At the end of 
2009, this vendor received a contract to produce ECHs to undergo government 
developmental testing with contract options for production deliveries after successful first 
article tests (FATs). In late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army and 
USMC approved the Milestone C to enter into low rate initial production (LRIP) with the 
selected vendor (“Enhanced Combat Helmet,” 2009; “Marine Corps Notice,” 2009). The 
LRIP decision permitted the production of a small number of helmets to undergo testing in 
order to validate that the contractor could successfully produce the helmets to performance 
requirements. 
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Figure 5. ECH Program Timeline 
(Cox, 2013; “Enhanced Combat Helmet,” 2009; “Marine Corps Notice,” 2009; “New 
Helmets,” 2010) 
In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of FAT. To meet an aggressive 
production schedule for the Army and USMC, the ECH vendor submitted an engineering 
change proposal for a second and third production line. It would take all of 2012 for the 
vendor to successfully pass the third round of FAT for all three production lines after working 
through issues between test sites, U.S. Army Test Center and National Institute Justice 
laboratories, as well as issues with the source of rifle rounds (Winchester vs. Hornady vs. 
Remington). 
The ECH FAT results demonstrated that the ECH met its requirements and offered 
Soldiers the potential for greater protection compared to the ACH. Against a requirement for 
a 35% increase in fragmentation protection compared to the ACH, the ECH demonstrated 
an average increase of 53% (Mortlock, 2014). For the 9mm BTD requirements, the ECH 
demonstrated an average increase in performance of 10% over the ACH performance 
(Mortlock, 2014). Finally, against the chosen test rifle threat, the ECH demonstrated an over 
153% increase in protection over the ACH for resistance to penetration (Mortlock, 2014). Of 
note is the fact that there was no BTD requirement against rifle threats for the ECH. The 
legacy ACH 9mm BTD requirements were too restrictive for rifle threats, and there was no 
basis to assign 9mm BTD requirements to rifle threats without injury data, which does not 
exist. To avoid jeopardizing the program due to unachievable or unrealistic requirements, 
rifle BTD testing occurred for government reference purposes only.  
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Part II: ECH Procurement and Fielding Decision, Summer 2013 
After passing FAT and four years after program initiation, in summer 2013, the ECH 
was ready for a full rate production (FRP) decision, after which the ECH would be produced 
to the approved acquisition objective quantity. Each production lot of helmets would undergo 
lot acceptance testing (LAT) to verify continued compliance to specification requirements. 
After passing LAT, the Army could field helmets to deploying Soldiers. 
The FRP decision would involve significant procurement money to buy and field the 
ECH. Despite FAT results in which the ECH demonstrated superior performance against the 
requirements over current helmets, Army leaders, specifically the AAE, faced a difficult 
decision. Not all key stakeholders interpreted the test results similarly, raising significant 
safety concerns for Soldiers. The DOT&E issued a congressionally mandated Beyond LRIP 
Report recommending that the ECH not be fielded to Soldiers. DOT&E believed that the 
cost per helmet (roughly 2.5 times the current helmet) did not justify the minimal 
performance increase (DOT&E, 2011, 2012, 2013). DOT&E was also concerned that the 
Army did not test the ECH against the most stressing or most prevalent enemy rifle threats. 
More importantly, DOT&E stated that Soldiers wearing the ECH in combat would face an 
unacceptable risk of head injuries due to excessive backface deformation caused by rifle 
rounds. The medical community, through the Army Surgeon General, supported the DOT&E 
recommendations. These concerns put the AAE in a difficult position. To further complicate 
matters, the AAE had just spoken to DOT&E, who emphatically stood behind their 
recommendation.  
Again, the AAE convened the same Council of Colonels that had met four years 
earlier to discuss the decision to initiate the ECH program. Colonel Smith admitted the ECH 
program had not met the original timelines, but emphasized that the ECH had finally 
successfully passed testing and met its performance requirements. Colonel Smith also 
stressed that $35 million was at risk if the procurement decision passed the end of the fiscal 
year, which was nearing. Colonel Crisp noted that he understood the program history well 
and understood the challenges. However, in DOT&E’s opinion, the ECH was not 
operationally effective or operationally suitable for fielding to Soldiers. The risk of injury to 
Soldiers was unacceptable; in DOT&E and the Army Surgeon General’s opinion, Soldiers 
wearing the ECH could suffer life threatening skulls fractures from excessive BTD from 
threat rifle rounds. Additionally, Colonel Crisp noted that the ECH was not tested against the 
most stressing threats, bringing in question the validity of the requirements. Colonel 
Johnson was livid that there was even a question about the requirements. All stakeholders 
had agreed to the original requirements more than four years ago. Everyone had accepted 
the program risks. Now, three years later than planned, when the ECH finally passed 
testing, concerns were raised. Colonel Johnson stated that the warfighter community 
strongly recommended getting the ECH to Soldiers as quickly as possible. 
Colonel Smith again tried to remain neutral to avoid the appearance that the PM was 
biased toward buying the ECH. However, he was compelled to provide the complete picture 
to the AAE for the most informed decision. His program office was also charged with the 
collection and analysis of battle-damaged helmets from Soldiers who had been shot in the 
head while wearing their helmets. Analysis of those helmets indicated that no Soldiers had 
died or suffered major injuries as a result of excessive backface deformation of the helmet. 
The average deformation observed was 35% of the 9mm BTD required of 25.4 mm (or 
coincidentally, exactly 1 inch). Colonel Crisp interrupted and stated that DOT&E placed no 
value on the results because they were not statistically robust, and were not done under 
strict testing conditions where the variables were controlled. Colonel Crisp also pointed out 
that the government’s own reference testing indicated that the BTD observed from the test 
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rifle threat was 18% to 89% higher than the 9mm BTD requirement. Colonel Smith 
concurred with those numbers but indicated that he was not finished presenting the rest of 
the field data results, which indicated that nearly 74% of Soldiers died if the threat round 
completely penetrated the helmet. Again, Colonel Crisp dismissed that data, and again 
brought up the rifle threat round used in testing. Colonel Johnson asked a question about 
the operational safety margin built into the testing. Colonel Smith replied in the affirmative 
that the chosen rifle round was fired at the ECH at muzzle velocity and at 0% obliquity, 
operationally providing Soldiers a safety margin, because in combat, rounds are fired at 
considerable distance, slowing down in flight and striking at non-direct angles. Therefore, 
even though the chosen test round was not the most stressing rifle threat round, the ECH 
still provided considerable protection and 153% more protection from penetration than the 
current helmet against the rifle threat. 
The AAE realized that the meeting of the Council of Colonels was probably at a point 
of agreeing to disagree. The AAE understood each of the positions clearly and thanked 
everyone for their candid and articulate input. In light of the data presented, should the Army 
buy and field the ECH?  
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Appendix 1. U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution—Decision Framework 
Within the DoD, the development, testing, procurement, and fielding of capability for 
the warfighter operates within a decision-making framework that is complex. Within the 
private sector, similar frameworks exist. The U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution has three 
fundamental support templates that provide requirements, funding, and management 
constraints. The executive branch, Congress, and industry work together to deliver 
capability with the program manager (PM) as the central person responsible for cost, 
schedule, and performance.  
The government PM is at the center of defense acquisition, which aims to deliver 
warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for cost, schedule, and performance (commonly 
referred to as the “triple constraint”) of assigned projects—usually combat systems within 
the DoD. The executive branch of government provides the PM a formal chain of command 
in the DoD. The PM typically reports directly to a program executive officer, who reports to 
the Service Acquisition Executive (an assistant secretary for that service—either Army, 
Navy, or Air Force), who reports to the Defense Acquisition Executive (the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). Depending on the program’s visibility, 
importance and/or funding levels, the program decision authority is assigned to the 
appropriate level of the chain of command.  
Programs within Defense Acquisition require resources (for funding) and contracts 
(for execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for the defense 
programs through the annual enactment of the Defense Authorization and Appropriation 
Acts, which become law and statutory requirements. The PM, through warranted contracting 
officers governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulations, enters contracts with private 
companies within the defense industry. Other important stakeholders include actual 
warfighters, the American public, the media, and functional experts (like engineers, testers, 
logisticians, cost estimators, etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers.  
As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure for defense PMs, there 
are three decision support templates: one for the generation of requirements, a second for 
the management of program milestones, and a third for the allocation of resources. Each of 
these decision support systems is fundamentally driven by different and often contradictory 
factors. The requirement generation system is driven primarily by a combination of capability 
needs and an adaptive, evolving threat. The resource allocation system is calendar-driven 
by Congress writing an appropriation bill—providing control of funding to the Congress and 
transparency to the American public and media for taxpayer money. The Defense 
Acquisition Management System is event-driven by milestones based on commercial 
industry best practices of knowledge points and off-ramps supported by the design, 
development, and testing of the systems as technology matures. Often integration and 
manufacturing challenges occur. 
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Appendix 2. Helmet Testing Basics (Zheng, 2002) 
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by Soldiers against protocols to 
ensure they conform to stringent requirements to protect Soldiers against both blunt trauma 
and ballistic threats. Typical battlefield ballistic threats include fragments from explosive 
devices and bullets from handguns and rifles. Within the DoD, System Threat Assessment 
Reports document relevant and existing helmet threats and these threats are validated by 
the National Ground Intelligence Center. With respect to fragmentation, the Army Research 
Laboratory proved that five fragment simulators represent 95% of the range of threat 
fragments Soldiers expect to face from exploding munitions. Fragment threats used in 
testing include the 2, 4, 16, and 64 grain right circular cylinders, as well as 17 grain fragment 
simulating projectile. Handgun threats include the 9 mm full metal jacket 124 grain, .357 Sig 
full metal jacket 125 grain, and the 44 Mag 240 grain (Mortlock, 2014). These threats are 
defined by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Rifle threats include eight different rounds 
to include 5.45 mm, 5.56 mm, and 7.62 mm rounds (both armor piercing and non-armor 
piercing varieties; Mortlock, 2014). 
Helmet testing is a form of destructive testing because the helmets are non-
recoverable after the testing. Generally, testing can focus on physical properties (like density 
or melting point), mechanical properties (like tensile strength or impact strength), and 
ballistic properties. Three ballistic properties particularly important for helmets are complete 
penetration (the bullets goes completely through the helmet), partial penetration (the bullet 
does not go completely through the helmet), and backface transient deformation (a measure 
for the amount the round’s impact indents the helmet material).  
Depending on the materials selected and the manufacturing process, each helmet 
will demonstrate a ballistic testing curve, represented in Figure 6. The frequency of complete 
penetration can be plotted against the striking velocity of the round. A striking velocity of V0 
is the highest velocity at which no rounds completely penetrate the helmet shell. A striking 
velocity of V100 is the velocity at which all rounds completely penetrate the helmet shell. The 
V50 striking velocity represents the velocity at which 50% of the rounds completely penetrate 
and 50% partially penetrate the helmet (Zheng, 2002). Figure 6 labels the zones of variation 
and non-variation. The variation zone represents a performance area for the helmet in which 
the helmet may provide the different levels of protection but demonstrate the same V0 and 
V100 characteristics. 
 
Figure 6. Ballistic Helmet Testing—Penetration 
(Zheng, 2002) 
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V0 is the “protection parameter” because it identifies the warfighter’s guaranteed 
protection level. It is an important parameter in production quality and control; however, it 
does not completely measure material performance and depends greatly on the production 
process. Generally, helmet manufacturers want to make the actual V0 demonstrated by a 
helmet higher than the V0 required to ensure a helmet passes testing (see Figure 7). V50 is 
the “material parameter” because it does not represent a guaranteed level of protection but 
is important in the optimization of the helmet design. There is a unique V50 for each helmet 
design. Generally, the design goal is to make V50 as high as possible and as close to V100 as 
possible.  
 
Figure 7. Penetration Testing Conclusion 
(Zheng, 2002) 
During ballistic testing, if a bullet only partially penetrates the helmet, testers 
measure the backface deformation using calipers or laser techniques. The lower the 
deformation exhibited by a helmet in testing, the lower the potential for injuries to the 
wearer’s head. Figure 8 is a pictorial representation of a sample backface deformation 
measurement. After a series of tests, testers plot the observed backface deformations for a 
helmet. This results in a distribution of values around an average value (Figure 9). The lower 
the average measured backface deformation compared to the required value, the more 
protection the helmets offer and the greater the testing success rate for the design and 
manufacturer (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8. Ballistic Testing—Back Face Deformation 
(Zheng, 2002) 
 
Figure 9. Deformation Testing—Conclusion 
(Zheng, 2002) 
There is an additional important point to understand about helmet testing with 
respect to battlefield operational relevance. In testing, the Army performs V0 resistance to 
penetration and backface deformation testing with the threat rounds fired at the helmet at 
speeds representing threat weapon muzzle velocity and at angles of 0% obliquity. This 
represents a worst-case condition that is representative of extremely close combat 
scenarios. Under these conditions, the round strikes the helmet with the maximum force and 
the highest chance for penetration, but during combat, the enemy fires at various distances 
from their targets. Over these distances, bullets slow down and strike their intended targets 
at various angles. Therefore, in combat, bullets strike Soldier helmets at speeds significantly 
lower than muzzle velocity speeds and from non-perpendicular angles. 
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Abstract 
Twenty years ago, the Navy began expanding the use of commercial industry 
information technology (IT) to employ Internet Protocol (IP)–based client server and web-
based technologies to improve software effectiveness and affordability on ships and 
submarines. Coupled with wideband satellite capabilities, these systems increased the 
Navy’s ability to plan, communicate, command and control, and execute increasingly 
complex missions. With a sound foundation in commercial IT installed in the Fleet, the Navy 
is looking today to improve warfighting by leveraging emerging technologies in Data 
Analytics, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and Deep Learning (DL). These 
technologies have the potential to change how the Navy fights and will drive changes to the 
Fleet’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture and processes. This paper proposes a reference 
architecture, new processes, and tools to meet the dynamic nature of these emerging 
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technologies, to include employing the commercial DEVelopment and OPerationS (DevOps) 
construct. The reference architecture and processes have the potential not only to 
accelerate the modernization of the afloat Navy networking WAN/LAN infrastructure, but 
also to deliver important warfighting capabilities to support Command and Control, 
Intelligence, and Logistics software applications. 
Introduction 
In 2017, the Space and Naval Warfare System Center Pacific (SSC Pacific) 
presented senior Navy leadership a technical vision for the future of the afloat Navy in which 
AI technologies, Cyber, and increased cohesion in mission planning played a central role in 
warfighting success. In the video scenario presented, a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in 2035 
was deployed and tasked to conduct a humanitarian relief operation in a contested 
battlespace. Examining many of the concepts highlighted in Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2016), 
Second Machine Age, and the concept of improved human-machine teaming, the video 
focused on the interaction of the CSG staff as they wrestled with the development of 
courses of action (COAs) to balance rules of engagement, asset limitations, and force 
protection. During the planning session on the flagship USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), 
both CSG and ship leadership engaged with the ship’s computing stack, nicknamed 
“Kennedy” via a natural language processing interface. Kennedy was able to not only 
understand the crew’s instructions, but also to access tactical and logistic information 
resident aboard the ship and, using reach-back, interface with ashore command and control 
nodes. The information Kennedy processed spanned the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels, providing the system requisite context across all domains.  
In one vignette, SSC Pacific highlighted the potential use case for human-machine 
learning in a scene featuring a conversation between the staff Operations Officer and the 
Battle Group Commander regarding COAs. Having monitored the conversation and without 
prompting, Kennedy interjected with an independent COA not considered by the staff. In the 
past, human-machine teaming of this level was the stuff of science fiction. Today, however, 
advances across multiple technologies are making these capabilities a potential reality—
albeit in incremental steps. 
The Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise Services (CANES) provides the 
computing infrastructure and the foundation of the Navy’s Information Warfare Platform 
afloat (NEJ, 2018). To deliver a more mission-effective, cyber-secure and affordable afloat 
Information Warfare Platform, CANES is modernizing its software application hosting and 
application integration processes and tools to implement a cloud-enabled DevOps 
framework. Agile Core Services (ACS) is a critical sub-system of CANES that has two broad 
categories of capabilities—core services and data analytics. Both support data sharing and 
analytics for CANES’ hosted applications. ACS also provides a platform for the rapid 
insertion and management of software and facilitates applications’ access to commercial 
analytics tools optimized to support the maritime battlespace. As shown in Figure 1, ACS 
sits on the stack as part of the CANES system between software application logic and the 
computing system. 
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Figure 1. Open System Interconnection Model Mapping to Present Naval C4I 
Systems 
An examination of the emergence of AI and ML technologies indicates that ACS also 
provides a framework to deliver these emerging technologies at the maritime computing 
edge afloat. AI technologies applied to command and control, intelligence, and logistics 
missions have the potential to provide new insights and speed of command. In this paper, 
we examine how the Navy can expand CANES to support AI and ML. In the first section of 
the paper, we examine ACS and its present capabilities. After that, we discuss how the 
current DevOps processes can support AI and ML. Next, we explore some of the 
commercial AI and ML technologies that exhibit initial potential to support Navy missions 
afloat. Finally, we cover potential Fleet use of the technologies and discuss implementation 
at sea. 
Agile Core Services (ACS) Capabilities 
Agile Core Services (ACS) provides a core set of software services that collectively 
create a shared framework for applications to build, deploy, and operate mission threads. 
ACS provides enterprise computing with integrated solutions of commercial off-the-shelf 
products creating an underlying service infrastructure to support the modernization of 
applications. Two primary services are provided to promote connection, collaboration, and 
communication between applications. These are Data Analytics and Common Services. 
Figure 2 provides an overall system resource flow description. 
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Figure 2. Agile Core Services Functional Diagram 
ACS Data Analytics Services 
The abundance of data within the Navy has driven the demand for ACS to provide a 
common data analytic architecture. By leveraging new industry technologies, ACS is able to 
provide a data analytic architecture that can process far greater volumes and variety of data 
at unprecedented velocities. The Data Processing and Analytics Framework utilizes 
clustering for the streaming, batch, and data processing to enable parallel processing for 
improved performance, robustness, and scalability. 
Today, ACS leverages Apache’s Spark and Storm, two common open source 
distributed compute engines. Both perform analytics and distributed compute tasks, but with 
distinctive implementations and focuses. Apache Spark provides fast cluster computing as a 
general-purpose distributed computing platform. It does provide limited stream processing; 
however, Apache Storm is specialized in reliably processing unbounded streams of data. 
Apache Storm provides real-time analytics, online ML, continuous computation, distributed 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC), and Extract, Transform, Load (ETL). A Storm topology 
consumes streams of data and processes those streams in arbitrarily complex ways, 
repartitioning the streams between each stage of the computation however needed.  
The two engines described above are only a subset of the ACS data analytic 
framework. The following is a synopsis of all of the capabilities: 
 Streaming Processing Framework for non-interactive manipulation and 
analysis of data moving at high velocity 
 Batch Processing Framework for efficient, non-interactive analysis of big data 
stored at rest  
 Shared Semantics Framework enabling a common vocabulary across 
heterogeneous data sources 
 Application Programmer Interfaces (APIs) for data ingest, normalization, 
enrichment, and fusion 
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 Pre-Defined Query Processor to support interactive queries across 
heterogeneous data (structured, unstructured, and semantic) 
 Alert Processor to generate alerts by comparing data against alert criteria 
Identifying trends, finding patterns and relationships, and drawing conclusions are all 
reasons why data analytics has become vitally important. Given the variety of data available 
in the maritime environment, including operational data, content data (e.g., documentation, 
videos, and imagery), authoritative data (e.g., sensor data), and system-generated data 
(e.g., system logs), the data analytic solution has to be flexible enough to handle structured 
and unstructured data. With the diversity in data there are great opportunities to develop 
new decision aids that can help assist the Fleet fight and win.  
Until now, many applications have leveraged data to do a specific task. As the Navy 
moves into the future, data will drive decisions by providing additional solutions that may 
have been overlooked due to the previous inability to analyze and provide relationships 
between overwhelming quantities of data. This is where a data analytic engine can facilitate 
advanced analytics and can accelerate the delivery of emerging technologies in DL and AI. 
Analytics include ML, data mining, and statistical analysis. When applied in real time and 
presented in an operational context, analytics can enhance the warfighters’ ability to 
complete complex missions afloat. This unlocks many possibilities for the advancement in 
applications developed for the warfighter. 
ACS Common Services 
To support the agility required in present-day software development and to keep 
pace with the demand for new updates and patches, ACS Common Services provides a 
suite of services to aid in the modernization of applications. Each service is decomposed 
below. 
Geospatial Data Access Layer and Geographic Information System (GIS) 
Services 
A prevailing set of data that is common to many Navy applications is geospatial data. 
Geographic data is large in size and requires ample storage in the realm of terabytes. The 
Geospatial Data Access Layer and GIS Services provides a full suite of geographic data 
persistence, analytic, query, and mapping capabilities based around standard Open 
Geospatial Consortium (OGC) interfaces. By providing a common service for applications to 
retrieve geospatial data, this reduces the burden of hosting multiple map servers, each of 
which require maintenance while consuming terabytes of storage space reducing cost, man-
hours, and storage space. 
Mediation 
The mediation service provides middleware platforms for hosting and integrating 
modular Java software components and sharing data via machine to machine messaging 
using topics and queues. Together these components support implementation of common 
enterprise integration patterns. 
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Visualization 
Learning new applications can be incredibly challenging for Fleet Sailors due to the 
current portfolio of diverse user facing software. The visualization service provides a 
common user interface framework to help support applications with similar mission threads 
providing consistency to the look and feel of the application. A cohesive user interface 
presenting different types of data processed in various ways in a common structure enables 
warfighters to focus on decision making with the presented data instead of struggling with 
the complexities of using an application. Combining natural language with user interfaces 
will be the next step in user application interaction. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
PaaS enables application services to change quickly, innovate easily, and remain 
competitive by supporting a services/microservices architecture reducing the complexity of 
building and maintaining the infrastructure typically associated with developing an 
application. A growing trend is the demand for cloud computing with microservices that can 
be scaled and deployed separately, enabling shorter release cycles. A PaaS service 
enables easy deployment of microservices by standardizing how services are executed, 
maintained, and orchestrated with a standard framework using containers to isolate 
elements of application deployment which reduces integration risks often seen in monolithic 
software architectures. As a result, service providers can more easily implement continuous 
delivery of updates to their services incorporating key practices of DevOps discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
Development Operations (DevOps) Processes, Capability Delivery 
One of CANES’ objectives is to lower the barrier of entry for applications that are 
hosted on or connect to CANES. Serving more than 100 applications from across the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy, CANES can drive affordability and increased 
speed to capability by providing application developers a common development 
environment, in some cases a cloud-based capability, along with the governance and 
processes to rapidly progress to the testing, information assurance, and fielding pipeline. To 
increase their ability to release capabilities, features, and patches out faster than ever 
before, industry established a software development culture and practice to bridge the gap 
between development and operations, which is known as DevOps.  
Riding on the CANES platform, ACS provides an operational environment where it 
enables many of the tenets of the DevOps movement. As discussed previously, ACS 
provides a PaaS, in which automated development, deployment, provisioning, security, and 
other application lifecycle management tools are supported. In DevOps, PaaS enables 
applications to have a representative operational environment during development so that 
each step of taking a capability from development to operations can be automated. 
Automation accelerates the development cycle, increasing deployment frequency, while 
maintaining stability.  
Beyond providing the technology and tools for application to leverage for DevOps, 
CANES/ACS has strategically aligned the people, processes, and tools to create the 
DevOps objective end state, which is depicted in Figure 3. It highlights several 
organizational and cultural changes that are described in detail in the next section to how 
CANES/ACS is developed and deployed operationally. 
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Figure 3. Afloat DEVelopment and OPerationS Framework 
Planning 
Each cycle starts with planning following the Agile Scrum methodologies. Work is 
described as product backlog items where it is prioritized based upon criticality and need. 
An important change that is depicted in the Figure 3 diagram is the feedback loop that 
comes from operational users and/or automated monitors afloat in the CANES/ACS platform 
that can provide suggestions and/or issues back to developers. As DevOps matures, this 
cycle between receiving feedback to deployment of changes to the system becomes shorter 
and shorter, transitioning from a lifecycle of years to possibly days.  
Development/Build 
Continuous Integration is a foundational part of DevOps that occurs during 
development in which developers regularly merge their code changes into a central 
repository (i.e., software version control), and automated builds and tests are executed. 
Both CANES and application stakeholders that deploy applications on CANES will drive 
affordability and improved interoperability by adopting this development practice to minimize 
integration efforts throughout the development and deployment process and to be able to 
continually deliver new capability as they become readily available. 
Test 
Since CANES provides a fully integrated computing infrastructure comprised of 
hardware and software, the staging environment supports various test environments. 
Applications at the software level can be tested against the latest version of CANES in a 
commercial cloud environment, and applications that are tested at a hardware level can test 
in a lab environment with representative hardware. The key benefit of the staging 
environment is to provide integration early on and throughout the development of CANES 
and integrated applications. The combination of a staging environment and automated 
testing is an indispensable part of quality assurance. Adopting this new test strategy will free 
up time that used to be spent on manual tests that were too slow to keep up with the rapid 
development that typically occurs and help teams focus on quality enhancements that until 
now have been addressed at the tail end of development.  
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Release/Deploy 
Release will be a governance process to be defined based on existing processes 
and new options now available as automation is introduced. In addition, technologies 
provided by ACS such as PaaS help simplifies the deployment and management of modern 
web applications.  
Operations/Monitoring 
Operations is the last stage in DevOps where CANES is deployed and is operating 
on ship. As monitoring tools continually advance providing platforms that aggregate data 
and perform cross analysis, commercial tools are improving the user experience with easy-
to-use UIs and system alerts to show correlations between events providing performance 
degradation or user experience issues quickly back to the developers is the crucial data in 
shortening the cycle between identified issues and deployment of fixes. When examining the 
Operations side of DevOps, it’s important to highlight that unlike our commercial 
counterparts, our afloat networks are mobile, global, and engineered to be shot at both 
kinetically and are prime nation-state cyber targets. Furthermore, our systems are 
maintained by Sailors with at times limited access to shore support. These attributes drive 
an even more critical need to get the right system data from the platform and to use every 
interchange with the afloat platform right.  
Commercial Technologies 
To envision the CANES/ACS DevOps and tactical Data Analytics platform for the 
near future, it is instructive to look at some of the current and emerging trends in this space: 
 Advanced DevOps/microservices capabilities 
 Self-healing and self-protecting systems 
 Serverless platforms and function as a service (FaaS) 
 ML, especially deep machine learning 
 Augmented analytics 
 Game theory and ML/DL 
 Advanced analytics processors 
Advanced DevOps/Microservices Capabilities 
As discussed earlier, ACS provides an operational environment that is integral to 
DevOps. In particular, the PaaS capability provides containers, where applications can build 
in an environment that encapsulates the necessary software dependencies and enables 
robust, fault-tolerant remote installations. While we have yet to fully exploit all of the 
benefits, the capability exists today (Farcic, 2017) to perform zero-downtime software 
upgrades, immediate rollback to prior versions if problems occur, and phased rollouts 
(“blue/green deployments”). Of particular interest to data analytics is the ability to perform 
“A/B testing.” In this case, two (or more) different versions of a data analytic could run 
simultaneously and, based on the results, the more successful version would be retained. 
Blue/green and A/B deployments allow new analytics to be pushed to a ship and tested, 
evolving the analytics on a tactical platform without disrupting current missions. 
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Self-Healing and Self-Protecting Systems 
The PaaS + Microservices architecture supports self-healing software, a design 
pattern for high availability systems that is actually fairly common in distributed data 
analytics platforms such as Hadoop. These self-healing systems are as follows (Bonér et al., 
2014): 
 Reactive—maintaining rapid and consistent response times 
 Resilient to failure—through replication, containerization, isolation, and 
delegation 
 Elastic—rapidly scaling under varying workloads 
 Asynchronous—implementing loose coupling between components, so 
failures are isolated 
By using ML algorithms for anomaly detection and classification, it will soon be 
possible to build systems that are self-protecting at the architecture, application, and OS 
levels (Yuan, 2016). This adaptive, intelligent defense, coupled with traditional security 
protections, will be very important in improving our defenses against the growing frequency, 
complexity, and sophistication of cyberattacks. In fact, the trend is toward self-managing, 
self-healing, self-configuring, and self-protecting software systems enabled by ML. 
Serverless Computing/Function as a Service 
Serverless computing allows highly efficient sharing and utilization of compute 
resources (Roberts, 2016). The term serverless is generally acknowledged as a misnomer—
there are definitely still servers in the system—but the details of the infrastructure, servers, 
operating systems, and runtime environments have been abstracted away from the 
application developer, so they need not be concerned with the implementation or 
management of the underlying system. The serverless platform provider manages all the 
details of the environment and the dynamic allocation of compute resources. All the 
application provider does is deliver the code. This code is an event-driven, functional 
program (as opposed to object-oriented or procedural code), hence the alternative term 
function as a service (FaaS). Amazon Web Services Lambda, Azure Functions, and Google 
Cloud Functions are all examples of cloud-based FaaS. Apache OpenWhisk, originally 
developed by IBM, is an open source serverless platform that can be deployed on-premises.  
In FaaS, an event (such as incoming data) triggers execution of the function, which 
can scale horizontally with varying load. The code is automatically containerized, deployed, 
scaled, and executed. The serverless architecture has built-in high availability and fault 
tolerance, and allows for very efficient utilization of compute resources. This resource 
efficiency is very appealing in the fixed-footprint compute environment of a tactical platform. 
Because FaaS compute is event driven and transient, there is a reduced attack surface and 
it is more resilient. 
Not all applications are suited for FaaS. The best applications are for short 
computations, triggered by very short bursts of activity. Long-running processes, or ones 
with consistent loads, do not benefit much from FaaS. Nevertheless, FaaS is excellent in 
periods of rapid activity and is highly optimized for performance in such situations. 
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Deep Machine Learning 
It is now commonplace to encounter ML applications in our day-to-day lives. Digital 
assistants such as Alexa, Siri, and Cortana are generally able to respond to questions and 
voice commands with reasonable accuracy. ML speech-to-text, natural language 
processing, and text-to-speech algorithms are all employed by these digital assistants. 
Photo library software on our personal computers can do facial recognition. Using clustering 
algorithms, recommender systems from Netflix or Amazon suggest what to watch or buy. DL 
is a subset of ML that brings us closer to AI. Whereas ML can perform natural language 
processing (NLP), finding common words, n-grams, and phrases, DL is more capable of 
natural language understanding (NLU). NLU not only identifies common words and phrases, 
it can analyze sentences and groups of sentences to discern topics and context and thus it 
comes closer to understanding conversation. Furthermore, speech-to-text ML can couple 
with audio ML analysis (e.g., speech-to-emotion) or image recognition (body language), 
providing further understanding beyond word recognition. Even tougher NLU problems such 
as identifying sarcasm and irony, which are difficult with purely speech-to-text analysis, are 
amenable to these hybrid analyses. It is feasible to use these technologies to construct a 
model of the social hierarchy of a group (think of a ship’s Flag Command Center or a 
boardroom in a business). The implications of these technologies to assist decision-makers 
during periods of stress, for example, to determine if group dynamics are negatively 
impacting the decision-making process are tremendous. Similar to how better cockpit 
resource management made aviation safer, perhaps in the above scenario, these 
technologies could help decision-makers in real time make better strategic decision by 
better understanding the human teaming in the room.  
Augmented Analytics  
In the SSC Pacific vision video, when “Kennedy” suggested a COA not considered 
by the staff, this represented Augmented Analytics (AA; Su, 2017). AA uses ML, NLP, and 
other tools to perform data source selection, preprocessing (cleaning), analysis, insight 
generation, and presentation. Indeed, behind the scenes, Kennedy was presumably 
continuously selecting and analyzing data to generate actionable insights, and then 
communicated those insights to the ship’s staff without the benefit of a human data scientist 
in the decision loop. No one commanded Kennedy to conduct an analysis or build a DL 
model, but rather it apparently was simply churning out insights on its own, waiting for an 
applicable situation to arise. 
Today, AA maturity as a near-term capability is unlikely. If performed as an 
exhaustive survey of a vast parameter space, AA is very resource intensive, roughly akin to 
categorizing everything in a haystack, finding multiple “non-hay” objects in the haystack, 
recognizing one of these non-hay objects is a needle, and generating the insight that this 
sharp object can be used to puncture a balloon, and that having the insight that puncturing a 
balloon would be a useful tactical objective. Even so, AA has near-term potential in 
streamlining the tedious parts of analytics: data collection, cleaning, labeling, classification, 
and preliminary analysis, setting the stage for people to make focused inquiries and 
interpreting and generating insights from the results. 
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Game Theory and ML 
The discussion of AA brings us to the intersection of Game Theory (GT) and ML/DL 
(Perez, 2016). If we (oversimplify) GT as modeling cooperation and competition (decision-
making) strategies based on deterministic game rules, we can see the role of DL as 
discovering rules based on imperfect knowledge of the outcome of games. What does that 
mean? To better understand this, consider the use of adversarial neural networks (ANNs), 
one of many possible approaches in DL. With ANNs, we pit one neural network against 
another in a game. The classic example in image recognition is that we have one neural 
network (NN) trying to distinguish between real and fake images. At the same time, a 
second NN is trying to generate convincing fake images. As time goes on, the first NN is 
trained to distinguish real versus fake images, while the second NN learns how to make 
better counterfeits. In the end, both NNs “learn” what makes an image “real” and what 
makes it “fake.” The result of the game is that both NNs learn from imperfect data to become 
better players.  
These technologies have potential to apply to tactical missions as they mature to a 
broader range of human machine interaction. For example, developing a DL algorithm about 
how to avoid detection of a ship’s electromagnetic signature could be modelled using ANNs 
under various environmental/weather conditions. These are the type of “games” Kennedy 
could play against itself to improve its algorithms. In Figure 4, we present a simplified NN 
that ingests data from various domains into the hidden layer and ultimately presents a 
probability of success of a specific mission course of action (COA). 
 
Figure 4. Simplified Example of Neural Network in a Maritime Tactical Network 
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Advanced Analytics Processors 
Finally, all of these data analytics make high demands on the compute resources on 
ship. Part of the problem is that generic (e.g., x86) processors are optimized for general 
purpose computing and not data analytics. Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) and Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are better suited for analytics processing, but 
Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), purpose-built for NN (ML/DL) computations, 
such as Google Tensor Processing Unit, have the potential to greatly accelerate DL 
calculations. These have a much smaller footprint and lower power consumption (relative to 
NN compute capacity), so they are enablers of more data analytics capacity in a constrained 
footprint, like an afloat platform. If we expect our systems (Kennedy) to be performing AA 
and ANN behind the scenes, we will need to rely on purpose-built hardware to achieve the 
necessary throughput and allow the ship to remain tactically relevant even if disconnected 
from the shore infrastructure.  
Overall, the near-term Data Analytics reference architecture will exploit DevOps 
capabilities to rapidly deploy new capabilities to the tactical edge. Looking toward the future, 
advances in technology will enable the platform to be self-healing and self-protecting, with 
highly efficient use of computing resources, including purpose-built processors. Potentially, 
we will leverage ML and DL for machine-human interaction and rely on AA to prepare and 
stage data for our analytics. Those analytics will be able to train themselves using game 
theoretic and DL technologies, and be ready to facilitate insights that will give our 
warfighters a critical advantage. As we engineer the CANES and ACS stack afloat to 
operate afloat in what is a very harsh maritime battlespace with intermittent and limited 
connectivity, we will need to examine how we integrate these emerging technologies afloat 
and allow them to be survivable and maintained by our Sailors afloat.  
Fleet Employment and Management of AI, DL, and ML Technologies 
In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, rapid technological change and challenges 
from our adversaries in every operating domain are identified as causes of our complex 
security environment. The strategic approach identifies several steps to build a more lethal 
force, including modernizing key capabilities in the C4ISR mission. The secretary of Defense 
states that investments will be prioritized for resilient and federated networks to assist in 
gaining information. AI, DL, and ML can support the objectives in the defense strategy as 
these technologies have the potential to give Navy warfighters the advantage in combat 
operations if they are deployed with the reliability and security that is needed for fleet 
missions. 
In the book The Master Algorithm, Pedro Domingos (2018) discusses the increasing 
growth of ML technologies across a wide spectrum of activities. Domingos highlights the 
initial use in the 1980s of early ML in the financial sector, and the migration toward other 
commercial uses in the subsequent decades. Additionally, Domingos discusses the rapid 
rise and early employment of ML tools following the attacks of 9/11 by the DoD and other 
agencies, and how ML is not a single set of technologies or algorithms, but rather a multi-
discipline body of knowledge or “tribes.” These “five tribes” that Domingos explores each 
approach the desired outcomes of ML from varied theoretical and applied approaches, 
suggesting that the state of practice today requires different technical approaches or in 
many cases a blending of technologies, based on the questions being asked. Hence, as we 
look toward ML solutions for the Navy, we will likely need to field a collection of capabilities 
that are optimized to our unique connectivity and maritime concept of operations.  
The CSG organization provides an excellent use case of where these technologies 
can be applied to support Fleet operations. In the CSG organizational structure, the Battle 
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Group Commander’s staff executes a series of functions required for the mission within each 
coded directorates. On the CSG flagship, the CVN or Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier, staff 
functions are supported by departments that exist within the shipboard organization. The 
Operations Department executes and supports current tasking and future missions while 
maintaining schedule. The Combat Systems Department is responsible for maintaining 
weapons and communications systems and ensuring the enterprise network is available. 
The Engineering and Reactor Departments are charged with ensuring safe and sustained 
propulsion, as well as maintaining all hull, machinery, and electrical equipment. The Air 
Department enables flight operations to occur hazard free and within environmental 
constraints of any geographical area. The Supply Department supports logistical needs in 
parts, materials, and consumable equipment. The Navigation Department is responsible for 
ensuring safe passage during open ocean transit, as well as in constrained and heavily 
trafficked waterways. The arrangement of departments onboard a CVN is similar to what 
may be found on smaller units, such as cruisers and destroyers—with the roles of each 
department differing slightly based on the specific mission of the ship. Weaving the activities 
of these departments, along with the Aircraft Carrier’s mission to deliver air power via an 
embarked airwing and other ships in the strike group, provides a compelling use case for the 
potential capabilities ML can provide.  
In examining each department’s specific areas of responsibility, it is evident that 
there are myriad opportunities for AI, DL, and ML to contribute to the naval mission. 
Examining the use cases, we see applications across Command and Control, Intelligence, 
Cyber, Logistics, and Personnel, to use the data in these domains to improve decision 
making. For example, one subset within the Operations Department is Operations 
Information (OI). The Operations Specialists in OI Division comprise the watchteam that 
maintains a current operational picture (COP) that provides the mission commander 
situational awareness to make decisions for the entire CSG. Key assets in the mission are 
identified and tracked with tools that present the commander with a comprehensive view of 
the battlespace. Contacts on the display are identified as friendly, neutral, or foe. Since the 
environment is constantly changing, this mission area is one that has the potential to benefit 
from AI technologies and a DevOps framework to rapidly integrate and process new 
sensors, data feeds, and contingences.  
The Navy has laid much of the groundwork associated with implementing AI 
technologies by employing data models and software patterns that leverage the commercial 
technologies that are many of the underpinning connectivity methods the newer AI 
technologies employ such as eXtensible markup language (XML) and other web-based 
connectivity tools (Rothenhaus IEEE, 304). To manage a growing demand for faster 
decision cycles and improved battlespace awareness, supporting systems such as Global 
Command and Control System Maritime (GCCS-M), as well as intelligence systems, the 
Navy can ensure our warfighters are not missing key elements of the operational picture due 
to over-complexity and human error by implementing intelligent systems able to process 
data automatically and present that correlation of data to Sailors and decision-makers. In the 
“Kennedy” vignette discussed earlier, tools are dynamic enough to adapt to emerging 
conditions, giving the warfighter the advantage of not having to focus on updating changing 
information, and instead allowing warfighters to focus precious attention on strategies to 
support mission success.  
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Further Research 
Although AI is not a new field of study, new methods and approaches enabled by 
increased computing, storage, and data management techniques are driving renewed 
interest in the commercial sector and are fertile areas of future research in the Navy 
enterprise. The adoption of those technologies for the Navy presents additional areas for 
multi-disciplinary research in the areas of computer science, system of systems engineering, 
and acquisition with likely many more potential areas of study. Areas of study include 
questions about how to characterize the data the Fleet manages from the perspective of 
volume and variety. Many of the technologies highlighted in this paper rely on significant 
quantities of data to gain the insights they deliver. Although ships have large databases, 
they may not have the types of enterprise-level data that would permit meaningful analysis. 
Additionally, our ships operate in a unique connectivity construct ranging from full wideband 
connectivity to being completely disconnected. Future research in the areas of data 
strategies to support sharing of processing between on-board and off-board processing with 
a focus of graceful scaling from very elastic processing environments ashore to more limited 
processing on shipboard data centers could help future engineers design systems to 
support the Fleet’s unique requirements.  
Conclusion 
Navy warfare increasingly depends on advanced software capabilities, deployed 
across numerous platforms and systems. As the amount of information grows with the 
increase in quality and quantity of sensors and new autonomous platforms, the Navy is 
looking to leverage commercial information technologies to improve warfighting outcomes 
and enhance mission execution. Leveraging AI technologies, Navy Program Offices are 
examining methods to provide a ready platform to rapidly and affordably integrate and test 
emerging AI capabilities. As we integrate these types of technologies into an already 
complex system of systems afloat, it is critical to manage the complexity to ensure our 
Sailors can employ and support them. In the areas of command and control, intelligence, 
and logistics, AI and ML have the potential to deliver to the nation that integrates them first a 
tactical advantage. For the Navy, CANES and ACS are the target platform on which to 
integrate those technologies to deliver important warfighting capabilities across Command 
and Control, Intelligence, and Logistics software applications. 
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Abstract 
Defense Department program managers and industry can streamline the acquisition 
process by conducting an early assessment of the “viability” of technical solutions during the 
market research phase of acquisition planning, or as the first step of the source selection. 
This research documents a viability assessment process as a best practice, provides an 
example of a successful application, and suggests metrics for measuring success. 
Introduction 
Fielding government systems can take decades under current acquisition processes 
(GAO, 2015). As a result, government program managers find it difficult to rapidly adopt new 
technologies that offer improved efficiency and effectiveness. One approach to improve the 
acquisition process would be to conduct an early assessment of the “viability” of solutions 
during market research, or as a first step of the source selection. Conducting an early 
assessment of industry capability before final source selection can lead to more informed 
acquisition strategies to rapidly adopt new technology. This paper documents a viability 
assessment method as a best practice, offers ideas on how to conduct an early 
assessment, and suggests metrics for measuring success.  
Background 
Program offices that deploy major systems find it difficult to evaluate and quickly 
adopt new technology due to the long time involved in acquiring systems under the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Commercial practice, by contrast, allows industry to test new 
technologies well before launching them into the market to determine if they are viable for 
use in products. Unfortunately, the federal procurement process subjects every proposed 
solution submitted under a federal government solicitation to the same rigorous evaluation, 
whether the solution is viable or not. Thus, the government must devote time and resources 
to performing detailed assessments of non-viable bids. Companies offering non-viable 
products may spend opportunity time and proposal costs to participate in a source selection 
they cannot win. There is also a risk that if they do win, only afterwards does the contractor 
(and the government) discover that the solution doesn’t work. Therefore, the federal 
government is trying to find methods or approaches to incorporate technology innovation 
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quickly and soundly from companies that are technically capable of meeting requirements 
(GAO, 2016a). 
How do program managers and acquisition professionals become early adopters of 
technology and quickly assess the viability of an offer before entering the rigorous proposal 
evaluation process? Using a viability assessment approach gives the vendors an 
opportunity to submit their products and solutions before the final request for proposal (RFP) 
is released. They can receive a no-harm-no-foul evaluation from the federal government, 
which may offer the necessary “quick look” and instant feedback to the prospective vendor 
community.  
Conducting a viability assessment early in the acquisition process would allow the 
federal government to shape the pool of companies that would likely submit acceptable 
proposals. The viability assessment would also help the government revise requirements, 
based on knowledge of industry capability, for an achievable outcome. Finally, vendors 
would know before they submit a proposal whether they should continue to pursue a 
contract that they have little chance of winning.  
Purpose 
This research paper offers an approach for acquisition professionals to make more 
defensible decisions and lower risks for better outcomes. It describes how government 
program offices can incorporate viability assessments into the competitive acquisition 
process. Specifically, it presents an approach to using viability assessments as part of an 
acquisition strategy to minimize the likelihood of unqualified vendors, and stimulate better 
competition for viable solutions. It emphasizes the importance of communications between 
industry and government during the acquisition process. It also offers standards for 
measuring success.  
Acquisition Planning 
The purpose of FAR Part 7, Acquisition Planning, is to ensure that the government 
meets its needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner. During the acquisition 
planning phase, program offices develop key system features or required functionality and 
convey them as a priority to industry through announcements issued prior to the formal 
source selection phase. The Requests for Information (RFI) announcements provide 
valuable information to industry on government-planned requirements. The RFI responses 
help government personnel, both acquirers and users, understand potential solutions 
available from vendors. The acquisition team can then leverage insights to determine how 
best to structure and shape the appropriate acquisition strategy. The RFI responses support 
development of contract strategies and incentives before releasing the final RFP. However, 
RFI responses generally offer paper solutions, marketing materials, and little detail about 
potential risks in performance.  
In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 7.105(a)(7), the acquisition 
team must conduct risk analysis to support the acquisition planning process. This risk 
assessment is critical in developing source selection criteria and evaluation factors (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 
2016). As part of the early phases of the acquisition planning process, the acquisition team 
needs to involve vendors in risk mitigation activities. Conducting viability assessments can 
create a better dialog between industry and government for risk reduction and risk mitigation 
strategies that may not be revealed until after award. Shaping the pool of prospective 
offerors before formal solicitation so that it includes only “viable” vendors would reduce risk 
and improve the quality of the proposals submitted.  
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Market Research  
In accordance with FAR Part 10, Market Research, acquisition offices conduct 
market research to identify contractors with the capability to provide the required service or 
product before soliciting bids or proposals for a contract. The market research also offers an 
opportunity for the government to refine requirements. Some market research 
communication techniques recommended in FAR Part 10 include the following: 
 Releasing a Request for Information (RFI) to solicit industry input on 
requirements and potential acquisition strategies and gauge current industry 
interest and market capabilities 
 Contacting knowledgeable individuals in government and industry regarding 
market capabilities 
 Gathering market information on specific products and potential suppliers 
 Gathering market pricing and technical information from commercial or 
government sources 
 Gathering market information on industry practices, supply and demand 
trends, and other relevant factors. 
These techniques can point to the ability of acquisition offices to understand the 
viability of products and risks associated with meeting the government requirement before 
releasing the final RFP to industry. FAR Part 10 encourages the use of viability assessments 
by “gathering market information” in a structured approach, based on the recommended 
techniques shown above.  
Communicating With Industry  
The federal government’s ability to achieve a successful contract award depends 
upon credible communications with offerors. Yet program offices often feel unsure of how to 
conduct such communication. To demystify misunderstood processes and procedures, 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) released a series of Myth-Busting memos 
to foster productive communication between the federal government and industry from the 
beginning phase (including market research) of acquisition planning through the final phase 
of the source selection process:  
 Myth-Busting: Addressing Misconceptions to Improve Communication with 
Industry in the Acquisition Process (February 2, 2011) 
 Myth-Busting 2: Addressing Misconceptions and Further Improving 
Communication During the Acquisition Process (May 7, 2012) 
 Myth-Busting 3: Further Improving Industry Communication with Effective 
Debriefings (January 5, 2017) 
These documents emphasize a strong dialog between industry and government, 
especially during the early phases of the acquisition process. They also encourage 
government to be more open with industry regarding their requirements during events, such 
as industry days and bidders’ conferences, to gain insight into market conditions and 
technical capabilities. Viability assessments can be considered another effective tool in 
communicating with industry regarding government requirements and the need for quality 
solutions.  
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Acquisition Strategy  
Rapid down selection, which narrows the field of potential bidders, has 
dramatically accelerated government acquisition efforts and can be applied to 
cyber contracting. It must be done early in the acquisition process, well 
before a formal RFP and preferably long before a draft RFP. Otherwise, 
companies already may have invested considerable resources in pursuing an 
opportunity and will be reluctant to forgo their activities. (Gilligan, 2016a, p. 
41) 
Including a viability assessment as part of the acquisition strategy gives program 
offices a better understanding of the marketplace and how their requirements will match 
vendor products. This strategy also allows industry to become aware of the competitive 
nature of the acquisition by obtaining early feedback on how competitive their solution will 
be viewed. As a result, industry is in a better position to choose which solicitations to 
pursue, since they normally have more contract opportunities to bid on than they have 
resources to support a proposal.  
An acquisition strategy that utilizes viability assessments can reflect a stronger 
analysis of alternatives in fulfilling customer requirements. It accommodates the FAR Part 7, 
Acquisition Planning, and Part 10, Market Research, by encouraging two-way 
communication between industry and government. It offers a valid down-selection method 
under FAR 15.202 for source selection. 
RFI Versus Multi-Step RFP 
Viability assessments can be conducted at two points in the acquisition process. 
Both have merit, depending on industry capability, market conditions, and technology 
maturity.  
The RFI 
Releasing a Request for Information (RFI) to solicit industry input on requirements 
and potential acquisition strategies and gauge current industry interest and market 
capabilities is one of the recommendations for market research under FAR Part 10. Rather 
than require paper responses that offer no feedback to industry, an RFI can include an 
assessment of capability based on a set of criteria or scenario. Feedback can be provided to 
industry on an advisory basis. Any results would not preclude industry from bidding on the 
formal RFP. However, this early look allows vendors to decide if they pursue the business 
considering their product solutions.  
The Multi-Step RFP 
FAR 14.501 addresses two-step sealed bidding as a combination of competitive 
procedures designed to obtain the benefits of sealed bidding when adequate specifications 
are not available. FAR 15.202 Advisory Multi-Step process allows for viability assessments 
as part of the solicitation process. The language in FAR 15.202 specifically defines the 
advisory nature of the assessment and allowing industry to make an informed decision to 
pursue a competition: 
 The agency may publish a pre-solicitation notice that provides a general 
description of the scope or purpose of the acquisition and invites potential 
offerors to submit information that allows the overnment to advise the offerors 
about their potential to be viable competitors.  
 The pre-solicitation notice should identify the information that must be 
submitted and the criteria that will be used in making the initial evaluation. 
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Information sought may be limited to a statement of qualifications and other 
appropriate information (e.g., proposed technical concept, past performance, 
and limited pricing information). At a minimum, the notice shall contain 
sufficient information to permit a potential offeror to make an informed 
decision about whether to participate in the acquisition.  
 This process should not be used for multi-step acquisitions where it would 
result in offerors being required to submit identical information in response to 
the notice and in response to the initial step of the acquisition.  
 The agency shall evaluate all responses in accordance with the criteria stated 
in the notice, and shall advise each respondent in writing either that it will be 
invited to participate in the resultant acquisition or, based on the information 
submitted, that it is unlikely to be a viable competitor.  
 The agency shall advise respondents considered not to be viable competitors 
of the general basis for that opinion. The agency shall inform all respondents 
that, notwithstanding the advice provided by the Government in response to 
their submissions, they may participate in the resultant acquisition. 
Building viability assessments into the acquisition process can strengthen the 
government’s knowledge of the industry and technical capabilities before award. This would 
reduce the risk of design problems and allow adjustments to government specifications 
before award.  
Source Selection  
Conducting viability assessments during source selection can provide invaluable 
insight into how the marketplace will respond to federal government requirements. Since 
viability assessments are “advisory” (the contracting officer never directly discourages 
companies from bidding), they do not restrict competition or the ability of companies to 
submit offers for award consideration.  
Competitive Approaches 
Incorporating viability assessment results into a competition can be done either 
through feedback from the RFI results, including any challenge events, or the first step of 
the multi-step process under FAR Part 15.202. Federal procurements use several 
evaluation methods to select a winning proposal. Viability assessment information can be 
incorporated into these methods.  
 Traditional evaluation process. Under the traditional process, the 
contracting office releases an RFP to industry; industry provides written 
proposals and receives written evaluations; discussions, usually in writing, 
resolve discrepancies or address weaknesses; and the government makes 
an award based on best value. All communication is in the form of paper 
proposal submissions. Even though many contracting offices release a draft 
RFP to obtain comments and answer questions to “fix” the RFP anomalies, 
many times this process does not reflect a robust dialog or a preview of 
proposed solutions. 
o A viability assessment conducted before the traditional competitive 
process can allow a healthy exchange between industry and 
government before the formal RFP, allowing adjustments to 
requirements before award.  
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 Sample Scenarios with proposal. Some acquisitions include sample Task 
Orders with the RFP. Companies respond to scenarios after the formal 
selection process starts. This process leaves little room to adjust scenarios or 
requirements based on learning. 
o Viability assessments can replace scenarios to allow that learning, 
feedback, and adjustments to requirements before source selection. 
 Demonstrations after award by winning vendor. Some acquisitions 
require the successful vendor to prove that its solution performs as required 
through a demonstration or prototype after award has been made. If the first 
awardee is not successful, the award goes to the next offeror, who has a 
chance to demonstrate that its product will meet the requirement. This 
creates added churn and expense for industry and government.  
o Viability Assessments can capture and refine risk prior to award.  
Viability assessments provide evaluation of solutions and feedback to industry and 
allow adjustments to government requirements. Viability assessments can capture and 
refine risk prior to source selection and award, reducing the need for several rounds of 
negotiations.  
Protests 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Protests for fiscal year (FY) 
2016, identified the following reasons for sustaining protests, in descending order of 
importance: 
1. unreasonable technical evaluation 
2. unreasonable past performance evaluation 
3. unreasonable price/cost evaluation 
4. flawed selection decision (GAO, 2016b) 
The GAO report stated that in many cases agencies failed to meaningfully consider 
the merits of the evaluations or proposed prices. In response to this situation, the National 
Defense Authorization Act 2017 requires government agencies to submit a report on 
protests based on quantity and quality of information that vendors received both before and 
after award that affected the decision to file a protest. This congressional requirement 
underscores the attention being paid to communications with industry. Acquisition officials 
can improve the quality of information in proposals by responding to offeror concerns early 
in acquisition planning. 
Companies can protest requirements included in the formal RFP and the final award 
decision. However, industry does not protest an RFI or feedback on their responses to that 
RFI, since it is advisory in nature. Viability assessments allow companies to understand why 
their solutions are unsatisfactory early in the acquisition process, which in turn can avoid 
submission of proposals that receive a negative evaluation and the potential of protest by 
unsuccessful offerors.  
A viability assessment conducted during the RFI process may generate a sounder 
RFP package. A viability assessment conducted as part of the first step of an RFP down-
select, the government provides an unsuccessful offeror all the documentation related to the 
evaluation, including evaluation results generated during a viability assessment. In the latter 
case, the vendor may decide not to protest the award because it understands that the 
company’s proposed solution has little chance to win the award.  
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Designing a Viability Assessment 
This section describes how program offices can design and execute a viability 
assessment during the acquisition planning phase. The key to designing the viability 
assessment is to incorporate the method into the existing acquisition planning process. This 
would include defining the requirements in terms of outcomes or functional characteristics, 
defining the format of responses, developing a scoring method, advertising the event 
through a request for information (RFI) to industry, evaluating submissions, and providing 
feedback to industry.  
Defining the Requirements of a Viability Assessment 
Describe the requirement in terms of the distinctive characteristics, quality attributes, 
or property features that are especially important for the system or service. The information 
requested should focus on critical characteristics of the requirement, not provide a full 
detailed specification. As an example, software is typically described in terms of features; 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines the term feature in IEEE 
829 as “a distinguishing characteristic of a software item (e.g., performance, portability, or 
functionality)” (IEEE, 2008).  
Viability assessments may be used for information technology (IT) requirements, 
especially those that lend themselves to commercial product attributes and characteristics. 
Chapter 10, Vendor Lock, of Open Systems Architecture (OSA) Contract Guidebook for 
Program Managers provides a strategy to evaluate the viability of software before the RFP 
phase (OUSD[AT&L], 2013, p. 11).  
Define the evaluation criteria and scoring mechanism. The team should decide 
whether scoring criteria for each characteristic should be numeric point scoring (for example, 
on a scale from 1 to 10), or adjectival (using qualitative descriptors ranging from 
“outstanding” to “unacceptable”). 
Format for Responses 
Program offices can define the responses for viability assessments based on several 
types of information from industry. These responses can follow a design or characteristic, as 
those used in a market research request, or a sophisticated challenge or scenario. Formats 
can take the form of a white paper stating relevant product capability or technical approach, 
or a more complex response, such as a demonstration of a proposed solution (The MITRE 
Corporation, n.d.).  
The more extensive the responses, the more expensive the process for both sides. 
The RFI or RFP first step should instruct vendors to submit only a technical statement of 
features and characteristics of the product, and vendors should be expected to perform a 
small demonstration to validate the claims made in the statement.  
Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria can provide objective reference points for the government’s analysis. Some 
notional criteria based on characteristics of the system or service can include the following:  
 Maturity level of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)-based products 
 Web-enabled solutions  
 Product that can be configured or minimally customized to support unique 
requirements  
 Product that can integrate into an enterprise infrastructure 
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 System that can interface with other systems internal and external to being 
acquired 
 System that can interface with a data warehouse 
 Innovative, cost-effective solution and implementation methodology to 
achieve desired objectives and results within the context of the solicitation 
Scoring Responses 
After the contracting office receives responses, the evaluation team scores the 
responses to each question and documents notes to support the scoring. Program offices 
can analyze the responses and then score them for purposes of feedback to industry. The 
generally accepted methods used in source selections to evaluate technical requirements 
can easily be adapted to viability assessments. These methods are as follows: 
 Pass/fail. The government reviews the merits of submissions based on 
various criteria that lend themselves to a yes or no result. This may work well 
with known IT system characteristics, but would present a challenge for 
emerging, unproven technology. 
 Color scoring. The government evaluates submissions based on grading 
criteria that depict levels of acceptability based on a color-coding scheme. 
This scoring can reflect strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies in the 
product. 
 Adjectival scoring. The government evaluates submissions by assigning 
adjectives that describe the level of quality. This scoring can also reflect 
strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies in the product. 
 Risk. The government can incorporate consideration of risk levels into the 
assessment if a proposed solution could cause problems with performance or 
overall system sustainment. Risk is normally described as low, moderate, or 
high. 
 Not Addressed. If a vendor’s response does not address a certain aspect of 
the requirement, the government provides no feedback on that portion of the 
requirement that is not address.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) Source Selection Procedures contain evaluation 
criteria that suggest consideration of overall proposal risk in conjunction with strengths, 
weaknesses, significant weaknesses, uncertainties, and deficiencies in determining 
technical ratings for a source selection (OUSD[AT&L], 2016). Section 3.1, Evaluation 
Activities, Table 3, describes these criteria. Table 1 adapts that DoD table to apply 
specifically to viability assessments. 
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Table 1. Combined Technical/Risk Rating Method Rating 
 
The evaluation team then provides a summary of the results, outlines discriminating 
differences, and compiles the scores for the different vendors, from highest to lowest, to 
identify the most viable solutions. The team can use a consensus process to mitigate outlier 
scoring or differing opinions. After reviewing the scores and rationale, the contracting officer 
and program manager determine the “most viable” companies.  
Providing Feedback  
The contracting officer notifies all respondents of their evaluation. Those companies 
that did not submit a viable solution are informed that they do not stand a good chance of 
success “with that proposed solution” for the pending solicitation. The contracting officer can 
offer to provide feedback on how the company scored in the evaluation. However, at no time 
does the contracting officer directly discourage that company from submitting an offer on the 
subsequent RFP. This process gives offerors whose solution was deemed non-viable the 
opportunity to decide whether to submit a bid once the formal solicitation process begins. 
Measuring Value 
Program offices can use the metrics shown in Table 2 to measure the value of 
applying viability assessments during the acquisition planning phase. Continuous review of 
known acquisition and contracting metrics will ensure that programs apply this method 
effectively and that it yields benefits.  
- 219 - 
Table 2. Viability Assessment Metrics 
Metric Used to Measure 
Time to Award Reduced lead time to reflect efficiency 
Number of High-Quality Proposals Reduced number of proposals that were not responsive to 
requirements, because the viability assessment made 
vendors realize they could not meet the requirements 
Cost Control Reduced cost over life of the system based on viable 
solutions 
Number of Protests Industry satisfaction with the process as being competitively 
fair 




Partnership between government and contractor to solve 
technical problems in program delivery; fewer technical 
changes or engineering change proposals 
Positive impact on acquisition process; less rework 
Conclusions 
Viability assessments can help the federal government instill confidence in the 
acquisition process to maximize competition among viable offerors. Industry can better 
understand requirements before submitting a formal offer, while gaining additional insight 
from their assessment results to improve future proposals. Contracting officers and program 
managers can apply this approach to refine their requirements before the formal RFP is 
released, thereby improving the likelihood that the proposed solutions would meet program 
needs. 
Acquisition offices can use viability assessments when vendor solutions will likely 
vary widely and many companies can be expected to submit proposals. Such variance in 
solutions could occur when market conditions reflect many new entrants or when legacy 
systems require unique upgrades or emerging, unproven technology.  
The following criteria would indicate use of viability assessments as an appropriate 
approach:  
 Use of this method improves government knowledge of the marketplace and 
an ability to rapidly adopt new technology.  
 An early engagement between government and industry leads to better 
quality proposals in the final evaluation process.  
 This method complements Chapter 10, Vendor Lock, of Open Systems 
Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers (OUSD[AT&L], 
2013) by providing another method to evaluate viability of software before 
RFP phase. 
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Appendix: Viability Assessment in Practice 
DHS ICE Investigative Case Management System  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) conducted a competitive acquisition to modernize an investigative case 
management information technology (IT) system, using viability assessments as part of their 
RFI and RFP process.  
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DHS ICE TECS Requirement 
DHS ICE needed to modernize its mission-critical major IT development program, 
ICE Treasure Enforcement Communications System (TECS). This program provides the 
next-generation system for ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents.  
Approach and Methodology 
The RFI Process: DHS ICE released an RFI to industry through the Federal 
Business Opportunity (FEDBIZOPPS) website to solicit their input on potential contract 
types and performance-based requirements. DHS ICE issued a subsequent RFI to industry 
through Government Wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs) and Multi Agency Contracts 
(MACs) to solicit capabilities and evaluate responses, using a specific set of questions and 
requirements for the desired capabilities. Because of this market research, DHS ICE 
decided to conduct a full and open competition for the TECS modernization.  
The Multi-Step RFP Process: DHS ICE released RFP HSCETC-14R-0002 on May 2, 
2014 and provided the ICE TECS system modernization objectives to modernize and 
simplify the case management technological infrastructure and improve data integration and 
information sharing. The DHS ICE conducted a public Industry Day on May 8, 2014, and 
provided the following acquisition strategy:  
 HSCETC-14-R-00002 will be competed IAW FAR Part 15 as a full and open 
competition using a multi-step advisory down-select process. 
 Offerors must participate in Step 1 (OCD) to be eligible to participate in Step 
2 (Full Proposals). 
 The full set of requirements will be provided to those offerors who participated 
in the Operational Capabilities Demonstration (OCD) and choose to proceed 
to Step 2 of the competition. 
System Criteria: Within the RFP Section C, ICE defined the system by the following 
criteria:  
 Mature COTS-based, web-enabled solution that can achieve delivering a 
production ready solution for formal integration testing for initial operation of 
the system  
 System that can be configured or minimally customized to support unique 
requirements  
 System that can integrate into the DHS and ICE enterprise infrastructure  
 System that can interface with other specified systems that are internal and 
external 
 System that can interface with the ICE Data Warehouse. 
DHS ICE then required the offerors to provide, as part of their proposals, a 
Performance Work Statement (PWS) that would be evaluated and incorporated into the 
winning award.  
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Evaluation Process  
DHS ICE RFP, Section M, included the following evaluation criteria: 
M.3.1-STEP 1 (OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES DEMONSTRATION) EVALUTION 
CRITERIA  
Each Offeror’s Operational Capabilities Demonstration (OCD) will be evaluated using 
the following factor to determine their current solution’s viability:  
FACTOR 1: Maturity of the Offeror’s current system to meet requirements of OCD:  
The Offeror’s ICM system must demonstrate a high level of existing capability to 
meet the requirements of the OCD. Step 1 is meant to provide an advisory down-select to 
Offerors with the potential for success at an acceptable level of risk.  
The system proposed by the Offeror during the OCD will be evaluated as to whether 
they have demonstrated the ability to meet the requirements of the preplanned scenario 
provided by the government, and whether they are likely to be a viable competitor in 
accordance with the criteria set forth below. These criteria will be used to rate each Offeror’s 
OCD.  
The degree to which the proposed investigative case management system 
demonstrates existing (“out of the box”) capability to substantially meet the system 
capabilities of the preplanned scenario of the OCD with a potential for success in Step 2 at 
an acceptable level of risk. The Contracting Officer will notify each Offeror, in writing, by e-
mail of the results of their OCD evaluation. Offerors who are notified that they are unlikely to 
be a viable competitor are encouraged to evaluate their likelihood of receiving an award and 
decision to continue to Step 2.  
Any Offeror who provides an OCD in Step 1 may participate in Step 2.  
M.3.2-STEP 2 EVALUTION CRITERIA 
Proposals will be evaluated using the following three (3) factors to make a best value 
determination: 
FACTOR 1: Technical: Sub-factor 1: Technical Approach; Sub-factor 2: Management 
Approach  
FACTOR 2: Past Performance  
FACTOR 3: Business & Price 
DHS ICE RFP, Section L, included instructions on the OCD and the evaluation 
process:  
L.3.1 OCD Instructions. HSCETC-14-R-00002 will be competed as a multi-step 
advisory down-select process. The requirements in the RFP posting are a sub-set of the 
entire requirements package which contains Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) 
requirements. The requirements provided in the RFP are sufficient to allow Offerors to 
prepare for the Operational Capabilities Demonstration (OCD). The full set of requirements 
(including LES information) will be provided to those Offerors who participated in the OCD 
and choose to proceed to Step 2 of the competition. Offerors must participate in Step 1 to be 
eligible to receive the LES information and participate in Step 2. 
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L.3.2. STEP 1 OCD. To continue to Step 2 and receive the full list of requirements, 
each Offeror must perform an OCD to test and validate their system’s maturity and capability 
in meeting the requirements of the ICE Investigative Case Management (ICM) System. 
These demonstrations will require each Offeror to execute a predefined scenario of critical 
capability and then allow the government operators an opportunity to execute additional 
tasks that encompass the same system capabilities as the predefined scenario. This 
scenario will require the Offeror to demonstrate system capabilities.  
The result of Step 1 is an advisory down-select. After all OCDs have been 
conducted, the Offerors will be notified in writing as to whether they appear to be a viable 
competitor for Step 2. OCDs will be evaluated in accordance with Section M.2.2-STEP 1. 
Although all Offerors that participated in the OCD are eligible to participate in Step 2, 
Offerors who appear to be nonviable based on the evaluation of their OCD are provided an 
opportunity now to make the business decision as to whether it is in their best interest to 
continue to Step 2.  
L.3.3 STEP 2 WRITTEN PROPOSALS. Law-Enforcement Sensitive Information: 
Those Offerors who choose to proceed to Step 2 shall submit an e-mail to ICE with their 
intent to participate in Step 2; this e-mail must be received by 2:00 pm EDT on the third 
business day of receipt of the viable/non-viable down-select letter. All Offerors will have 30 
days from receipt of the LES information to provide Step 2 written proposals: 
Results  
DHS awarded the ICE ICM Solution contract on September 26, 2015, which was 60 
days after receipt of Step 2 proposals. DHS made the contract award with no protests of the 
award decision.  
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Emily Harman—is the Director, Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP), for the Department of 
the Navy (DoN), serving as chief advisor to the Secretary on all small business matters. She is 
responsible for small business acquisition policy and strategic initiatives.  
Harman joined the Secretary of the Navy staff as a member of the Senior Executive Service in August 
2015 and has over 30 years of federal service. Prior to receiving this appointment, she served as 
Associate Director of the Naval Aviation Systems Command’s (NAVAIR’s) OSBP from November 
2005 to August 2015.  
Harman’s previous experience includes serving as a Division Director in the Major Weapons System 
for Air-Antisubmarine Warfare, Assault, Special Mission Programs Contracts Department, and as the 
Multi-Mission Helicopters Program Office’s (PMA-299) Contracting Officer. Harman has NAVAIR 
experience as a Services Contracting Officer, as well as Contracting Officer for the AV-8B Weapon 
Systems Program Office (PMA-257).  
Prior to joining NAVAIR in 1997, Harman served as a Contracting Officer for the Naval Supply 
Systems Command’s (NAVSUP’s) Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Norfolk Detachment 
Washington. Harman served as a Supply Corps Officer in the Navy from 1985–1992 and retired from 
the Naval Reserves. She served onboard the USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) and earned the Supply 
Corps Surface Warfare pin. Her other duty stations include Supreme Allied Command Atlantic, 
Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, United States Naval Academy, and FISC Norfolk 
Detachment Washington.  
Harman is a member of the DoD Acquisition Professional Community and is Level III certified in 
Contracting. A Certified Professional Contracts Manager through the National Contract Management 
Association, she holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physical Science from the United States 
Naval Academy, and a master’s degree in Management/Acquisition and Contract Management from 
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the Florida Institute of Technology. Harman is a member of Leadership Southern Maryland’s Class of 
2010. 
Harman is a graduate of NAVSUP’s Corporate Management Development Program, NAVAIR’s 
Senior Executive Leadership Development Program, and the Federal Executive Institute. Harman has 
a number of personal and command decorations including the DoN’s Meritorious Civilian Service 
Medal, DoN’s FY2010 Acquisition Excellence Award, and the 2015 Public Servant Award from the St. 
Mary’s County Chamber of Commerce.
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The Impact of 8(a) Small Business Graduation 
David J. Berteau—is Professional Services Council (PSC) President and CEO, with 400 member 
companies of all sizes providing federal contract services. Berteau was ASD for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness and served 14 years in the Defense Department, under six defense secretaries. 
Earlier, Berteau served at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syracuse 
University’s National Security Studies Program, and SAIC. He is a Fellow of the National Academy of 
Public Administration and taught graduate courses for 14 years at the Maxwell School, Georgetown, 
and the LBJ School. [berteau@pscouncil.org] 
Amanda Swanson—serves as PSC’s Research and Analysis Associate. She conducts federal 
spending analysis on the behalf of both member companies and PSC leadership to support the 
association’s advocacy efforts. Swanson also works closely with PSC’s senior staff to explore 
emerging issues in defense policy and acquisition. Previously, she worked as a research consultant 
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Abstract 
The 8(a) small business set-aside program is designed to support small business 
participation in the federal market and to foster small business growth. However, 8(a) 
graduates do not fare well over time, with more than 60% no longer receiving federal prime 
contract obligations less than 10 years after graduation from set-aside eligibility. Those who 
were still federal prime contractors gained very little additional government business, with 
the average contract obligation up only 3.3% to $6.25 million, from $6.05 million (showing a 
decline when adjusting for inflation). Additionally, 8(a) graduates still depended on set-
asides for more than half of their federal prime contract dollars. Overall, they are not 
rewarded for graduation. 
Introduction 
For decades, it has been the policy of the U.S. government to support and promote 
the growth of small businesses in the American economy. Part of that support comes from 
awarding government contracts to businesses that fall below certain size standards and are 
therefore eligible for special consideration. Constraining eligibility for contracts to certain 
businesses are sometimes called “set-aside” programs. One group of such set-aside 
programs is the 8(a) Business Development program under the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA). Under 8(a), the federal government limits competition for certain 
contracts to businesses that participate in the 8(a) Business Development program.1 
Qualified businesses that are certified to compete for 8(a) set-aside contracts do not 
retain that eligibility forever. Participating companies need to complete annual reviews to 
maintain good standing in the program, and a firm’s certification will last for a maximum of 
nine years. At the end of that period, companies may still compete for and win government 
contracts, but they will no longer be eligible for 8(a) set-aside contract awards, though in 
certain circumstances they may later regain eligibility.  




 For more information about 8(a) requirements and eligibility, see https://www.sba.gov/federal-
contracting/contracting-assistance-programs/8a-business-development-program. 
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Through the SBA, the federal government tracks and reports on 8(a) set-aside 
contracts. What happens, however, to companies whose certification eligibility has ended? 
How successful are they in pursuing government contracts? Do they even stay in business? 
It appears that the SBA cannot answer these questions, because once a firm graduates 
from 8(a) eligibility, it’s not tracked and reported on. 
The Professional Services Council, under its Foundation, undertook an examination 
of these questions (illustrated in Figure 1). This paper describes the research question, the 
methodology, and the initial research results. It draws some preliminary conclusions and 
outlines further research needed. 
 
Figure 1. Research Background and Question 
The 8(a) Program allows disadvantaged businesses2 to compete for set-aside 
contracts, amongst other benefits. Firms may remain in the 8(a) program for up to nine 
years and may graduate from the program early in the case that they exceed size limits 
before the nine-year period of eligibility has expired.  
The expiration of 8(a) eligibility for a company is commonly referred to as 
“graduation.” From that point, previously certified firms may continue to pursue full and open 
competition for government contracts. This means they will need to be ready to compete 
with significantly larger and better resourced competitors. This study seeks to determine 
what happens to firms after they are no longer eligible to receive 8(a) set-asides.  
Research specific to the 8(a) Business Development Program and its outcomes is 
relatively limited. However, there is a body of research that more broadly explores the role of 




 “Disadvantaged” is defined by Title 13, Part 124 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and 
focuses on socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. 
- 228 - 
set-asides in the government contracting industry both in the United States and 
internationally. 
A 2013 study by Jun Nakabayashi sought to estimate additional cost to government 
of procurement via set-asides for public construction projects in Japan. The study estimated 
that roughly 40% of small and medium contracting firms would fall out of the market if set-
asides were taken away. The study concluded, therefore, that procurement cost would likely 
increase as competition decreased (Nakabayashi, 2013). That conclusion may require 
further analysis and verification. 
Further, a 2011 comparison of small business contracting in the United States and in 
Europe found an increasing interest in fostering small business procurements in the 
European Union and some of its member countries (Kidalov, 2011). Small business set-
asides and other means of supporting the competitiveness of these firms may be an 
important component of a healthy federal contracting market. However, that success can be 
jeopardized if, after graduation, those firms have difficulty remaining competitive or even 
staying in business. 
 
Figure 2. Research Methodology 
For purposes of this study, we narrowed our focus to those firms that graduated from 
8(a) eligibility in 2009 and 2010. These two groups of firms will henceforth be referred to as 
“graduating classes,” designated by their year of graduation. 
We first identified firms of interest using the Dynamic Small Business Search 
(DSBS), furnished by the Small Business Administration. The search consisted only of 
previously 8(a) certified firms. The search did not include any firms with active 8(a) 
certifications. Due to the large number of firms that met this criterion, the DUNS numbers 
were gathered in groups of roughly five geographic states at a time. The resulting output 
from the DSBS included DUNS numbers and corresponding locations and 8(a) exit dates. 
After compiling a complete list of previously 8(a) certified DUNS numbers, all 
relevant contract data since FY08 were queried within a proprietary database of federal 
obligations data, originally extracted from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). To 
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ensure the fidelity of the data, we spot-checked a sample of the selected DUNS numbers 
against obligations data available at USASpending.gov.3 
We examined 10 fiscal years’ worth of data for DUNS numbers continuing to receive 
obligations (Figure 3). We then used FY17 as an end point to examine who was still in the 
market, who their customers are, and other characteristics of their interactions with the 
federal market.  
There are limitations when using obligations data provided by FPDS, with occasional 
errors and other inconsistencies within the data. Our work over the years with FPDS data 
shows, however, that such errors tend to be consistent over time and have little influence on 
long-term trends. Therefore, our analysis focuses on overarching trends within the data.  
 
Note. This figure shows total contract obligations in current dollars, to the 2009 and 2010 
graduates. 
Figure 3. Comparison of Total Obligations and Unique DUNS Counts 
One obvious metric for measuring the success of the 8(a) program is the number of 
firms remaining in the federal contracting market several years after their graduation from 
set-aside eligibility. There are, however, significant limitations to this approach. First, it is 
possible for a single firm to have more than one DUNS number, dependent on the services 
they provide and the customers they supply. It is also possible that a simple count of unique 
DUNS numbers will overestimate the number of firms participating in the market. Second, 
differences in spelling and format of vendor name entries in FPDS make it difficult to prevent 
overestimation using vendor names. Finally, there is nothing within FPDS data to indicate 




 Because the data provided by USASpending are updated regularly, the obligations totals provided 
there and those provided by the proprietary database did not match exactly. However, the differences 
were minimal and deemed insignificant to the analysis. 
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why a DUNS number is no longer receiving prime contract obligations in later years. If a 
DUNS number is no longer receiving obligations after graduation, the firm may have failed 
and subsequently gone out of business, or it may have merged, been acquired, became 
only a subcontractor, or simply left the federal market. Further research will be required. 
However, a count of unique DUNS numbers may provide insight into broader 
outcomes of the 8(a) program. The 2009 graduating class included 418 unique DUNS 
numbers. Members of the 2009 graduating class received nearly $2.5 billion in prime 
contract obligations in FY09. By FY17, only 138 unique DUNS numbers from the class of 
2009 remained, representing a 67% decrease. In the same year, total obligations for this 
group had declined to $1.07 billion. Interestingly, this group experienced growth in total 
obligations over FY16, suggesting a potential rebound.  
The 2010 graduating class included 673 unique DUNS numbers. These firms 
received roughly $4.1 billion in prime contract obligations in FY10. By FY17, only 291 of 
those unique DUNS numbers received prime contract obligations. At 57%, the attrition rate 
was slightly lower than that of 2009 graduates. Total prime contract obligations for the group 
declined to $1.61 billion in FY17 and did not show similar signs of rebounding.  
There is a similar pattern in the decline in total prime contract obligations by class 
following graduation from 8(a) eligibility. For both graduating classes, the initial decline is 
steep, followed by a flattening out. Overall, only 39% of company-based DUNS numbers 
were still receiving prime contracts from the federal government in FY17. Contract 
obligations overall declined nearly as much, with FY17 totals being 41% of the funding in the 
year of graduation. In addition, the average size of contract obligations per DUNS number 
rose very little, from $6.05 million in graduation year to $6.25 million in FY17. Adjusted for 
inflation, the value of such obligations actually declined.  
 
Figure 4. Total Obligations: Department of Defense 
In examining the general decline of 8(a) graduates, it is important to note that this 
decline does not occur uniformly across graduating classes or contracting agencies. Figure 
4 shows trends within the Department of Defense (DoD). There are differences in how 8(a) 
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graduates have fared in working with each military department. The seven-year decline was 
relatively uniform for 2010 graduates, between 10% and 11% per year for each military 
department. For 2009 graduates, the largest decline occurred in contracts with the 
Department of the Army, with a compound annual growth rate of -14.12% over the seven-
year period from FY11 to FY17. Alternatively, the seven-year decline was less than 1% for 
contracts with the Department of the Air Force. Overall, 2009 graduates experienced a 
6.58% annual decline in obligations from the DoD between FY11 and FY17. 
Additionally, 2009 graduates experienced a significant rebound in prime contract 
obligations from FY15 to FY17, with the largest growth occurring in contracts with the 
Department of the Air Force at 15.49%. Contracts with the DoD grew 8.8% over the same 
period for 2009 graduates. The 2010 graduates did not experience the same rebound 
between FY15 and FY17, however it is possible that these firms may experience similar 
growth in FY18.  
 
Figure 5. Total Obligations Amongst Other Agencies 
Figure 5 shows declines contract obligations for 8(a) graduations from the 
Department of State, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Energy. 
There is no uniform trend across these agencies. 
For the Department of Energy, 2009 graduates experienced a seven-year decline of 
roughly 14%; they experienced 50% compound annual growth in the three-year period from 
FY15 to FY17. Prime contract obligations to 2010 graduates working with the Department of 
Energy were essentially flat from FY11 to FY17, however these firms experienced 23% in 
compound annual growth from FY15 to FY17. 
The Department of State showed a significant decline in prime contract obligations to 
2009 graduates over both the three-year and seven-year periods. However, though they 
experienced a decline from FY15 to FY17, contract obligations to 2010 graduates have 
remained flat at the Department of State over the seven-year period from FY11 to FY17.  
- 232 - 
Neither graduating class experienced growth in prime contract obligations with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The largest decline occurred for 2010 graduates between 
FY15 and FY17 at 31%. The 2009 graduates experienced a 24% decline over the same 
period.  
The number of 2009 and 2010 8(a) graduates receiving federal prime contract 
obligations receiving federal prime contract obligations declined more than 60% by 2017, 
and the total value of their contracts by nearly the same amount. However, to understand 
the viability of 8(a) graduates, it is also important to consider the sources of their contract 
dollars. Figure 6 shows those sources for 2009 graduates.  
 
Figure 6. Obligations by Set-Aside Type: Surviving 2009 Graduates 
The 2009 graduates received nearly 50% of their prime contract obligations from 8(a) 
program set-asides in their graduation year. It is also worth nothing, though, that roughly 
one-third of prime contract obligations for these firms came from full and open competition in 
FY09.  
By FY17, however, the percentage of obligations for 2009 graduates from full and 
open competition remained the same as in FY09, roughly one-third. The proportion of 
obligations from other set-asides, on the other hand, more than tripled compared to FY09, 
from 19% to 62%. In other words, many of these businesses depended on other set-aside 
programs. A majority of the funds obligated through other set-asides came from general 
small business set-asides.  
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Figure 7. Obligations by Set-Aside Type: Surviving 2010 Graduates 
In FY10, 44% of prime contract obligations for 2010 graduates came through 8(a) 
set-asides. This proportion is nearly identical to 2009 graduates in their graduation year. The 
2010 graduates also received a near identical proportion of obligations through full and open 
competition in FY10. They received a slightly larger proportion through other set-asides.  
Unlike 2009 graduates, however, by FY17 there was significant growth in the 
proportion of prime contract obligations awarded through full and open competition, from 
32% in FY10 to 51% in FY17. Contract obligations from other set-asides rose 50%, a far 
smaller increase than for 2009 graduates. 
Conclusion 
The 8(a) small business set-aside programs are designed to support small 
businesses and foster their growth. However, 8(a) graduates do not fare well over time, with 
more than 60% no longer receiving federal prime contract obligations. Those who were still 
federal prime contractors grew very little, with the average contract obligation up only 3.3% 
to $6.25 million from $6.05 million (if we adjusted for inflation, the average would show a 
decline). Finally, 8(a) graduates still depended on set-asides for more than half of their 
federal prime contract dollars. Overall, they are not rewarded for graduation. 
This suggests that, in general, even 8(a) graduates who are still receiving federal 
prime contracts are not growing. Further research is needed, particularly to identify which 
firms have grown and to determine the nature of that growth. Until then, it seems that 8(a) 
set-asides do not position graduates for growth.  
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Abstract 
This paper garners information crucial to understanding business growth for new 
entrants and small businesses who contract with the federal government. This information is 
then used to evaluate entrances, exits, and status changes among commercial and federal 
vendors with the purpose of comparing challenges faced by small businesses with those of 
larger ones. Measuring market trends over time and in multiple sectors shows how the 
challenges facing small businesses, such as market barriers to entry and imperfect 
competition, keep them from growing. The final results compare the survival rates between 
small and medium or large new entrants contracting with the federal government and 
analyzes the graduation rates for those small new entrants who grew in size during the 
observation period. 
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Introduction 
Promoting small businesses has been a key issue for economic policy makers since 
the Great Depression occurred almost 90 years ago. This focus is not surprising given that 
small businesses have been referred to as the backbone of democracy, as their success 
unequivocally fosters an equal distribution of wealth (Bean, 1996). Furthermore, an 
entrepreneur’s ability to create new companies and enter new markets is a signal of a 
healthy economy as the abundance and prosperity of small businesses and new entrants 
are clear indicators of market sustainability, improving both public and private interests. In 
recent years, small business policy makers have focused on emerging obstacles, especially 
for those businesses newly entering the heavily regulated market for federal contracts. For 
instance, the DoD’s desire to access non-traditional vendors galvanized the inception of the 
DoD’s Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). Another example is Title 15 of U.S. 
Code § 657a, otherwise known as the HUBZone Program that provides set asides for 
qualified businesses that might not otherwise be able to effectively compete for federal 
contracts.  
This paper studies entrances, exits, and status changes of six samples of newly-
entered federal vendors and specifically DoD vendors. Each sample observes a set of new 
entrants in each year from 2001 to 2006 and how they fared over the following 10-year 
period. For example, the first sample looks at new entrants in 2001 and measures their 
success through 2011, while the last sample looks at how new firms in 2006 fared through 
2016. The study team additionally investigates how these outcomes change between small 
and medium or large businesses. 
There is a wide body of literature studying the ability for new entrants, and 
specifically small businesses, to survive in different industrial sectors. Scholars studying this 
issue have identified various industry-level, macroeconomic-level, and firm-level 
characteristics that affect new entrants’ and small firms’ ability to survive. In the context of 
public procurement, there is only a small amount of literature focusing on the relationship 
between small businesses and federal contracting. To break new ground in this critical but 
understudied domain, the study team observed a large longitudinal sample of firms that 
offers complete information on firm entries, firm exits, and other available firm-level 
characteristics. 
The study team garnered firm-level information from the years 2000–2017. The study 
team posed four research questions to guide the exploration of the data: 
1. What are the survival rates for new entrants in the market for federal 
contracts?  
2. How do these survival rates compare with the survival rates for new entrants 
in the defense industrial base specifically? 
3. How do these survival rates change between small and medium or large 
businesses? 
4. What firm-level characteristics differentiate small from medium or large 
businesses?  
This paper seeks to answer these questions by first reviewing the existing literature 
that studies new entrants’ ability to survive and specifically how small businesses fare in this 
context. Second, by outlining the characteristics that have been found to shape a new 
entrant’s ability to survive based on the literature. Third, by describing and analyzing the 
data that the study team gleaned from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and 
the System for Award Management (SAM). Finally, by offering a discussion of the results 
and drawing conclusions from the findings.  
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U.S. Government Policies and the Existing Literature 
Small Businesses and New Entrants  
Federal policies take a range of approaches to promote entrepreneurship, 
competitive markets, and small businesses. In addition to alleviating anti-trust threats and 
providing technical assistance, small-business policy aims to utilize public acquisition dollars 
as a tool for enhancing demand for small businesses in the market for federal contracts. 
Under the current policy, federal government agencies are subjected to an overall goal of 
spending 23% of their prime-contract dollars with small businesses (Moore, Grammich, & 
Mele, 2014). Generally, both public and academic spheres have acknowledged that the 
market for government contracts has high barriers to entry and can be a turbulent 
environment for small businesses, even once penetrated. The government responds to this 
market failure with various small-business set asides aimed to improve the relationship 
between small-business vendors and the government. 
Given these theoretically favorable opportunities for small businesses in the market 
for federal contracts, it is worthwhile to study the chance of survival for new entrants in these 
markets. On the one hand, policy makers should be aware of the success rates for small 
businesses in the market for federal contracts to better adjust or implement policy when 
needed. On the other hand, small businesses who might utilize the policy advantages 
provided to them should be aware of the likelihood of success in certain markets before 
entering them.  
While policy makers are concerned with making the market for government contracts 
accessible to small businesses, a 2008 survey found that when small businesses were 
asked to rank 75 problems in order, where 1 equals most concerning and 75 equals least 
concerning, small business participants listed being awarded a federal contract as 71st out 
of 75, on average (Kovacic, 1992). Whether small businesses view their participation in the 
market for federal contracts of high significance, well-rounded participation in this market is 
important so that the market for federal contracts remains healthy despite its monopsonistic 
and monopolistic nature. Without legal pressure, the market for federal contracts can 
become easily concentrated for a variety of reasons. First, many products and services 
bought by the federal government function at a large scope, making it difficult for small 
businesses to serve as a prime contractor for certain items (Kovacic, 1992). Second, 
barriers to entry in the market for federal contracts exist. For instance, navigating the highly 
regulated nature of federal contracting requires large structural and personnel investments 
by any businesses looking to sign a federal contract for the first time (Kovacic, 1992). 
Given the historical priority placed by policy makers on both the amount of small 
business participation in, and the general health of, the market for federal contracts, the 
variables associated with successful small business contracting deserve empirical 
examination. Furthermore, the investigation of new entrants in the market for federal 
contracts goes hand in hand with the small business issue because previous research has 
shown that size impacts a new firm’s ability to succeed (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001). 
Identifying which variables are associated with successful market participation will help small 
businesses and new entrants to target practices that enhance their ability to enter the 
market for federal contracts and further improve the health of the economy.  
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Variables Associated With New Entrants’ Success 
The current body of literature that studies the ability for new entrants to survive has 
identified three buckets in which the characteristics affecting survival rates of new entrants 
exist: firm-level characteristics, industry-level characteristics, and macroeconomic-level 
characteristics. This section discusses the existing literature’s findings on these 
characteristics in support of the methods this paper uses to study small business new 
entrants in the market for federal contracts.  
Firm-Level Characteristics 
Size 
The theories on how size affects new entrants’ survival have evolved over time. 
Scholarship studying new firm survival initially accepted Gibrat’s law, which states that firm 
survival and subsequent growth is independent of firm size (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001). 
This law was challenged, however, by subsequent scholars studying small businesses and 
firm survival. For instance, Evans (1987); Hall (1987); Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 
(1988); Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); and Grammich et al. (2011) found that small firms 
have a higher likelihood of exiting the market compared to larger firms. Moreover, Geroski 
(1995) argues that the preponderance of support for the evidence that small firms are more 
likely to exit the market has become a stylized fact. The literature thereafter follows this view 
and as a result, includes variables measuring firm size when analyzing survival rates and 
growth for new entrants.  
Size critically affects a business’s ability to survive because small businesses are 
disadvantaged by their inability to operate at the minimum efficient scale level of output from 
the beginning (see discussion from Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). Small firms experience a 
cost disadvantage compared to their larger, incumbent competitors and are therefore more 
likely to fail. In the context of public procurement, Flynn, McKevitt, and Davis (2015) find that 
within the definition of small businesses, there are further subsets of size that differentiate 
micro-businesses from small businesses in general and that these two groups tend to 
experience different survival and growth rates when participating in public tendering.  
The literature review findings on the effect that size has on new entrants’ survival 
rates provides the foundation for the study team’s comparison of survival rates for small and 
medium or large firms. Analyzing this comparison in the context of federal contracting, with 
the dataset gleaned by the study team, is novel and looks to inform the public procurement 
community on the success of their efforts to improve the environment for new entrants and 
small businesses in federal contracting. 
Firm Age 
Firm age is an important variable in this analysis for two reasons. First, the 
association of firm age and survival of new entrants has been deemed as another stylized 
fact by Geroski (1995) and can also be found in analyses by Evans (1987) and Audretsch 
(1991). Geroski (1995) lays out a rationale for this phenomenon:  
Since the process of information acquisition is costly and time consuming, 
many new entrants are likely to under-invest in information gathering. Further, 
to the extent that market opportunities change post-entry, the types of actions 
which entrants need to undertake in order to survive and prosper are also 
likely to change. The implication is that the growth and survival prospects of 
new firms will depend on their ability to learn about their environment, and 
link changes in their strategy choices to the changing configuration of that 
environment. 
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In other words, new entrants can only know so much at the time of their entry into the 
market. It is necessary for these firms to spend time in the market to garner information that 
can be used and analyzed to improve business development. Some information can only be 
gleaned over time, making firm age an important variable to consider when analyzing new 
entrants’ survival rates. While financially-robust new entrants might be better positioned to 
obtain information at an earlier stage, they will likely increase efficiency and capacity with 
age and experience. 
Firm Ownership and Demographics 
The study team incorporates the firm-level characteristic of firm ownership in the 
model estimating likelihood of survival because there are various small business policies 
issued by the U.S. government that create set asides depending on the nature of firm 
ownership. There are multiple categories of contracting assistance programs available to 
certain disadvantaged groups and locations. For example, the U.S. government created the 
8(a) Business Development Program to aid small, disadvantaged businesses to participate 
in the market for federal contracts. The U.S. government has these policies in place due to 
the disadvantage that small, minority-owned businesses face in competing for federal 
contracts (Small Business Administration, n.d.). 
Firm Nationality 
The U.S. government has policies in place that regulate the content that federal 
contractors can procure from foreign sources. For instance, the Buy American Act (41 U.S. 
Code §§ 8301–8305) requires federal contracting agencies to prefer domestic materials and 
services for public use or public works in the United States (41 U.S. Code Chapter 83). 
Additionally, Buy American Laws such as the Berry and Kissel Amendments mandate nearly 
exclusive use of U.S. content in certain products. The Berry Amendment requires that the 
DoD specifically purchases certain items such as textiles, food, shoes, and hand/measuring 
tools exclusively from domestic suppliers, and the Kissel Amendment extends this to the 
Department of Homeland Security (Congressional Research Service, 2017). Due to these 
regulations, the study team explores the relationship between firm nationality and survival in 
the market for government contracts because these policies indicate that location could 
impact these relationships.  
Industry-Level Characteristics 
The characteristics that shape each industry create environments that have differing 
effects on the ability for new entrants to enter and survive. For this reason, policy makers 
and scholars who study new entrants account for the differing environments across 
industries. For instance, the SBA’s definition of a small business varies depending on 
industry sector. Furthermore, scholars who have studied survival rates for new entrants tend 
to acknowledge these differences by implementing variables measuring industry-level 
characteristics that have been shown to affect a new entrant small business’s likelihood of 
survival (Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; Reijonen, Tammi, & 
Saastamoinen, 2016). Certain industry-level characteristics that the literature has focused 
on are degree of competition, innovation rate, industry growth rate, and capital intensity in 
an industry. While controlling for these industry-level characteristics is beyond the extent of 
this paper, future iterations will control for these factors by measuring the primary industry 
that a firm contracts in through NAICS identification. 
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Degree of Competition 
As one of the pillars supporting a healthy market, the degree of competition impacts 
the conditions facing new entrants and their ability to survive in a market. Competitive 
markets provide more opportunity for growth, which enables firms to more easily reach the 
minimum efficient scale. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) posit that risk is higher for new 
entrants when the cost-price margin of an industry is high and that this result increases in 
non-competitive markets that are highly concentrated because the larger incumbents have 
more control over price and supply. When measuring survival rates for new entrant small 
businesses, it is important to account for the degree of competition of the industry in which 
the new entrant participates.  
Innovation Rate 
The innovation rate in the industry entered by the firm is an important variable cited 
in the current literature as having an impact on small business net entrants’ survival rates. 
Technological or informational conditions that dictate the amount of innovation necessary to 
succeed in an industry influence the ability for new entrants to survive in a market. This idea 
has been explored by Winter (1984) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995). Winter (1984) 
finds that industries differ, with some operating as a “technological regime” and others as an 
“entrepreneurial regime.” Industries characterized as a “technological regime” are more 
favorable to established incumbent firms who already have the capital and knowledge base 
to effectively innovate and survive. Conversely, “entrepreneurial regimes” foster innovative 
success by new entrants and small businesses, giving new entrants an innovative 
advantage over their incumbent competitors. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) empirically 
test how hazard rates for new entrants depend on innovation rates. They estimate that new 
entrants face a higher risk of failure in highly innovative environments, although their results 
are not statistically significant.  
Industry Growth Rate 
Industry growth rates have been shown to affect survival rates because growth rates 
have been shown to increase price-cost margins (Bradburd & Caves, 1982). Like the 
industry characteristic degree of competition, industry growth rates influence the price-cost 
margins that in turn impact the operations of companies in that industry. Heightened price-
cost margins create environments where participating firms can survive when operating at a 
suboptimal level of scale, thus influencing the ability for new firms to survive (Audretsch & 
Mahmood, 1995). 
Capital Intensity 
Theoretically, high capital intensity makes it harder for new entrants and especially 
small businesses to survive and grow in an industry. This is because it is more difficult to 
acquire the necessary resources needed to operate in a capital-intense environment before 
operating at the minimum efficient scale. Moreover, incumbent firms in capital-intense 
industries likely operate with economies of scale, giving them an advantage over newly-
established competitors. On the one hand, Audretsch (1991) found that the likelihood of 
survival for small, newly-established firms is lower in capital-intensive industries that are 
dominated by scale economies. On the other hand, industries exhibiting high investments in 
human capital, with higher wages, are a reflection of the tendency to invest heavily in labor-
related costs such as training and firm-specific skills, and tend to have a higher likelihood of 
survival (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995). 
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Macroeconomic-Level Characteristics 
The third and final set of characteristics that may influence a firm’s likelihood of 
survival pertains to macroeconomic variables. The state of the economy influences business 
success across all levels of business size and thus must be controlled for when estimating 
the survival rates of new entrants. The point in time of the business cycle, the 
unemployment rate, and inflation rates all influence factors such as investment, GDP, 
employment, and demand. Previous work on this topic has acknowledged these 
relationships by including variables describing various macroeconomic characteristics, such 
as the unemployment and real interest rates, to control for these effects and estimate the 
impact of new entrant size on likelihood of survival more accurately.  
Data and Specification 
The study team collected the data for this report from the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS) and the System for Award Management (SAM). The study team gleaned 
data on a yearly basis measuring a wide variety of variables on new entrants in the market 
for federal contracts from these two sources and merged them together by firm. The result is 
a longitudinal data set that provides information on firms entering and exiting the market on 
an annual basis over the period from 2000 to 2017.  
The study team subsets the collected data to six analytical samples of new entrants 
in the market for both government-wide and DoD-specific contracts. Each sample includes 
all new entrants starting in year 𝑡 where 𝑡 = 2001–2006. Each sample is tracked over the 
decade following 𝑡. To define new entrants, the study team uses the registration date in 
SAM to indicate when a firm entered the market for federal contracts. To define exits, the 
study team uses the last signed date within the 10-year study period from FPDS.  
Given the information on entries and exits, the study team calculates the 𝑖-year 
survival rates for each of the six samples of new entrants where 𝑖 can equal three, five, or 
10. The survival rate is equal to the number of firms that survived in the ith year divided by 
the total number of firms that entered in the baseline year. These calculations are made for 
all new entrants, small-business new entrants, and medium- or large-business new entrants. 
The same calculations are made for those new entrants contracting specifically with DoD. 
Furthermore, the study team calculates the graduation rates of small businesses specifically 
for each of the six samples. The study team considers small business graduation to occur 
through either organic firm growth or acquisition by a larger company. In this analysis, a 
small business is considered to graduate if, during the 10-year observation period, it 
changes from small-business status to medium- or large-business status for the majority of 
contract obligations that it has with the federal government after its first contract as a 
medium or large firm had been signed. The graduation rates are then calculated by dividing 
the number of graduated firms over the 10-year observation period by the total number of 
small firms that entered the market in the baseline year. 
With respect to the firm-level variables, the study team uses firm size, firm location, 
and firm ownership status. Firm size is defined by the variable “Contracting Officer’s 
Determination of Business Size” from the FPDS database, which denotes whether the 
contracting officer concluded that the firm satisfies the small business size criterion for the 
contract’s assigned NAICS code. The firm location variable is binary, determining whether 
the firm is domestically or internationally located. This is defined by the “country” variable 
that is given from the SAM database. Firm ownership status is described by four variables: 
woman owned, veteran owned, minority owned, and foreign owned. Using the FPDS section 
on contractor data, woman owned is defined by the “Woman Owned Business” variable and 
veteran owned is defined by “Veteran Owned Business.” Minority owned is defined as 
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inclusion in any of the following categories: “Minority Owned Business,” “American Indian 
Owned Business,” “Alaskan Native Owned Corporation of Firm,” “Native Hawaiian Owned 
Organization or Firm,” “Tribally Owned Firm,” “Asian-Pacific American Owned Business,” 
“Black American Owned Business,” “Native American Owned Business,” “Subcontinent 
Asian (Asian-India) American Owned Business,” “Hispanic American Owned Business,” and 
“Other Minority Owned Business.” Finally, foreign owned is defined by the field “Foreign 
Owned and Located.” There were some cases where observations were dropped due to 
missing values in the firm-level characteristic fields; however, these numbers were never at 
high enough magnitude to raise alarm. 
Results: New Entrants in the Market for Federal Contracts 
The number of new entrants that entered the market for federal contracts and the 
market for DoD contracts specifically each year from 2001 to 2016 is reported in Figures 1 
and 2. The overall trend for the entire time period is similar for new entrants in the market for 
all government contracts and for new entrants contracting with the DoD specifically, where 
the number of new entrants entering the market to contract with the government decreases 
each year on average. The trends from 2005 to 2016 are more constant, while there are 
much larger numbers of new entrants in the first four years. Interestingly, the number of new 
entrants for all federal agencies increases dramatically in 2004, yet this does not happen for 
new entrants contracting with the DoD. The high rate of decrease of new entrants 
contracting with the federal government in the beginning of the period of study is not 
sufficiently explained in this report, lending itself to future research. It could be due to factors 
such as a reporting phenomenon, policy implementation, or the state of the economy. The 
consistency of this phenomenon, with declines happening in the DoD sample even as 
contract spending is surging combined with significant overhauls of FPDS during the same 
period,1 leads the study team to suspect that a change in the reporting of DUNS numbers 
most likely explains a significant portion of this phenomenon. Until the precipitous decline is 
better understood, the paper will focus on what trends within each sample rather than trying 
to explain the differences between years. 




 FPDS-NG launched at the start of 2005, though a variety of data changes preceded the change. 
http://www.govexec.com/technology/2004/12/new-procurement-data-system-to-debut-at-end-of-
month/18247/   
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Figure 1. Number of New Entrants per Year (2001–2016)—All Federal Agencies 
 
Figure 2. Number of New Entrants per Year (2001–2016)—DoD 
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2001 Sample of New Entrants  
The differences in firm-level characteristics between small and medium or large 
vendors is displayed in Table 1. Small firms were around 14 years younger than their 
medium or large competitors, on average. Nearly all small and medium or large firms were 
domestically located, although the difference in means is significantly different from zero. 
Small businesses tended to have higher rates of minority, veteran, and woman owners, on 
average.  
The sample of businesses that started contracting with the federal government in 
2001 had relatively high three-year survival rates, where the survival rate for all new 
entrants after three years was 78%. The small businesses in this sample had lower survival 
rates than the medium or large firms, with three-year survival rates of 76% for small 
businesses and 81% for medium or large firms. After five years, the survival rates decrease 
to 62%, 61%, and 64% for all firms, small firms, and medium or large firms, respectively. 
The 10-year survival rates decrease by a much greater margin, and small new entrants have 
a higher survival rate than medium or large new entrants, at 20% and 19%, respectively. 
The graduation rate for small businesses contracting with all federal agencies is 
approximately 4%. 
The new entrants that contract with the DoD have similar results in that the 
difference in survival rates between firms at three years and five years is less severe than it 
is between firms at five years and 10 years. Small new entrants contracting with the DoD 
also have lower three- and five-year survival rates than medium or large new entrants. After 
10 years, however, small new entrants have a higher survival rate than their medium or 
large counterparts, although the difference is hardly over one percentage point. The 
graduation rate for small businesses contracting with DoD is 2.4%. 
Table 1. 2001 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
  
Small Medium or large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 19.12 33.46 -10.51*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0 -1.73 
Woman Owned 0.1 0.012 9.74*** 
Veteran Owned 0.05 0.01 7.05*** 
Minority Owned 0.06 0.01 7.82*** 
Domestic Location 0.99 0.95 5.86*** 
Significance Level: *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 2. 2001 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  



















3-Year  78.01% 76.09% 80.72% 3-Year  71.56% 69.81% 74.05% 
5-Year  62.27% 61.31% 63.60% 5-Year  55.47% 55.31% 55.70% 
10-Year  19.58% 20.49% 19.16% 10-Year  13.98% 15.14% 12.32% 
Graduation Rate 3.53% Graduation Rate 2.38% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
2002 Sample of New Entrants 
The mean differences in firm-level characteristics for the 2002 sample of new 
entrants are displayed in Table 3 and follow very similar patterns to the 2001 sample. 
Additionally, the 2002 sample of new entrants (displayed in Table 4) exhibit similar results to 
the 2001 sample. The three-year survival rate is relatively high, at around 75%. Different 
from the 2001 sample, small and medium or large new entrants in 2002 show nearly equal 
three-year survival rates, varying within 1 percentage point of one another. Both small and 
medium or large new entrant’s five-year survival rate reduces by about 15 percentage points 
compared with the three-year rates, but the difference between the two groups remains at 
less than 1%. The 10-year survival rate is much smaller for both small and medium or large 
new entrants, and small new entrants have a higher survival rate than medium or large new 
entrants after 10 years. The graduation rate for small businesses contracting with the all 
federal agencies in 2002 is 3%.  
Small new entrants contracting with the DoD have slightly higher three-, five-, and 
10-year survival rates than medium or large new entrants in 2002. Approximately 70% of all 
new entrants survive after three years, with 54% surviving five years, and about 15% of the 
2002 new entrants still alive after 10 years. These rates are slightly lower than the survival 
rates for the 2002 sample of new entrants contracting with all federal agencies. The 
graduation rate for small new vendors over the decade after they entered in 2002 is 2%. 
Table 3. 2002 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
  
Small Medium or Large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 19.69 32.25 -9.65*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0 N/A 
Woman Owned 0.11 0.01 9.79*** 
Veteran Owned 0.05 0  6.97*** 
Minority Owned 0.07 0.01 7.94*** 
Domestic Location 0.99 0.92 7.69*** 
Significance Level: *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 4. 2002 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  




















3-Year  75.41% 75.17% 75.74% 3-Year  70.21% 70.84% 69.38% 
5-Year  60.19% 60.69% 59.52% 5-Year  54.08% 55.14% 52.67% 
10-Year  20.82% 22.22% 18.93% 10-Year  16.44% 17.39% 15.17% 
Graduation Rate 3.24% Graduation Rate 2.11% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
2003 Sample of New Entrants  
On average, medium or large new entrants were approximately 13 years older than 
their small firm competitors in 2003. Additionally, small firms had higher levels of woman, 
veteran, and minority owners (see Table 5). The 2003 sample of new entrants contracting 
with all federal agencies have lower survival rates than the previous two samples examined 
for all year categories. The survival rates of the 2003 sample do not vary by a high 
magnitude between small new entrants and medium or large new entrants in the three- or 
five-year categories. However, the 10-year survival rate for small new entrants is just over 4 
percentage points higher than that of medium or large new entrants, at 13% for small new 
entrants and 9% for medium or large new entrants. The graduation rate for the 2003 sample 
of small new entrants is 1.1%. 
The 2003 sample of new entrants who contract specifically with the DoD shows 
similar changes between the three-, five-, and 10-year rates to those for all federal agencies, 
although the rates are lower across the board. Again, small new entrants have higher 
survival rates than their medium or large competitors, but the differences between the two 
groups is never larger than two percentage points. The graduation rate for those small 
businesses who started contracting with the DoD in 2003 is 0.42%. 
Table 5. 2003 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
    Small Medium or Large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 17.07 30.77 -7.25*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0.01  -2.01* 
Woman Owned 0.13 0.01 8.45*** 
Veteran Owned 0.05 0 5.83*** 
Minority Owned 0.11 0.01 7.64*** 
Domestic Location 0.99 0.83 9.37*** 
Significance Level:*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 6. 2003 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  




















3-Year  62.52% 62.67% 62.27% 3-Year  56.16% 56.53% 55.70% 
5-Year  46.79% 47.83% 45.60% 5-Year  41.60% 42.71% 40.19% 
10-Year  12.03% 13.94% 9.71% 10-Year  8.26% 8.79% 7.59% 
Graduation Rate 1.07% Graduation Rate 0.42% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
2004 Sample of New Entrants  
The mean differences of firm-level characteristics between small and medium or 
large firms can be viewed in Table 7 and follow the same patterns as the previous three 
samples. The survival rates for the 2004 sample of new entrants (see Table 8) continue the 
trend of decreasing consistently from the three-year rate to the 10-year rate. However, a 
new trend exhibited by the 2004 sample shows the difference in survival rates between 
small and medium or large new entrants is much greater than the three previous samples. 
For instance, the three-year survival rate for small new entrants is 6 percentage points 
higher than medium or large firms, while the five-year rate for small new entrants is about 11 
percentage points higher, and the 10-year survival rate for small new entrants is 
approximately 6 percentage points higher. The graduation rate for the 2004 sample is 1.1%. 
The 2004 survival rates of new entrants who contract specifically with the DoD follow 
similar patterns but are across the board lower than those of new entrants contracting with 
all federal agencies. Small new entrants contracting with the DoD have higher survival rates 
than their medium or large competitors across all year categories. Additionally, the lowest 
survival rate out of all samples examined thus far occurs for medium or large new entrants 
contracting with the DoD after 10 years, at approximately 4%. On average, 0.91% of newly 
entered vendors contracting with the DoD in 2004 survive after 10 years. 
Table 7. 2004 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
  
Small Medium or Large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 16.65 29.35 -7.71*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0.01 -1.88* 
Woman Owned 0.1 0.01 7.85*** 
Veteran Owned 0.06 0.01 6.22*** 
Minority Owned 0.09 0.02 6.49*** 
Domestic Location 0.99 0.84 10.63*** 
Significance Level: +p<.15 *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 8. 2004 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  




















3-Year  58.79% 61.93% 55.66% 3-Year  55.07% 60.56% 49.85% 
5-Year  41.61% 47.05% 36.32% 5-Year  37.07% 43.79% 30.68% 
10-Year  10.02% 13.27% 6.84% 10-Year  7.11% 10.25% 4.13% 
Graduation Rate 1.13% Graduation Rate 0.91% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
2005 Sample of New Entrants  
Table 9 displays the mean differences in firm-level characteristics between small and 
non-small firms who became federal vendors in 2005. These results follow similar patterns 
to the previous samples; however, the mean difference in age between small and medium 
or large firms is at its highest in absolute value. The 2005 survival rates, shown in Table 10, 
follow the same trends as the 2004 sample, where small new entrants have higher survival 
rates for all three years examined. Again, the magnitude of difference is relatively high—
small entrants have 7, 11, and 5 percentage point higher survival rates for three-, five-, and 
10-years, respectively. The 2005 sample of new entrants has the lowest three-year survival 
rates out of all the samples examined thus far, at 54%, 58%, and 50% for all new entrants, 
small new entrants, and medium or large new entrants, respectively. On average, 0.93% of 
newly entered small firms contracting with all federal agencies in 2005 graduated from 
small-firm status. 
The new entrants who entered the market in 2005 and contract with the DoD exhibit 
very similar results to those new entrants who entered the market in 2005 and contract with 
all federal agencies. Just over half of the new entrants survive after three years, around 40% 
survive after five years, and less than 10% survive after 10 years. Small new entrants tend 
to survive at higher rates than medium or large new entrants, much like the other samples 
examined. For those new businesses working with the DoD in 2005, 0.73% of them 
graduated from small-business status in the 10-year observation period. 
Table 9. 2005 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
  
Small Medium or Large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 15.61 31.53 -8.34*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0.02 -3.02*** 
Woman Owned 0.09 0.01  5.90*** 
Veteran Owned 0.07 0 5.92*** 
Minority Owned 0.13 0.03 6.64*** 
Domestic Location 0.98 0.72 12.92*** 
Significance Level: +p<.15 *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 10. 2005 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  




















3-Year  54.17% 57.65% 50.39% 3-Year  54.36% 58.48% 50.18% 
5-Year  40.82% 46.26% 34.88% 5-Year  38.55% 45.85% 31.14% 
10-Year  8.16% 10.68% 5.43% 10-Year  7.45% 9.39% 5.49% 
Graduation Rate 0.93% Graduation Rate 0.73% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
2006 Sample of New Entrants  
The final sample of new entrants studied are those that entered the market in 2006. 
The mean differences in firm-level characteristics between small and non-small vendors that 
began federal contracting in 2006 follow the same patterns as the other five samples (see 
Table 11). Moreover, Table 12 shows that the survival rates of this sample for those 
contracting with all federal agencies are very similar to the sample studying new entrants 
that entered the market in 2005. About 60% of small new entrants survive after three years, 
while slightly over 50% of medium or large new entrants survive after three years. The 
difference in the five-year survival rate between small and medium or large entrants in 2006 
is the largest across all years sampled, at 15 percentage points. Small new entrants have 
higher survival rates for all three-year categories. On average, 0.56% of the small firms that 
started contracting with the federal government in 2005 graduated. 
The new entrants that entered the market in 2006 and contract with the DoD follow 
similar patterns in their survival rates to those that contract with all federal agencies. The 10-
year survival rate for medium or large new entrants is the lowest of all samples studied, at 
around 4%. Consistent with every year sampled, small new entrants contracting with the 
DoD have higher survival rates than their medium or large competitors. The five-year 
survival rate for small new entrants is much higher (almost 17%) than the five-year survival 
rate for medium or large new entrants. For those new businesses working with the DoD in 
2006, 0.42% of them graduated from small-business status in the 10-year observation 
period.  
Table 11. 2006 Mean Firm-Level Characteristics Between Small and Medium or 
Large Firms 
  
Small Medium or Large T-Stat Ha: diff≠0 
Firm Age 14.11 29.99 -7.33*** 
Foreign Owned 0 0.05 -4.25*** 
Woman Owned 0.12 0 7.59*** 
Veteran Owned 0.07 0.01 4.90*** 
Minority Owned 0.15 0.02 6.91*** 
Domestic Location 0.98 0.71 12.04*** 
Significance Level: +p<.15 *p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
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Table 12. 2006 New Entrants’ Survival Rates  




















3-Year  56.47% 61.11% 51.71% 3-Year  53.05% 59.84% 45.58% 
5-Year  42.52% 50.00% 34.85% 5-Year  38.95% 46.99% 30.09% 
10-Year  6.52% 8.67% 4.33% 10-Year  5.89% 7.63% 3.98% 
Graduation Rate 0.56% Graduation Rate 0.42% 
Source: FPDS and SAM 
Discussion 
The above results show a severe decline in the number of new entrants entering the 
market each year from 2001 to 2016. This result is surprising and merits further attention. 
The study team hypothesizes two factors that could be influencing this result. The first factor 
that could be significantly decreasing the number of new entrants contracting with the 
federal government each year is the reporting practices of Dun and Bradstreet or SAM. 
Second, the large reduction in new entrants working with the government over the study 
period could be purely due to an outside factor, such as policy or economic conditions. With 
this in mind, an analysis of the above survival rate results shows that when contracting with 
the federal government, new entrant small businesses tend to have higher survival rates 
than their medium or large competitors over three-, five-, and 10-year periods. A similar 
pattern persists for those new entrants contracting specifically with the DoD. As previously 
discussed, these results may be an outcome of the U.S. government’s small business 
policies.  
The implications of this result are multifaceted. On the one hand, these results 
suggest that small business policy successfully aids newly entered small businesses 
because they tend to survive at higher rates than newly entered medium or large firms. On 
the other hand, this could imply that small businesses face a perverse incentive regarding 
their business model. Growing firms produce the most jobs and provide more competition 
because they have reached minimum efficient scale for a wide range of products and 
services, fulfilling one of the goals of the small business promotion system. However, if the 
likelihood of survival in the market for federal contracts decreases as a firm grows, newly 
entered firms contracting with the federal government might not pursue a business model for 
profit maximization through growth because they would lose their small-business set aside 
privileges, inhibiting their ability to contract with the government.  
Policy makers should pay attention to these perverse incentives when working with 
small businesses. These results imply that the small business policy that aims to aid small 
businesses in contracting with the government could be successful; however, the benefits of 
these policies may be exclusively limited to companies that stay small. Consequently, highly 
consolidated sectors where the government is reliant on a small number of large 
businesses, especially a risk for the DoD, might be cut off from a potential source for new 
competitors, as graduation from small business status is a major obstacle for most firms, 
who cannot compete with competitors like the big 5 for government contracts without the 
support of policy.  
- 251 - 
Compared to the existing body of literature studying the success between small 
business and medium or large business new entrants, these results are surprising. As 
previously discussed, the existing literature found that small businesses tend to have lower 
rates of success as new entrants than their medium or large competitors in different 
industrial sectors. The key difference here is the focus on federal contracts, and although 
the study team at this time cannot conclusively state if this change in small business new 
entrant success is due to contracting with the federal government, it will be a focus of future 
research. 
Furthermore, the results should be taken into consideration with the following 
limitations in mind. First, these results paint a purely descriptive picture of the success rates 
for small and medium or large businesses contracting with the federal government. In other 
words, the calculation of the survival rates fails to control for other factors that could 
contribute to the success or failure of new entrants contracting with the federal government. 
Therefore, the reported results could be biased and an outcome of other factors not 
considered. The study team intends to address this limitation in future work by modeling the 
hazard rates of new entrants over time. Second, and as previously discussed, the study 
team is suspicious of potential reporting errors that might be a contributing factor to the large 
drop-off in new entrants in the beginning of the study period. The study team plans on 
working towards investigating the data further by cross-referencing with internal data 
sources and speaking with external experts. 
Next Steps 
The study team will continue this investigation through a variety of paths. First, the 
study team is working towards strengthening the statistical capacity of the calculations by 
examining survival between small and medium or large new entrants through a proportional 
hazard model. This model will allow the study team to control for the various firm-level 
factors that could contribute to a new entrant’s success, regardless of whether that firm is 
small or not, as shown by previous research on this issue. Furthermore, this will allow for the 
control of the industry-level characteristics that, as determined by the existing literature, 
influence small and medium or large firms’ ability to survive, depending on what industry 
they are operating in. By expanding the analysis in this way, the study team will be better 
positioned to draw conclusions regarding which factors contribute to the differences 
between small and medium or large new entrants’ survival rates as vendors with the federal 
government.  
Second, the study team has identified further areas of exploration that could 
productively contribute to the analysis of contracts for small business new entrants and their 
medium or large competitors when working with the federal government. Primarily, 
calculating the percent of dollar obligations that go to surviving firms, exiting firms, and 
graduating firms will increase the reliability of the study’s results. These calculations will be 
made for existing firms in each sample period so that the proportion of work contracted to 
new entrants by dollar amount is known. Additionally, the study team will explore the 
survival rates of all existing firms and compare these to the rates calculated for new entrants 
to further increase the reliability of the study.  
Finally, the study team will investigate the 2001–2002 phenomenon that was only 
lightly touched on in this paper, and will attempt to explain why there are significantly more 
new entrants contracting with the federal government than compared to the other years 
examined. Two areas of exploration could confirm whether these high counts are accurate 
relative to the rest of the observed period; data reporting practices and policy 
implementations will be examined as possible contributing factors to the phenomenon. The 
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results of this research will be reported in a subsequent technical report that CSIS will 
publish later this year.  
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Abstract 
Our study of the federal small business set aside program assesses the impact of 
small business set asides on supplier competitiveness, program participation, and firm 
growth. Federal procurement policy distinguishes suppliers as either small or not small. 
Small businesses benefit from set asides and other programs offered by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA), whereas large companies have internal capacity, scale, and 
extensive past performance history to compete for procurements. Mid-sized suppliers are 
too big to qualify for set asides, yet do not have parity with large firms.  
We focus our research on suppliers utilizing the small business set aside program 
and are particularly interested in firms that are “advanced small” or recently graduated 
suppliers (i.e., grew beyond the size standard prescribed by the SBA). We examine the 
federal small business set aside program and assess the impact of small business set 
asides on supplier competitiveness, program participation, and firm growth. We analyze 977 
suppliers that participate or had participated in small business set aside procurements. We 
find the majority of suppliers stay small, and approximately 5% of small businesses grow to 
mid-sized. 
Introduction 
Federal procurement policy distinguishes suppliers as either small or not small. 
Small businesses benefit from set asides and other programs offered by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA), whereas large companies have internal capacity, scale, and 
extensive past performance history to compete for procurements. Mid-sized suppliers are 
too big to qualify for set asides, yet do not have parity with large firms. Anecdotal evidence 
of this disparity exits (perhaps best underscored by the work of trade associations such as 
the Association for Corporate Growth, Mid-Tier Advocacy, GTSC-Lion’s Den, and the 
development of the bi-partisan Congressional Caucus for Middle Market Growth). However, 
there is a dearth of empirical evidence on both the structural barriers that exist for middle 
market firms and the effects of their competitive disadvantage. Before we can understand 
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challenges for mid-sized suppliers, first we need to examine the marketplace where small 
businesses can thrive: small business set aside procurements. Our study begins to clarify 
industry narratives by analyzing the contours of the competitive federal procurement market 
for small and mid-sized suppliers. 
Inequities in the public procurement market are not an insignificant concern. The 
scale and scope of federal procurement is vast, with over 5,000 different types of products 
procured (Brown, 2013) and over $438 billion in contracts obligated in 2015 (accounting for 
approximately 2.5% of gross domestic product [GDP]). The National Center for the Middle 
Market reports “middle market” firms account for one-third of private sector GDP and one-
third of U.S. jobs. However, it is unclear whether mid-sized firms are correspondingly 
represented in the federal procurement market. A study by the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS) suggests the answer may be no (Ellman, Morrow, & Sanders, 
2011). The CSIS found that mid-sized market share of federal professional services 
contracts is shrinking. Mid-sized contractors claimed 40% of the total value of federal 
professional services contracts in 1995, but only 30% in 2009. During the same time period, 
large contractors increased their market share from 41% to 48%, and small business market 
share increased from 19% to 22%. Understanding the barriers to competition, purported 
disparities, and structural policy effects that impede middle market firms’ ability to compete 
for federal contracts will in turn help us to understand their ability to capture market share, 
grow business, and deliver value to federal agencies. 
This study examines the federal small business set aside program and assesses the 
impact of small business set asides on supplier competitiveness, program participation, and 
firm growth. Our study is based on a random sample of 977 firms with a small business set 
aside contract action in 2005. We include firms with contracts for products and services, 
which vary in complexity from simple product procurements to more complex services 
contracts (e.g., information technology systems). We follow these firms for a decade in order 
to better understand their contracts and the operating environment for small and mid-sized 
suppliers.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide context for the study by describing 
the federal policy environment for small and mid-sized suppliers. Next, we address our data 
and methodological approach. Then, we share our analysis and discuss policy implications 
and opportunities for future research. We suspect that firms that successfully transition out 
of the small business marketplace have unique ways of overcoming the “benefit cliff” they 
encounter as they grow out of a sheltered small business market, and this research lays the 
foundation for further study of these dynamics. We consider whether current policies 
governing procurement hamper mid-sized firm competitiveness in the federal procurement 
market and dampen U.S. economic growth. 
Set Aside Policies in Federal Procurement 
The first substantive guidance directed to federal agencies to contract with small 
businesses originated in the U.S. Senate in 1940 with the Special Committee to Study and 
Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises, and in the U.S. House of Representatives 
in 1941 with the Select Committee on Small Business. The committees were created to 
protect the interests of small business owners, recognizing the need for a thriving small 
business community for innovation, economic growth, and national security. The Small 
Business Act of 1953 explicitly stated government prime contracts and subcontracts should 
be awarded to small businesses, and later the Small Business Act of 1958 created the SBA, 
an independent agency within the executive branch. Permanent committees were later 
established by both chambers: the Congressional Committee on Small Business and the 
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Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (U.S. Small Business 
Committee, n.d.; U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, n.d.; DoD 
Office of Small Business Programs, n.d.).  
The policy goals for small businesses in federal procurement are multifaceted.1 The 
initiating legislation created a competitive marketplace for small businesses to participate in 
federal procurement and win government awards; small business set aside procurements 
meet this policy objective. Government procurements are also required to allocate a 
percentage of all awards to small businesses. Firms bidding for these set asides must 
adhere to strict regulations to qualify as “small business concerns.” Although there are many 
exceptions and stipulations delineated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that 
determine how contract officers must classify the size of firms, the two primary criteria are 
the 12-month average number of employees and three-year average receipts. The Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) requires the SBA to calculate these size standards for each line 
of business specified in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). For 
example, according to the current size standards, an iron and steel forging company (NAICS 
332111) may be considered small if it has an average of 750 employees or fewer. A 
management consulting firm (NAICS 541611) may be classified as small if it has a three-
year average of no greater than $15 million in revenue. In response to concerns that the 
SBA size standards failed to adapt to the changing economy, Congress passed the Jobs Act 
in 2010, requiring the SBA to review all size standards and make necessary adjustments to 
reflect market conditions at least once every five years (SBA, 2017).  
The SBA also establishes procurement goals for federal agencies. Government-
wide, 23% of the contract value of prime contracts is set aside for small businesses awards. 
There are goals within that subset, such as 5% of prime and subcontracts are to be awarded 
to woman-owned small businesses, and 5% of prime and subcontracts are to be awarded to 
small disadvantaged businesses, among others. Agencies also biennially negotiate their 
targets with the SBA in order to meet government-wide goals. In fiscal year (FY) 2017, goals 
ranged from 10% at the Department of Energy to 73% at the SBA. Additionally, federal 
agencies have annual goals for subcontracts. For example, the DoD’s prime contract goal is 
22% in FY2017, but the subcontracting goal is 34%.  
One of the other key policy objectives of the Small Business Act is to promote small 
business in order to foster economic growth. Yet as suppliers grow towards their NAICS 
thresholds, they encounter a “benefit cliff” that disincentivizes growth, counter to this goal. 
                                            
 
 
1 The SBA serves the interests of small business beyond those discussed here relating to federal 
procurement. For example, the SBA has developed several financing and loan tools and set aside 
procurement policies to support small business growth. One of the most popular programs is the 7(a) 
Loan Guarantee which allows small businesses that are otherwise incapable of obtaining private 
sector financing access to funding up to $5 million. These funds may be used for a wide range of 
applications including the purchase or repair of capital, expansion or building of structures, and 
refinancing existing debt (Murray, 2013). A similar program, the 504 Certified Development Company 
loan, offers long-term fixed-rate financing specifically for the purchase of fixed assets for expansion or 
modernization (SBA, n.d.). Other innovative solutions such as the Small Business Investment 
Company (SBIC) and Surety Bond Guarantee programs offer growth-phase firms access to 
investment capital and bonding that they would otherwise be too small to acquire.  
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While the SBA might support economic growth among the smallest of small businesses (see 
Footnote 1), federal procurement policy is arguably less effective in supporting economic 
growth.  
In the absence of robust research on firm behavior in sheltered markets, we turn to 
another policy domain for insight on benefit cliffs and unintended consequences. 
Comparisons can be drawn between the small business set asides growth disincentive and 
the benefit cliff observed in social welfare programs. Consider Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), the federal program implemented by states that provides financial 
welfare support. TANF includes work requirements and income thresholds to qualify and 
maintain benefits. Recipients benefit if they remain below the income threshold, as the loss 
in benefits is greater than the gain from increased wages (Bargain & Doorley, 2011; 
Randolf, 2014). In some cases, recipients maintain lower wages to keep ancillary benefits, 
such as child care, or forgo raises or promotions in order to stay under wage limits (Rutgers 
Center for Women and Work, 2016). Evidence shows that families also respond to benefit 
changes, altering employment decisions (Bargain & Doorley, 2011; Hoynes, 1996). It is 
clear that a similar dynamic exists for suppliers in the small business set aside program. Set 
aside procurements create incentives for suppliers not to grow beyond the NAICS size 
standard thresholds in their lines of business. 
Public management research sheds light on a different dynamic at work in set aside 
procurements. One of the underlying tenets of contracting for goods and services is to 
harness the competitive force of the market. As with most government policies, unintended 
adverse effects can result in the pursuit of overcoming market failures (Vining & Weimer, 
2005). In this case, set aside programs restrict competition, contribute to weakly competitive 
procurements, and thereby limit the range of cost, quality, and delivery options for goods 
and services procured under said programs (Brown, 2007; Girth et al., 2012). When markets 
are constrained, purchasers have fewer choices to balance different, and sometimes 
competing, purchasing goals (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2013; Johnston & Girth, 2012). 
Taken together, these conflicting objectives between efficiency, equity, and effectiveness 
illustrate the intricacies of multifaceted policy interventions such as the small business set 
aside program. 
Methods and Data 
Our purpose is to understand the contours of the small business set aside 
marketplace, and we do this through descriptively analyzing federal contracts. We examine 
small business behavior by gathering data on 9772 suppliers that had a small business set 
aside contract in 2005 (i.e., they have at least one contract action associated with a small 
business set aside contract). Data was drawn from the Federal Procurement Data System–
Next Generation (FPDS). The FPDS is a repository of all non-classified prime contract 
activity with any action exceeding $3,000 in value for federal agencies. The FAR requires 
contract officers to enter contract information into the FPDS-NG and update as required. 
Contract actions include the individual records created when a contract is initiated and 
subsequently modified. We stratify the sample such that 60% of contracts are DoD contracts 




 We initially extracted a sample of 1,025 suppliers. In some cases, contract actions reported in 
FPDS-NG were missing key data elements, such as product or service code, principal NAICS code, 
or contracting agency; this reduced our sample to 977 suppliers. 
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to mirror federal spending. The sample includes firms with contracts for products and 
services varying in complexity, from simple product procurements to more complex services 
contracts. The unit of analysis is firm-year, and contracts data from the FPDS-NG is 
aggregated to account for contract activity for each fiscal year.  
Data on firm attributes was procured from Dun & Bradstreet. This data is reported 
annually and appended to FPDS data to create our dataset. We also conducted content 
analysis and cross-referenced data with the System for Award Management (SAM), 
Dynamic Small Business Search (DSBS) database, and open source material. 
Analysis  
While following 977 suppliers over a decade, we observed patterns in their 
engagement with federal agencies. As shown in Table 1, about one-third of suppliers 
consistently maintained contracts with federal clients in every year studied. The remaining 
firms had irregular activity (e.g., contract actions 2005–2006, no contract actions 2007–
2009, and contract actions 2010–2014). In some cases, suppliers were only inactive for one 
year. In other cases, we observed suppliers with two or more continuous years of inactivity, 
which indicates the firm either discontinued serving federal customers or did not survive. 
Table 1. Contracting Patterns 
 
Our data shows that suppliers that are eligible for set asides utilize that advantage. 
Yet it also suggests that small businesses are successfully obtaining contracts on the open 
market. Although we have 9,770 observations (977 firms and 10 years of contracts data), 
we only have 5,995 observations in the data set with contract activity.3 Table 2 contains 
descriptive statistics of variables in our dataset. 




 As Table 1 illustrates, we only have 303 suppliers with contract activity in all 10 years. This means 
3,030 observations for those suppliers as the unit of analysis is firm-year. The remaining observations 
represent varying scenarios from Table 1 (one supplier might only have contracts data for 2005, 
another might have contracts data for every year except 2014). This is why our total observations of 
suppliers with contracts data reduces to 5,995. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Attributes 
 
 Percent set asides: We define contracts as small business set aside 
contracts to include set aside categories targeting small businesses, such as 
woman-owned small business, 8a, service disabled veteran owned small 
business, and the like. The variable measures the percent of contract actions 
specified as small business set asides compared to total contract actions in a 
given year. We see that an average of 43% of a supplier’s portfolio are 
related to small business set aside awards. The distribution of this variable is 
like a hockey stick—at the 75th percentile, set asides are 100% of supplier 
portfolios.  
 Agency diversity: We calculate the number of agencies (at the corporate 
level) with which a supplier has contract actions recorded for a given year. 
This shows that most small business suppliers serve one or two distinct 
federal agencies. 
 NAICS diversity: We track the number of NAICS codes affiliated with contract 
actions for each year. This value represents the number of different NAICS 
associated with all contract actions for a supplier in a given year. NAICS are 
aggregated to the first two digits (e.g., naics53, naics54). Most firms operate 
in one or two NAICS categories.  
 Lines of business/Standard Industrial Classification (SIC): Primary SIC is 
developed by the federal government and is reported to Dun & Bradstreet. 
The first two digits of a four-digit code rolls up to one of 11 categories. Seven 
of the 11 categories are in this sample: services, manufacturing, 
transportation and public utilities, retail trade, wholesale trade, finance, 
insurance and real estate, and construction. About 40% of the firms in this 
sample identify their primary SIC as services.  
 Ownership: Approximately 23% of the observations are attributed to woman-
owned suppliers. Approximately 16% of the observations are attributed to 
minority-owned suppliers. 
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In addition to capturing descriptive attributes of the contracts and suppliers in our 
dataset, we cross-checked suppliers in SAM, DSBS, and other open source materials. While 
FPDS data specifies whether a supplier obtained a set aside contract over this time period, 
supplier data on firm size is not as reliable. Dun & Bradstreet has a small business indicator 
among firm attributes, but this is also not a consistent indicator of the firm’s status, as it 
compares reported annual revenue or employee totals to primary NAICS. This process does 
not capture the other NAICS (beyond primary) that the firm can utilize to win set aside 
contracts, and revenue and employee data is often incomplete or in error for small 
businesses in Dun & Bradstreet’s data. As a result, we gathered information from additional 
resources to determine whether firms remained a small business or grew into the middle 
market and reported the results in Table 3.  
Table 3. Supplier Growth 
 
Approximately 59% of suppliers with a small business contract action in 2005 remain 
small and eligible for set asides in 2017. Fewer than 5% of suppliers grew to mid-sized. 
Nineteen percent of suppliers that had a set aside contract action in 2005 no longer exist. 
We are unable to substantiate the status of approximately 18% of suppliers that had a 
contract action in 2005. These are suppliers that (a) no longer register in SAM, (b) have no 
recent contract activity in the FPDS, and (c) have no publicly available data to support 
approximating firm size. 
Among those 46 firms that grew to mid-sized, we find that half grew through 
acquisition. We also see small businesses acquiring other small businesses and remaining 
small in some NAICS. Of the 43 supplier acquisitions we find through our content analysis, 
20 are still small businesses.  
Discussion 
Our interest in this research lies in the design and implementation of the small 
business set aside program. Our analysis shows the tension between programmatic goals 
that established the SBA and set aside programs: economic growth versus equitable 
access. In this section, we explore the implications of these tensions in practice. We discuss 
implications of our descriptive analysis and present future research opportunities in light of 
our exploratory findings. We raise data limitations encountered with this study, which has 
bearing on future work, and explore approaches to research design in light of data 
constraints.  
The vast majority of suppliers in our sample shelter in the small business set aside 
market. They fail to grow beyond the sales or employee thresholds in the product or service 
areas for which they have self-certified. In most cases, firms in our sample elect to stay 
small. These suppliers recognize the value of the constrained federal market established for 
small businesses. Their clients also value their small business status, allowing for more 
desirable procurements as they help to achieve the agency’s small business goals. In other 
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cases, we suspect small businesses are unable to harness the resources, whether financial 
or managerial, to grow. In yet other instances, prior study finds that firms respond to 
undesirable consequences resulting from growth. Despite evidence to the contrary, firms 
fear increased size can make firms more vulnerable to surviving crisis (Davidsson, 
Achtenhagen, & Naldi, 2006).  
When suppliers make strategic decisions to stay small in order to retain small 
business status for federal procurements, they artificially constrain growth in order to stay 
under the revenue or employee thresholds for specified NAICS. If the intent of federal 
policies to support small business is to encourage economic growth and innovation, then 
firm behavior does not necessarily align with these goals. The behavior, albeit rational on 
the part of small business, is an unintended consequence of creating markets and 
subsidizing subsets of industry. Yet this phenomenon reinforces questions about the 
behaviors of suppliers that are not able to thrive as they grow into the middle market, and 
either intentionally constrain to meet small business thresholds in subsequent years or fail to 
win contracts when competing outside of the set aside market.  
Several policy implications begin to form in light of this exploratory research, 
including policy priorities to support lasting transition to the middle market. Policy options 
might include modified size standards aimed to benefit mid-sized firms (particularly those at 
the lower threshold of the middle market). One concern with simply raising current size 
standards, or increasing the number of years in the rolling average to determine 
qualification, is that action fails to address underlying issues for emerging small businesses 
and is a temporary remedy for only those firms on the edge of mid-sized. 
There are also other ways the federal government could support mid-sized suppliers 
that are neither large nor small. Agencies increasingly rely on federal schedules and multi-
award vehicles. Creating a unique vehicle for mid-sized suppliers is one alternative 
advanced by trade associations supporting mid-tier suppliers. Another policy option is to 
create subcontracting benefits for prime contractors that utilize mid-sized suppliers. That is, 
rewarding proposals with mid-tier suppliers on the subcontracting team, or compelling large 
firms to diversify their teams by including mid-sized suppliers in addition to meeting existing 
small business requirements. 
While there may be little drive among policymakers or administrators to create 
additional regulation, there appears to be a desire to address some of the structural 
challenges faced by mid-tier suppliers. The Chairman of the House Small Business 
Committee, Steve Chabot, recently noted,  
After a small business has proven its success by growing out of its small size 
standard, it exists in a murky limbo—it is too large to benefit from small 
business set-asides, yet is too small to compete with billion dollar firms. (U.S. 
Small Business Committee, 2017, p. 1)  
Even with political support, we conceive of a number of roadblocks to these alternatives. 
First, contract officers are already stretched thin, and policies to support the middle market 
would likely increase regulatory burden on acquisitions staff. Second, large firms benefit 
from status quo policies and would likely mobilize and challenge any regulatory changes 
that strengthen the middle market at the expense of the large suppliers. Third, it is unclear 
where the line should be drawn between emerging small business at the margins of the 
middle market and larger mid-tier suppliers. Who should make that determination, how, and 
where is the appropriate regulatory home for middle market suppliers?  
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More broadly, the underlying issue for policymakers to consider is simply the way in 
which procurement policy and regulation recognize federal suppliers as either “small 
business” or “not small business.” By ignoring the middle, the government may be losing an 
opportunity to secure value by not actively seeking contracts with mid-sized firms. It is well 
understood that small businesses are higher risk suppliers. Unlike large firms, their internal 
processes are immature, and resource shocks can have profound effects on a small 
enterprise and its clients. Large firms largely mitigate that risk, but can be costly. Mid-sized 
firms can be well suited to provide value at lower risk than small firms and lower cost than 
large. In any case, federal agencies are likely missing opportunities to secure value by 
treating all firms that are not small as large and not incentivizing contracting with mid-sized 
suppliers. 
Future Research 
The purpose of an exploratory study is to describe the current state and then 
propose further research to advance knowledge. With this in mind, we propose a number of 
possible avenues for future study. To begin, small and mid-tier businesses would benefit 
from understanding the success factors for the unusual firms in our study that started as 
small businesses and then successfully grew beyond their size standard and into the middle 
market. A qualitative study designed to solicit interviews from principals of the 46 firms we 
identified would shed light on success strategies.  
Further, the initial intent of our research was to determine growth factors for suppliers 
successfully transitioning to the middle market, yet we have been unable to answer this 
research question due to inadequate data specification in the FPDS and from Dun & 
Bradstreet. Extensive primary data collection is needed to address this shortcoming. One 
approach to this is to leverage the qualitative findings from the aforementioned principal 
interviews to develop a survey instrument for wider distribution to small and mid-sized 
suppliers. 
Next, we designed our study to gather contracts data across a wide range of 
contracts and did not constrain our sampling procedure to a specific NAICS in order to 
replicate the procurement environment. Replicating and then extending this study by 
analyzing a sampling of contracts within a single NAICS, to include the full range of 
suppliers (small and not small), would provide a different perspective on the supplier 
dynamics in the federal procurement market. Although this process would limit 
generalizability, this would help to shed light on the competitive landscape for all suppliers 
within a controlled category. 
Finally, our analysis of contract patterns showed that one-third of businesses 
consistently contract with federal agencies. While some firms went out of business during 
the time period studied, others no longer participate in the federal marketplace. Future study 
on the reasons for the lack of continued participation could help us understand barriers to 
federal contracting, particularly among firms with a diverse client base. 
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Conclusion 
In practice, acquisition officials are asked to deliver contracts that meet best value, 
low cost, or other performance objectives, and to meet broader political objectives that can 
affect (constrain) eligible suppliers. Public sector contracts are not simply a tool to increase 
efficiency; they can also serve to promote other public values. Procurement policies that 
target specialized groups, such as small businesses, minority-owned, or women-owned 
firms, are designed to promote equity and representativeness. In short, public procurement 
is a way in which governments can promote social policy goals, such as increased 
opportunity for underrepresented groups (McCrudden, 2004). It is this tension amongst 
competing values that motivates our interest in this study of small business set asides. 
Our research represents a first step in capturing the structural dynamics involved in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of competitive practices in federal agencies 
aimed at promoting small business participation and growth. For small and mid-sized 
suppliers, the analysis shows the market dynamics do not favor growth. Further analysis is 
needed to determine success factors for outlying suppliers that succeed in the middle 
market.  
The results also have implications for policymakers. The Small Business Act has 
succeeded in carving out a competitive space for small businesses seeking federal 
procurements. The SBA’s policies support growth among the smallest of firms, but appear to 
fall short in one of the Small Business Act’s other goals, which is to encourage economic 
growth. There is yet another dynamic that should concern policymakers and administrations, 
which is if further analysis confirms that middle market firms are, on balance, unable to 
compete in the federal procurement market, then agencies are likely missing critical 
opportunities to secure value.  
References 
Bargain, O., & Doorley, K. (2011, May 26). Caught in the trap? Welfare’s disincentive and 
the labor supply of single men. Journal of Public Economics, 1096–1110. 
Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2006). Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to 
finance as a growth constraint. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(11), 2931–2943. 
Brown, T. L. (2007, September 19). Testimony on the Small Business Administration’s 
contracting programs, Small Business Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, DC. 
Brown, T. L. (2013). A guide for agency leaders on federal acquisition: Major challenges 
facing government. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
Brown, T. L., Potoski, M., & Van Slyke, D. M. (2013). Complex contracting: Government 
purchasing in the wake of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Davidsson, P., Achtenhagen, L., & Naldi, L. (2006). What do we know about small firm 
growth? In The life cycle of entrepreneurial ventures (pp. 361–398). Boston, MA: 
Springer. 
DoD Office of Small Business Programs. (n.d.). Legislation. Retrieved April 1, 2017, from 
http://business.defense.gov/legislation/  
Ellman, J., Morrow, D., & Sanders, D. (2011). Structure and dynamics of the U.S. federal 
professional services industrial base. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
- 264 - 
Girth, A. M., Hefetz, A., Johnston, J. M., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Outsourcing public service 
delivery: Management responses in noncompetitive markets. Public Administration 
Review, 72(6), 887–900.  
Hoynes, H. W. (1996, March). Welfare transfers in two-parent families: Labor supply and 
welfare participation under AFDC-UP. Econometrica, 295–332. 
Johnston, J. M., & Girth, A. M. (2012). Government contracts and “managing the market:” 
Exploring the costs of strategic management responses to weak vendor competition. 
Administration & Society, 44(1), 3–29.  
McCrudden, C. (2004). Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes. Natural 
Resources Forum, 28(4), 257–267. 
Murray, K. (2013, October 30). SBA's 7(a) loan program explained. Retrieved from 
https://www.sba.gov/blogs/sbas-7a-loan-program-explained  
Randolf, E. (2014). Modeling potential income and welfare assistance benefits in Illinois: 
Single parent with two children households and two parents with two children household 
scenarios in Cook County, City of Chicago, Lake County and St. Clair County. Chicago, 
IL: Illinois Policy Institute. 
Rutgers Center for Women and Work. (2016). New Jersey's benefits “cliff effect” and 
economic self-sufficiency fact sheet. New Brunswick NJ: Author. 
U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship. (n.d.). History. Retrieved 
April 1, 2017, from https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=History  
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). (n.d.). Office of financial assistance: Resources. 
Retrieved from https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/ofa/resources/4049  
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). (2017). A report on the first five-year 
comprehensive review of small business size standards under the Small Business Jobs 
Act of 2010. Washington, DC: Author. 
U.S. Small Business Committee. (n.d.). Committee history. Retrieved April 1, 2017, from 
http://smallbusiness.house.gov/about/  
U.S. Small Business Committee. (2017, November 14). Mid-sized businesses: Too big to be 
small and too small to be big [Press release]. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from 
https://smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400479   
Vining, A., & Weimer, D. (2005). Economic perspectives on public organizations. In D. 
Ferrin, L. Lynn, & M. Pollitt (Eds.), Oxford handbook of public management (pp. 209–
233). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.  
Acknowledgments  
This material is based upon work supported by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Program under Grant No. N00244-16-1-0049. The views expressed in 
written materials or publications, and/or made by speakers, moderators, and presenters, do 
not necessarily reflect the official policies of the Naval Postgraduate School nor does 
mention of trade names, commercial practices, or organizations imply endorsement by the 
U.S. government. 
Professors Brown and Girth are Fellows of the National Center for the Middle Market 
at the Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, and acknowledge the center’s 
support for this research. 
Disclaimer 
Draft. Do not cite. 
- 265 - 
Panel 23. Designing Cybersecurity Into Acquisition 
Programs 
Thursday, April 27, 2017 
1:45 p.m. – 
3:15 p.m. 
Chair: Rear Admiral Edward Anderson, USN, Deputy Commander, Fleet 
Readiness Directorate, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
Applying Cause-Effect Mapping to Assess Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in 
Model-Centric Acquisition Program Environments 
Jack Reid, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Donna H. Rhodes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Automated Methods for Cyber Test and Evaluation 
Valdis Berzins, Naval Postgraduate School 
Cybersecurity: Converting Shock Into Action 
Paul Shaw, Defense Acquisition University 
Robert Tremaine, Defense Acquisition University 
 
Rear Admiral (Sel) Edward Anderson, USN—was born in Glendora, CA, and is a 1990 graduate of 
United States Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering. He holds a Master 
of Business Administration with Honors from Indiana University and is a graduate of the Aspen 
Institute seminar on Global Leadership. 
His sea tours include division officer, USS Newport News (SSN 750); strategic weapons officer, USS 
Ohio (SSBN 726) (Blue); and executive officer, USS Jefferson City (SSN 759). Four years after 
departing his executive officer tour, Anderson assumed command of Jefferson City in July 2008. 
Ashore, Anderson has served as space control officer in Cheyenne Mountain, U.S. Space Command; 
submarine operations officer at Commander, Allied Naval Forces South in Naples, Italy; submarine 
operations and anti-submarine warfare training officer for Commander, Strike Force Training Pacific; 
deputy director for Navy programs and congressional liaison for Undersea Warfare and Strategic 
Programs, Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs; assistant program manager, Common Submarine 
Radio Room; and major program manager for Undersea Integration (PMW 770). 
Anderson was selected for flag officer in March 2017 and was then selected to serve as deputy 
commander, fleet readiness, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in May 2017. 
Anderson’s decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious 
Service Medal (three awards), Joint Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation 
Medal (two awards), Joint Achievement Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (four 
Awards), and various campaign, unit, and service awards. 
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Abstract 
Digital engineering approaches are increasingly used in acquisition of systems, 
changing the current paradigm from documentation-centric to model-centric. Not only are 
these systems highly vulnerable to cyber threats, so too are their enabling environment and 
digital assets. While good practices have emerged to support the shift to model-centric 
program acquisition, such programs experience perturbations over their life cycles that 
introduce new vulnerabilities that may lead to cascading failures. Cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities are of particular concern given digital transformation and increasing threat 
actors, making vulnerability assessment essential throughout acquisition program life cycles. 
This paper discusses ongoing research that seeks to provide program managers with the 
means to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities within model-centric programs (along with 
other model-related vulnerabilities) and determine where interventions can most effectively 
be taken. The research builds on recent work in developing a reference model for model-
centric program vulnerability assessment that uses the Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) 
analytic technique. This research investigates cybersecurity specifically, using CEM and 
other dynamic analysis approaches, including a prototype for proactive assessment of 
cybersecurity and evaluation of potential interventions. 
Introduction 
Digital transformation changes how systems are acquired and developed through the 
use of model-centric engineering practices and toolsets. While offering great benefit, new 
challenges arise from both technological and socio-cultural dimensions. This drives the need 
to examine and address vulnerabilities not only for products and systems, but also for the 
model-centric environments necessary for their acquisition and development. Recent 
research has investigated the use of Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) as a mechanism for 
better enabling program managers and system engineers to anticipate and respond to 
programmatic vulnerabilities as related to model-centric environments. A Reference CEM for 
model-centric enterprises resulting from the work shows promise for considering the 
cascading vulnerabilities and potential intervention options. In ongoing research, additional 
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investigation aims to refine the Reference CEM and analytic approach for cybersecurity-
focused program vulnerability assessment. 
Motivation 
Modern society has many needs and problems that can only be addressed through 
large-scale socio-technical engineering programs (e.g., defense systems, multi-modal 
transportation systems, energy delivery system of systems, health-care management 
systems). The use of model-centric approaches, modeling and simulation, and “digital twins” 
is increasingly used in acquisition of such systems, changing the current paradigm from 
documentation-centric to model-centric. Not only are these systems highly vulnerable to 
cyber threats, so too are their enabling environment and digital assets. While good practices 
have emerged to support the shift to model-centric program acquisition, such programs 
experience perturbations over their life cycles that introduce new vulnerabilities that may 
lead to cascading failures. For instance, perturbations may be caused by policy change 
(leading to IP disagreements), economic factors (leading to training cuts), or disruptive 
technology (leading to outdated infrastructure). Early detection and intervention of 
vulnerabilities can mitigate disruptions and failures. The research seeks to contribute to the 
vulnerability assessment state of practice for acquisition programs, both public and private, 
that increasingly depend on digital assets and model-centric environments.  
Background 
The following subsections describe model-centric engineering, cyber-security 
vulnerability assessment, and cause-effect mapping. A companion paper (Reid & Rhodes, 
2018) provides additional background information. 
Model-Centric Engineering 
Acquisition program management is grounded in management science and a sound 
set of practices evolved over decades; however, new challenges arise as acquisition 
becomes increasingly model-centric. Baldwin and Lucero (2016) state, “The DoD sees value 
in adopting digital engineering design and model-centric practices, enabling a shift from the 
linear, document centric acquisition and engineering process toward a dynamic digital, 
model-centric ecosystem.”  
Model-Centric Engineering (MCE) has been defined as “an overarching digital 
engineering approach that integrates different model types with simulations, surrogates, 
systems and components at different levels of abstraction and fidelity across disciplines 
throughout the lifecycle” (Blackburn et al., 2017). MCE involves using integrated models 
across disciplines, subsystems, life-cycle stages, and analyst groups. It uses models as the 
“source of truth” to reduce document handoff and allow for more continuous evaluation. This 
reduces communication time and rework in response to requirement changes. Most 
discussions of MCE focus on engineering practices and methods to overcome 
implementation difficulties. In any system, however, engineering is only a piece of the 
problem. Numerous human factors, business, and organizational issues exist. Current 
program managers have significant experience with modern engineering processes and use 
this experience to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. No such experience exists with MCE, 
however. This fact, coupled with the increased integration of models, means that emergent 
uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive technologies, threats, changing 
demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced training 
hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within MCE programs, potentially jeopardizing 
program success. New tools are needed to enable program managers to identify model-
centric program vulnerabilities and determine where interventions can most effectively be 
taken. 
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Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment 
MCE, with its focus on digitization, integration, and collaboration, has the potential to 
increase the cybersecurity vulnerability of an enterprise. A vulnerability is the means by 
which the hazard might disrupt the system, thus it is through the vulnerability that the system 
is susceptible to the hazard. Vulnerabilities are best expressed as the causal series of 
events connecting a hazard to system failure. This is a generalization of common, field-
specific usages of the term. MITRE’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
database defines a vulnerability as “a weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) 
found in software and some hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited, 
results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR availability” (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2015). In this definition, the same components can be seen: some structural 
means or “weakness” that can result in system disruption or “negative impact” if a hazard is 
present or the vulnerability is “exploited.” For example, the infamous Spectre security 
vulnerability is described by CVE as “systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative 
execution and branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an 
attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis” (The MITRE Corporation, 2017). 
This is a neat summary of the hazard (an attacker), the means (side-channel analysis using 
speculative execution and branch prediction), and the disruption (unauthorized disclosure of 
information). 
Risk and vulnerability assessment methods have not failed to adapt to novel 
cybersecurity concerns. The aforementioned CVE database has been public since 1999. 
Quality assurance testing (essentially the verification and validation of software) has been 
around since the beginning of commercial software. Software penetration testing (where 
security experts intentionally seek to break a software product) has been the industry norm 
for more than a decade (Arkin, Stender, & McGraw, 2005). Black-box mutational fuzzing and 
concolic execution are being used to automatically test for certain types of software 
vulnerabilities (Schwarz, 2018). Formal verification tools, initially limited to pure software 
domains such as cryptography (Meadows, 1994), has been rapidly advancing and finding 
applications in hardware (Kern & Greenstreet, 1999) and business processes (Morimoto, 
2008), as well as fields that straddle the software-hardware-environment boundaries (Kamali 
et al., 2016). The methods listed here just scratch the surface of approaches security 
researchers and engineers are taking to identify and resolve such technical cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities. 
Beyond these specific testing methods, assessment frameworks have progressed as 
well. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has adjusted, adapted, and been applied 
to handle cybersecurity vulnerabilities associated with additive manufacturing (Pope & 
Yampolskiy, 2016), Internet of Things (Pope, 2017), Air Operations (Young, 2013), and 
Mission Operations (Young & Porada, 2017). More recently, there have also been efforts to 
combine compiler technology with STPA to automatically detect vulnerabilities in software-
controlled systems (Pope, 2018).  
While cybersecurity vulnerabilities in operational systems remain alarmingly 
common, from the trivial (Hanselman, 2012) to the critical (Gressin, 2017), there is some 
evidence that software is becoming more secure, at least in terms of defects per line of 
equivalent source code (Pope, 2017). In many cases, however, the acquisition or 
development process itself needs to be protected from outside threats and endogenous 
failures. Be it military information or technology-related trade secrets, there is real value in 
attempting to penetrate much earlier in the life cycle in order to either steal secrets (Hanna, 
Smythe, & Martin, 2018; Raymond, 2017) or to disrupt production (Statt, 2018). 
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Defense acquisition programs have already instituted a variety of means of ensuring 
the security of their work. Some of these means were originally instituted to address other 
forms of threats but have turned out to be effective in addressing cybersecurity as well. 
These methods include relying on the security clearance process, the use of Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), restrictions on the use of media storage 
devices, separate networks such as SIPRNet and NIPRNet that are isolated or semi-isolated 
from the internet, and general compartmentalization of critical information. Some (non-U.S.) 
defense agencies have gone so far as to revert to using typewriters where able in order to 
avoid security breaches and leaks (Irvine & Parfitt, 2013). 
Unfortunately, many of these historically successful methods are in conflict with the 
more straightforward implementations of many components of an MCE environment. For 
example, the use of SCIFs has been quite successful in preventing unauthorized access to 
data. The typical use of a SCIF in the design process, where a small number of engineers 
work on a task isolated from the outside world, is not directly compatible with an MCE 
environment structured around model integration and collaboration across teams and 
locations. While this problem has been previously considered and ways to mitigate this 
conflict have been proposed (e.g., Reid & Rhodes, 2016), no silver bullet to resolving these 
tensions exists and it is likely that the increased use of MCE will result in both the 
exacerbation of current vulnerabilities and the creation of new ones. Furthermore, most 
means of assessing such vulnerabilities are aimed at assisting software and systems 
engineers to identify and remove cybersecurity vulnerabilities from the end system. New 
methods for enabling project and program managers to perform cybersecurity assessments 
of their enterprise and engineering environment are needed. 
Cause-Effect Mapping 
Cause-Effect Mapping is a vulnerability assessment tool that consists of a mapping 
of causal chains that connect an exogenous hazard to a system degradation or failure, 
termed a terminal event. Each chain represents a specific vulnerability, sometimes called a 
vulnerability chain in order to emphasize that vulnerabilities are not discrete events. 
Terminal events are broadly defined and include any form of value loss. Interventions are 
actions that eliminate or mitigate a vulnerability, and are represented on the map as points 
that break the causal chain. An example CEM (that lacks interventions) can be seen in 
Figure 1.  
The hazards are external to the perspective of the defined user, and are thus 
sometimes called external triggers. An intermediary event is any unintended state change of 
a system’s form or operations that could jeopardize value delivery of the program.  
A CEM is not created for a system, but for a specific class of decision-maker. The 
hazards (referred to as “spontaneous events” in Figure 1) are exogenous from the point of 
view of the decision-maker that the CEM was made for. In this way, CEM avoids the 
“blaming someone else” problem by making all hazards exogenous. The decision-maker 
only has control over the intermediary events. While she may not be at fault for any of the 
vulnerabilities, it is still her responsibility to address them. 
CEM is fundamentally a qualitative analysis method, though it can be readily adapted 
into a quantitative form by adding probabilities of transition to each intermediary. CEM 
provides immediate insight into which parts of the system warrant more detailed modeling 
using other methods.  
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The basic steps to create a new CEM are not application specific and are as follows: 
1. The stakeholder herself lists potential hazards posed to the program. 
2. She then traces the consequences of each of these hazards through the 
intermediary events to the final terminal events. 
3. The process is then done in reverse: She looks at the terminal events, adds 
in any that are still missing, and works backwards on how they might come 
about. 
4. She then examines the causal connections between each intermediary event 
to see if there are any additional connections not previously noticed. 
5. Finally, she consults lessons learned databases, case studies, and other 
experts to generate additional hazards, intermediary events, causal 
connections, and interventions, as well as to verify existing ones. 
Any of these steps can take place either formally, using automated tools to 
enumerate possible vulnerabilities, or informally, relying upon the stakeholder’s own 
experience.  
 
Figure 1. Example CEM of a supply chain 
(Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) 
CEM has previously been applied in a case study of a Maritime Security System of 
Systems (Mekdeci et al., 2012) and to a supply chain case (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). More 
recently, an earlier phase of this research developed a Reference CEM for use by program 
managers to assess enterprise-level vulnerabilities in the MCE environment (Reid & 
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Rhodes, 2018). This work, which was based upon literature reviews, interviews with experts, 
and other sources, sought to provide program managers with an entry point for considering 
such vulnerabilities. Additionally, the steps to create a CEM for one’s own program were 
outlined and some potential use cases discussed. These use cases are as follows: 
(A) By a Program Manager: Assessing potential future vulnerabilities and plan 
possible interventions 
(B) By a Program Manager: Determining specific vulnerabilities to address in 
response to the presence of a specific hazard 
(C) By the Program Organization: Changing program processes to mitigate or 
eliminate vulnerabilities 
(D) By Researchers: Organizing and classifying vulnerabilities into various 
categories or types  
Most users of CEM tend to find it most useful in identifying high priority intervention 
points and new vulnerabilities. Other benefits of note include increased understanding of the 
causal path and the interrelationships between vulnerabilities. While the resultant reference 
CEM was quite detailed in some respects, such as both vulnerabilities and interventions 
involving model curation, it was less well developed in others, notably cybersecurity, as can 
be seen in Figure 2. 
Use (A) is most relevant for novice program managers or program managers using 
MCE for the first time. A senior program manager or team of program managers creates a 
CEM for their organization’s program process. This CEM can then be provided to the novice 
for study and reference. The program manager can then learn what can go wrong and how 
to intervene. In this case, the CEM could be tied to a Lesson’s Learned database, such as 
NASA’s Lessons Learned Information System (NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, 1994). 
This enables concrete examples and consequences to be linked to each vulnerability. One 
of the important factors here is that the CEM does not just present potential interventions, 
but it also places them in the appropriate part of the causal sequence. This enables the 
program manager to not only know how to intervene, but at what point. 
In Use (D), CEM is used to organize and classify vulnerability chains. Two obvious 
classifiers are terminal events and hazards. Which is used to organize a CEM depends on 
whether the user wants to examine the causal chains forward or backwards. Beyond this, 
however, more complicated classifiers are possible. As can be seen in Figure 2, external 
triggers that result in similar vulnerability chains are grouped together. By “similar,” we mean 
that these vulnerability chains either involve many of the same intermediary events or that 
they involve the same part of the program. For instance, most of the intermediary events 
involving model curation and trust are located close to one another in the center-top of the 
figure. Once these groupings have been identified, they can be considered together, such 
as the “Belt-tightening” grouping, and common means of intervention considered. 
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Figure 2. Preliminary Reference CEM for Model-Centric Vulnerabilities With 
Example Intervention Points 
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Strengthening Cybersecurity Aspects of a CEM for Model-Centric Programs 
As was discussed in the previous section, the MCE Reference CEM shown in Figure 
2 was generated using literature reviews and interviews with experts, among other sources. 
The cybersecurity portion of it was adapted, mostly unchanged, from previous work on 
supply chains (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). Cybersecurity is a rising international concern and 
is of particular relevance with the increasing digitization associated with MCE environments. 
As a result, further development of that portion of the Reference CEM was desired. 
To accomplish this, an ongoing series of interviews with systems engineers and 
program managers from a variety of fields, including defense, aerospace, manufacturing, 
and semiconductors, is being conducted. These interviews have sought to provide insight 
into the following questions, in the context of a model-centric enterprise: 
1. To what extent are program managers aware of programmatic 
vulnerabilities? 
2. How do program managers conceptualize these vulnerabilities?  
3. How do program managers respond to these vulnerabilities? 
4. What vulnerabilities are present in MCE programs? 
5. What cybersecurity vulnerabilities does MCE pose? 
The first four questions were the primary focus of that previous phase of research. In 
this phase of the research, the focus is on the fifth question as a means of expanding the 
cybersecurity component of the Reference CEM shown in Figure 2. When it came to the 
topic of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in general, the interviewees commonly raised the 
following issues: 
 Cybersecurity needs to be thoroughly considered much earlier than it 
commonly is, preferably in the proposal generation stage. 
 Program managers and systems engineers are sometimes intimidated by 
cybersecurity issues and thus seek to pass them onto specialists later in the 
acquisition process. 
 MBSE and MCE toolset developers and proponents have not done a 
thorough enough job of considering programmatic cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, though the tools are typically quite effective at designing for 
cybersecurity in end systems. 
 Despite all of the above, according to the interviewees, traditional 
programmatic cybersecurity defensive practices tends to quite effective. This 
is due primarily to the conservative approaches most defense-related 
engineering groups use, as discussed in the Cybersecurity Vulnerability 
Assessment section. The increased use of MCE, particularly for multi-site 
collaboration, could change this. 
The above points, many of which were commonly stated by the same expert, are 
clearly nuanced and complicated, with both points of success and failure. These points, 
along with more specific comments from the interviewees, resulted in an expanded 
cybersecurity CEM that can be seen in Figure 3. Note that in its full form, this would still be a 
part of the general Reference CEM shown in Figure 2. Here it is shown isolated for clarity.  
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Figure 3. Reference Cybersecurity CEM (Preliminary)  
Discussion 
Some of the vulnerabilities and interventions shown in Figure 3 are not unique to 
MCE environments. Some of the vulnerabilities will simply be exacerbated by the increased 
use of MCE environments and processes. Some of the interventions will require new, 
creative means of implementing. For instance, Intervention Point #1 in Figure 3 is 
“Compartmentalize sensitive information.” Clearly this is already done with the use of SCIFs 
and the Need-To-Know (NTK) information framework. However, such methods may not be 
feasible if the benefits of model integration and collaboration offered by MCE are desired. 
Instead, new methods must be developed. An example of one such possibility is the Federal 
Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Sentinel Initiative, which involves querying a distributed 
system and receiving anonymized, aggregate data back (Office of Surveillance and 
Epidemiology, 2010). Such a system may allow modeling software to communicate across 
domains and locations, while still ensuring that even if one location is breached, only some 
information is exposed. 
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This Reference CEM does omit vulnerabilities and interventions that are entirely 
unchanged, however. For example, practices like the security clearance system and 
restricting the usual of digital storage media will remain effective interventions that are not 
significantly impacted by MCE environments. 
One set of vulnerabilities that came up repeatedly in both the interviews and was 
observed in the class activity dataset were those that passed through the reputation harm 
intermediate event, as shown in Figure 4. Despite the frequency that the potential for this 
vulnerability was raised, few interventions were proposed for post-breach. This suggests 
that program managers and systems engineers could use more training in how to respond 
to breaches, particularly prominent ones, instead of just how to prevent them. While in the 
private sector there is evidence suggesting that the reputation harm incurred by a prominent 
breach does not significantly impact the firm (Lange & Burger, 2017), contractors to the 
government are known to suffer significant financial penalties due to breaches, even when 
such a breach is unrelated to their government duties (Braun, 2014; Overly, 2017). In a 
defense acquisition environment, there is thus significant incentive to having program 
managers (and the enterprise as a whole) well prepared to respond to major breaches. 
 
Figure 4. Reputation Harm Vulnerabilities, Section of Figure 3 
CEM is intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing vulnerability 
assessment methods, particularly when it comes to cybersecurity. In this way, it can help 
fulfill the requirements set by NIST’s Risk Management Framework (RMF; Ross et al., 2016) 
and the DoD’s Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS; Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership, 2017b). These regulations have shifted how government contractors 
handle cybersecurity. Previously, one-time assessments were completed and defensive 
practices instituted. Now the process is more dynamic. Contractors have to continuously 
assess threats and develop countermeasures as they arise, both with regards to the end-
system and to the enterprise. CEM can potentially assist in this by serving as a reference 
that can be revisited as new threats arise. 
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Future Directions 
As the research progresses, three directions of future research are being pursued. 
The first is to conduct a second round of interviews with other stakeholders in the acquisition 
process. The second is to evolve an interactive version of the Reference CEM. The third is 
to compare vulnerabilities present in MCE environments with those present in other, 
comparable fields. 
Future Interviews 
The interviews thus far have been with program managers and system engineers 
(the people who “live in” in the MCE environment). As this research proceeds, a future round 
of interviews with MBSE and MCE toolmakers and leaders of enterprise model-centric 
environments is planned. Several of the interviewees expressed an interest in increased 
enterprise-level ownership of MCE environments. Additionally, a few expressed concern 
about the degree of security in MCE toolsets. Thus it is worth talking to such individuals 
about their perspectives on vulnerabilities in MCE environments. 
Interactive Tool 
An interactive version of the CEM, which enables easy sorting and adding 
vulnerabilities, is desired. This would make the method more accessible, similar to how 
NIST’s Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Manufacturing Extension Partnership, 2017a) 
makes the RMF (Ross et al., 2016) more approachable to small manufacturers. Additionally, 
it could serve as a platform for future usability testing of CEM in MCE programs. In future 
research, an interactive demonstration prototype will be generated to synthesize the 
research outcomes and show how these can be used in practice. 
Healthcare Industry Comparison 
There is some indication that program managers may be well served by observing 
fields that are somewhat analogous to defense acquisition in order to derive helpful 
metaphors (Karas, Moore, & Parrott, 2008) or lessons learned (German & Rhodes, 2016).  
The healthcare industry shows promise for such an analogy to cybersecurity in MCE 
environments. The healthcare industry deals with sensitive information, computer 
equipment, and high pressure environments. All of these are present at numerous stages of 
operation. Patient records have to be transferred from one system to another and be 
available to medical practitioners. Researchers need to be able to query systems in order to 
provide improved medical treatment but cannot violate individuals’ privacy. They must do all 
this and more while under constant threat of cyberattack, as recent events have shown 
(Ryckaert, 2018; Woollaston, 2017; Zetter, 2016). 
Engineers and researchers have made significant headway in making medical 
devices more interoperable with one another, particularly when it comes to sharing data 
securely (Goldman, 2014). Increasingly, model-based methods are being used to assess 
and design medical systems (Pajic et al., 2014). As was related in the Discussion section, 
the FDA’s Sentinel Initiative seeks to enable active querying of medical data while 
preserving individual privacy.  
All of these endeavors are strikingly similar to the challenges currently faced in 
defense acquisition. This suggests that there may be benefit in conducting a systematic 
comparison of the two fields. The healthcare industry, along with other fields, will be 
examined for potential metaphors and lessons learned that are applicable to understanding 
vulnerabilities in MCE environments. 
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Conclusions 
Acquisition programs increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating and 
using digital assets throughout the life cycle. Recent advancements support new model-
centric practices, yet uncertainties can lead to model-related vulnerabilities jeopardizing 
program success. Extending recent research (Reid & Rhodes, 2018) on vulnerability 
assessment of model-centric programs to cybersecurity, anticipated results are empirically-
grounded cybersecurity vulnerabilities related to model-centric acquisition programs, and a 
prototype using a CEM reference model with dynamic analytic tools. 
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Abstract 
Cyber security of mission-critical software is a relatively new concern that is difficult 
to measure and hence difficult to incorporate effectively in software development contracts. 
The DoD has typically relied on black-box approaches to software testing. However, cyber 
vulnerabilities, particularly those deliberately injected into systems, are often statistically 
invisible with respect to affordable levels of black-box testing, which implies that they cannot 
be effectively detected using conventional testing techniques. This motivates augmenting 
traditional testing approaches with additional types of test and analysis procedures. This 
paper explores application of automated testing and other automated analysis methods to 
reduce cyber risks. We analyze several types of undesirable software behaviors and identify 
automated methods that could detect them within practical limits on time and computational 
resources. 
Overview: Cyber Testing Challenges 
Failures Are Not Random 
The quality objectives for cyber concerns are seemingly similar to those for software 
meant to operate in uncontested environments, but on closer examination, there is a 
fundamental difference with far-reaching consequences for testing and evaluation. In both 
cases, we wish to minimize the risk of improper software behavior, consistent with the policy 
set in ICD 503 (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008). However, “risk” has 
very different meanings in the two contexts.  
For uncontested environments, failures act like random processes, and an 
appropriate risk concept is a statistical combination of severity of consequences from each 
type of potential mishap weighted by their frequency of occurrence, consistent with the 
formulation in DoD (2012). The ideas of “safety” and “reliability” are based on this point of 
view, which equates risk to the expected loss, damage, or injury when averaged over time. 
The unstated assumption of most work in this camp is that the probability distribution for 
mishaps is stationary, which means that the frequency of occurrence is stable over long 
periods. This approach is reasonably consistent with the properties of failures that are due 
to unintentional events with unpredictable variations, such as equipment wearing out, 
human errors, electronic noise, background radiation, and so on. 




 The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of DoD or its components. 
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In contested environments, failures are not random, and frequency of occurrence 
can vary dramatically depending on external circumstances, driven by the existence of an 
adversary whose deliberate behavior depends on variable conditions, such as the following: 
 Are we at war? 
 How much profit/military advantage/political value would a successful attack 
provide? 
 Are sufficient resources available for successful attack? 
 How much risk of prosecution or counterattack is there? 
In this case, which matches cyber-attacks, game theory provides a better model of 
risk than statistics. The associated underlying assumption is that there is a capable 
adversary who will choose courses of action that maximize damage. Consequences of this 
paradigm shift include the following: 
 Focus of risk management shifts from minimizing expected loss to minimizing 
worst-case loss. 
 Scope of risk management expands from mitigations concerned solely with 
the software to those that address both the software and the adversary. 
 Risk assessment becomes sensitive to surprises due to new adversary 
tactics. 
 Unlikely conditions and rarely traversed paths through the code can no longer 
be ignored. 
Causes and Effects Will Be Hidden 
A consequence of Rice’s theorem is that perfect cyber certification is impossible. 
This theorem is a well-known result in computability theory that says any non-constant 
property of program behavior is undecidable. Non-constant means the property is true for at 
least one program and false for at least one other program, which holds for all software 
security properties of interest. “Undecidable” means there is no systematic method 
(algorithm) that will always produce a correct decision and will always terminate in a finite 
amount of time. This theorem applies to both testing and static analysis of the source code. 
Since any workable certification procedure must fit into a definite schedule, it must 
operate within some reasonably short bounded time, say less than a year. The theorem 
therefore implies that all practical certification procedures produce imperfect decisions: Any 
such procedure must produce some false positives and some false negatives, or fail to 
reach a conclusion for some inputs. 
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Capable adversaries expect defenders to search for vulnerabilities, know that 
detection will be imperfect, and design their attacks to make them difficult to find. Some 
ways to hide are as follows: 
 Small footprint: Design malicious behavior so that it will be triggered in only 
one of a huge number of possible execution conditions. The triggering 
condition can be made statistically invisible very easily because the search 
space has exponential size2 (see examples in Berzins et al., 2015). 
 Fragmentation: Malicious behavior resulting from interaction between widely 
separated parts of the code, such as exception handlers and multiple threads 
with no logical connection. Such non-local interactions are difficult to detect in 
large systems. 
 Delayed manifestation: Corrupt the code or data in ways that will not affect 
behavior until much later, possibly waiting for a statistically invisible external 
trigger. 
 Timing: Information content of behavior is correct, but is delayed sufficiently 
to cause failures. Software that controls physical components is susceptible 
to this hazard. 
 Parasitic effects: Breaking the model of computation so that logically correct 
source code can produce damaging behavior.  
Consequences Are Physical 
Much work on cyber security focuses on information—how to keep it confidential, 
free from corruption, authentic, and so forth. However, risk-based approaches are guided by 
severity of consequences, and relevant consequences are physical. Thus, system context 
must be considered as part of risk management, and if context is expanded far enough, all 
critical software is part of some cyber-physical system and either controls or influences its 
behavior. The following are examples of possible consequences of software faults: 
 Dangerous physical events involving controlled equipment, such as collisions 
between moving vehicles or discharge of weapons 
 Disrupting defensive capabilities of a military platform in a conflict, increasing 
vulnerability to kinetic attack 
 Revealing the location of a military unit or identity of a covert operative, 
exposing them to attack 
 Revealing military plans, enabling adversaries to target weak points and 
increase damage 
 Economic and political analogs of the above 






 cases to test, where b is the number of bits in all input and state variables combined. 
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Threats Can Morph 
The most serious cyber risks are due to corruption of software at runtime. Runtime 
corruption of the executable code can result in unlimited damage at the discretion of the 
adversary. Not only is severity of consequence potentially the worst possible, but also, 
detection of this type of threat is especially challenging because the potentially damaging 
behavior is inserted after certification processes are completed. The destructive payload is 
not present either in the source or in the executable that is analyzed, so there are no 
adverse consequences to detect in the initial uncompromised configuration of the system 
under test.  
Recovering From Mishaps 
The above lines of reasoning imply that software defenses will never be perfect, 
especially for systems of practical size, for which exhaustive analysis is impractically 
expensive both in terms of money and in terms of available time (billions of years may not 
be enough). 
Strategies involving defense in depth can be useful for extending the time that 
systems under cyber-attack can remain operational, but they cannot provide complete 
immunity to attack by a capable adversary. This well-known approach to cyber-defense 
needs to be augmented with self-healing capabilities—so that systems can recover from 
partially damaged states and continue operating despite partially successful cyber-attacks. 
Even better are adaptive immune responses that reconfigure a system damaged by attack 
so that it is no longer vulnerable to a replay of the previously successful attack. The 
objective should be to increase the time and cost of successful attacks to the point where 
they are not affordable by adversaries. 
Some self-healing capabilities are practical at the current state of the art, and 
continued research to improve this approach is recommended. 
You Don’t Know What You Don’t Know 
Adversaries are constantly finding new ways to attack systems. This makes it difficult 
to write development contracts for secure software, because contracts inherently define 
fixed responsibilities for the contractors, but the set of actual threats is incompletely known 
and open-ended. Supporting a rapid repair capability requires agility both in the software 
and in the contracting approach. 
This seemingly unsolvable problem can be addressed by suitable application of 
Open Systems Architecture and Technical Reference Frameworks. Rapid reconfiguration 
can be supported by an architecture that accommodates all needed configurations without 
changing the architecture. In this context, architecture can be considered to consist of the 
aspects of a dynamic system that do not change. Architecture for cyber-resilient systems 
should include standardized structures and requirements for supporting functions related to 
resilience, such as runtime monitoring and self-healing functions. 
As an example, consider the high-risk threat of runtime code compromise. Services 
called out in associated parts of a Technical Reference Framework should include facilities 
for the following: 
 Secure, authenticated distribution of software updates 
 Runtime monitoring of executable code to detect unauthorized changes 
 Restoring corrupted code to an authorized configuration 
 Restoring the execution state to a valid configuration and resuming execution 
with the restored code configuration 
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These services and modules should all conform to a stable standardized interface 
specified in the architecture, so that best-in-class components providing these services can 
be shared across different systems and future technology improvements related to these 
critical issues can be readily incorporated by software module swapping, ideally without 
stopping operation of the system. The example illustrates a vision of how rapid 
reconfiguration capabilities could be specified in a fixed architecture fragment that could be 
called out in fixed and definite development contracts. 
Insider Threats 
Turn-Key Malware 
Malicious insiders may build some types of malware into software before delivery. 
These people are part of the development team and have full access rights to the code. 
Examples of this type of malware include “Easter Eggs,” which are extraneous bits of 
functionality that are typically triggered by some single special input value, often one that is 
extremely unlikely to be encountered as part of a normal workload. Although many known 
instances of Easter Eggs have done little harm, the ability to detect the pattern is a cyber-
testing concern because Easter Eggs can also hide extremely damaging extra capabilities, 
such as enabling unauthorized access or unauthorized modifications to a system.  
Testing Difficulties 
Common testing practices in the DoD rely heavily on black-box testing, in which test 
cases are designed based on the requirements, without knowledge of the structure of 
content of the source code. The method is widely used because it is reasonably good for 
checking that the delivered software has the behavior specified in the requirements, which is 
a primary concern in acceptance testing. It may also be the only viable testing approach if 
the development contract does not include rights to access the source code for the 
developed software. 
Unfortunately, black-box testing is not effective for checking the absence of 
undesired extra functionality, such as deliberately planted cyber vulnerabilities. Since there 
is often only a single test case that could demonstrate the existence of an embedded Easter 
Egg and the number of possible test cases is usually astronomical, the odds of detection by 
black-box testing are practically none (see Berzins et al., 2015, for quanititative details). 
Solutions 
Clear-box testing with respect to the statement coverage criterion can detect Easter 
Eggs in a practical manner that can be readily specified as a development requirement in a 
contract. The statement coverage criterion requires that every statement in the source code 
must have been executed by at least one test case. Relatively low-tech tools that count the 
number of times each statement in the code has been executed can check compliance with 
this requirement; the requirement is met if all of these numbers are greater than zero, which 
can also be checked by a simple piece of software. Many compilers include options for 
measuring statement coverage, for example, the gcov facility in the gcc tool set, which 
directly reports the percentage of source statements that have been covered by a test 
(“Monitoring Statement Coverage,” n.d.). 
Difficulties with this approach include finding test cases that can exercise rare paths 
and handling unreachable sections of the code. Although the general problem of finding test 
cases that trigger particular paths in the code does not have an effectively computable 
solution, experience with fuzz testing shows that constraint solver tools can handle a 
majority of the cases that arise in practice (Cadar et al., 2008). Additional tactics that can be 
useful for exercising rare paths are to seek module-level test cases that reach the 
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statements in question, as opposed to system-level test cases. This provides more direct 
control over the execution state of the module and simplifies the constraints that need to be 
solved to generate the needed test cases, enabling a larger fraction of the cases to be 
solved automatically.  
In some cases, unreachable code as well as extraneous code that does not affect 
the outputs of software services can be identified by using a form of dependency analysis 
known as software slicing (Berzins, 2014). These automated methods can help diagnose 
parts of the code that could not be exercised by test cases. The remaining cases are a small 
fraction of the code and may be few enough to be affordably examined by human analysts. 
Outsider Threats 
Runtime Code Modification 
As noted above, runtime code modification is the most serious cyber risk in any 
system, because its severity of consequences includes the consequences of all other cyber 
risks. From a game-theoretic viewpoint, which focuses on worst-case risk, we expect an 
adversary to inject the most damaging exploit available to them if they chose a runtime code 
modification attack. 
The signature of a runtime code modification vulnerability is not presence of 
inappropriate software behavior, but rather the existence of a possible path for executable 
code (or data that affects code behavior) to be eventually modified without authorization. 
The triggering condition as well as the inappropriate actions in such a path may involve 
interactions that bypass the official interfaces of the system to be certified, and may not be 
present in the high-level models programmers use to design and check their code. For 
example, the triggering event may involve corruption of system memory from a logically 
unrelated function or process. This implies that this type of malicious behavior may be 
completely invisible to black-box testing in the initial uncorrupted state of the software, not 
just statistically invisible. 
Another consequence of this cyber risk is that the critical parts of the code cannot be 
localized within current development approaches, especially in the context of programming 
languages without garbage collection and provisions for memory protection. Any part of the 
software that manipulates pointers can be a potential avenue for attacks that modify code at 
runtime, and these parts are spread throughout most systems. This makes it very difficult to 
focus the most intensive testing and analysis efforts on just the “security critical” parts of the 
system, and greatly increases testing cost for high confidence systems. 
Detection 
Following the principle of defense in depth, we suggest a layered approach to 
detection, coupled with mitigations that combine preventive and remedial measures. This 
section focuses on detection. The following are possible measures: 
 Software update service analysis 
 Architecture conformance checking  
 Memory allocation checking 
 Memory reference checking 
 Runtime monitoring of executable code 
Many current systems include explicit interfaces for upgrading the software to new 
versions or distributing patches. This part of the system is cyber-critical, expected to be a 
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focal point for attack, and should be subjected to the most intense degree of testing and 
analysis possible, at multiple levels.  
 At the requirements and architecture level, check whether the service is 
required to authenticate authority to update the software and check integrity 
of the transmitted code, and whether the methods for doing so are the 
strongest available at the time. The latter review has to be repeated regularly 
to account for future development of improved methods for providing these 
capabilities.  
 At the source code level, do static analysis of the implementations of these 
methods, up to and including constructing/checking mathematical proofs of 
the security properties of the protocols and algorithms used for transmitting 
and installing the software updates. Also check that the source code matches 
the algorithms and protocols that were proved, if the proofs are done based 
on some representation other than the actual source code for the service.  
 At the executable code level, do penetration testing by highly competent red 
teams aimed at these services, and check that the executable code matches 
the source code and is free from extra functions. This last step is needed to 
guard against possible compromise of the compilers, linkers, and loaders 
used to build the software, which could be corrupted to add back doors into 
the executable code they produce, which could be specifically targeted at just 
the implementation of the software update service. Such back doors could 
bypass the authentication and integrity checks that exist in the source code 
and provide unauthorized access to the software update service when 
activated by adversaries. 
Checking conformance to architecture includes checking that interfaces and 
executables do not contain any extra services or interaction paths, beyond those specified in 
the system interfaces. Such extra services could be avenues for execution of malware, and 
extra interactions could be paths for triggering malware or exfiltrating its results. Architecture 
conformance has two levels: checking actual source code interfaces for extra services, and 
checking source code of services that are specified in the architecture for extra interactions, 
such as reading or writing from files, network locations or global variables that are not 
included in the interface specification for the service. This latter check can be done via 
dependency analysis algorithms such as data flow analysis and software slicing (Berzins & 
Dailey, 2009). 
Memory allocation checking consists of checks for references to pointers that have 
not yet been initialized or that point to memory areas that have already been deallocated 
(“dangling pointers”). This is a common problem in programming languages without 
automatic garbage collection, and there exist commercial tools for doing such checking, 
including Insure++ and Valgrind (“Parasoft Insure++,” n.d.; “Valgrind’s Tool Suite,” n.d.). 
Memory reference checking is a runtime check that all pointer references refer to a 
non-null object of the proper type and that all array references are within the range of 
declared array bounds. Compilers of some languages can do this, and for some such as 
Ada, the runtime checks are required except for contexts in which the compiler can prove 
they are unnecessary because violations are impossible. Requiring use of such facilities 
would make it more difficult for adversaries to create exploits that corrupt memory containing 
executable code and critical data. Proof systems such as Spark can check properties such 
as these mostly automatically (“Spark Pro,” n.d.). 
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Runtime monitoring of executable code is an active check at runtime that the 
executable code matches the most recent version that was installed (Berzins, 2014). There 
should be a Technical Reference Framework that specifies a standard service for doing this, 
which can be easily incorporated in the architecture of any mission-critical system. This 
would enable development of standard software implementations of this service that could 
be used in any system conforming to the architecture. These implementations could have 
variants that work with different operating systems and different programming languages. 
Mitigation 
Detection of vulnerabilities and attacks is not sufficient for achieving reliable system 
operation—mitigation and recovery are needed as well. Some mitigations for code 
corruption attacks are as follows: 
 Using pure code segments contained in read-only hardware. This preventive 
measure would make runtime code modification attacks impossible, at the 
expense of specialized hardware and prohibition of automatic installation of 
software updates. This approach is not a new idea—it was used in very early 
systems that had magnetic drums as secondary memory (predating magnetic 
disks). A modern version could use erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EPROMs), which could allow updates but only with human 
intervention via physically exposing the memory chips to UV light to erase 
them and enable them to be reprogrammed. This would make software 
updates less automatic, but could provide two-factor authentication for 
updates and guarantees of absence of change between such updates. This 
mitigation is relatively expensive and cumbersome, but it could provide very 
high levels of runtime code protection to critical applications that really need 
it. 
 Restoration of code from ROM. A lighter-weight version of the above 
mitigation is to require runtime monitoring of the executable code, as 
described in the previous section, together with a facility for restoring the 
code from a backup copy in read-only memory (such as a locked CD ROM), 
restoring a safe execution state, and continuing the operation of the software. 
This solution can be implemented using existing hardware, but would require 
more time to restore operation after a failure. A stronger version of this idea 
would use a backup copy with a different code layout, which would reduce 
the chances that replay of the same attack would succeed again, thereby 
increasing time to next failure.  
 Disabling reflective language capabilities. Some modern programming 
languages, including Java, provide capabilities for runtime inspection and 
modification of interfaces and implementations. Access to such capabilities 
makes an adversary’s job much easier. Development contracts should either 
require the use of a programming language without reflective capabilities, or 
require the developer to demonstrate that those capabilities have been 
removed from the system. 
 Use of programming languages with garbage collection should reduce 
exposure to the threat of code and data corruption. The memory allocation 
and recycling facilities of languages and their supporting systems (compilers, 
runtime libraries, linkers, loaders, etc.) should be intensively checked for 
faults that could lead to memory corruption in applications constructed using 
those languages and systems. 
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Conclusions 
There is no silver bullet when it comes to cyber security, and no such thing as a 
completely secure system. The best practical solutions involve a layered set of defenses 
and mitigations that increase the time and effort it will take an adversary to compromise the 
system and decrease the time to detect a compromise and restore dependable operation. 
An appropriate goal would be to make system compromise prohibitively expensive for most, 
if not all, potential attackers. 
This paper defines a risk concept appropriate for gauging cyber threats, identifies 
cyber risks with greatest risk exposure, and suggests corresponding methods for detection 
and mitigation. In addition to methods that make the systems more difficult to compromise, 
we recommend further investigation of mitigations that address both the system and the 
adversary. This would include stronger methods for authenticating access to systems and 
networks, along with facilities for recording and linking people’s identities to evidence of 
potential wrongdoing that could support deterrence in the forms of legal prosecution of 
individual wrongdoers and determined public action against state-sponsored attacks. 
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Introduction 
BIGBADABOOM-2. That’s the name of a recent cybersecurity breach affecting 5 
million stolen credit card and debit card holders (O’Brien, 2018). Unfortunately, these 
breaches are becoming all too common. At an alarming rate, nation states and malign 
actors are better equipped to conduct cyberattacks than ever. The risk is growing. Some 
adversaries will be able to disrupt critical infrastructure against the United States in a crisis 
short of war (Coates, 2018). To make matters worse, cyber threat actors are more 
threatening and their abilities more sophisticated. While “abilities” are just as important to 
defend against cyberattacks, attitudes are just as vital when it comes to the selection of the 
required learning strategies given their connection to necessary cybersecurity behaviors. 
Unfortunately, the DoD’s current approach for the acquisition community won’t easily fulfill 
the stated and implied security and resilience imperatives anytime soon unless attitudes (a 
critical catalyst) start to change. The learning strategies required that embody it trace back 
to Bloom, Krathwohl, and Harrow—all research leaders in their respective fields. Their works 
speak to the importance of the affective domain (i.e., the way our attitudes affect our 
learning behaviors). This study explores the impact of the DoD’s overall implied 
cybersecurity learning strategy and associated actions taken to date—all intended to 
safeguard the efficacy of the DoD’s weapon systems and supporting infrastructure. Also 
included is a case study discussion to demonstrate the cybersecurity actions taken by one 
particular organization to better prepare themselves for their assigned cybersecurity duties 
despite the DoD’s good intentions. The learning outcome of this case study could serve as a 
forerunner for other DoD acquisition organizations as they consider how to implement a 
robust, effective and sustainable cybersecurity program. The researchers firmly believe that 
the DoD will be hard pressed to achieve the desired gains in security and resilience without 
recognizing that the critical cybersecurity behaviors and concomitant attitudes at the 
individual, team, and organizational levels come first. And, that might come as a shock. 
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Background 
Like any emerging challenge as complex as cybersecurity, organizations will test the 
outer edges of their learning envelopes. To better guide this research pursuit, the authors 
used four specific questions to better isolate these and other learning implementation 
limitations currently found in the DoD’s cybersecurity learning strategy. The answers were 
both informative and instructive: 
1. Have the DoD’s actions (e.g., policy directives, tools, methods, etc.) met 
the stated and implied expectations for protection and resilience in the 
acquisition community?  
 
Not really. Results of the independent assessments of the DoD’s 
cybersecurity reports from the Defense Science Board and the DoD’s testing 
community collectively signaled severe concerns about whether or not the 
DoD can accomplish its core missions and keep its critical assets intact. In 
2015, a RAND Corporation report found that “cybersecurity risk management 
does not adequately capture the impact to operational missions and that 
cybersecurity is mainly added onto systems, not designed in (Snyder et al., 
2015, p. ix).” Rand went on to say that the policies governing cybersecurity 
are better suited for simple, stable, and predictable environments leading to 
significant gaps in cybersecurity management. The consequences could 
include the following: 
o prescriptive solutions for military system cybersecurity that favor 
security controls over more sound system security engineering, 
o emphasis of processes and security controls for information 
technology systems over more tailored military systems solutions, 
o implementation of tactical security controls over more strategic 
mission assurance imperatives, and 
o overreliance on standardized and formalized security control 
compliance as a means to achieve cybersecurity (Snyder et al., 2015, 
p. viii). 
To communicate cybersecurity imperatives, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
regularly updates (about every three weeks) the policies affecting cybersecurity in a 
summary chart called “Build and Operate a Trusted DoDIN” (see Figure 1). Aside from the 
microscope nature of the details, the chart is largely outcome-based only 
(http://iac.dtic.mil/csiac/ia_policychart.html). Many of these high level outcomes exceed the 
security capabilities of the DoD’s current systems capabilities recommended by the DoD 
DIACAP and now Risk Management Framework (RMF) process. Many of the other 
outcomes are either slightly mentioned in current acquisition documents or absent. The 
disconnect is readily apparent. How programs actually capture the DIACAP/RMF processes 
appear to be more compliant dominant and presumably driven by official approval of the 
system instead. These programs also tend to depend on a “cookie cutter” approach where 
they sometimes use a template overlay for security controls. Without thinking more critically 
about every likely eventuality along with leveraging the testing community’s expertise to 
confirm operational objectives beforehand, these same programs face looming cost and 
schedule risks. The OCX program reinforces the repercussions when they do. Raytheon 
fully underestimated the cybersecurity requirements by discounting the impact of COTS and 
free and open source software. It represented one of several factors that contributed to a 
multi-year schedule delay and cost increase estimated to exceed $1 billion (Kendall, 2016). 
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Note. This chart is updated frequently by the DoD CIO. 
Figure 1. Build and Operate a Trusted DoDIN 
What are the metrics and have they been effective?  
The answer is no.  
 Most systems have rudimentary security requirements for implementing 
metrics. They generally include the following: 
o exercising logical access controls with certain frequency, 
o managing software inventories at certain intervals, 
o implementing information security management in accordance 
through prescribed methods, and 
o monitoring/detecting data exfiltration.  
While NIST 800-53 security controls recognize these type of metrics as a 
good start, programs fall short of implementing a dynamic evaluation 
approach that includes testable standards with the proviso that they need to 
evolve as a part of a system’s inherent system security architecture. 
 Most Program Office requirements fall short of testing at levels that mimic 
likely operational conditions and scenarios. Systems designers normally 
concentrate on the threats to and subsequent actions required in the context 
of information exchanges within their system where they believe they could 
be more easily exploited. Alternately (and more effectively), the testing 
community uses external stimuli they expect to see surface in an operational 
environment that could easily (and frequently) exploit security and resilience 
gaps. They don’t treat systems as adiabatic in any way, shape or form. This 
effect is especially evident when high level requirements go beyond basic 
system behaviors (from inside the system to the system’s exchange of 
information requirements). 
- 292 - 
 In an independent assessment conducted by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) with Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014: 
Annual Report to Congress for FY 2016, the DoD’s information security 
program received an uncomplimentary rating (p. 44). From a scale of 1 
(lowest) to 5 (highest), the DoD earned grades on the lower end of the scale 
compared to all federal agencies that earned grades on the higher end, 
ranging from 4 to 5. The DoD’s grades were consistently on the low end:  
o Identify—Level 2 Defined 
o Protect—Level 2 Defined  
o Detect—Level 1 Ad Hoc  
o Respond—Level 2 Defined  
o Recover—Level 2 Defined  
Can these shortcomings be overcome? It requires a change of approach, culture, 
and workforce attitudes.  
Is the DoD headed in the right direction?  
The answer is partly.  
 The DoD has reinforced “cybersecurity as a requirement for all DoD 
programs across the life cycle” (DoD CIO, 2014, p. 155).  
 The DoD has recognized that all systems must manage “risk commensurate 
with the importance of supported missions and the value of potentially 
affected information or assets” (DoD CIO, 2014, p. 2). Moreover, the DoD’s 
cyber strategy emphasizes the need to: 
o not defend every network against all threats;  
o identify, defend, & prioritize most important for mission;  
o be able to operate in degraded & disrupted environments; and  
o use technology & innovation to stay ahead of threat (p. 13). 
 The DoD emphasizes the need for systems to be both secure and resilient. 
Security mechanisms afford a defense against a cyberattack or allow a 
system to maintain operations. Resilience can reset a system, even if the 
cyberattack is not detected or understood (Defense Science Board, 2016), or 
allow it to operate in a degraded mode. Critical cyber components could 
implement resilience for performance of critical functions, regardless of fault 
cause or nature (Defense Science Board, 2013).  
Systems like WIN-T changed their thinking to incorporate threat-based 
engineering and developed multiple threat models. They assumed comprise 
and adopted a continual testing process strategy and cybersecurity that 
became an inherent part of the engineering processes across their systems. 
Cybersecurity was no longer a separate solution.  
More specificity is warranted. The DoD’s high-level policy has many cybersecurity 
elements at the outcome level to guide programs, although noticeable gaps in acquisition 
guidance persist for the effective implementation of key objectives in a meaningful way (i.e., 
how to better respond to realistic conditions that the operational test community will impose). 
The DOT&E annual report dated January 2018 indicated that “despite improvements in 
network defenses, almost every assessment and test demonstrated that DoD network 
defenses still contain exploitable problems that provide cyber adversaries opportunities for 
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access to DoD networks” (p. 318). If the DoD were to compel the acquisition workforce to go 
beyond a “compliance construct” for cybersecurity, more systems might just pass various 
Adversarial Assessments in Operational Test and fulfill Operational Commanders’ mission 
assurance needs. This requires a change of approach, culture, and workforce attitudes.  
What industry best practices should the DoD adopt and why? 
Industry best practices have concentrated their efforts on resilience, trustworthiness, 
and continual testing. Intel, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, and others have boosted their security 
posture by going beyond traditional security activities that focus just on system protection. 
For example,  
 Intel employs a Trusted Execution Technology to ensure their operating 
kernels are of a known trusted state.  
 Google verifies that all servers in their data centers operate from a globally 
distributed trusted image. 
 Microsoft’s evolving security posture continually evaluates threat activities. 
 Netflix conducts cybersecurity testing with the Simian Army in continuous 
mode and digitally stresses their content delivery infrastructure to influence 
responsive systems engineering actions. 
All these companies have adopted a security posture of adaptability and innovative 
thinking in response to impending cyber threats. They don’t think for a second they won’t be 
compromised. Their active measures are also consistent with comments made by the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation FY 2016 Annual Report, where he said, 
“Cybersecurity tests will demonstrate active defense from attacks, measure the 
effectiveness of the cyber defenses, and assess the mission impacts resulting from cyber-
attacks” (Behler, 2018, p. 447). These cybersecurity strategies align with the September 
2016 Defense Science Board report on Cyber Defense Management, which suggested 
“examining the attack data to determine what is working well, what is not, where changes 
need to be made, and where investment is required to better defend against troublesome or 
emerging threats to move beyond a compliance approach towards a more dynamic 
performance evaluation” (p. 11). Will this type of thinking eventually become pervasive in the 
DoD? It requires a change of approach, culture, and workforce attitudes.  
Assumptions 
As with any research study, assumptions generally help characterize the research 
constraints as well as the prevailing environmental domain. For cybersecurity, it’s no 
different. While strikingly provocative, the following assumptions reinforce today’s 
cybersecurity operating envelope: 
 Cybersecurity is a decaying function—static cybersecurity assures a declining 
security posture.  
 NO SYSTEM is without malware—every system has an inherent vulnerability 
just waiting to be exploited. 
 Organizations rely too much on technology for security and don’t sufficiently 
consider the people and process components. 
 The seemingly most secure system often fails to acknowledge that it can be 
affected by a higher-level threat (e.g., any system can be misconfigured). 
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 Cybersecurity policy stands at the outcome level; acquisition guidance and 
implementation below the outcome level is subjective (i.e., outcome level is 
typically characterized as “design for the fight”). 
 Most programs undershoot “adequate security”—many operate under a false 
sense of security until they discover they did not sufficiently manage realistic 
and likely operational risks. 
 The DoD may not be proactive enough to exploit its own systems to 
withstand advanced threats. 
Research Tools Used 
Several tools were ideally suited for this research pursuit. The first, a high-level logic 
model (see Figure 2), would set the flow, narrow the focus, and underpin the researcher’s 
end-in-mind. In the past two decades, its usefulness has also been recognized by others. 
Clarke (2004) used diagramming since they link categories with categories to form a 
substantive theory of action that shows “at a glance if outcomes are out of sync with inputs 
and activities.” They help researchers “make sense of relationships that may not have been 
previously explicit” (Buckley, Waring, 2013). Spaulding and Falco (2013) found they “provide 
linkages between activities and outcomes as well as to serve as a framework for developing 
quality and purposeful activities.” For cybersecurity, there are no perfect solutions. However, 
“living” models like logic models could expose these new truths during a project’s life cycle, 
especially when the operating environment can be so dynamic and ambiguous at the same 
time. 
 
Figure 2. High Level Logic Model That Guided This Research 
Kirkpatrick’s Learning Levels was the second tool selected because “Logic Models 
don’t show why activities are expected to produce outcomes” (Clark, 2004). The Kirkpatrick 
would show why and help verify if the learning stuck long enough to change the way the 
learners operated back on-the-job to be highly effective. The authors were especially 
interested in determining if what a cohort group learned in an objective-driven workshop 
resulted in any behavioral changes back in the workplace. Among the various learning tools 
available, Kirkpatrick’s four levels of learning seemed well suited to help characterize the 
learners’ journey to demonstrate the achievement of their indispensable “critical behaviors.” 
In its simplest form, Figure 3 depicts the Kirkpatrick’s learning levels. 
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Figure 3. Kirkpatrick Learning Levels 
(Kirkpatrick, 2016) 
Incorporating both the Logic and Kirkpatrick Learning tools into a Performance 
Learning Value chain tool would provide a fully embodied visual representation (see Figure 
4). It would also help show the learning dependencies leading to the learning evidence. 
Without the evidence, it would be hard to prove any link(s) to the initial and/or ongoing 
learning investment made by any organization.  
 
Figure 4. Performance Learning Value Chain 
(Adapted from ASTD, 2004, as cited in Elkeles, Phillips, & Phillips, 2017, p. 10) 
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To help build greater cybersecurity knowledge and raise awareness for acquisition 
professionals, DAU conducted a variety of workshops—over 35 in the last three years 
across various DoD components and program offices. During these workshops, the 
following common themes surfaced from the engaging discussions: 
 Current DoD cybersecurity guidance is at the strategic outcome level and 
generally forces program offices to take more time translating these 
outcomes into operation and tactical outputs. 
 Enterprise cyber intelligence and warning signs can be difficult to translate 
into cybersecurity risk for probability and impact to their system because 
cyber threats are so fluid. 
 Cybersecurity threats force program offices to spend more time on something 
that is so dynamic and sometimes difficult to translate their needs based on 
how they might impact their systems today. 
 Risk mitigation strategies aren’t tightly connected to mission assurance 
imperatives in the face of a hostile environment imperatives.  
 Program offices may too quickly acquiesce (and accept higher risk levels) to 
cybersecurity design decisions because of their inability to change in their 
acquisition life cycle stage or to accept the perils of their inherent legacy 
design. 
 Program offices still have to convince their resource sponsors and MDA of 
the needs and consequences to address potential cyber vulnerabilities. 
The three models discussed previously were not used in the cybersecurity 
workshops. However, they set the stage for a more comprehensive case study assessment. 
Case Study  
For most organizations that seek to connect their learning gains in class (level II) with 
objective applications in their workplace afterwards (Level III), the bridge between level II 
and Level III can be a difficult challenge. Without it, what evidence can organizations use to 
confirm that the resources they allocated to Level II learning gains actual paid off? The 
Assistant Auditor General for Financial Management & Comptroller Audits who reports to the 
Naval Audit Agency graciously volunteered to participate in this case study. They wanted to 
ensure their auditors could apply what they learned in what they considered to be a vital 
functional domain—cybersecurity. Figure 5 represents the current instantiation of the Naval 
Audit Service Directorates. Earlier, a couple of their personnel attended DAU’s cybersecurity 
awareness workshops. They left with a very strong feeling that their cohort group needed 
the same experience. Later, and after several subsequent interactions between DAU and 
the Naval Audit directorate’s team leads as well as their leadership, the directorate 
welcomed a way to confirm the critical cybersecurity behaviors expected of them in the 
prosecution of their all audit responsibilities were met. 
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Figure 5. Naval Audit Services Directorate Structure 
The cybersecurity workshop customized for the Naval Audit Services Directorate 
addressed the following learning objectives (i.e., Learning Level II): 
 Determine the effectiveness of security controls in support of risk 
management. 
 Evaluate the performance of security controls in support of organizational 
mission assurance objectives. 
 Justify security control development and implementation in support of 
organization mission assurance objectives. 
 Evaluate security controls at system interfaces and that span system of 
systems.  
 Appraise protection of information assets in context of a threat level for 
protected information assets.  
The learning objectives cut across the five domains that constituted the team’s 
responsibilities (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Domain Participation 
The directorate’s intact teams who attended the workshop also previously committed 
to connecting Level II learning objectives with the Level III critical behaviors. Just as 
importantly, their leadership committed to what Kirkpatrick calls its required drivers (i.e., 
monitor, encourage, reinforce, and reward) to assure their Level III achievements 
(Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 56). Without them, a key feedback mechanism would be missing, and 
accountability opportunities would be lost. 
Results and Findings 
Figure 7 summarizes what 19 respondents had to say about their Level II learning 
levels “before and after” after the workshop. There were noticeable shifts and distinctions 
from this highly interactive and hands on event in each learning category without exceptions. 
Domain 2 had the most significant shift where the respondents no longer needed assistance 
after the workshop. Domains 1 and 2 virtually eliminated their lack of understanding for any 
domain afterwards. 
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Figure 7. Cybersecurity Workshop Results 
The respondents also provided a number of illuminating comments when asked, 
“What initial successes will likely occur as you consistently apply what you learned?” Here’s 
what they had to say: 
 We plan to incorporate all the concepts we learned in future cybersecurity 
audits. 
 Being able to plan and execute an audit using cybersecurity and cyber 
resilience concepts and policies/guidance on a system or process. 
 To be able to initiate an audit in cybersecurity with the training, tools, and 
material provided in confidence. 
 I will more often consider risks concerned with access to any naval systems 
that are applicable to assigned future audits. 
 Also, I plan to work with the audit team to develop potential audit topics that 
involve cybersecurity within the DoN. 
 Be able to identify potential cybersecurity internal control weakness regarding 
people and processes. 
 Cybersecurity attack vulnerability minimized. 
 I will pursue more knowledge in this area to get a better understanding. 
 Agencies will be better prepared to tackle cyber obstacles they may have not 
known existed prior to the audit. 
 I think the senior Navy leadership will start seeing our capabilities and 
request more cybersecurity audits. 
However, the more important aspect surrounding the abilities and attitudes of the 
learners to apply what they learned in the workshop back on-the-job (i.e., Level III) that 
doesn’t atrophy, and what results their learning afforded. Furthermore, what will happen and 
what needs to happen to strengthen the bridge between Level II and Level III? Here are the 
Level III critical behaviors that were jointly developed up front with the team: 
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 Auditor determines control effectiveness and makes audit findings on controls 
for organization evaluation. 
 Auditor evaluates control performance to determine support of organization 
mission objectives and makes audit findings on controls for organization 
evaluation. 
 Auditor justifies control development and implementation to determine 
support of organization mission objectives and makes audit findings on 
controls for organization evaluation. 
 Auditor evaluates security controls in the operational environment to include 
across system of systems and makes audit findings on controls for 
organization evaluation. 
 Auditor appraises protection of information assets in terms of operational 
requirements and organization objectives to make audit findings and 
recommendations. 
 Auditors are able to successfully execute an external cybersecurity audit with 
defendable judgements and findings by reviewing information, work products, 
or systems outputs based on a set of accepted auditing criteria. 
The achievement of these Level III critical behaviors represents the litmus test. 
Through a suitable dose of feedback (i.e., monitor, encourage, reinforce, and reward), Level 
III critical behaviors and Level IV results can be achieved, later. 
Extendability 
The generalizability and extendibility of the claims from this research should be able 
to be prove validity through independent repeatability (Creswell, 2015). The NIST 800-181 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework 
defines tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities of numerous groups throughout the 
Cybersecurity Workforce. Using these workforce tasks, knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes, 
learning objectives, and critical behaviors should be extendable to other workforce groups. 
Measurement issues of study constructs can easily exploit instruments like the Kirkpatrick 
model. However, caution should be taken to avoid use of just a single measure (Lund 
Research Limited, 2012). There is more than one interaction and measurement in any 
research project. Addressing these considerations would reduce the burden of proof for 
validity and broader extendibility. 
Conclusion 
Despite the DoD’s good intentions in their policy declarations, focusing on the 
cybersecurity behavioral changes in the acquisition community is an equally important 
consideration that doesn’t appear to be highly visible. The number of cyber threat actors 
who have the ability to exploit DoD’s systems is growing at a staggering rate, while too many 
people involved in the acquisition community may not have fully embraced (or even 
understand) their role in cybersecurity. It’s vitally important to elevate the acquisition 
community’s knowledge of all cybersecurity risks in order to more carefully plan, decide, and 
act for the inescapable and impending cybersecurity threats. Admittedly, the danger signs 
are very telling, and they’re not all good. No one would argue that cybersecurity is taking 
center stage as our dependency on the internet continues to increase. 
Following a particular organization responsible for auditing the implementation of 
cybersecurity imperatives has been quite informative and has highlighted instrumental 
triggers and influencers that are so central to the achievement of desired learning outcomes. 
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The personnel involved in the case study is still underway. In Part 1 of a two-part research 
project, the authors helped reinforce which critical behaviors the participants had to embody 
to assess mission assurance. Time will tell if it resulted in any expected gains. In the interim, 
the Assistant Auditor General for Financial Management & Comptroller Directorate intends 
to monitor, encourage, reinforce, and reward the behaviors required by their daily duties to 
guide them—and convert shock into action. Part II will address their successes as well as 
any particular challenges they faced through ample objective evidence. 
From a macro viewpoint, what steps should the DoD take now to translate their high-
level outcomes into achievable acquisition behavioral changes? 
 Ensure that programs don’t stop cybersecurity development and testing at the 
interfaces, and instead compel programs to instinctively develop in a real 
world environment. 
 Publish the critical cybersecurity competencies and proficiency levels 
required by all defense acquisition professionals. 
 Recognize that any new policy requires a companion discussion on learning 
behavior implications and compel the services to report annually on their 
actions to address them. 
What steps should YOU take to better prepare for your cybersecurity acquisition 
responsibilities? In many cases, it comes down to personal attitudes. Here are several that 
require more immediacy: 
 Don’t outsource your cybersecurity thinking to someone else. Take time to 
learn the risks and issues. Be prepared for all eventualities. 
 Think critically about cybersecurity. Open your apertures, think beyond 
compliance, and build a more robust cybersecurity posture. 
 Daily exercise the cybersecurity critical behaviors incumbent in your duties 
and hold your colleagues accountable to the same standards.  
 Always assume compromise and set the lowest threshold for trust in all 
system interfaces. Never trust another system, especially if unexpected 
behavior occurs. 
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Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition community is increasingly pursuing 
means to introduce new capabilities to the warfighter as quickly as possible. When facing 
emerging threats, the warfighter cannot wait for a new, critical capability to work its way 
through the rigid and time-consuming traditional acquisition process. In an era of tightening 
federal budgets and increased demand for new technology to help meet mission 
requirements, agencies are searching for ways to deliver critical mission functionality faster 
and with less risk.  
The traditional acquisition planning process, with its numerous maturity milestones 
and decision gates, was designed to reduce risk and field a mature, sustainable capability, 
and is not suitable for obtaining smaller, innovative technologies that may have shortened 
technology life cycles, or for helping users counter emerging threats. The DoD is challenged 
to quickly address urgent operational needs (UONs) that could endanger military personnel 
or lead to mission failure (Wizner, 2013). During the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) promoted and implemented a decision process to shorten 
existing budget planning and procurement cycles, to create rapid acquisition methods to 
equip the warfighter, and to fulfill UONs. However, this process was implemented in an ad 
hoc manner across the Services. Critical review of these rapid methods provided insights 
regarding shortfalls of a shortened process, and revealed a need to mature and formalize a 
rapid process.  
Circumventing the traditional acquisition process to field capability more quickly 
affects requirements, cost, and affordability planning. Therefore, the DoD is challenged to 
generate confident and credible cost estimates where programs may have less definition 
and/or greater uncertainty in a rapid acquisition environment. The military sector strives “to 
be an innovation leader in developing technology to protect troops on and off the battlefield” 
(DoD, 2017). When utilizing rapid methods, the DoD must ensure that it understands the 
total costs of a capability to make informed decisions about the capability and systems being 
acquired. To make effective decisions, it is essential to establish a repeatable process and 
assess initial costs, as well as the potential enduring impact on costs, as solutions move 
from rapid processes into traditional Programs of Record (PoRs). 
Cost estimating plays a critical role in a rapid decision-making process by providing 
decision makers a deeper understanding of cost implications in rapid acquisition 
environments. Embedded in the traditional capability planning process are well-documented 
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and recognized best practices for developing credible cost estimates to support DoD 
decision planning. However, new rapid acquisition approaches, with their short timelines, 
challenge the cost-estimation community. Therefore, the cost community needs to 
understand and mature estimation techniques to adapt and operate effectively when using 
rapid acquisition approaches. The DoD needs to be able to deliver accurate and credible 
cost estimates on rapid acquisitions to make better informed decisions.  
This research provides the acquisition, cost, programmatic, and system engineering 
communities a deeper understanding of the impacts on cost estimating processes and cost 
approaches. This will help the DoD understand key areas where cost estimation should be 
adapted, and areas where there is increased uncertainty. This research focuses on all 
aspects of rapid acquisition to help program offices develop credible and confident cost 
estimates needed to make informed, data-driven decisions. This research will generate key 
insights that programs need to fully understand both near-term and long-term cost 
challenges of a rapid acquisition process compared with capabilities developed and 
acquired using traditional acquisition procedures. Results of this research on maturing cost 
methods in a rapid acquisition environment will improve the ability of program offices to 
estimate the cost of implementing rapid capability in a consistent and repeatable way.  
Understanding the impact that a rapid acquisition process has on generating credible 
cost estimates helps to prove this research proposition and deliver outcomes that are 
impactful for programs and the defense acquisition community. This research will impact 
programs by improving the ability to make informed, data-driven decisions in a rapid 
acquisition environment. It will also benefit the DoD, Joint, and Services’ portfolios at an 
enterprise level, where the research will help cost communities and program leadership 
assess and evaluate cost implications of capabilities acquired when using rapid acquisition 
methods.  
Terminology 
This report uses the following terminology specific to the rapid acquisition landscape:  
 Deliberate planning is the traditional acquisition approach, which is based 
on three principal decision-making processes. Specifically, the DoD uses  
o As the requirement process: Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS)—the formal DoD procedure that 
defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future 
defense programs 
o To deliver a mature capability to an end user: Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS)—an event-based acquisition management process 
governed by milestone reviews and other decision points  
o To allocate resources to satisfy requirements: Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting & Execution Process (PPBE)—a cyclical 
process to determine DoD funding requirements and affordability 
 Rapid acquisition is a non-traditional acquisition approach used to acquire 
and field urgent capability in response to adversarial threats, or to leverage 
new market technologies quickly. 
 Urgent need(s) refer to capability required to remedy shortfalls that could 
endanger military personnel or lead to mission failure, as well as to the DoD’s 
need to leverage emerging and relevant technology to bring innovations to 
the field, and protect troops. Urgent needs may be Service-specific (referred 
- 307 - 
to as UONs), or joint across multiple Services—Joint Urgent Operational 
Needs (JUONs) or Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs).  
 PoR is a term used in this research to describe a program that has approved 
funding across the defense program, achieved through the Program 
Objective Memorandum process, and resulting in an official line in the 
budget. 
 Project is defined as a stand-alone effort outside a PoR (which might 
transition into a PoR); or, alternatively, a project can be a sub-set capability 
within a PoR. 
 Cost estimate is defined as the summation of individual cost elements, using 
established methods and valid data to estimate future costs of a program, 
based on what is known. The cost estimate is continually updated with actual 
data, revised to reflect changes, and analyzed by calculating differences 
between estimated and actual costs (GAO, 2009). 
Background 
The GWOT and Iraqi and Afghanistan wars required changes within the DoD in both 
the requirements and acquisition planning processes to quickly address emerging capability 
shortfalls. The DoD promoted and implemented streamlined decision processes to shorten 
existing budget planning and procurement cycles to under two years. The DoD created and 
implemented policy in an ad hoc manner across the Services to support a top-down push for 
streamlined acquisition, and faster fielding of urgently needed capability. All Services 
established JUON and UON processes to quickly field critically needed capability. 
Consequently, the United States (U.S.) Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reported, “total funding for the fulfillment of urgent needs is at least $76.9 billion from fiscal 
years 2005 through 2010” (GAO, 2010). This included numerous programs of various sizes. 
Some urgent requirements grew into large, complex programs such as Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP), Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Other smaller programs targeted special operations, equipping 
the soldier and fielding emergent technologies. One common element in these programs 
was the practice of rapid acquisition to meet urgent needs and field capability quickly.  
The GAO (2011) criticized the ad hoc and complex processes created by the DoD, 
finding,  
The department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and 
oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by 
warfighters in-theater. Federal internal control standards require detailed 
policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve 
desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. 
Further criticism from the Defense Science Task Force on the DoD fulfillment of 
UONs reinforced the lack of mature, repeatable rapid processes. “The department, as well 
as the acquisition community it depends on, has struggled in their ability to field new 
capabilities in a disciplined, efficient, and effective way” (Defense Science Board Task 
Force, 2009). 
Under the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress formally 
required updates in DoD policy. Interim policy was created in 2012, and by 2015, policy for 
rapid acquisition was recognized in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01H. These updates 
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formalized requirements and acquisition processes for rapid acquisition and fulfilling urgent 
needs. 
The DoD implemented policy based on criticism and lessons learned, but a void 
remained in policy and guidance for creating confident and credible cost estimates in a rapid 
acquisition environment. Ad hoc processes resulting from urgent conditions can lead to 
poorly defined assumptions, failure to consider all costs, inadequate data collection, 
inappropriate estimating methodologies, inadequate assessment of risk and uncertainty, and 
indefensible estimates used in the budget planning process.  
Generating confident and credible cost estimates is difficult when rapid acquisition 
programs have less definition and greater uncertainty than traditional acquisition progams. 
The rapid acquisition process should be robust enough to support decisions based on 
affordability, using mature cost methods grounded in a repeatable process, thereby bringing 
credibility to the estimate and decision planning.  
Several studies have assessed a non-traditional planning process compared to the 
traditional process. Understanding differences between traditional acquisition planning and 
non-traditional methods provides insights into important factors enabling implementation of 
rapid acquisition methods. The following are differences identified in GAO audits and 
Defense Science Task Force recommendations:  
 Traditional planning consists of three core components: (1) requirements 
validation, (2) acquisition planning, and (3) affordability planning required in 
the approval of a new military system. These three processes include 
maturity milestones and decision gates throughout system fielding to deliver a 
99% solution in roughly three to 11 years.  
 Traditional planning encompasses full life-cycle acquisition of a system 
owned by a Service in a formal PoR. This process is scalable for military 
solutions and adaptable to each individual Service. Deliberate planning is well 
documented, formal, and has repeatable processes to define requirements, 
acquisition, and affordability.  
 Non-traditional planning responds to and encourages innovation for quick 
fielding of a capability or system. This approach does not focus on fielding a 
100% solution, which is a critical factor in shortening procurement time. The 
decentralized process reduces the number of requirements and acquisition 
approvals through a shortened decision chain within the Services and Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  
 Non-traditional planning evolved in an ad hoc manner without a well-
documented, repeatable process to address affordability and cost estimation. 
Historically, urgent needs waived affordability requirements during wartime 
operations. 
Recent DoD policy updates define two key parameters for rapid acquisitions. The 
first parameter requires that the system be fielded in 24 months. The second requires that a 
disposition analysis be conducted within the first year of sustainment. The system 
disposition analysis determines (1) termination of the program, (2) sustainment for current 
contingency, or (3) transition to a PoR. This policy update creates a critical decision point for 
re-assessing requirements, acquisition, and affordability of the system. The recommendation 
then follows the steps for validation and approval as defined in JCIDS. This process 
identifies decision gates that form the foundation of a repeatable and defensible decision 
process. Understanding the path a system takes, and decision gates within rapid 
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acquisitions, allows the DoD to better understand and anticipate the total costs of a rapidly 
acquired system.  
Consolidating the acquisition process to make it deliver capability more quickly 
affects requirements, cost, and affordability planning in both the near and long terms. In a 
rapid acquisition environment, acquiring a partial system in the near term might change the 
affordability and sustainment of a complete system in the long term. Recent policy updates 
do not provide detailed guidance on how to identify and assess the cost impacts across an 
accelerated program. 
Rapid Acquisition Landscape 
The research team conducted a comprehensive research of open sources to 
characterize and understand the rapid acquisition culture and community. Literature reviews 
and recent policy updates demonstrate the DoD’s commitment to a rapid acquisition 
process. Recent policy updates and implemented best practices address gaps and shortfalls 
from the audits. However, a gap remains regarding how rapid acquisition processes address 
affordability. The DoD has not provided specific guidance on how to develop cost estimates 
to support rapid acquisitions. Critical to understanding a program’s affordability is a credible 
cost estimate grounded in repeatable processes. Open source literature identified factors 
that affect both near-term and long-term program costs. This research assessed and 
characterized these factors to provide a better understanding of their impact on cost-
estimating methods in a rapid acquisition environment. 
 Rapid acquisition process accepts a less than 100% solution for use in a 
limited definition and/or use case. This creates greater uncertainty around 
near-term cost estimates as well as long-term costs of the full program, 
because the program technical baseline is bounded by the use case and not 
by cost of a fleetwide implementation.  
 The DoD created innovation forums to provide a better understanding of 
technology maturity for science and technology (S&T) and bring innovation to 
DoD programs. However, the new demonstration forums are not specific to a 
Service, program, or capability gap. This DoD process relies on limited seed 
funding by a Service or by the PoR that selects the technology and 
incorporates it into its program. If a PoR chooses to incorporate a showcased 
technology, its decision may affect both near-term and long-term costs 
associated with customizing a commercial solution to meet a specific military 
need, and overcoming additional acquisition barriers, such as funding 
governed by appropriation laws and industry sourcing. 
 Rapidly acquired solutions may be viable in a rapid fielding scenario with 
limited production quantities. However, this drives uncertainty into a program 
by producing impacts on both quantities (expansion from initial plan) and lead 
time in cases of a limited supplier/parts base. These impacts may affect both 
near-term and long-term program cost estimates, as well as the new policy 
fielding constraint of less than 24 months. The DoD has no process in place 
to address gradations of programs deemed viable under a rapid acquisition 
process but not sustainable under a traditional process.  
 Abbreviated testing is typically associated with a rapid acquisition. A 
traditional process requires a complete testing program to demonstrate full 
functionality of a system in the operating environment. The testing phase 
identifies risks that can be addressed prior to full production and fielding of a 
system. To meet urgent fielding requirements, some programs may consider 
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testing in parallel with fielding a system. Then, work-around solutions must be 
found to address issues found during the testing phase that could not be 
handled before fielding. Work-around solutions generate costs and schedule 
impacts to a program using rapid acquisition methods. Therefore, this should 
be taken into consideration, as it impacts total program cost and affordability 
of the system.  
 Rapidly fielded solutions may include combinations of commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) and modified COTS solutions, thus limiting requirements for 
new development and potential platform-integration efforts. In many cases, 
COTS products require additional engineering to integrate with another 
system. Formalizing methods used to estimate rapid acquisitions will ensure 
that these additional integration costs will be accounted for in the cost 
estimating process.  
 Limited deployment of a capability might require only a limited training and 
sustainment approach—one that is aimed at meeting the near-term fielding 
requirement. For example, MRAP is considered a successful program that 
has fielded thousands of vehicles to meet urgent needs, but early deployment 
suffered from the lack of an advance-planning timeline typically found in 
logistics and sustainment areas of a traditional program. MRAP had no 
process to establish common parts or logistic chains to support the vehicles’ 
numerous variants. While the near-term implementation of the vehicle met 
critical warfighter needs, the program did not transition into a PoR because of 
long-term affordability and sustainment issues. 
 Urgent schedule constraints have an impact on acquisition strategy for a 
near-term solution. Acquiring a capability rapidly requires a streamlined 
acquisition process and market sources for the product. Urgent schedule 
constraints might limit acquisition strategies and source to a single vendor to 
meet time constraints of the rapid acquisition. This may affect near-term and 
long-term costs, because the near-term solution may develop a reliance on a 
commercial proprietary system that may not be sustainable under a PoR. A 
traditional acquisition approach includes a mature process for assessing 
competition and sources in the marketplace.  
Role of Cost Estimation 
The open source review of literature did not provide specific guidance on DoD policy 
or processes for conducting cost estimates in a rapid acquisition environment. No open 
source documents described if or how any review of cost estimates should be conducted for 
UONs and rapid acquisition. Furthermore, the 2016 policy updates do not contain specific 
guidance on how rapid acquisitions across the Services and joint programs should address 
affordability. Yet, the GAO recognizes that cost estimating is a critical part of project 
formulation and execution.  
Best practice processes for developing cost estimates are defined in the 2009 
publication GAO Cost Estimating Guide: Best Practice for Developing and Managing Capital 
Program Costs to ensure proper stewardship of public funds, employ effective management 
practices, and provide reliable cost information to government officials and decision makers. 
This GAO (2009) guide provides processes, standards, and procedures for developing, 
implementing, and evaluating cost estimates for use across the federal government. 
The GAO process represents a repeatable method that results in high-quality, 
comprehensive, and credible estimates. Twelve distinct steps are organized into four 
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evolutionary phases for developing a cost estimate. The GAO observed that, when an 
agency did not incorporate all 12 steps, its estimates were unreliable. Furthermore, when an 
agency lacked an overall comprehensive process, its ability to create credible cost estimates 
was impaired. Therefore, the GAO recommends that each step be followed to ensure that a 
quality estimate is used when making decisions. The GAO describes four phases and the 
corresponding steps included in each phase (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. GAO Cost Assessment 12-Step Process 
(GAO, 2009) 
The GAO (2009) presents the diagram in Figure 1 to illustrate how the phases and 
steps are related. The GAO emphasizes that the fundamental scarcity of resources and 
growing budget demands make it imperative that government acquisition programs deliver 
as planned, “because every dollar spent on one program will mean one less available dollar 
to fund other efforts” (GAO, 2009). 
The rapid acquisition process accepts a less than 100% solution in order to provide 
capability in a shortened timeline. Consolidating a traditional process to deliver capability 
more quickly affects requirements, cost, and affordability planning in both the near and long 
term, and thus requires a repeatable cost estimating process that provides reliable cost 
information to government officials and decision makers operating in a rapid environment. 
The GAO understands that “an estimate that meets all these steps may be of little use or 
may be overcome by events if it is not ready when needed. Timeliness is just as important 
as quality. In fact, the quality of a cost estimate may be hampered if the time to develop it is 
compressed” (GAO, 2009). 
Relying on a standard process that emphasizes pinning down the technical scope of 
work, communicating the basis on which the estimate is built, identifying the quality of data, 
determining the level of risk, and thoroughly documenting the effort should result in cost 
estimates that are defensible, consistent, and trustworthy. In a rapid acquisition 
environment, it is important to have a credible cost-estimating process to ensure that limited 
resources are allocated effectively to meet the warfighters’ need (GAO, 2009). 
In the literature review and findings of this research, the research team identified 
several key cost processes used in rapid acquisition environments that deviate from the 
traditional process. These differences, reflected in the case study research, provided the 
foundation for recommendations to mature and improve cost estimation methods and 
processes in a rapid acquisition environment. From these insights and recommendations, 
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the research team created guidance that offers the acquisition, cost, and programmatic 
communities a deeper understanding of the cost implications of rapid acquisition for service 
programs and the DoD enterprise. 
Research Methodology 
This research used a case study approach to characterize and classify findings on 
cost methods employed in rapid acquisition environments, and compared these 
characterizations with cost processes used in traditional processes, as defined in the GAO 
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO, 2009), through a formal case study research 
design. 
Fundamental to case study research is its design. It is a linear and iterative process 
that requires planning to conduct valid and thorough research. To model the case study 
research, the research team employed research and design methods described in “Case 
Study Research Design and Methods” by Robert K. Yin (2014). Yin’s methods provide 
necessary rigor by capitalizing on the strengths and compensating for limitations of case 
study research. Yin provides strategies and methods that the team used to construct and 
conduct this case study research.  
Characterization of the problem, and findings from literature reviews, raised 
questions about the credibility of cost estimation methods in a rapid acquisition environment. 
An examination of the rapid acquisition community reinforced the relevance and importance 
of examining “how” cost estimates are conducted and “what” is different in a rapid 
acquisition environment compared to a traditional one. Key research questions relevant to 
rapid acquisition are as follows: 
 What are the overarching factors and characteristics that affect cost 
processes and methods? 
 What are the key programmatic and technical differences compared to a 
PoR? 
 What are the impacts on cost approaches and processes? 
Research questions help to form the hypothesis and boundaries of the research. The 
research team developed a hypothesis focused on factors that affect cost estimation of a 
rapid acquisition. Effects of these factors depend on solution maturity, type of program, type 
of system, and size of system acquired through rapid methods. The hypothesis also 
considers processes surrounding rapid acquisition, and characteristics like number of 
resources, types of resources, and variations from the traditional approach. The research 
hypothesis is as follows:  
Cost estimates for rapid acquisition projects will improve in reliability and 
credibility by using a proven and repeatable approach specific to the rapid 
acquisition environment.  
The research team collected and examined relevant evidence from case studies to 
better understand and support the research hypothesis. The collected data and information 
provided insight into how costing methods used in rapid acquisition cost estimating differ 
from methods used in traditional processes and PoRs.  
Pre-screening of case study candidates was conducted to provide further insight into 
the rapid acquisition community and identify case study candidates. Interviews with 35 
subject matter experts (SMEs) across 25 programs helped the research team characterize 
rapid acquisition in the DoD, and identified future opportunities for validating the research 
outcome. Additionally, the research team used data obtained during the pre-screening 
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phase to refine their characterization of rapid acquisition environments and address these 
findings during the data-collection phase.  
Seven case studies were conducted using an established case study protocol and 
framework for collecting data. Four of the case studies were conducted using a detailed 
questionnaire and interview. Three of the case studies were conducted using a high-level 
questionnaire and response. Cases varied from responses to urgent cyber threats to PoR 
technology insertion of hardware and software solutions through rapid acquisition methods. 
Program managers, engineers, and cost analysts participated in the case studies.  
As part of the interview process, the research team input developed a data-collection 
questionnaire for analysis. The data-collection questionnaire needed to address and collect 
data on all steps in the GAO process. Each question was assessed and mapped either to a 
single step or to multiple steps. Some questions addressed all steps in the GAO process. 
Each question was also assessed for the type of data being collected. Almost all data 
collected was “qualitative” or “open-ended.” Key areas on the data collection questionnaire 
included the following: 
1. What overarching factors do you think most affect rapid acquisition costing? 
2. What are the key programmatic and technical differences in a rapid 
acquisition (e.g., testing, training, documentation, maintenance, etc.)? 
3. How is a traditional cost estimating process changed to adapt to a rapid 
acquisition environment? 
4. What are the main rapid acquisition cost estimating challenges? 
5. What rapid acquisition cost estimating process recommendations would you 
suggest? 
To analyze qualitative data, the research team assigned an identifier to information 
collected during an interview. They recorded data from the interviews in a Microsoft Word 
file, then grouped it by question. They also assigned codes to information collected against 
a step in the GAO process and used additional codes to identify challenges and 
recommendations for a rapid acquisition environment. Once they had coded all data against 
the 12 steps, the research team consolidated and grouped the findings by step. Through 
discussion and consensus on the findings throughout the analysis process, the research 
team identified themes, patterns, and trends in the data. Further analysis triangulated the 
findings with insights from literature and pre-screening interviews.  
The research team used a multilevel review process to validate results. One level 
involved reaching out to 25 SMEs representing a wide variety of rapid acquisition programs, 
approaches, and experiences. The research team asked these SMEs to review key findings 
and recommendations, and provide feedback on each key finding, stating whether they 
agreed, disagreed, or had recommended changes. Nine of the 25 SMEs provided validation 
feedback. For the second level of validation, the research team used detailed SME reviews. 
Four SMEs participated in a detailed review and discussion session, and provided 
comprehensive feedback on the full set of results. The research team incorporated feedback 
received from all SMEs into the final set of findings and recommendations. 
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Results 
The research team analyzed qualitative data collected from open source materials, 
ancillary interviews, high-level case studies, and detailed case studies. Through an 
assessment of this information, they identified themes, patterns, and trends which they 
organized by “findings” and “recommendations.” They mapped and coded each finding and 
recommendation to one of the 12 steps in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide 
(GAO, 2009). The GAO’s 12 steps are recognized as best practices by the cost estimating 
community, and served as the overarching theoretical framework for the research. The 
research team identified key findings and recommendations to highlight results with the 
greatest impact and importance.  
The research team identified several rapid acquisition characteristics that impact cost 
methods, and provide context in which recommendations are made. These characteristics 
include the following: 
 Rapid acquisition emphasizes delivery of a capability quickly, which causes 
very short acquisition timelines. 
 To achieve these shortened timelines, rapid programs operate at a fast pace, 
and have a great concurrency of efforts. 
 Schedule is the top priority; cost and capability are flexible to support desired 
schedule. 
 There are many rapid acquisition approaches that vary in solution maturity, 
size, type, and timeline, as well as acquisition strategy. 
Rapid acquisition, with its compressed timelines, pose unique challenges to the cost 
estimating process. Specific challenges identified during the findings assessment are shown 
in Figure 2. The research team made recommendations in this report to specifically address 
these challenges, while considering the constraints of rapid environments. 
 
Figure 2. Cost Estimating Challenges in a Rapid Environment 
The research team identified, organized, and aggregated key results to highlight the 
most important findings and recommendations among detailed results. Six major themes 
emerged: 
1. cost estimating process 
2. cost analyst 
3. documentation 
4. uncertainty/risk 
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5. trade-offs 
6. scope/baseline 
Overall, the research team identified 10 key findings and 15 key recommendations 
across these six major themes. Key findings and recommendations maintained the mapping 
to the GAO 12-step process, and mappings are shown in parentheses following each result. 
In some cases, the result is mapped to “All Steps” as the result applies across the entire 12-
step process. The team selected key recommendations to specifically address the most 
important challenges to the cost estimating process in a rapid environment, while also 
considering constraints imposed by rapid environments. 
Theme: Cost Estimating Process 




Theme: Cost Analyst 
Key Findings:  
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Theme: Scope/Baseline 




Overall, Step 8 had the greatest number of key recommendations, followed by Step 
3 and “All Steps.” Although Step 2 and Step 3 had more detailed findings (as shown in 
Figure 3), the most important recommendations are in Step 8, Step 3, and those that apply 
across “All Steps.” These steps focus on the importance of defining the program’s 
characteristics, conducting a sensitivity analysis of the cost estimate, following the overall 
GAO 12-step process at an appropriate level for program maturity and available time to 
develop the estimate, and involving cost analysts early to develop the cost estimate.  
  
Figure 3. Numbers of Key Recommendations by GAO Step 
In summary, the research team conducted case studies, organized the information 
they collected, and analyzed it for themes, patterns, and trends. They aligned results with 
the GAO’s 12-step cost estimating process which represented a theoretical framework for 
analysis. Key results yielded 10 findings and 15 recommendations. Results were most 
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numerous in Steps 2 and 3, although all 12 steps had some findings and recommendations. 
Figure 4 shows a summary of key recommendations mapped against the GAO’s 12-step 
cost estimating process. Although Step 2 and Step 3 had the greatest number of detailed 
results, the most important recommendations are in Step 8, Step 3, and those that apply 
across “All Steps.” These steps focus on the importance of defining the program’s 
characteristics, conducting a sensitivity analysis of the cost estimate, following the overall 
GAO 12-step process at an appropriate level for program maturity and available time to 
develop the estimate, and involving cost analysts early to develop the cost estimate. 
 
Figure 4. Summary of Key Recommendations 
Recommendations can be easily applied, are flexible, and can accommodate a 
variety of rapid timelines and approaches. Some factors to consider when applying the 
recommendations include: rapid acquisition approach, size of program (in dollars), new 
program start versus an established program, timeline, solution maturity, and solution 
complexity. The research team aligned its recommendations with the GAO’s best practices 
to establish credibility and accommodate ease of use. Recommendations allowed flexibility 
in implementation to ensure broad applicability across a variety of rapid acquisition methods. 
Summary 
Agencies are increasingly pursuing means to introduce new technology and 
capabilities as quickly as possible to counter emerging threats. For critical capabilities, 
warfighters cannot wait for new technology or capability to work its way through a rigid and 
time-consuming acquisition process. Agencies are using rapid acquisition methods to help 
achieve these goals. Rapid acquisition approaches have challenged the acquisition 
community’s ability to generate credible cost estimates. Ad-hoc and disparate processes 
have been used over the past decade, leading to poorly defined assumptions, inadequate 
data collection, inappropriate estimating methodologies, and inadequate assessments of 
risk and uncertainty. 
- 319 - 
This research set out to advance the capabilities of the acquisition and cost 
communities by maturing cost analysis aspects of rapid acquisition processes, and 
developing a proven and repeatable approach to generating accurate and credible cost 
estimates. The research team developed guidance to aid the cost, acquisition, and system-
engineering communities who face unique challenges within rapid acquisition environments. 
This guidance includes findings that characterize these environments and recommendations 
for developing credible cost estimates, given the constraints of rapid acquisition 
requirements.  
The research team performed multiple activities during the development of guidance 
for cost estimating communities. They performed a comprehensive literature and landscape 
review, and conducted an assessment and detailed characterization of the rapid acquisition 
environment. Qualitative data-collection methods included interviews with 35 SMEs and 
seven case studies representing a broad range of programs, solution types, and rapid 
acquisition approaches. The research team compiled and analyzed the qualitative data for 
patterns and trends, and used the GAO’s cost estimating best practices to develop 10 key 
findings and 15 key recommendations. By mapping their findings and recommendations to 
the GAO’s 12 steps, the team ensured that their recommendations could be easily applied 
to a variety of rapid timelines and approaches. Finally, the research team identified key 
findings and recommendations to highlight the most important results. 
This guidance describes common characteristics of rapid acquisition environments, 
and unique challenges faced by cost, acquisition, and system-engineering communities 
operating within rapid acquisition–compressed timelines. It recognizes that there are many 
rapid acquisition approaches that vary in solution maturity, size, type, timeline, and 
acquisition strategy and presents specific characteristics that impact cost methods in rapid 
environments. These include emphasis on quick delivery of capability, short acquisition 
timelines, fast-paced environments with a high degree of concurrency of efforts, and the 
need for cost and capability trade-offs to meet schedule.  
This guidance provides an easily usable and adaptable set of findings and 
recommendations aimed at strengthening the ability of the cost and acquisition communities 
to produce credible cost estimates for capabilities that require rapid acquisition methods. 
The recommendations guide program offices that are implementing rapid acquisitions to 
help mature their cost estimating processes and align them with best practices; decrease 
the variance seen today across rapid acquisition cost estimating processes; and help the 
cost community establish repeatable, proven processes for operating in rapid environments. 
The recommendations are linked to the GAO cost estimating best practices that, when 
implemented, help ensure that credible, reliable, and confident cost estimates are 
delivered—even within the constraints of rapid acquisition timelines. Ultimately, a credible 
cost estimate helps improve a program office’s ability to make better informed, data driven 
decisions (at the program and portfolio levels). 
- 320 - 
Recommendations 
The research team developed several recommendations for cost analysts developing 
cost estimates in a rapid environment. These recommendations specifically address the 
challenges they face, and consider the constraints imposed by a fast-paced rapid acquisition 
environment. Recommendations include the following:  
 Apply the GAO 12-step process, even if it is applied at a high-level. 
There are multiple levels of depth at which each step can be applied. The 
rapid acquisition approach, solution maturity level, and timeline will constrain 
the depth to which each step can be applied in a given situation. Research 
results indicate that every step can be applied at some level in a rapid 
environment. Including all steps will ensure that the full spectrum of best 
practices is applied. 
 Use trained cost analysts and engage them early on. The research 
revealed that many of the initial estimates were not developed by trained cost 
analysts. Although well-intentioned and limited by time, the estimates lacked 
best practices that a trained cost analyst would have applied. Initial estimates 
are often the most important in establishing budgets and baselines, so, 
incorporating cost analysis best practices upfront is critical. 
 Develop cost estimate ranges to reflect uncertainty and risk in rapid 
acquisitions. Rapid acquisitions often have greater uncertainty and risk than 
traditional acquisition programs. Much less may be known about the solution 
and implementation. In rapid acquisitions, it is important that uncertainty and 
risk be reflected in a range estimate, not a single point estimate. 
 Know cost drivers and trade-offs. Rapid environments are fast-paced. 
Schedule is top priority, and cost and capability trades are often required. 
Knowing the critical trades that may be required upfront, and key cost drivers 
in the estimate, help ensure that options can be examined often, quickly, and 
effectively. 
 Understand and reflect abbreviated acquisition and technical efforts. 
There are adjustments made to efforts in the interest of faster delivery to the 
field. Integration, testing, documentation, and training efforts may be reduced 
compared to traditional acquisition efforts. The cost estimator needs to 
understand which efforts may be reduced, reflect these reductions in the 
estimate, and allow for additional efforts that may be moved to the 
transitioning to a PoR later. 
 Document, but be light and flexible. Documentation is not a top priority in 
rapid acquisitions, and there is minimal time in a rapid environment. 
Research findings uncovered very limited documentation or records of key 
scope and GR&As. The intent of this recommendation is not to impose an 
unreasonable burden in a constrained environment, but to reinforce the need 
for flexible media to document the most important features related to the cost 
estimate to establish credibility and traceability. 
Recommendations can be easily applied, and are flexible enough to accommodate a 
variety of rapid timelines and approaches. Some factors to consider when applying these 
recommendations include: rapid acquisition approach, size of program (in dollars), new 
program start versus an established program, timeline, solution maturity, and solution 
complexity. These recommendations are aligned to established best practices, yet allow 
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flexibility in implementation to accommodate ease-of-use and ensure broad applicability 
across a variety of rapid acquisition methods. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes a software analysis application, the Set-Based Design 
Evaluation Tool (SET), which supports an innovative accelerated acquisition methodology 
for rapidly informing prototyping investments across the Navy and Marine Corps. The tactics 
and technology exploration and experimentation (TnTE2) method is fostering innovation and 
is used to quickly respond to high-priority urgent or emerging operational needs. This 
methodology brings together operational and technical teams of warfighters and engineers, 
leveraging aspects of a systems engineering methodology called Set-Based Design (SBD) 
to rapidly assess emerging technologies and engineering innovations against a specific 
capability-based framework. The basis of this practice is rooted in the SBD systems 
engineering construct to enable data-based decision-making. The SET software automates 
the analysis by coding the configuration evaluation portion of SBD into a user-friendly 
application to significantly increase the speed of analysis, reduce the chance of data input 
error, and standardize the reporting. Specifically, SET provides a streamlined and 
systematic way to 
 Create a Capability Concept Wheel 
 Quickly process extremely large data sets (trillions) 
 Integrate and process/filter data 
 Produce concise visuals of data relationships and solution alternatives 
 Provide reports of analysis results 
Its demonstrated benefits include enabling users to understand and rapidly assess 
interdependencies between requirements, components, and variables of large and complex 
data sets; providing a means for decision-makers to explore the tradespace and perform 
cost versus capability trade-offs; and giving leaders an automated tool to maintain and 
manage evolving requirements. 
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Introduction 
In today’s world, new technological breakthroughs seem to occur daily. SpaceX 
successfully launches the heaviest rocket in history into space, and then precisely lands its 
two booster rockets on their designated landing pads. Robots from Boston Dynamics 
effortlessly scramble over rough terrain with perfect balance, and easily open closed doors 
and walk through. Medical technologists around the world print human hearts, kidneys, and 
livers in the race to produce the first viable 3-D printed organ that can be implanted in the 
bodies of people on long organ donor lists. Each of us read about or watch these events 
(often in real time) on small screens on phones in our hands, or sometimes on even smaller 
screens on our watches. Even those of us who work in technical fields cannot help but be 
awed at the technological innovation that seems to be exploding around us.  
In this dynamic atmosphere, anyone paying attention would find it difficult to believe 
there is only one technological answer out there for any given technical problem. Instead, 
when faced with such a problem, we would expect to be able to choose from a plethora of 
technology solutions—some of which we likely didn’t even know existed until we began to 
fully analyze our problem and start our solution search in earnest. But with this wealth of 
technological possibilities comes a challenge: How do we quickly and effectively evaluate, 
compare, and choose the “right” solution from a large pool of varying potential solutions 
without spending excess time and money on the search?  
The DoD is facing this challenge as it works to maintain our technological edge over 
adversaries who are rapidly catching up. While it is crucial that we continuously explore new 
technologies (and enhance older ones where feasible) as rapidly as possible, there is not 
sufficient time, funding, or personnel for the DoD and Services to pursue every technological 
idea that has promise, raising the questions: Which technologies do we invest in, and how 
can we get them in the hands of the warfighter as soon as possible? Which capabilities are 
the most important to satisfy? 
Defense leadership views rapid concept exploration and prototyping, the “fail 
fast/learn fast” mindset, as key to meeting this challenge. In response, the U.S. Navy is 
implementing an innovative accelerated acquisition methodology to rapidly inform 
prototyping investments across the Navy and Marine Corps. The tactics and technology 
exploration and experimentation (TnTE2) method is fostering innovation and is used to 
quickly respond to high-priority urgent or emerging operational needs. This new 
methodology brings together operational and technical teams of warfighters and engineers 
leveraging aspects of a systems engineering methodology called Set-Based Design (SBD) 
to rapidly assess emerging technologies and engineering innovations against a specific 
capability-based framework. The methodology expands the tradespace to assess a much 
larger range of options. The process eliminates options only when they are proven infeasible 
based on objective quality evidence (OQE), and delays making critical constraining 
decisions until after the requirements and the solution options are better understood.  
Crucial to the success of this method is the ability to quickly and effectively perform 
complex data analysis on extremely large data sets and then translate the results into 
formats (including visualizations) that decision-makers can quickly interpret to choose the 
most feasible solutions to further explore for a specific problem. The information analyzed 
includes “the ilities,” such as adaptability, durability, interoperability, portability, scalability, 
supportability, and stability, among other non-functional requirements, to assess the 
operational burden of a specific solution. Decision-makers often have to weigh technical 
capability against critical parameters such as performance, maturity, cost, schedule, 
development time, and risk, all of which, when combined and compared, create millions of 
options in different sets of permutations. Since no commercial or government off-the-shelf 
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tool currently exists that can quickly fuse, analyze, and display all the required data to 
support the decision-making process, the engineers and data scientists at the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC PCD) developed a new software application 
tailored for complex data analysis. This new tool lends itself to both the rapid prototyping 
process and naval system acquisition. The Set-Based Design Evaluation Tool (SET) is a 
desktop software application that can be run on any computer with a Windows operating 
system. Currently in its beta phase of development, the SET is evolving through hands-on 
use by the technical and operational community. Through this user operational system 
evaluation context, SET is becoming more capable and robust and is already successfully 
being used to support the rapid prototyping process, including the following: 
 Problem definition  
 Capability concept generation 
 Fleet valuation exercises 
 Data analysis from demonstration and experimentation events of individual 
technologies 
SET is designed on the backbone of the SBD engineering methodology, and thus 
helps ensure a sufficient degree of engineering rigor is applied in the rapid prototyping 
process—something that is often missing in rapid prototyping efforts. The tool organizes and 
analyzes the data to help produce and document OQE that is traceable to warfighter 
missions, scenarios and tasks, and helps define requirements. 
This paper describes the history of SET, its current scope of capability (with a recent 
use case), and what SET will look like in the future as it evolves in capability. 
Historical Evolution of SET 
In 2014, NSWC PCD’s Innovation Cell (iCell) proposed bringing U.S. sea mining into 
the 21st century by prototyping and demonstrating a modular “smart” mine suite, which 
would: (1) include communications, command and control, sensors, and both kinetic and 
non-kinetic effector nodes; (2) launch from unmanned surface and undersea vehicles; and 
(3) be able to be pre-positioned in international waters to persistently influence the 
adversary at a time/place of our choosing. The proposed iCell concept gained early DoD 
and Navy leadership support, and when U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) released a Joint 
Emergent Operational Needs Statement (JEONS) in 2015 seeking an asymmetric capability 
to address the threat of contested environments, PACOM and then-Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E), 
Dr. John Burrow, felt that the smart mine concept could potentially offer a solution. Burrow 
tasked NSWC PCD to lead a cross-Naval Research and Development Establishment 
(NR&DE) Smart Mine Initiative (SMI) to explore innovative concepts and share technologies 
which could be integrated to meet the vision of a smart mine for the JEONS. 
At the time of the release of the JEONS, the DASN was also exploring implementing 
the innovative SBD systems engineering methodology across the Navy R&D warfare 
centers to change the paradigm of Navy system design. The SBD methodology, which has 
been used successfully for years in the automotive industry by Toyota, first emerged for 
potential use in Navy ship design in 2008 when Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan, then-
Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, issued a memo that expressed the need 
for evolving models and analysis tools to be compatible with, among other things, SBD 
(Singer, Doerry, & Buckley, 2009). An instantiation of the SBD methodology was 
successfully used by the U.S. Marine Corps in 2013 in concept exploration for an affordable, 
survivable, high water speed Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to replace the cancelled 
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Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV; Burrow et al., 2014). The first Navy instantiation of the 
SBD methodology was used in 2014 to develop preliminary designs for the Navy Ship to 
Shore Connector (SSC; Mebane et al., 2011), a new ship to replace the Landing Craft, Air 
Cushion (LCAC). The DASN RDT&E thought the SMI effort was a good opportunity to utilize 
the SBD methodology at the beginning of development of a new Navy capability to be 
rapidly prototyped to meet an urgent warfighter need. In 2016, NSWC PCD and its cross-
warfare center SMI team began to incorporate aspects of SBD methodologies into a six-
month analysis of the smart mine capability tradespace. The goal was to identify feasible 
configurations for potential prototyping. 
In simple terms, SBD is a methodology that allows designers to fully explore a design 
tradespace, evaluating very large numbers of design configurations early in the design 
process to quickly eliminate designs which are not feasible based on OQE so that the most 
promising ideas can be modeled or prototyped to determine viability prior to choosing a final 
design. In its most basic form, SBD is design discovery by way of elimination. The delay in 
final design choice until superior OQE data is gathered results in better understanding of the 
requirements, more optimal designs, lower risk, lower cost, and increased stakeholder 
interaction. Using this design methodology, engineers are not selecting the best solution so 
much as they are eliminating the worst. It allows for convergence on a solution set that 
increases understanding of design decision impacts. 
SBD is a significant paradigm shift from the Navy’s traditional design methodology, 
which follows a classic design path: (1) Converge as quickly as possible on a solution (a 
single “point” in the identified solution space) that has acceptable risk and fits within the 
limitations of either budget or available time, or both; then (2) rapidly and incrementally 
develop and evolve that solution until it meets the requirements and can be fielded to the 
warfighter. This can be an effective approach if the optimal solution is selected at the start 
(highly unlikely). Choosing that optimal solution is challenging, however, especially when the 
requirements are relatively immature and not well understood (a common acquisition 
problem), or when the design incorporates technologies that don’t perform as expected 
(another common acquisition problem). What happens when the solution selected proves to 
be less than optimal and issues arise? The process, which planned and funded solely for 
success, remains locked on that “point-based design” and the program manager has to 
spend extra time, effort, and funding to modify the design until it meets the (potentially 
immature, and more likely ill-conceived) requirements.  
SBD takes a very different approach. As noted previously, instead of quickly 
converging on a single point based design solution, SBD expands the tradespace to assess 
a much larger range of options that includes cross domain intersections. It delays making 
critical decisions until later in the process when both the range of requirements and the 
potential solution options are better understood through OQE, data analysis, modeling and 
simulation (M&S), and rapid prototyping.  
A good analogy for the value of SBD can be found in the story of those infamous 
builders “The Three Little Pigs,” who classically used a point-based design approach to 
design a shelter to protect themselves from the Big Bad Wolf. Under their point-based 
design approach, they generated hard and fast requirements too early with incomplete 
knowledge of the problem, resulting in incorrect assumptions, such as the structure had to 
provide shelter, it had to stand up to strong wind, and it had to hold at least one pig. When 
they began looking for solutions to meet their requirements, they constrained their trade 
space to the design options they were familiar with rather than expanding the space to look 
for more innovative options. For example, the type of shelter they quickly settled on was a 
building (expanded trade space options may have included a tree house or a cave or an 
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underground home or a wolf-free island that needed no shelter). They chose materials they 
were most familiar with, such as straw, sticks, and bricks. An expanded tradespace may 
have included glass and metal. They then proceeded down three independent paths and 
conducted their trade studies in stovepipes. Their studies for materials, floor plan, roof pitch, 
and so forth, were all conducted independently with no cross-domain intersection 
considerations. No one understood the core required capability (the critical design factor), 
which was not maintaining security of the pigs as much as wind resistance. As a result, the 
first design, the straw house (chosen because it met the basic requirements and appeared 
to be cost effective), failed integration and operational testing when the wolf came knocking. 
They then had to redesign the straw house for a better (but not fully) understood 
requirement for wind. Under their point-based design approach, it took multiple iterations—
each with an associated cost and schedule—before they gained enough knowledge to 
inform the final design and realize a brick house would work. Their point designs became 
hindsight engineering. And with a dangerous enemy like the wolf, they could ill afford these 
high-risk return trips to the materials pile to get it right.  
Under the SBD approach, the pigs would have designed all three houses 
concurrently, and then used field and lab testing, low-efficacy models, and simulation 
techniques to eliminate poor design configurations prior to committing resources for building 
the final house. They would have made design decisions based on OQE, and they would 
have had a better understanding of how to meet the now fully understood requirements. 
Bottom line: If they had used the SBD approach, they could have saved time and money 
and all lived out their lives safely and comfortably in brick homes (or maybe even in a cool 
cave or on a wolf-free tropical island). 
When the wolf is at the door, SBD can show that not all feasible designs (those that 
look good on paper) are viable (actually work), which allows leadership an opportunity to 
make important decisions and understand their impact before the house is built. The SBD 
engineering effort has a cost and schedule that is front loaded. It may not be quicker getting 
started; however, the savings in cost and schedule come in the latter half of development by 
avoiding costly and lengthy redesign, test, and production reiteration. 
Specifically, the SBD methodology does the following:  
 Considers large data “sets” of candidate solution alternatives in the trade 
space (often containing millions of potential configurations)  
 Takes advantage of modern automated analytical frameworks that leverage 
high-speed computing power to develop, explore, manage, and visualize 
large data sets  
 Reduces the trade space in a progressive, deliberate manner by eliminating 
alternatives only when objective evidence (analysis, M&S, rapid prototyping) 
shows they do not meet the necessary criteria (i.e., feasibility/viability and 
cost/schedule/performance) 
 Increases knowledge as the sets of alternatives are narrowed 
 Converges to more globally optimal solutions with greater fidelity 
 Reinforces confidence in final recommendations to leadership with a pattern 
of reproducible, defensible artifacts in support of the decision process, 
specifically before highly constraining decisions 
 Builds a body of lessons learned on options that were eliminated, which can 
inform future efforts 
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A critical requirement of SBD implementation in system development is a means to 
rapidly conduct the complex data analysis and translate the results for decision-makers. For 
the previous Navy SBD efforts, a one-of-a-kind automated analytical framework tool called 
the Framework for Assessing Cost and Technology (FACT) was developed for each specific 
effort to provide visual simulations that integrated data and model input on design, cost, 
schedule, etc., to allow leadership to quickly see how the various design choices affected 
outcome.  
Specifically, the FACT tool (whose capabilities are shown in Figure 1) enabled the 
efforts to 
 Process large data sets through integrated M&S 
 Provide data integration, processing, and concise visuals of data 
relationships and solution alternatives 
 Allow users to understand and rapidly assess interdependencies between 
requirements, components, and variables of large and complex data sets 
 Allow decision-makers to explore the tradespace and compare alternatives 
 Allow leaders to maintain and manage an evolving requirements set 
 
Figure 1. Framework for Assessing Cost and Technology (FACT) Structure 
While the FACT tools developed and used for both previous efforts shared a 
common software architecture, each version required unique software coding, man-hours, 
and expense to tailor it to the subject matter. Since SMI did not have the time nor funding 
available to pursue a lengthy rework of the existing tool, when the SMI effort launched 
NSWC PCD and the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) (which developed the FACT 
software for the U.S. Marine Corps) worked together following the FACT example to create 
a less detailed, but more adaptable, version of the previous tools to meet the needs of the 
smart mining effort. Creating the SMI version of FACT took six months of focused 
development and coding. In the end it was a single instantiation of an SBD tool that was 
developed for a single purpose. It built upon and progressed previous SBD tools, as it did 
allow the user to quickly (~30 minutes) analyze very large data sets. At the end of its 
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development, the SMI FACT was able to help leadership visualize and analyze a tradespace 
of 1.9 quadrillion possibilities that resulted in a recommendation of nine feasible 
configurations that included cost, schedule, risk, and performance. 
Since the DASN planned to implement SBD across the entire Navy R&D community, 
it became clear that a new FACT-like tool was needed that was flexible and robust enough 
for systems engineers to apply to any SBD system development effort without the need for 
major recoding. After the SMI six-month effort was completed, NSWC PCD systems and 
software engineers began developing SET to fill that tool gap. The SET team is building on 
the FACT capabilities, which improved with each of the FACT instantiations (as shown in 
Figure 2). The SET team has been working on the tool continuously since 2016, adding 
more capabilities daily (sometimes “on the fly” as needs emerge while being used to support 
an R&D event). As noted previously, the tool is still in beta form, but it is being used to 
support current rapid acquisition efforts using SBD methods. The vision for SET is to reach 
the robustness of the previous FACT tools (including being able to ingest inputs from 
external models such as cost models) in an “off-the-shelf” version flexible and powerful 
enough to work across all problem solution efforts employing a SBD methodology.  
 
Figure 2. Improvements in FACT Performance 
Current SET Capability and a Representative Case Study 
SET provides an easy-to-use tool to quickly process extremely large data sets (into 
the trillions), integrate and process/filter the data, and provide concise visuals (such as 
scatter plots and histograms) of data relationships and solution alternatives. Currently it is 
limited to evaluation and comparison of individual technologies, but the envisioned end state 
will allow for evaluation and comparison of sets of configurations which can be quickly 
formed and re-formed using the tool to allow decision-makers to clearly see how different 
design choices in configurations affect system outcome. 
SET is structured around the elements of a Force (e. g., the warfighter) Engagement 
Process framework using tailored SBD elements that can be used to support the rapid 
prototyping process and overall Navy system development. The framework translates a 
specific, emerging Fleet or Joint Force concept of operation (CONOP) into increments of 
capabilities. Those increments of capability, presented through a SET visualization tool that 
models a Capability Concept Wheel (CCW), are used during a series of scenario-based 
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wargames with teams of warfighters to provide insight into the relative value of increments of 
capability to effective mission operation(s). Once the capability concepts which are the most 
highly valued by the warfighters are identified, a robust database of relevant technologies 
that can support those capability concepts is developed through data calls and calls for 
proposals. Subject matter experts (SMEs) then analyze and bin the submitted technologies 
by capability concept, and assess them operationally and technically. Technologies are 
eliminated from consideration only when OQE shows them to be infeasible for helping solve 
the problem. The resulting narrowed group of technologies are then assessed operationally 
(in a scenario) and technically by warfighters in an Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 
(ANTX). In cases where a technology is supported by such a high degree of OQE that 
further evaluation is superfluous, the technology may skip an ANTX and begin planning for 
prototyping. 
The Force Engagement Process framework (shown in Figure 3) underlying SET 
involves three phases: 
 Force Valuation  
 Assessment Workshop 
 Demonstration and Assessment 
A fourth phase is envisioned for the future. It includes the integration of models (e. g., 
cost and/or performance), so that decisions on acquisition, contracting, and system 
prototype configurations can be completed. Data analyzed through SET will lead to 
recommendations for continued system design of feasible configurations that lead to 
execution of viable designs and solutions. 
 
Figure 3. Force Engagement Process Underlying SET 
In the Force Valuation phase, the systems engineering team makes the engineering 
preparations for and executes a Force Engagement Team (FET) valuation exercise in which 
warfighter teams with a mix of mission-appropriate skill sets use a Capability Concept Wheel 
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in a tabletop wargame to determine which of the capability concepts they value most highly 
in a relevant operational scenario. In this phase, SET can be used to record the definitions 
of terms so all participants use the same taxonomy; automatically create the Capability 
Concept Wheel based on manual inputs from the capabilities decomposition; record the 
points assigned during the valuation wargame; analyze the valuation results; and generate 
reports (including visualizations such as scatter plots and histograms).  
In the Assessment Workshop phase, the team issues data calls and requests for 
proposals to collect data on relevant technologies that potentially support the most highly 
valued capabilities. The collected data is then used to create a technology database. SMEs 
meet to bin the technologies by capability, then conduct technical and operational 
assessments to eliminate technologies based on initial filtering criteria, thus narrowing the 
number of potential technologies going into the ANTX. In this phase, SET can be used to 
import the technology database, bin the technologies, record the assessment data, and filter 
the technologies. 
In the Demonstration and Assessment phase, the team plans and executes an ANTX 
or other demonstration in which technologists are invited to bring and demonstrate the 
filtered technologies so warfighters can physically view them and conduct technical and 
operational assessments. In this phase, SET can be used to create the electronic 
assessment forms, record the results (through individual networked computer tablets) from 
the technical and operational assessments, filter the technologies based on assessment 
results, and generate reports (including visualizations). 
The current beta version of SET was most recently used to support a recent Urban 
5th Generation Marine (U5G) effort. As outlined in the Marine Corps Operating Concept 
(MOC) and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s Future Operating Environment, the 
growth of crowded, poorly governed, or lawless areas (particularly in and around the world’s 
littorals) will force future commanders to consider how to conduct operations in complex 
terrain. In 2017, a U5G Task Force was established to develop concepts that enable 
situational awareness, counter reconnaissance, maneuver, fires, and command, control, 
communications, computers and information (C4I) operations within and among the 
populations that reside in the urban littorals. The task force—comprising a core team of 
operational, acquisition, and technical subject matter experts from Headquarters Marine 
Corps Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 
(MCWL), Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), and the NR&DE—is charged with 
executing a progressive series of ANTX that will inform emerging concepts of operations 
and future acquisitions.  
The first end-to-end exercise of the TnTE2 method, U5G ANTX 2018, was held in 
March 2018 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA. The ANTX was structured to 
provide warfighters with the opportunity to assess the operational utility of emerging 
technologies and engineering innovations that enhance the U5G concept of operations as it 
applies to a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), which is given missions to operate in 
an urban environment. 
The ANTX explored the five domains of air, space, cyber, logistics, and intelligence, 
with the focus on how those areas affect the operation in the urban environment at the 
company level. The ANTX used two vignettes to provide context for employment: (1) A rifle 
company must secure a key piece of infrastructure in a hostile environment where 
adversaries blend with civilians requiring a high degree of urban situational awareness, 
precision effects, and minimal signature; and (2) A rifle company, as part of a larger 
operation, must conduct offensive operations to clear a complex urban area consisting of 
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multiple city blocks, underground corridors (subway, sewer basements, etc.), and multi-story 
buildings. Once cleared, they must secure and defend the area while potentially providing 
assistance to any remaining civilians. During the course of both vignettes, the rifle company 
is continually conducting offense, defense, and stability. 
SET was used to support each of the three phases of the Force Engagement 
Process in the U5G effort.  
Primary goals for SET during the ANTX event included the following:  
 Improving methods, processes, and tools 
 Integrating assessments of operations, technology, and capability 
 Leveraging technology to enhance data capture and analysis 
 Providing traceability to U5G core capabilities 
 Providing data longevity for future study 
 Providing insight upon which solutions are ready for rapid acquisition, 
experimentation, or are a science/technology of interest 
Prior to the start of the ANTX, Operational and Technical SMEs helped draft the 
criteria, scales, and weights associated with assessing the candidate technologies. The 
ANTX event was split into two days of Limited Technical Assessments (LTAs) and 2 days of 
Limited Objective Experimentation (LOE). During the LTAs, squads of Marines handled 
individual pieces of technology at static displays or as part of live demonstrations. During the 
LOEs, platoons carried out operational missions, both day and night. Three platoons were 
issued multiple pieces of technology while rotating between mission objectives and 
operational locations. Upon conclusion of each LTA or LOE event, an embedded data 
collector would capture both quantitative and qualitative assessment data from individual 
marines, and the technical assessors via the SET assessment interface. Technical 
assessments were captured by tailored, diverse groups vice individuals to ensure subject 
matter expertise was factored in and the groups could build upon separate areas of 
knowledge for a complete assessment: mechanical, electrical, computer science, and so 
forth. Over four days, SET processed 2,664 total assessments: 2,210 operational, 304 
technical, and 150 scenario based. 
SET provided near real time statistical observations on operational and technical 
performance of demonstrated technologies from the warfighter and engineering 
perspectives in the form of histograms and scatter plots. It translated concepts of capability 
assessment, technical assessment, and operational assessment into data views which 
enabled cross referencing of performance not only from a total score perspective, but it 
enabled drilling down to specific questions of interest, such as operational relevance or 
personnel burden. SET also highlighted those technologies that traced back to the top 
capabilities required for success within the proposed scenarios. 
Future developments of SET may be able to provide justification criteria for DoD 
acquisition by providing the linkage between capability requirements and in field testing. 
The next several figures are good representations of data from the U5G ANTX. 
Figure 4 presents the Capability Concept Wheel that the U5G team created using SET for 
the Force Valuation phase. Figure 5 presents a visualization of the Assessment Workshop 
phase binning of the 93 technologies that were evaluated. Figure 6 presents an example 
(non-U5G) of an assessment form created using SET (similar to what was created for the 
U5G ANTX). Figure 7 provides a sample of a visualization from the U5G ANTX assessment 
results. 
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Figure 4. U5G ANTX 2018 Capability Concept Wheel 
 
Figure 5. U5G ANTX 2018 Technologies Mapped by Capability Area in SET 
- 333 - 
 
Figure 6. Sample Assessment Form Created With SET 
 
Figure 7. Example of Assessment Results Visualization From SET for U5G ANTX 
2018 
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Next Stages of SET Development 
In its current instantiation, SET successfully evaluates measures of stakeholder utility 
and may apply these measures against technology solutions whether they are tactics, 
process, or systems. However, to come to full realization as an automated analytical 
framework tool, current development needs to address not just stakeholder utility, but also a 
means to understand the relationships between sets of solutions and how they may drive 
the feasibility of design. 
A close focus on improving the user interface will help fortify the methodology and 
help teams adopt the principles of SBD. Focus on SET outputs will aid in institutional 
learning, reuse, and knowledge retention. New designs will be able to build upon previous 
explorations. 
Functions that are currently under development in SET include the following: 
 The capability to create design sets and configurations, providing definition 
and constraints 
 Establishing mathematical relationships to set intersections 
 Providing a GUI which allows input, modification, and visualization of design-
impacting attributes 
 The capability to evaluate a design space for feasibility and dominance, 
specified by a set of constraints and given specific functional relationships 
 The capability to interface with other models, such as cost and risk, to provide 
other interpretations of set feasibility 
Ultimately, the goal of SET is to help inform future design and improve design quality 
by allowing greater design space exploration and providing support to a methodology which 
may provide solutions more resilient to requirement changes, grant early understanding of 
design relationships, and reduce design rework. 
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Abstract 
The tactics and technology exploration and experimentation (TnTE2) method has 
been shown to foster innovation and create speed in responding to high-priority urgent or 
emerging operational needs. The TnTE2 method rapidly shepherds a balanced team of 
warfighters and technologists through a series of capability-based rapid prototyping and 
experimentation cycles, which accelerate complex warfighting concepts and tactics 
development. Set-based design (SBD) methods enable full exploration of both the 
warfighting capability and technology trade space. SBD tools and visualizations facilitate 
complex data analysis and decision-making. TnTE2 methods were synthesized in the recent 
Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation (S2ME2) Task Force (TF), where 
a first-ever Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (ANTX) informed a developing warfighting 
concept and started associated rapid prototyping projects—all within the standard program 
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objective memorandum (POM) cycle. The TnTE2 method is open, competitive, and merit-
based. Future applications of TnTE2 will be expanded to include the deliberate use of new 
acquisition authorities, policies, and contracting vehicles, and has the potential to 
fundamentally change how systems are acquired with agility and speed. 
Background 
USS JOHN C. STENNIS, somewhere in the South China Sea. 
Warfare Commanders, War Room, 0330 hours (local time). 
Final strike planning … 
“I can’t show protection in this close with these environmentals, boss. As Air Defense 
Commander, I’m saying … if you launch this morning, we’re gonna take losses.”  
“We are going to take losses, Steve. This strike needs to happen now though, this 
morning, with the sun at our backs. These Alert fives you’ve had us on are taking a toll on 
birds AND crews. CAG’s down three Hornets as it is, so another 24 hours isn’t in the 
cards. Look, I just need to be here, and quiet, for another hour, okay? Keep working the 
problem. Rollo, anything new from CHUNG HOON?” 
“No sir, just the ‘POSS-SUB’ we told you about earlier, never confirmed. Theater ASW’s 
barrier search will be done at 0430, but buoy data’s showing some movement in the 
sound velocity profile down the threat axis.” 
“Ok. IWC, talk to me about layers, RF and acoustic. I want to be launching in an hour and 
striking five minutes after sunrise.” 
“Admiral, METOC’s loading the 0330 acoustic predictions now. Surface layers have been 
really close for days, so I’m confident in Rollo’s posture for that strike window. Steve’s got 
a problem though. NAVOCEANO launched a new RF modelling format yesterday that is 
MUCH better, but our NITES system needs a new card to use it. OCEANO’s paralleling 
the old format, but not over GBS, so I can’t get it passively. Right now, my best RF 
prediction is the air search RADAR which is why Steve’s Aegis system is being so 
conservative. TWC and I think we can get NITES back online by 0400 though … right, 
Melony?” 
“That’s right, Ender. Admiral, I just chatted with Linda Collins and Admiral Beckett in San 
Diego. They did a rapid prototyping authorization for us, and I expect a file for the new 
NITES card any minute. It’ll take 10 minutes to print and install the card, so NITES should 
be good to go by 0400.” 
“Alright, good. Port the new RF paths directly to Aegis so Steve can update 
apportionment for inbounds. I want us all playing off the best sheet of music when we go 
on this. Everyone stay on your bricks, but keep ’em on Low. We don’t need any leakage 
while our tattletale is enjoying his last hour above the surface. I’ll be in TFCC at 0415. 
Ready, Break.” 
This vignette is completely imaginary. The scenario and all characters are fictitious, but they 
plausibly juxtapose today’s strike force leadership and planning with future capabilities 
envisioned by authors of this paper. 
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Introduction 
Over 30 years ago, the U.S. Navy knew it had to coordinate air, surface, and 
subsurface warfare in order to maintain superiority over what we then called near-peer 
competitors. The composite Warfare Commander (WFC) construct helped us achieve that 
coordination, establishing Air Defense Commanders, (like Steve in the vignette above), 
Strike Warfare Commanders (CAG), and Sea Combat Commanders (Rollo) to form a team 
of super teams, each dominant in their domains and each contributing to shared situational 
awareness of the overall battlespace. This was ahead of its time, actually, and it served us 
very well until the “knee” of a technology curve began pressing on our chest about five years 
ago. 
For the past three years, we’ve been working to integrate information warfare (IW) 
into that composite model (led by IWC, or Ender, in the vignette). We hope IW will help us 
match our own pace of maneuver and lethality to that of our “informatized” adversary. This 
force-matching instinct, however, which has been bred over centuries of warfare, 
approaches a new, information-enabled battlespace as a more complicated but ultimately 
predictable environment. While IW feels revolutionary, it may have missed a fundamental 
change in that environment. A technology-fueled explosion of interdependency between 
tools, operators, and tactics now accelerates naval warfare near a distinct complexity 
threshold. General Stanley McChrystal found himself on the wrong side of that threshold in 
2004 while fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq (McChrystal et al., 2015). There, he discovered an 
environment of such staggering complexity that prediction and operational efficiency were 
rendered obsolete by resiliency and adaptability. Since our IW work is largely about 
efficiently sensing and predicting highly contested battlespaces, maybe we missed the root 
cause of that heavy feeling in our chest five years ago. Now, as the feeling moves toward 
our throat, we think it is less about technology and more about interdependencies and 
speed, about unpredictable complexity.  
In 2015, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) said that “core attributes” like Integrity, 
Accountability, Initiative and Toughness must underpin a decentralized command structure 
(CNO, 2015). To anyone who grew up with “Honor, Courage, & Commitment,” the first two 
items on the CNO’s new list were unsurprising. Initiative and Toughness, however, seemed 
new, and a little edgy. They sounded a lot, in fact, like McChrystal’s resiliency and 
adaptability. If we mean to use these new attributes against a peer competitor, we should 
stop prioritizing clever tactics and exquisite tools, which have unknown but probably short 
shelf lives in a complex battlespace. Instead, we should prioritize a method for speedy, 
coordinated, correct capability fielding, so that we can adapt faster than our adversary in a 
complex battlespace.  
This paper describes a methodology that has been shown to synchronize the 
development of tactics and technology in response to high-priority and emerging operational 
needs. The tactics and technology exploration and experimentation (TnTE2) method, 
pronounced “T-N-T-2,” fosters innovation and creates speed by rapidly shepherding a 
balanced team of warfighters and technologists through a series of capability-based rapid 
prototyping and experimentation cycles. TnTE2 methods and tools were synthesized 
through two recent Task Forces that applied the method to rapidly identify highly-valued 
capabilities, inform developing warfighting concepts, and initiate rapid prototyping lines of 
effort—all within the standard program objective memorandum (POM) cycle. The recent 
Task Forces (i.e., Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation [S2ME2] and 
Urban Fifth Generation Marine [U5G]), formulated and applied the TnTE2 method with a 
keen understanding of the nature and politics of major military innovation (Gardiner, 1992; 
Hayes & Smith, 1994), agile teaming constructs (Rubin, 2013), war room processes 
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(Burrow, 1997), and set-based design principles, as expanded by the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) for the Small Surface Combatant Task Force (Garner et al., 2015) and 
Advanced Combat Vehicle (Burrow et al., 2014). The TnTE2 method and the Task Force 
strategy collectively enabled the rapid and full exploration of highly complex technical and 
operational solution spaces and promoted in major naval innovation. The TnTE2 method 
“bring(s) together technology, doctrine, and policy objectives” (Gardiner, 1992, pp. 10–11) to 
encourage innovation from within the Naval bureaucracy, promoting “diversity of potential 
sources of innovation” (Hayes & Smith, 1994, p. 75), and provides a forum for “prototype(s) 
… (to) demonstrate feasibility … at critical junctures” (Hayes & Smith, 1994, p. 100).  
Throughout S2ME2 and U5G Task Force execution, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]) worked across Congress, 
the Office of the Secretary of the Defense (OSD), the DoN, and Naval Systems Commands 
to explore underutilized financing, acquisition, and contracting authorities. This “Fast Lane” 
effort, further described below, is aimed at effectively scaling up the successful prototyping 
effort and applying new accelerated acquisition authorities and tools to speed capability to 
the field. 
Unless we think the pace of technology, or that of our peers, will relax, the “knee on 
our windpipe” must be addressed. Strong efforts to accelerate capability fielding have 
existed in both the Fleet and the Naval Research and Development Enterprise (NR&DE) for 
years. In a few recent cases, these efforts have collided like neutrons, releasing tremendous 
energy in the form of a special, new kind of rapid prototype. These rapid prototypes are 
distinguished by the fact that their specific capability contribution is valued and fully 
characterized from both a tactics and technical perspective, allowing one to imagine a future 
acquisition system where our “technology bench” is expansive, fully characterized, and 
standing ready to field. Such rapid fieldings of emergent, modified, or adapted technologies 
to U.S. forces at sea (hypothesized below) might be coordinated, afloat, by a technology 
warfare commander (TWC, or Melony, in the vignette).  
Today we face a multi-domain warfighting problem defined by unprecedented 
complexity. Recent, deployed experience with that complexity tells us that a successful 
capability-based concept exploration method rooted in Set-Based Design (SBD) can provide 
a simple but powerful mechanism to prepare for high-end conflict. Only through 
synchronized discovery and injection of tactics and technology, tailored in iterative and 
progressive cycles toward specific warfighting capability, can we pace technology and 
outpace our adversaries.  
Prior Work  
Our most senior leaders recognize the potential of a deliberate and continuous 
partnership between the engineering, acquisition, and operational communities in 
addressing high-end conflict. The Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) The Future Navy was 
heavily influenced by the pace of technology, and that of our adversaries, speaking often to 
notions like “rapidly iterative approach[es]” and encouraging us to “simultaneously build and 
innovate” (Richardson, 2017, p. 7). The CNO told us to optimize requirements via 
“meaningful discussion[s] [between] industry leaders, technologists, our defense labs, the 
requirement officers, and our budget people” (Richardson, 2017, p. 7).  
On January 7, 2016, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 
and Acquisition (ASN [RD&A]), the Honorable Sean Stackley, laid down a marker with 
Congress, calling for “active and continuous engagement by our Naval Research and 
Development Establishment (NR&DE) with Fleet forces” (Stackley, 2016, p. 4). The 
elevation by Stackley of this imperative concept seeded a revolution in acquisition methods, 
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which has grown strongly in the two years since his call. The 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (DoD, 2018) also encourages developing operational concepts and technologies 
together: 
Evolve innovative operational concepts. Modernization is not defined solely 
by hardware; it requires change in the ways we organize and employ forces. 
We must anticipate the implications of new technologies on the battlefield, 
rigorously define the military problems anticipated in future conflict, and foster 
a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking. We must anticipate 
how competitors and adversaries will employ new operational concepts and 
technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts 
to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality. (p. 7) 
Excellent and recent articles may also be found on experimentation and prototyping. 
Simmons (2017) compared deliberate practice with deliberate experimentation through an 
operational lens in his November 2017 article, “Forget the 10,000-Hour Rule; Edison, Bezos, 
& Zuckerberg Follow the 10,000-Experiment Rule.” By drawing his comparisons in 
operational, albeit commercial, contexts, Simmons offers insight on accelerating technology 
insertion into capability. He notes that practice alone, while useful in static fields of 
endeavor, is “next to useless in areas that change rapidly, such as technology” (Simmons, 
2017). By contrast, experimentation in large numbers brings the power of odds and large 
data sets to bear on the problem of non-linear technology acceleration. In fact, the 
undeniable resemblance of Simmons’ experimental success graphic, shown in Figure 1 
(Simmons, 2017), to recent portrayals of adversary capability is thought-provoking.  
 
Figure 1. Success Curve 
(Simmons, 2017) 
The Path to Prototype Warfare (Kozloski, 2017) examines how Cold War industrial 
and geopolitical environments shaped the DoD’s acquisition system in the 1960s and how 
those environments differ today. Concluding that technology and international relations have 
invalidated the DoD’s acquisition model, Kozloski explores an alternative one based on 
rapid, mission-targeted, research and prototypes rather than monolithic, unwieldy programs 
of record. Whereas Cold War strategy intentionally avoided surprise by making large fielding 
decisions based on assured technology predictions and intelligence, today’s strategy must 
do the opposite. “[Quickly] … equip … with weapons custom designed for a specific … 
mission,” says Kozloski; increase “the number and type of threats a defending force must 
consider during battle”; and deliver “promising weapon systems … quickly to the operational 
forces in limited quantities.” Kozloski then asks pointed questions about why the military 
does not act on these ideas and proposes that his questions “be part of a debate on 
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reforming the acquisition process and designing the future force” (Kozloski, 2017). He even 
nearly described the TnTE2 method by asserting that “…rapid deployment of unique 
weapons would demand that the… military… quickly develop… tactics…” (Kozloski, 2017). 
Even without the final mental leap to integrate TnTE2, this article is bluntly insightful. The 
assertion that strategic surprise “is viewed often as a tool of the weaker state” (Kozloski, 
2017) should not delay our adoption of it, formally, as a defense strategy. After all, the only 
thing worse than becoming the weaker state would be not recognizing it.  
Historical Perspective 
We recognized the complex, multidomain warfighting problem presented to our 
nation in World War II (WWII), and we acted on it with a national fervor not approximated in 
peace or war since. The 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized our national will, sacrifice, 
and, innovative spirit, but Naval Forces had been eagerly learning from the embattled 
British, and from industry, for years before that. The amphibious craft used during America’s 
march across the Pacific evolved from Floridian inventor Daniel Roebling’s hurricane 
floodwater recovery “amphibious tractor” (amtrac), built less than a decade earlier. Historian 
Henry Shaw, Jr., writes, “When the first production [Landing Vehicle Tracked] (LVT) rolled 
off Roebling’s assembly line … in July 1941, there was already a detachment of Marines at 
nearby Dunedin learning to … develop tactics for their effective use” (Shaw, 1991). Shaw 
exactly captured TnTE2’s exploratory spirit here, adding that “no sooner did the LVTs make 
their appearance in significant numbers than the thought occurred that the tractors could be 
armed and that they could have a role as an assault vehicle, leading assault waves” (Shaw, 
1991). 
Air power saw tremendous innovation as well. Marine observers from captains to 
colonels visited British air stations throughout 1941, studying “the weapons and equipment 
being used and the tactics and techniques being practiced.” What we learned about air 
control and weapons and RADAR, to say nothing of carrier-based aviation in the Pacific, 
expanded air power’s mission from strictly surveillance into an offensive game changer.  
Let’s not ignore lessons from the other side either. German Blitzkrieg tactics, 
developed only a generation earlier, had become one of the most effective maneuver 
methods in history. Small, nimble, lethal units wreaked havoc on Allied troops by moving 
quickly, aggregating and disaggregating in precise time and space to inflict specific damage. 
They stayed in touch, and alive, using radios that were simplistic but faster than Allied trucks 
and horses.  
The atomic bomb, infamous for its destructive power, was also an inspiring example 
of operating force–scientist teaming on a just-in-time, rapid prototyping effort which set the 
conditions for Japan’s surrender and, ultimately, for Allied victory. Richard Rhodes’ Making 
of the Atomic Bomb documents this historic operational-technical collaboration in an 
enjoyable read (Rhodes, 1987; see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Manhattan Project Scientists and Military Personnel Gathered Around 
the Bomb Pit, Ready to Watch the Little Boy Bomb Being Loaded Into the 
Enola Gay  
(Rhodes, 1987) 
In the decades following WWII, the U.S. Navy matured into a highly trained, precision 
firepower, sea-based force. Innovation continued more slowly but no less impressively. 
Submarine-launched Polaris missiles, nuclear propulsion, modern aircraft carriers, space-
based communications, and the Aegis weapon system all capitalized on late 20th-century 
technology with (Cold) war-winning effect.  
Between 1989 and about 2010, we practiced and refined the methods and 
technology that put us on top despite an increasingly deliberate and laborious defense 
acquisition system (DAS). Meanwhile, factors like the post–Cold War “Peace Dividend” and 
a shift in focus from peer competitors to combatant commander hotspots stretched U.S. 
Naval forces thin. Figure 3, taken from a recent Strategic Readiness Review, starkly depicts 
the reduced force and increased operation tempo of the current Fleet (DoN, 2017). 
 
Figure 3. The Dramatic Rise in Percentage of the Total Force Deployed: 1985–
Present  
(DoN, 2017) 
Very recently, in the last three to five years, honest self-assessment and glide slope 
comparisons with China and Russia have created the sense of urgency captured in the 
CNO’s The Future Navy (Richardson, 2017) and the Marine Corps Operating Concept 
(USMC, 2017). Naval component commanders are revamping Concepts of Operation 
(CONOP), experimenting with new warfighting constructs like Distributed Maritime 
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Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and prioritizing 
underutilized mission areas like Information Warfare (IW).  
During this time of renewed operational innovation, Secretary Stackley’s 
aforementioned Congressional testimony brought clarity and focus to the Navy’s renewed 
focus on technical innovation. In that January 2016 testimony, he identified four key 
enablers to accelerate acquisition (Stackley, 2016). The complete list shown here became 
the four cornerstones of acquisition reform as we know it today. TnTE2, described in full 
detail later in this paper, now emerges as the executable method to build on those 
cornerstones.  
 
Figure 4. ASN(RD&A) Testimony on Acquisition Reform 
(Stackley, 2016) 
Previous acquisition reform efforts, such as the Better Buying Power initiatives, all 
had the effect of tinkering with the current DAS, adding complexity, rigor, work content, 
schedule, and cost. In 2016, however, the threat from peer adversaries motivated leaders 
Capitol Hill, acquisition, and operational communities to pursue “skip-gen” approaches. 
Prototyping how we do prototyping, the DoN launched a series of dedicated, task-force-like 
initiatives focused on Smart Mining (SMI), Counter small Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(CsUAS), Unmanned Systems (UxS), and Advanced Combat Systems Technology (ACST). 
The creation and branding of the Naval Research and Development Establishment 
(NR&DE) marshaled the collective and collaborative efforts of the 15 naval labs and warfare 
centers and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) behind these initiatives in support of 
Secretary Stackley’s accelerated acquisition strategy. Led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (DASN[RDTE]), the NR&DE 
designed and developed the methodologies and committed dedicated experts to rapidly 
form the Fleet/Force Engagement Teams (FET), which explored tactics and technology with 
operational forces.  
In parallel with these DoN efforts, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) released 
the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC; USMC, 2017), which articulated a new central 
warfighting problem: the future operating environment was changing exponentially. Even in 
2016, said the Marines, the confluence of a technology explosion, conflicted littorals, 
complex terrain, adversary use of the information environment and exploitation of 
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems created increased challenges to 
naval and littoral maneuver. Recognizing the USMC was at a significant, strategic, inflection 
point as a service, leadership focused increasingly on challenges and opportunities that 
would define the future, rethinking the methods, tools, and processes that inform investment 
decisions. They wanted to accelerate the speed at which USMC develops, integrates, and 
deploys future systems, and they wanted to co-evolve tactics development and integration. 
Understanding the complexities of amphibious warfare operating spaces was a daunting 
task. USMC leadership was searching for new approaches and technologies that would 
enable real world experimentation and revolutionize warfighting approaches to peer threats. 
These approaches included artificial intelligence, manned and unmanned teaming, 21st-
century combined arms leveraging the information environment, enhanced littoral maneuver 
and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and counter ISR. These 
approaches were applied to five capability concepts: 
 Ship to Shore Maneuver: clandestine, overt maneuver from varied distance to 
support reconnaissance, assault, and heavy material 
 Amphibious Fire Support and Effects: finding targets and engaging targets; 
emphasis on long range precision against moving targets 
 Clear Amphibious Assault Lanes: identify and clear mines and obstacles; 
beach reconnaissance and survey 
 Amphibious C4: secure resilient and robust communications; common 
operational picture; precision navigation and targeting  
 Amphibious Information Warfare: corrupt the enemy perception with decoys, 
electronic support, and attack 
S2ME2 Task Force  
Having both recognized a strategic transition point, USMC and DoN leaders 
empowered a task force to accelerate the exploration and experimentation of advanced 
tactics and technology for 21st-Century Ship to Shore Maneuver warfare. The USMC deputy 
commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I), and DASN(RDT&E) 
chartered the Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation (S2ME2) Task 
Force on August 24, 2016 (DoN, 2016a). This task force applied the TnTE2 methodology, 
rapidly shepherding a balanced team of warfighters and technologists through an iterative 
series of capability-focused rapid prototyping and experimentation cycles. Chartering 
members provided the operational imperative and mission focus, and they empowered an 
experienced team of warfighters and technologists to set new standards for speed, scale, 
and rigor. 
The establishment and structure of a task force was critical to the overall strategy. 
The S2ME2 Task Force, simply referred to as the “Task Force” for the remainder of the 
paper, primarily consisted of operational and technical subject matter experts from 
DASN(RDT&E), Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), and the 
labs and warfare centers of the NR&DE.  
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In just seven months, more than 130 emerging technologies were evaluated, and 52 
highly-valued capability prototypes were demonstrated for naval operators, scientists, and 
engineers during a two-week exploration event at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. This 
was the first-ever Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (ANTX), and it set benchmarks and 
best practices for implementing the TnTE2 methodology and ANTX constructs across the 
entire department and throughout the NR&DE. Unexpected findings included novel concepts 
such as Proximity: Unmanned Systems can achieve tactically relevant proximity with 
persistence and low signature. They can effectively maneuver far forward of manned units 
with very low risk in order to sense and provide effects. A few promising “skip-gen” type 
technologies were left with operational forces for extended user evaluations. The most 
extensive integration resulting from S2ME2 ANTX has been the collaboration between 
ONR’s Information Support to Operations office and the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance 
Battalion. By October 2017, 14 prototypes, organized around six highly-valued mission 
threads, were integrated into Fleet/Force Experimentation venues including BOLD 
ALLIGATOR 17 and DAWN BLITZ 17. S2ME2 Task Force efforts directly initiated more than 
30 follow-on rapid prototypes and S&T accelerations, many of which are scheduled to 
culminate with Fleet/Force experimentation events in fiscal year 2018.  
Naval Technology Exercises  
The S2ME2 Task Force expanded upon the concept of an Annual Naval Technology Exercise, which had 
been pioneered by the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Division Newport in August 2015. NUWC 
Division Newport leadership leverages their Naval Innovative Science and Engineering (NISE) program to 
host an annual event that provides government and industry participants access to a collaborative, low-risk 
environment to demonstrate technologies across NUWC Division Newport labs and ranges. Recognizing 
the tremendous, unique, intrinsic potential of NR&DE-wide resources and facilities, DASN(RDT&E) 
subsequently promoted Advanced Naval Technology Exercises (ANTX) as key events in the early 
exploration phases of TnTE2. Operational Force–championed ANTXs are distinguished by mission focus, 
team structure, and full employment of TnTE2 methods to evaluate a highly complex tactics and technology 
trade space. A detailed description of the TnTE2 methods is the focus of the section titled “TnTE2 Within 
S2ME2.” A summary of Annual Naval Technology Exercises and ANTXs that have been executed, or are in 
planning phases, across the NR&DE labs and warfare centers are included as the appendix. 
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Figure 5. S2ME2 Task Force Strategy 
The complexity of the solution space and the speed at which leadership demanded 
execution and recommendations required a synchronized effort from warfighters and 
technologists. The complexity of the solution space was generally defined by the following: 
 Tightly coupled and multi-domain operating environments—requires our 
most innovative operators and planners to explore warfighting capabilities 
and alternate tactics 
 Technology options are significant in number and diversity—requires 
our most innovative scientists and engineers to explore the applicability and 
limitations of emerging technologies  
 Technology and tactics pairings are significant in number and 
diversity—requires BOTH our most innovative operators and technologists 
to rapidly explore, iterate, and assess technology and tactics pairings  
The S2ME2 Task Force employed TnTE2 methods through a series of capability-
based workshops, which led up to field demonstrations, exercises, and experiments. 
Throughout the course of these rapid iterations, the operational and technical experts 
explored the solution space together, assessing emerging capabilities from their respective 
areas of expertise. The method effectively unleashed the intrinsic ingenuity of our practicing 
operators, planners, scientists, engineers, and industry partners, and it leveraged the full 
potential of our Naval laboratory infrastructure to “reestablish agile experimentation at 
appropriate levels (seen as) critical to achieving a strategic innovation advantage” (DoN, 
2015). 
S2ME2’s operational team contributed expertise in the specific emerging concept of 
operations, scenarios, and related tactics of interest. “Delivering capability at the speed of 
relevance” (DoD, 2018, p.10) demanded mission focus and expertise from the operators. 
These operators were “current” and empowered by leadership to advance tactics for the 
high end fight. For S2ME2, the Operational Champion was a senior general officer with 
sufficient experience and authority to set priorities. This is considered a critical element for 
all TnTE2 implementation.  
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S2ME2’s technical team of practicing scientists and engineers provided expertise 
related to the specific technologies and their potential applicability and limitations in the 
relevant environment. While the S2ME2 Task Force did not require long-term reassignment, 
it established a core team and prioritized the efforts of an extended team of experts for the 
duration of the Task Force. For example, expertise was resourced from across the NR&DE 
and USMC commands for dedicated periods of time for Force Valuation workshops, 
planning workshops, ANTXs, and Fleet/Force experiments.  
The underlying thesis for S2ME2 was that mature and emerging technologies from 
the DoD, the DoN, and industry had been largely untapped. Many mature prototypes 
inspired better and/or alternate tactics for amphibious ship to shore maneuver. By studying 
and in many cases, leveraging significant prior S&T and R&D investments, the Task Force 
quickly and cost-effectively characterized the tactics and technology trade space and 
informed:  
 S&T, R&D, and rapid prototyping investments  
 Industry and NR&DE internal investments  
 Concept and requirements development 
 Acquisition plans  
Extensive participation by small, large, traditional, and non-traditional DoD and 
industry partners was encouraged by a Special Notice promulgated on the Federal Business 
Opportunities website (https://www.fbo.gov/) and socialized through various public websites 
and industry forums. Overall, more than 48 R&D organizations participated in S2ME2 ANTX 
through their current contracts or new cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADA) with the appropriate NR&DE lab or center. More than 75 operational assessors 
from over 10 Fleet and Force organizations participated in the Force Valuation workshops, 
planning, and ANTX and FLEX events, providing more than 760 technical and operational 
assessments that informed leadership decisions. 
The S2ME2 Task Force has fostered innovation and accelerated development of 
complex warfighting capability in ways that informed the tactics as much as the systems that 
were prototyped. The Task Force directly informed the development of the Marine Corps 
Operating Concept (MOC; USMC, 2017) and emerging Ship to Shore Maneuver concept of 
operations. USMC leadership recognized the potential of TnTE2 as an innovative process to 
integrate tactics and technology evaluation, initiate follow-on prototyping for 
experimentation, further technology development, and inform decisions to move into rapid 
fielding. USMC leadership also considers S2ME2 as a rapid prototyping, experimentation, 
and demonstration (RPED) project and will continue employing these methods to accelerate 
capability development and acquisitions (DoN, 2016b). 
Throughout S2ME2 execution, DASN (RDT&E) worked with Congress, the Office of 
the Secretary of the Defense (OSD), the DoN, and Naval Systems Commands to explore 
underutilized financing, acquisition, and contracting authorities. This “Fast Lane” effort, 
further described below, is aimed at effectively scaling up the successful prototyping effort 
and applying new accelerated acquisition authorities and tools to speed capability to the 
field. Another iteration of TnTE2, focused on the “Urban 5th Generation (U5G) Marine” is in 
progress at the time of this writing, and planning has begun for a third iteration focused on 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Information Warfare.  
At present, in early 2018, the authors sense a tipping point, either just ahead or just 
behind us, beyond which our most senior leadership view accelerated acquisition, based on 
TnTE2, as an executable method of preparing Naval and Joint forces for high-end conflict. 
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Recent guidance from the 2018 National Defense Strategy reinforces the authors’ belief that 
such combined action between the Fleet/Force and the NR&DE is not only desired, but 
essential to delivering “a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force” (DoD, 
2018, p. 1).  
It is believed the strategy and methods synthesized by the S2ME2 Task Force 
constitute the first comprehensive response to recent DoD and DoN calls for faster capability 
fielding. The remainder of this paper will describe TnTE2 in detail, including specific S2ME2 
implementations, how it has evolved since 2017, and remaining work. We will also describe 
additional, “Fast Lane,” Accelerated Acquisition (AA) work, both planned and in progress, 
and suggest ways for readers to get involved. 
TnTE2 Within S2ME2  
TnTE2 methods, as applied during the S2ME2 and U5G Task Forces, have proven 
successful in rapidly identifying highly-valued capabilities, informing developing warfighting 
concepts, and initiating rapid prototyping lines of effort. Set-based design (SBD) principles 
and decision methodologies, as expanded by the DoN for the Small Surface Combatant 
Task Force (Garner et al., 2015) and Advanced Combat Vehicle (ACV; Burrow et al., 2014), 
allowed for the full exploration of complex technical and operational solution spaces.  
The TnTE2 method can be generalized into four interrelated major elements, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Tactics and Technology Exploration and Experimentation (TnTE2) 
Method 
It is important to note that the metrics and data depicted in Figure 6 were captured at 
a specific point during the S2ME2 ANTX. The method and major elements are applied 
iteratively throughout the TnTE2 process. Leadership is continuously informed by additional 
and more quantitative data gathered throughout the assessment process, (i.e., capability 
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increments, “tech bank,” assessment results, databases, systems engineering artifacts, 
architectures, cost estimates), which increases fidelity and confidence in decision-making. 
Major Element: Force Valuations and the Capability-Based Framework 
The development of a capability-based framework is foundational to the TnTE2 
method. The Capability Concept Wheel (CCW) is the capability-based framework that 
translates concepts of operations into capability areas and then into increments of capability. 
Increments of capability include definitions and sufficient parameterization such that an 
operator can assess the relative value of discrete capability increments and a technologist 
can identify specific technology solutions. The CCW is a shared framework that must be 
developed, acknowledged, and maintained by both the operational and engineering 
community. It becomes the primary communications tool used throughout wargaming, 
tactics development, and the series of iterative and progressive rapid prototyping, 
experimentation, and demonstrations that ensue.  
The CCW is essentially a table that includes underlying definitions and parameters. It 
is typically presented as a wheel with increments of capability of increasing complexity along 
the radial axes. Capability increments can be cumulative or exclusive, and differences are 
typically denoted with asterisks to guide the user. Joint publications are typically referenced, 
but in cases of multi-domain or joint efforts where lexicon differs among warfighter 
communities, the framework establishes a common lexicon and definitions that are agreed 
upon for the duration of the Task Force’s efforts. The S2ME2 CCW was developed over the 
course of two four-day workshops and validated during a Force Valuation dry run. Helpful 
hints are provided to operational and technical subject matter experts throughout the efforts 
of a Task Force. Hints specific to CCW development are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Hints for Capability Concept Wheel Development 
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The major capability areas of the S2ME2 CCW are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. S2ME2 Capability Areas 
It is imperative that a CCW provide coverage for the entire trade space of tactics and 
technology options. Initial workshops to develop the CCW are a mix of facilitated 
brainstorming and wargaming sessions where operators are asked to articulate capabilities 
a planner or operator would employ during specific scenarios. In the context of TnTE2, a 
capability must be technology or solution agnostic and strictly defined as the ability to 
perform or achieve certain actions or outcomes. Capability examples might include abilities 
like: sensing the spectrum, where increments of capability span frequencies and/or ranges; 
or engaging kinetically, where increments of capability span ranges and/or effects. Allowing 
capabilities and/or increments to be limited to a specific technology or solution will stifle 
innovation, as there may be more than one technical approach to achieving a specific 
capability.  
Force Valuation workshops are typically executed over the course of a week where 
teams of planners and operators play a series of scenario-based tabletop wargames that 
provide insights into which capabilities the operators value most for a given scenario and 
mission. Care must be taken when scripting scenarios, so as to not limit tactical creativity or 
preordain solutions. Multiple scenarios may be “played” to learn more about capabilities 
unique to specific areas of responsibility (AORs) and/or phases of conflict.  
Each team “plays” a given scenario multiple times (i.e., Game 1, 2, … n) and with 
decreasing resources, as shown in Figure 8. Operators are asked to place their resources 
on the specific increment of capability they value most in executing the mission. “Pulling 
rank” is discouraged, and teams must collaborate to converge on a single set of capabilities 
required to execute a mission plan. Each team is carefully manned with planners and 
operators of various experience and expertise. Discussions regarding specific technologies 
may aid in developing the CCW and during the Force Valuations, but the fact that the CCW 
is entirely capability-based is critically important. Teams may be shuffled and scenarios and 
games repeated to provide more fidelity to the capability valuations. Plays are captured with 
“chips” or “thumbtacks” on the CCW, and statistical analysis provides a summary capture of 
the results for leadership review and validation.  
Flag or general officers should validate the results from these valuations because 
these results directly inform the ensuing prototyping and experimentation campaign and 
S&T investments. Data gathered from Force Valuation workshops provide decision-makers 
with insight into the relative value of each increment of capability for a given mission and 
scenario. If results are anticipated to vary significantly between theaters, then multiple Force 
Valuation Workshops may be conducted. Results may be normalized, but retaining the 
ability to visualize unique insights from different phases, scenarios, and AORs is important. 
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Figure 8. Force Valuation Process 
Force Valuation workshop outputs are typically visualized as histograms that show 
Capability Increments ranked according to their relative value in the relevant mission 
scenarios. A typical set of mission scenarios, selected by the operational leadership, 
includes “most stressing” and “most likely” scenarios at a minimum. For S2ME2, these two 
scenarios were “amphibious raid” and “amphibious assault.” In general, S2ME2 Force 
Valuation findings demonstrated that capabilities required to plan and execute an 
amphibious raid differed greatly from those required in amphibious assault. This prompted a 
leadership decision to focus the majority of S2ME2 ANTX mission-threads on evaluating 
alternate tactics and technology pairings to help advance the raid forces. Force valuation 
results also demonstrated that operators and planners employed many diverse capability 
sets. No single capability would completely enable the emerging tactics. These discoveries 
further justified the need for a deliberate, low-barrier-to-entry, exploration phase that was 
loosely scripted to allow for rapid iterations of tactics and technology pairings.  
Major Element: Technical and Operational Assessments 
Simultaneous to the execution of the Force Valuation workshop, a “Special Notice” 
was posted to the Federal Business Opportunities website and distributed through other 
various public websites and industry forums. The S2ME2 CCW formed the basis of a call to 
industry, academia, and government labs for emerging technologies and/or engineering 
innovations. The capability areas, increments, and sample metrics were fully articulated in 
Section III of the Special Notice (SPAWAR Systems Command, 2016), which emphasized a 
desire for responses offering mature and emerging technologies that could be fielded within 
18 to 24 months. Submitters were asked to identify the specific increment, or increments, of 
capability that a particular technology was capable of providing. Submissions were 
maintained in a government-owned relational database known as the “Tech Bank.” 
Scientists, engineers, and subject matter experts then binned the technologies into the CCW 
increments and conducted technical assessments against categories that included technical 
maturity, integration readiness, reliability, standardization, etc. Operators, planners, and 
subject matter experts then assessed the technologies against categories, which included 
operational relevance, personnel burden, environmental constraints, etc. It should be noted 
that assessments and/or weighting criteria used to evaluate offerors’ technologies will vary 
depending on the urgency and/or specifics of the operational imperative, which will vary with 
different study areas. 
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More than 130 emerging technologies or engineering innovations were submitted in 
response to the S2ME2 Special Notice, providing a variety of technology solutions for the 
majority of the capability increments. Ensuring the CCW was wholly capability-based 
reduced the urge to presuppose technical areas and solution spaces and preserved the 
entire trade space. For example, both swarming UUVs and post-processed surface search 
radar returns were able to provide bathymetry predictions in an amphibious environment. In 
fact, at the time of the Force Engagement Team (FET) workshop, only one of the highly-
valued capability increments had less than two technology options. In general, highly valued 
increments of capability that garner few to zero submissions are typically fed back into the 
S&T and/or R&D communities for action.  
Technical and operational assessments during S2ME2 were iterative and repeated 
to gather more detailed and quantitative data as the Task Force progressed through the 
series of workshops, exercises, and experimentation events. Leadership was continuously 
informed by additional quantitative data gathered throughout the assessment process. 
Sample outputs from more than 50 dynamic and almost 30 static technologies assessed at 
S2ME2 ANTX are depicted above in Figure 6. During the ANTX, each technology was 
grouped into one or more of six exercise teams. Teams Shield, Spear, Dagger, Cutlass, 
Broadsword, and Battleaxe were formed around mission threads shown in Figure 9. Team 
Battleaxe, the sixth team, focused on the persistent aspects of amphibious command, 
control, communications, and ISR that could be applicable to both raid and assault 
scenarios. 
 
Note. Team Broadsword’s “capability concept” is highlighted in red. 
Figure 9. S2ME2 Teams by Mission-Threads 
A “capability concept” is the combination of a valued set of capability increments and 
an associated concept of operations. A capability concept is solution agnostic and may 
include many different technology options, and permutations thereof. Team Broadsword’s 
associated capability concept is highlighted in red in Figure 9. Force Valuations, described 
above, provide insight into the highest valued increments of capability. Technical and 
operational assessments provide insight into the most promising emerging technologies. 
The combination of this data is used to prioritize exploration efforts and inform near-term 
rapid prototyping investments. It should be noted that a capability concept is not intended to 
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fully define a system, or systems, as in the form of a “detailed specification.” Once 
technologies are identified for follow-on rapid prototyping and experimentation efforts, 
systems engineering effort and expertise are required to fully decompose the system of 
systems required for end-to-end integration of a given capability concept.  
Major Element: Innovation Events 
Innovation is fostered throughout the life of the Task Force, enabled primarily 
through the expansive characterization of a capability-based trade space where technology 
and tactics are fully characterized and the direct and continuous interaction between our 
Fleet/Force operators and planners and practicing scientists and engineers. This second 
element is so foundational to our strategy and to our methods that it was highlighted as the 
second key enabler of acquisition reform through experimentation and agility (Stackley, 
2016).  
Fleet/Force operators and planners, like those from our warfighting development 
centers and current or recent deployers, must be “current” on advanced tactics, and they 
must be empowered by an Operational Champion to develop them within specific missions 
and scenarios. Practicing scientists and engineers should be experts in the “state of the art” 
with a solid grasp of technical capabilities and limitations of the “bleeding” technological 
edge. Helpful hints specific to promoting innovation throughout the various phases of effort 
are provided in Table 2. For example, during a FET workshop, experts are asked to 
articulate new and innovative capabilities and technological solutions. During an ANTX, 
experts are provided a loosely scripted event where new and innovative technology/tactics 
pairings are captured and assessed. Facilitating these “direct and continuous interactions 
between our scientists and engineers and the Sailors and Marines they support will drive 
innovation and more importantly, align technical ideas with operational needs at the earliest 
stages in prototype development and experimentation” (Stackley, 2015, p. 5). 
Table 2. Hints for Promoting Innovation 
 
SBD principles are applied to the decision-making that occurs throughout the TnTE2 
continuum.  
 Full exploration of the trade space is enabled by the capability-based 
framework and full and open calls to government and industry partners. 
 Progressive and iterative series of prototyping and experimentation events 
are used to gather more qualitative and quantitative information.  
 Expansive consideration of technology/tactical pairings are characterized and 
evaluated prior to making decisions to proceed to the next phase. 
SBD principles and decision-making methodologies are applied to ensure that trade 
spaces are fully characterized with dense and diverse sets of tactics and technology 
pairings. Force valuations, technical and operational assessments, and visualization tools 
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provide leadership with the ability to make rapid data-driven decisions. The TnTE2 
continuum is shown Figure 10. The TnTE2 continuum includes exploration, rapid 
prototyping, Fleet/Force experimentation, and rapid fielding phases. The CCW, or the 
“framework,” is continuously matured and developed, informed throughout the continuum by 
innovations in tactics and/or disruptive technologies. Even as initial decisions are made, the 
framework and solution trade space can be updated and reemployed as technologies, 
threats, and budgets change. 
 
Figure 10. TnTE2 Continuum 
For S2ME2, the exploration phase was realized through the first-ever TnTE2 ANTX 
event. As described above, ANTXs are a very low-barrier-to-entry event where technologists 
demonstrate their technologies with operator participation and observation in a field or 
simulated environment. Speed and scope are prioritized; full integration is of lower priority. 
Technologies are demonstrated to operators in choreographed mission threads to help them 
assess the potential impact of the technology on advanced tactics. In many cases, 
advanced sensors or algorithms are demonstrated on COTS platforms that are not intended 
for fielding or acquisition. In these cases, the analysis and assessment must remain focused 
on the contribution of the specific emerging technology, not the platform. Even throughout 
these early stages, balanced and focused partnership with operational experts is critical. 
Emerging concepts of operations and tactics must be informed by the technological art of 
the possible, and technological solutions must be informed by emerging concepts of 
operations. S2ME2 Task Force findings confirmed observations from The Politics of Naval 
Innovation that a single, “new technology has not revolutionized naval warfare. … It was the 
final integration of several technologies,” most already existing that were simply applied in 
new ways that included: “1) synthesis—new combinations of existing technologies, 2) a 
keystone—a missing link for a new ensemble of technologies, or 3) tactical innovation—new 
uses for existing forces” (Lautenschlager, 1983, p. 50).  
TnTE2 methods and an exploration phase of significant scope and scale, such as 
realized through ANTXs, are the catalysts that ignite an extensive campaign of rapid 
prototyping, rapid fielding, and accelerated acquisitions. Highly-valued technologies are 
- 354 - 
selected to proceed to rapid prototyping, experimentation, and fielding phases for extended 
user evaluations. Concepts of employment are continuously evolved throughout the process 
and tested during these phases. Operators refine the concepts of employment and inform 
technology refinement while technologists are documenting top-level requirements, interface 
requirements, architectures, and cost data. Tight integration of operational and technical 
experts, documentation, and learning is paramount. The S2ME2 Task Force focused “on 
testing out ideas and concepts first and getting fast feedback through rapid prototyping” 
(DoN, 2016). USMC and ASN(RD&A) are embracing these methods as the new paradigm 
for rapidly identifying and integrating new technologies into military tactics, informing Naval 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions, and guiding future Navy and/or Marine Corps acquisitions.  
Remaining Work  
TnTE2 tools and methods continue to be refined, and planning has begun for future 
initiatives and Task Forces focused on other Navy and Marine Corps mission priorities. The 
areas provided below have been identified as opportunities to expand the impact of TnTE2 
methods and to ensure more confident transitions.  
 Funding expressly identified to support rapid prototyping, experimentation, 
and demonstration efforts which may be allocated within budget execution 
years based on data provided by open, merit-based methods such as TnTE2 
 Direct and deliberate implementation of alternate financing vehicles, such as 
prize challenges, multi-award contracts, Other Transactions (OTs; DAU, 
2017), throughout the TnTE2 continuum to enable rapid financing actions at 
the various decision points 
 Improvements in NR&DE and DoN processes and databases such that the 
framework and solution trade space, aka the “Tech Bank,” can be updated 
and reemployed as technologies, threats, and budgets change. 
 Automation and improved visualization of the technical and operational 
assessments made during ANTXs to enable even greater decision speed  
 Strategies and methods for rapid security classification of many-to-many 
technology and tactics pairings 
 Direct and deliberate use of TnTE2 methods in other wargame series, such 
as USN and USMC Title 10 wargames 
 Improvements to the NR&DE live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) ranges for 
concept exploration through experimentation events 
 Efforts to expedite integration and installation of prototypes into Fleet/Force 
tactical systems 
 Direct and deliberate integration of TnTE2 with acquisition and POM planning 
efforts 
The authors continue to seek opportunities to expand and apply TnTE2 methods to 
high-priority, emerging, and complex warfighting areas, where the technology and tactics 
trade space are inherently complex. Planning efforts are underway for the first-ever tri-
chartered ANTX with direct involvement of an operational Fleet command. Planned for 
December 2018, the next ANTX will focus on Information Warfare as it applies to the 
emerging concept of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). 
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Evolving Accelerated Acquisition 
Since 2015, NR&DE’s FET-led efforts like SMI, CsUAS, UxS, and ACST and more 
recent S2ME2 and U5G Task Forces have laid important groundwork for TnTE2. S2ME2 
and U5G Task Forces embraced the full potential of a unified partnership between operators 
and technologists. As a result of these recent Task Forces, TnTE2 methods identified 
impactful, mature technology candidates and initiated several rapid fieldings. While the DoN 
was leaning forward with TnTE2 methods and agile teaming constructs, Congress initiated 
the largest acquisition reform since the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Act. Although our traditional 
defense acquisition system will continue to guide most major defense platform acquisition, 
the 2016 and 2017 NDAAs authorize alternate pathways to accelerate urgent and 
component-level acquisition (USG, 2016, 2017). 
Middle-Tier Acquisition (Section 804) and Acquisition Agility (Section 806) pathways 
are depicted in Figure 11. These new authorities recognize that increased use of rapid 
prototype development and experimentation early in a program’s formulation are 
fundamental to improving acquisition outcomes (Dougherty, 2018; GAO, 2017). Additionally, 
they allow for agile methods and approaches, such as TnTE2, to be applied throughout the 
problem identification and definition phases, limited trials, and decision points. 
 
Figure 11. Alternate Acquisition Pathways 
Specifically, Middle Tier Acquisition introduced authorities that release certain 
service urgent programs from constraints in the Department of Defense (DoD) Instructions 
and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. In 
addition, Middle Tier Acquisitions allow the services to establish a flexible rapid prototyping 
fund to accelerate programs within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE) cycles. Acquisition Agility introduced authorities to acquire incremental capabilities 
by separating “component /technology acquisition” from “platform acquisition” for Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). This component acquisition allows components and 
their underlying technologies to be developed through an agile framework. Their host 
platform(s) requiring substantial investment will remain in the inventory for decades and will 
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be acquired through the established, deliberate, acquisition process. Using these new 
pathways depends on the services’ ability to prototype, experiment, and integrate 
components seamlessly into host platforms. These authorities could fundamentally alter how 
we execute MDAPs and provide alternative acquisition strategies to programs leveraging 
new methods, like TnTE2, which embrace open, competitive, merit-based, and fast 
acquisition as the rule vice the exception. 
The implementing policies for these alternate acquisition authorities are being 
developed by DoN leadership and experts in the Accelerated Acquisition “War Room,” 
located in Crystal City, VA. The following have been identified as the key enablers to 
accelerating acquisitions:  
 Organizational Constructs, which recognize and are comfortable employing 
new acquisition authorities, pathways, and tools aimed at agility and 
responsiveness 
 Technical Authority culture and process change to embrace speed to 
capability, risk, and uncertainty as sources of resiliency  
 Innovative Contract and Agreement Strategies to leverage inherent 
authorities and employ new tools applied to the appropriate level of service  
 Innovative Financing Constructs, which leverage DoD, national, and global 
investments in technology  
 Modern Systems Development and Engineering Methods, such as “agile” 
and “DevOps” that accelerate and streamline development, test, and 
deployment  
 Financial Management Methods and Benchmarks, which encourage 
agility and nimble financial decisions, obligations, and expenditures within a 
budget cycle  
 Cost Accounting Regulations and Practices aligned to the spirit of the 
Acquisition Agility Act, which are capable of monitoring Platform affordability 
without limiting incremental increases in capability 
 Expanded availability and access to Fleet/Force Experiments for extended 
user evaluation periods 
 Strategies and organizational alignment for rapid Security Classification 
determinations  
 Delegation of Authority to the lowest possible level 
 Flexible and agile Requirements Development methods that provide 
acquisition professionals the trade space to deliver technically and tactically 
relevant capability 
Acquisition professionals with expertise in one, or more, of these transition-enabling 
subject areas are strongly encouraged to visit the Accelerated Acquisition War Room to 
explore opportunities to contribute to this DoN Strategic Initiative. 
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A Future Perspective 
“Deliver performance at the speed of relevance. Success no longer goes to the 
country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it 
and adapts its way of fighting.” (DoD, 2018, p. 10) 
While this paper is about a method proven for rapid prototyping and capability 
development, we must acknowledge the inextricable linkage between operators and the 
technical and acquisition workforce necessary to institutionalize our ability to deliver 
capability at the speed of relevance. General McChrystal’s experience in Iraq, described in 
his excellent book, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World 
(McChrystal et al., 2015), describes a transformation of linear thinking and organizational 
charts into a new interwoven structure enabling parallel plans and execution, not at the 
squad level but across the enterprise. The general’s foe bore little resemblance to our peer 
naval competitors, but the Internet-enabled, shape-shifting environment he encountered has 
clear parallels to the contested maritime and uncertain fiscal environments we face. If the 
fight goes to the side who best understands and exploits the environment, and it usually 
does, then the environment is our “Rosetta Stone.” In increasingly complex warfighting 
environments, adaptability, not control, reigns supreme. It follows that an adaptable 
structure should form the basis of our acquisition system and strategy. OPNAV strategic 
planner CDR Frank Goertner recently observed that Russia and China “both appear intent 
on being first to learn early and learn fast in the operating environment” (Goertner, 2018). 
Second place has little value in that race. 
As technology, peer capability, and the rapidly changing interdependency between 
them proliferate, how will naval research, development, and acquisition change its structure 
to pace technology and outpace our adversaries? Taking full advantage of Congressional 
authorities is just the first step. If accelerating new system fieldings from 10 years to one 
year satisfies us today, what should satisfy us in the future, and how will that change over 
time? It takes both experience and imagination to answer that question. It means blending 
enduring ideas, like deterrence and combined arms maneuver, with new trans-regional 
complexities like Information Warfare. It requires conceptually refreshing and refitting how 
we deploy and sustain highly agile, lethal, expeditionary formations, and that requires faster 
decision-making. Faster decisions, at the Enterprise level, require flat, dynamic reporting 
chains, shared situational awareness, and trust, which can only be developed deliberately 
and systemically by the many, versus accidentally or episodically by the few.  
Looking ahead, we imagine the ability to download, print, or otherwise create new 
warfighting capability in the thick of a fight, in minutes or seconds, or fractions of sections. 
That kind of responsiveness certainly requires some new technology, but it may also require 
methods like TnTE2, alternate acquisition mechanisms, and agile teaming constructs. 
Scientists and engineers from across the NR&DE have already begun forming that team 
with our warfighters and acquisition professionals. Our methods unify developers and 
operators in the same way that the DevOps culture unified software developers and 
software operators in commercial industry. The only difference is that our developers know 
that a mistake, or a delay, can cost the life of an operator, a crew, or a fleet. Scientists and 
engineers will be critical shipmates in future conflicts because of the rapid pace of 
technological development.  
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We are not guided here by what we can prove or plan exquisitely, but simply by what 
is necessary. Put another way,  
Until one is committed, there is hesitancy, the chance to draw back. 
Concerning all acts of initiative (and creation), there is one elementary truth, 
the ignorance of which kills countless ideas and splendid plans: that the 
moment one definitely commits oneself, then Providence moves too. All sorts 
of things occur to help one that would never otherwise have occurred. A 
whole stream of events issues from the decision, raising in one’s favor all 
manner of unforeseen incidents and meetings and material assistance, which 
no man could have dreamed would have come his way. … “Whatever you 
can do, or dream you can do, begin it. Boldness has genius, power, and 
magic in it” [Goethe]. (Hutchinson, 1951) 
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Appendix: Annual Naval Technology Exercises and ANTX Summary  
 13 August 2015. NUWC Division Newport hosted the inaugural Annual Naval 
Technology Exercise. Undersea Constellation technology was demonstrated. 
 16–18 August 2016. Cross Domain Communications and Command & 
Control Above, On, and Under the Sea Annual Naval Technology Exercise 
hosted by NUWC Division Newport. Exercise focused on cross-domain 
collaboration for maritime superiority. 
 15–29 April 2017. DASN RDT&E/Marine Corps DC, CD&I Task Force led 
Ship to Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation (S2ME2). 
ANTX focused on evaluating technology and tactics parings that enable 
high speed and agility in order to rapidly deploy combat capabilities 
from the sea. 
 15–16 August 2017. Battlespace Preparation in a Contested Environment 
hosted by NUWC Newport/Keyport & NSWC Panama City. Exercise focused 
on battlespace preparation in a contested environment. 
 21 August–1 September 2017. ANTX Innovation and Sensor Fusion 
Experimentation Exhibit (ISFEE) hosted by NSWC Crane. Experiment 
focused on networked sensors, weapons, data fusion, data diffusion, 
processing, exploitation and dissemination and a Counter-UAS scenario. 
 13–14 September 2017. Surface Warfare Distributed Lethality in the Littoral 
hosted by NSWC Dahlgren. Demonstration focused on improving air/surface 
warfighting through unmanned system integration. 
 15—23 March 2018. DASN RDT&E/Marine Corps DC, CD&I Task Force 
led Urban 5th Generation (U5G) Marine ANTX. ANTX focused on 
assessing technology and tactics pairings that enable situational 
awareness, counter-reconnaissance, maneuver, fires, and C4I 
operations within and among the populations resident in the urban 
littorals. 
 21–25 May 2018. Coastal Trident 2018 to be hosted by NSWC Port 
Hueneme Division. Demonstration will focus on leveraging new and emerging 
technology to address operational and technical challenges presented by 
asymmetric threats in port and coastal regions. 
 29–31 August 2018. Human-Machine Optimization and Integrated Targeting 
in the Maritime Environment to be hosted by NUWC Division Newport and 
Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (CNMOC). 
Exercise will focus on human-machine Optimization and Integrated Targeting 
in Maritime Environments. 
 TBD December 2018. Information Warfare ANTX to be hosted by SSC 
Pacific and TBD Operational Force/Fleet champion.  
Note: Operational Force championed ANTXs denoted by . 
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Government, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the California Department of Education, 
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and the Arizona Diamondbacks. He teaches courses in cost estimation, systems engineering, sports 
analytics, and the science of baseball. 
Dr. Valerdi is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Cost Analysis and Parametrics and from 2009–2014 
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Naval Postgraduate School. He has 30 years of experience working in industry, academia, and 
consulting in technical and management positions. His research interests include modeling and 
simulation of processes for architecting and engineering of complex systems; system total ownership 
cost modeling and tradespace analysis; systems and software measurement; integrating systems 
engineering and software engineering disciplines; and integrating empirical research with process 
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Experience Searching for Causal Factors in Personal 
Process Student Data 
William R. Nichols, Jr.—joined the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in 2006. He serves as Team 
Software Process (TSP) Mentor Coach and maintains PSP and TSP Software Engineering Data. 
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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to apply recently developed techniques to infer causality 
from observational software engineering data. Determining causation rather than just 
correlation is fundamental to selecting factors that control outcomes such as cost, schedule, 
and quality. The Tetrad tool’s PC and FGES causal search algorithms were applied to 
software engineering data from 4940 programs written in the C programming language 
collected during Personal Software Process (PSP) training. PSP programs have previously 
been used in empirical research quantitative relationships between developer and project 
factors. Both algorithms successfully identified the expected relationships and did not find 
contradictory or implausible associations. Many of the available causal inference search 
algorithms require Gaussian distributional families with linear effects. The linear relationship 
may be especially important for software engineering research and may require prior 
knowledge and data transformation. Because software engineering has depended on small-
scale, low-power experiments, often using non-representative students, inferring causal 
relationships would expand the insight available to researchers. Inferring causation from 
observational software engineering data shows much promise, but is currently limited by 
researcher understanding of the capability and limits of causal inference, the quality of the 
underlying data, and the general requirement for linear effects. 
Introduction 
Despite repeated calls for empirical studies in software engineering (Perry, Porter, & 
Votta, 2000) and guidelines for their conduct (Kitchenham & Dybå, 2004) it is usually 
impractical to run controlled software development experiments. Thus, most data in software 
engineering are observational, presenting challenges to causal inference. Without 
causation, selection or control of factors will not have the desired effect on outcomes. 
Understanding causation is fundamental to the forward-looking control of the software 
development process.  
The epistemological problems of inferring causation from observational data are now 
being overcome (Pearl, Glymour, & Jewell, 2016; Spirtes, 2010) and accepted in research 
(Fedak et al., 2015). This study aims to apply causal search techniques to a previously-
studied software engineering data set to validate the overall approach and gain experience 
with the capabilities and limitations of these methods. 
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Tools for Causal Inference 
The University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), and the Pittsburgh 
Supercomputing Center serve as founding members of the Center for Causal Discovery 
(CCD). The CCD develops and maintains causal algorithms, software, and tools, including 
Tetrad. Tetrad enables users not only to search for causal graphs from a dataset, but also to 
estimate and evaluate parametric models. We applied the PC and FGES algorithms to 
selected data from PSP training. These two algorithms were chosen to exercise two different 
search approaches. 
The PC algorithm, named after its creators Peter Spirtes and Clark Glymour, sets a 
Fisher Z-based p-value cutoff for conditional independence testing. The FGES algorithm 
uses a fast greedy approach to search the space of causal Bayesian networks to return the 
most probable model(s) based on the Bayesian information coefficient (BIC) score 
(Sanchez-Romero et al., 2018). Both algorithms assume that each node is a linear function 
of its parents plus a Gaussian noise term. 
One advantage of score-based search algorithms over constraint-based search 
algorithms is that they can obtain quite accurate adjacencies within the causal graph 
equivalence class. Also, score-based algorithms typically output only directed or undirected 
edges. Because equivalence class scoring almost always favors one orientation over the 
other, bi-directed edges are rare. A limitation of score-based search algorithms is that they 
can be slow and might not scale as well as constraint-based searches. 
Generally in our analyses, we don’t have full knowledge of how well the assumptions 
of the various search algorithms are met, so we usually employ more than one algorithm. 
Also, because they rely on different mathematical mechanisms to construct the output graph 
(MEC), we favor applying one or more constraint-based searches and one or more score-
based searches, and comparing for commonalities in the direct causal relationships that are 
identified. This provides some protection against the uncertainties about how well the 
various assumptions are met by the dataset analyzed. Employing two or more search 
algorithms based on different mathematical approaches for inferring causal structure also 
allows us to take advantage of their respective strengths (e.g., there is less ambiguity in the 
direction of causality with score-based searches). 
Personal Software Process (PSP) Data 
Dataset Summary 
The Personal Software Process was developed by Watts Humphrey at the Software 
Engineering Institute to demonstrate how an individual can apply the process principles 
underlying the Capability Maturity Model for personal work. The PSP contains coherent 
frameworks for defining the development process and measurements for process and 
products. A progressive development process with activity steps, measurements, and a 
sequence of training assignment exercises is described in A Discipline for Software 
Engineering (Humphrey, 1995).  
PSP classes are taught by trained and authorized instructors who submit resulting 
data to the Software Engineering Institute for use in research. Several versions of the 
course have been taught over the years; this study uses the 10-assignment course taught 
primarily through 2006 because it contains a large sample and consists primarily of 
professional software developers rather than university students. Additional descriptions of 
the data and prior analyses can be found in Rombach et al. (2008) and Vallespir and 
Nichols (2012). For this study, because we wanted to reduce the number of potential hidden 
confounding factors, we selected only programs using the C programming language and 
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students who completed the entire 10-program sequence. Although using only a subset of 
the data introduces some risk for bias, lack of hidden confounders is a key assumption for 
both search algorithms.  
Data Attributes 
When using PSP for the program exercises, students record the direct (i.e., 
stopwatch) time engaged in particular activities (e.g., planning, design, design review, code, 
code review, compile, test, post mortem analysis) along with information on the defects 
injected and removed in each phase. For the more focused analysis that is the subject of 
this report, we used only the total effort (sum of all activities), the construction activity effort 
(design and code), and the total defects for the 494 students using the C programming 
language and implementing all 10 assignments. The data variables we examined were as 
follows: 
1. Assignment Average Minutes (abbreviated AsgAveMin)—for each of the 10 
program assignments, the average of the log-transformed effort required by 
the 494 students using the C programming language to complete that 
assignment. AsgAveMin can be thought of as a proxy for the requirements 
size of each program. (AsgAveMin is defined for 10 assignments.) 
2. Student Size Factor (abbreviated StuSizeFactor)—for each of the 494 
students, the ratio of total new lines of code written by the student for the 10 
program assignments compared to the total new lines of code written for the 
10 program assignments averaged across all 494 students. (StuSizeFactor is 
defined for 494 students.) 
3. Student Effort Factor (abbreviated StuEffFactor)—for each of the 494 
students, the ratio of the student’s total effort for the 10 program assignments 
to the overall student average. Thus, StuEffFactor is very similar to 
StuSizeFactor, but focuses on a student’s total effort rather than the total new 
lines of code written. (StuEffFactor is defined for 494 students.) 
4. Student Defect Arrival Rate (abbreviated StuDAR)—for each of the 494 
students, the ratio of defects introduced during program design and code 
activities (that is, during construction to the construction effort). This factor 
characterizes a student’s specific tendency to introduce defects while 
developing software, using “defects per hour” as the unit. Using hours as the 
unit instead of the more common minutes should not affect causal inference 
and provides a better scale for the log-transform. (StuDAR is defined for 494 
students.) 
5. Construction Minutes (abbreviated ConstMin)—for each of the 494 students 
and 10 program assignments, the effort expended in construction (design and 
code) activities, measured in minutes. Thus, ConstMin does not include effort 
expended in planning, reviews, compile, and test. (ConstMin is defined for 
494 students and 10 program assignments.) 
6. Lines of Code for the product (abbreviated LOC)—for each of the 494 
students and 10 program assignments, the sum of added and modified 
logical lines of code written. Thus, LOC does not include lines of code that 
were reused without modification. (LOC is defined for 494 students and 10 
program assignments.) 
7. Total Development Effort (abbreviated MinTot)—for each of the 494 students 
and 10 program assignments, the student’s total effort expended on the 
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program assignment, measured in minutes. (MinTot is defined for 494 
students and 10 program assignments.) 
8. Total Number of Defects Injected and Discovered (abbreviated DefTot)—the 
number of defects discovered after the step in which they were injected is 
completed. For example, any design defect discovered during coding would 
be counted, but not a defect both introduced and discovered in the same 
design phase. Also, a typo corrected during normal coding would not count, 
but a typo discovered by a compiler would. We asked students using 
interactive development environments to disable automated checking so that 
these defects would be visible and counted in compile. (DefTot is defined for 
494 students and 10 program assignments.) 
Note that AsgAveMin can be thought of as a proxy for the requirements size because 
each student must perform the same exact 10 exercises. The exercises vary in difficulty as 
does the amount of code required to implement those requirements. Thus, rather than using 
an estimate based on function points as a measure of requirements size, we estimate the 
relative size of specific exercises from the arithmetic average of the log-transformed effort 
expended on an exercise across all developers.  
By taking the log transformation, we accomplish several purposes. First, we reduce 
the effect of outliers, helping to make the search algorithms we utilize less sensitive to 
outliers, and thus the model(s) returned from causal search more stable. Second, 
transformed distribution is approximately Gaussian, which the theorems for consistent 
convergence of the chosen algorithms require. Third, the log transformation will later help to 
linearize factor effects. 
 
Figure 1. Individual Values Plot of Actual Effort for Each Programming 
Assignment 
Figure 1 shows that individual effort distributes widely for each programming 
exercise. The bulls-eye symbols indicate the median and the circles (connected by a line) 
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are the mean. The differences are statistically significant differences between program 
assignments. The mean values are also shown in a scatterplot of size versus effort in Figure 
2 , which also shows that the size varies by nearly a factor of three, while effort varies by 
roughly a factor of two. We interpret slope as code production rate and the intercept as a 
start-up cost. We decided to use only the effort factor for this study because for the 
aggregate, the correlation between size and effort is very strong, suggesting that adding 
size does not add much information. In this figure, the averages were computed from the log 
transformed data, then retransformed into the natural units of LOC and minutes. 
 
Figure 2. Correlation Between Program Size and Effort for 10 PSP “C” 
Programming Language Exercises 
We also included factors that account for programmer variability. The software 
engineering literature contains numerous studies reporting variation in programmer 
productivity (Sackman, Erikson, & Grant, 1968; Curtis, 1981; Valett & McGarry, 1989; 
DeMarco & Lister, 1999; Card, 1987; DeMarco & Lister, 1985; Sheil, 1981). Few studies, 
however, explicitly report individual differences in defects or size of solutions to similar 
problems. Nonetheless, a more recent work (Caliskan et al., 2018) reports that individual 
programmer characteristics can be identified from the compiled (and even optimized) binary. 
We decided to explicitly account for programmer idiosyncrasies in coding style, line counting 
standards, and solution approach with programmer-specific factors that affect product size, 
defect counts, and production rates. This is supported by a separate ANOVA analysis of the 
data that finds that such programmer factors are statistically significant and approximately 
doubles the amount of variance accounted for by the coefficient of determination (from R2 ≈ 
0.3 to R2 > 0.6). The untransformed distributions of student factors (StuSizeFactor and 
StuEffFactor) seem to follow lognormal distributions as shown in Figure 3 (note the heavy 
skew to the right); and the log-transformed data (lnStuSizeFactor and lnStuEffFactor) thus 
approximately follow normal distributions as shown in Figure 4. Defect arrival rates 
(StuDAR), untransformed and transformed, are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
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Figure 3. Histogram of Student Size and Effort Factors (494 Points) 
The untransformed student-dependent size and effort factors are shown in Figure 3. 
The log-transformed distributions approximate a Gaussian as shown in Figure 4. Please 
note that the scales in the paired plots may differ and ordinates are displayed below the left 
hand plot but above the right hand plot. 
 
Figure 4. Histograms of Log-Transformed Student Size and Effort Factors 
The defect arrival rate is the student’s rate of injecting defects during design and 
coding activities. Because this can be zero, we have added an offset of 1.0 in the 
transformation to prevent negative rates. This small offset will not affect the search provided 
that the distribution is approximately Gaussian. The StuDAR at zero are likely an artifact of 
data gathering practices. We are, however, reluctant to clean the data because of the threat 
of introducing bias. 
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Figure 5. Student Defect Arrival Rate (494 points) 
 
Figure 6. Log of the Student Defect Arrival Rate (494 Points)  
For our initial model, we examine the construction time (ConstMin) as a candidate 
causal contributor to lines of code and defects, and total effort (respectively LOC, DefTot, 
and MinTot). See Figure 7 for a histogram of ConstMin. Mathematically, construction time is 
a product of the construction rate times and the product size. Because this rate may already 
be implicit in other programmer factors, we avoided using it in this analysis. Moreover, that 
rate may be causal, but uncontrollable. Other factors, including estimation accuracy, effort in 
review, and review rates, will be considered in future work. For this analysis we use the 
construction effort because the expected model described in a later section is simple to 
construct and interpret, thus helping to validate the overall approach. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Construction Effort and Log Transform of Construction 
Minutes of Effort (4940 Points) 
The outcomes of interest are the program size measured in Lines of Code (LOC; 
shown in Figure 8), total effort measured in minutes (MinTot; shown in Figure 9) and total 
defects (DefTot; shown in Figure 10). 
 
Figure 8. Students’ Sum of Added and Modified Logical Lines of Code (LOC) and 
Log-Transformed LOC for Each Student Exercise Pair (4940 points) 
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Figure 9. Students’ Total Effort in Minutes (MinTot) and Log-Transformed MinTot 
for Each Student Exercise Pair (4940 Points) 
 
Figure 10. Students’ Total Number of Defects Injected and Discovered (DefTot) and 
Log-Transformed DefTot for Each Student Exercise Pair (4940 Points) 
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Data Analysis Approach 
Research Objective 
For this study, we wanted to  
 evaluate the effectiveness of applying the causal search algorithms to the 
PSP software engineering data. 
 determine effective data transformations that facilitate correct use of the 
selected causal search algorithms. 
The PSP data is useful for this research because 
1. All students develop programs from the same specifications. 
2. The measurements framework is required and reinforced by instructors. 
3. The data has been analyzed before and is familiar (Rombach et al., 2008; 
Grazioli, Nichols, & Vallespir, 2014; Vallespir & Nichols, 2011; Vallespir & 
Nichols, 2012). 
Based on prior analysis and experience, we expected some correlating factors to 
exhibit a causal relationship. 
Expected Models 
PSP data is used in planning and tracking projects that are run according to the 
Team Software Process (TSP). In TSP planning, estimates of component size, conversion 
factors to lines of code, overall production rates, activity effort distributions, historical defect 
injection rates, and activity defect removal yield are used to predict likely outcomes (Nichols, 
2012).  
For a PSP programming assignment (i) and student (j) pair, we would expect—
without examining any process data—that the program size can be estimated by the 
untransformed values:  
𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑗      (1) 
In the above, we can use the average effort (AsgAveMin) as a proxy for ReqSize. 
The actual size will likely vary based on factors such as design versus code effort. This is 
not yet modeled.  
Likewise, we expect the student effort (j) for each program should be related to the 
assignment size and student dependent factor: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 =  𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 × 𝑆𝐸𝐹𝑗      (2) 
Total development time should also be influenced by other factors, including design-
specific effort review time and review effectiveness (not included in this model) and the 
actual defect arrivals. The defect arrivals should be related to the student’s (j) defect 
tendencies, the program size (i), and the actual effort in construction (ij). It is during 
construction (design and coding) that most defects are injected. 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 × 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑗    (3) 
That these relationships are products is a problem for the search algorithms. We will, 
therefore, take advantage of the observation that the values from the left hand side of these 
equations distribute approximately lognormally, by using log transforms. The resulting 
transformed equations and data thus consists of a linear sum of normally-distributed data, 
making them more suitable for the search algorithms we intend to employ.  
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If the causal search is successful in finding consistent causal models involving these 
four introduced factors for problem requirements size and three developer traits 
(respectively, ReqSizei, SSFj, SEFj, and StuDARj), we will have added support to the case 
that these factors can be useful for prediction and mitigation in software development, at 
least at the individual and team levels for planning and tracking. 
Causal Discovery 
We ran the PC search algorithm with alpha = .05 (a hyper-parameter defining the p-
value cutoff for inferring conditional independence) and the domain-knowledge constraints 
described below.  
Tetrad allows users to add constraints regarding the required presence or absence 
of a particularly-oriented direct causal relationship between two nodes (i.e., parameters). For 
example, a causal link may be required or forbidden or the direction restricted. A known 
temporal order can be enforced by placing the nodes into knowledge-box tiers such that 
causality is only permitted forward, not backward. Adjacencies between nodes appearing 
within the same tier may be allowed or forbidden. We chose to structure tiers as follows: 
 Tier 1: Assignment Average Minutes (AsgAveMin), Student Size Factor 
(StuSizeFactor), Student Effort Factor (StuEffFactor), and Student Defect 
Arrival Rate (StudDAR)  
 Tier 2: Construction Minutes (ConstMin) 
 Tier 3: Lines of Code (LOC), Total Effort (MinTot), and Total Number of 
Defects Injected and Discovered (DefTot) 
Essentially the tiers correspond to pre-development inputs (characteristics of the 
problem or developers), in-process data (the construction effort in minutes), and process 
outputs (size, effort, and total defects). The default setting is that nodes in the same tier can 
have direct causal relationships between them, but a node in a lower tier (assigned a higher 
number) cannot have an oriented edge pointing to a node in a higher tier (assigned a lower 
number). 
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Results 
Node Links 
The search results are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. There are some 
differences but no explicit contradictions.  
 
Figure 11. Resulting DAG From Tetrads PC Search Algorithm for Data From 
Programs Written in C 
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Figure 12. Resulting DAG From Tetrads FGES Search Algorithm for Data From 
Programs Written in C  
The following direct causal edges occur in both graphs: 
1. AsgAveMin --> ConstMin 
2. AsgAveMin --> LOC 
3. AsgAveMin  --> MinTot 
4. ConstMin  --> MinTot 
5. MinTot  --> DefectTot 
6. StuEffFactor  --> ConstMin 
7. StuEffFactor  --> MinTot 
8. StuSizeFactor --> LOC 
The following undirected causal edge occurs in both graphs: 
1. StuEffFactor --- StuDAR (This means there’s evidence of a direct causal 
relationship between the two nodes, but there’s insufficient information to 
determine the direction.) 
The following directed causal edges occur in only one graph: 
1. ConstMin --> LOC (The graphs returned by PC shows as a bidirected 
edge, meaning there’s evidence for a hidden confounder of the two nodes.) 
2. StuDAR --> DefectTot (The graphs returned by PC shows as a 
bidirected edge, meaning there’s evidence for a hidden confounder of the two 
nodes.) 
3. StuEffFactor  --> LOC 
4. StuSizeFactor  --> ConstMin 
5. StuSizeFactor  --> DefectTot 
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The following undirected causal edge occurs in only one graph: 
1. StuSizeFactor --- StuDAR 
Threats to Validity 
Internal Validity  
That the PSP data collection forms filled out and collected during PSP training were 
consistent and completely filled in did not necessarily mean that students recorded complete 
and accurate data. Others (Johnson et al., 2003) found significant errors, though these 
seem primarily to be in hand calculations prior to automated tool support. Our analysis relies 
only upon direct measures for which all further calculations are performed by the data-
gathering spreadsheet used during training. Nonetheless, data correctness validation relies 
upon the diligence of the student and instructor. 
The difficulty of the exercises or rigor required by the course may lead to a survival 
bias. Excepting the LOC counter, which is the very first exercise, the series of exercises 
consists of writing programs that must perform statistical and floating-point math 
calculations. Some are more complicated and challenging to program than others, and 
many students failed to complete the course, perhaps in part due to challenges they 
encountered while working on these problems. Our analysis uses only data from students 
who completed the course. 
There may also be a bias in the experience of the students regarding domain 
experience with statistics or programming experience in general. The data used for the 
study includes 494 software practitioners who took part in the training at the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) or at external locations. The data provided limited information 
that could help us measure the programmers’ experience. We have indications of years of 
programming and the number of lines of code in the target language, but no information 
about domain experience. It is likely that more domain-experienced programmers (i.e., those 
with strong elementary knowledge of statistics and linear algebra) performed better.  
There is some risk of maturation bias. The PSP course deliberately teaches 
estimation, design techniques, and review of both code and designs, while the developers 
may gain experience within the numeric programming domain. The maturation effect on total 
defects and defects escaping into test is evident. Although total code production rate 
appears to be unchanged, the overall rate does initially slow, then return to near its original 
level. The risks with respect to inference on the effects of PSP training were addressed in 
Rombach et al. (2008) and Hayes and Over (1997); however, there could also be process-
drift effects. 
External Validity  
We report only on results from the C programming language. By selecting only data 
from students using C, we have mitigated issues arising from the use of different 
programming languages between subjects (e.g., in determining StuSizeFactor) at the 
expense of some generality. Different languages can be more or less suited to solving 
certain programming problems, and this could affect the assignment normalization factors. 
Future analyses will compare results with other programming languages. 
Because the work was performed in class settings rather than under normal 
industrial conditions, there is a risk that the results might not generalize beyond the 
academic setting.  
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Construct Validity 
The program assignment requirements were deliberately left vague on some key 
points, mostly related to the specifics of input and output formats, error checking, and so 
forth. Individual interpretations of the requirements could vary somewhat, adding some 
variation to implemented program size and effort.  
Our proxy for an independent measure of program size, the average effort in minutes 
(AsgAveMin), aggregated these individual programmer choices and thus might be subject to 
some systematic bias.  
Discussion 
All the identified causal relationships have face plausibility. Larger assignments 
cause more effort and larger amounts of code. The expected relationships for size and effort 
both appear reasonable. The relationship with defects is less clear. The FGES search 
algorithm finds the StuDAR and total effort (MinTot) rather than construction effort causing 
defects, while PC-Stable has a bidirected edge (double arrow) between DefectTot and 
StuDAR (indicating a hidden confounder). PC also has a connection from StuSizeFactor to 
DefectTot. 
It is possible that the algorithms lead to slightly different models because the data is 
from mixed-causal systems or is insufficient. Another possibility is that there is overlapping 
information in these specific variable constructs (creating dependencies with hidden 
variables). To avoid this problem it is often preferable to use only direct rather than derived 
values; however, that approach runs into the problem that both PC and FGES assume linear 
relationships between a child node and its parents, plus a Gaussian noise term. Additional 
work will be needed to find better variable selections with minimal variable overlap, paired 
with the most appropriately-selected causal search algorithms. In particular, there are 
search algorithms that were designed to search for non-linear causal relationships among 
variables having skewed noise distributions; and there are still variants, as well, that 
endeavor to take into account hidden confounders.  
We offer several observations of lessons learned during this exploratory work.  
First, it is imperative to visualize the data. We are not yet certain of the sensitivity to 
deviations from Gaussian, but single peaks and lack of outliers are surely important. 
Moreover, the distribution characteristics affect the available transforms. We have focused 
on simple relationships, but these will not get us from planning through production. Much 
work remains to model more complex and stepwise systems. 
Second, mechanistic relationships with direct measures can become complicated. 
Using derived measures risks including the same factor multiple times and can lead to 
mathematical artifacts because of ratios. The requirement for linear effects constrains the 
available choices in ways that are not immediately obvious. Moreover, it is not yet clear that 
the natural mechanistic models can be successfully transformed for analysis by the 
algorithms currently available. 
Third, while transformations can sometimes simplify the problem, they make the data 
relationships less intuitive.  
Forth, count data, such as defects, can be poorly behaved with low numbers. We 
counter this first by counting all defects, not just test, and by using an offset of “+1.” 
Nonetheless, the distributions can become noticeably discrete on the left-hand side of the 
peak. 
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Fifth, the data quality and consistency are a concern. Long lists of problems with 
software engineering data are available (Shull, Singer, & Sjøberg, 2008). The analyst must 
be keenly aware of the strengths and weaknesses of particular datasets.  
Ultimately, the causal mechanisms we expected to see do appear in the resulting 
models and implausible causal mechanisms do not. Which specific models are better 
predictors of future performance is left for future work.  
Conclusion 
The PC and FGES search algorithms returned results that are generally consistent 
with each other and with overall expectations.  
Causal inference methods should be applied in software engineering, but with 
caution. We have made only initial steps toward assessing the degree to which different 
search algorithms are sensitive to deviations from the assumptions about shape (Gaussian 
for some, skewed for others), outliers, linear effects, or homoscedasticity. Real datasets are 
likely to be subject to problems of construct validity, measurement inconsistency, 
determinism, and process drift. Guidelines on reporting data characteristics and the 
sensitivity of different algorithms will be included in future work. 
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Abstract 
Correlation does not imply causation. Though this is a well-known fact, most 
analyses depend on correlation as proof of relationships that are often treated as causal. 
Causal search, also referred to as causal discovery, involves the application of statistical 
methods to identify causal relationships using conditional independences (and/or other 
statistical relationships) within data. Though software cost estimation models use both 
domain knowledge and statistics, to date, there has yet to be a published report describing 
the evaluation of a software dataset using causal search. In a previous paper, the authors 
ran a PC causal search algorithm on Unified Code Count’s (UCC’s)1 dataset of maintenance 
tasks and compared them to correlation test results. This paper builds on the previous paper 
to introduce causal discovery to software engineering research by exploring additional 
causal search algorithms (PC-Stable, fast greedy equivalent search [FGES], and fast 




 http://ucc.usc.edu  
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adjacency skewness [FASK]) and comparing their results to the traditional multi-step 
regression analysis. 
Introduction 
Though analysts seek causation, “data, on their own, only communicate 
associations” (Elwert, 2013). Two variables with high correlations, or associations, may have 
causal or non-causal relationships (Elwert, 2013). Correlations, by themselves, cannot 
generally determine which relationships are causal (Cook, Campbell, & Shadish, 2002). 
Hence, statisticians emphasize correlation does not imply causation. Judea Pearl (2001) 
stated, “Behind every causal conclusion there must lie some causal assumption that is not 
testable in observational studies,” suggesting that one cannot gain complete causal 
knowledge through only observational studies or data alone. Experiments that manipulate 
causal variables can help identify causal relationships (Cook et al., 2002). However, there 
are “practical and ethical considerations that limit the application of controlled experiments in 
many cases” (Spirtes, 2010).  
In software engineering, it is impractical to run software development effort 
experiments. Developing the same software with various personnel attributes or 
manipulating the project's size and product attributes with the same team would become 
very expensive for software development teams. Hence, most data in software engineering 
are observational versus from controlled experiments. Though causal inference (which 
includes causal search) is characterized as “finding answers to questions about the 
mechanisms by which variables come to take on values, or predicting the value of a variable 
after some other variable has been manipulated” (Spirtes, 2010), estimation model 
developers have not used such statistical methods to confirm or reject causal assumptions. 
Until recently, estimation model developers lacked the tools to systematically evaluate 
whether the size and effort drivers identified by software project experts do, in fact, have 
significant (both in the statistical and effect size sense) causal effects on effort and, 
therefore, should be preferred for selection over other candidate drivers for effort estimation.  
Using the theory of causal inference, one can now perform a causal search “based 
on unmanipulated data” (Spirtes, 2010). According to Spirtes, causal inference consists of 
two parts: “search for a causal graph, and estimation of the free parameters from sample 
data and the causal graph.” In this paper, the authors run causal search algorithms that 
return causal graphs (the first part defined by Spirtes) with the intent to use the causal 
discovery results to estimate the parameters (the second part defined by Spirtes).  
Previously, the authors reported the differences between correlation test results and 
commonly-used causal search algorithm results on UCC’s dataset of maintenance tasks 
(Hira et al., 2018). This paper builds upon the first paper in several ways. First, the authors 
take the opportunity to discuss the differences between constraint-based versus score-
based search algorithms as both are used in this paper. Second, the authors run additional 
causal search algorithms (of both types) in order to better illustrate some of the other search 
algorithms and their capabilities given a relatively small dataset, and to further confirm or 
modify findings of the first paper in terms of factors having direct or indirect causal effects on 
software development efforts. Third and last, the authors more clearly contrast the traditional 
approach of correlation and multiple regression with that of the causal search approach. 
Interestingly, not all causal search algorithms will necessarily result in the same set of 
causal relationships.  
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Unified Code Count 
Development Environment and Dataset Summary 
The University of Southern California (USC) maintains Unified Code Count (UCC), a 
small- to medium-sized tool that provides source lines of code (SLOC) counting metrics for 
about 30 programming languages, such as logical SLOC (Park, 1992) and cyclomatic 
complexity (McCabe, 1976). UCC is an object-oriented project written in C++, and each 
year, development teams work on enhancements or extensions that range in size from 45 to 
1,425 equivalent source lines of code (ESLOC, defined in the subsection titled Dataset 
Attributes). USC releases an updated UCC annually with new language parsers, additional 
features, and/or additional metrics. UCC's current dataset covers recent projects consisting 
of six new language parser projects, five new features projects (such as GUI interface or 
additional input options), and 19 projects researching and adding cyclomatic complexity 
metrics to UCC's outputs. Data for analysis came from the developed code, weekly 
timesheets, test case documentation with corresponding test data, and explanatory reports 
summarizing the steps taken and the results of projects that began and completed between 
2010 and 2014.  
Dataset Attributes 
Along with size and effort, UCC's dataset contains project and personnel 
characteristics as defined by Constructive Cost Model® (COCOMO®) II. COCOMO® II is a 
parametric software cost estimation model that requires size, product, and personnel 
attributes as input, and outputs the estimated effort in Person-Months (PM). A summary of 
the attributes included in UCC's dataset of maintenance tasks are as follows, where items 
numbered 6 to 13 are effort factors defined by COCOMO® II: 
1. Equivalent Logical Source Lines of Code (ESLOC): Logical SLOC was 
developed and defined by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) to 
standardize SLOC measurement (Park, 1992). Equivalent logical SLOC 
(ESLOC) makes modifications to reused code equivalent to new code, which 
has been calculated using Nguyen's modification to COCOMO® II's reuse 
model (Nguyen, 2010; Boehm, Madachy, & Steece, 2000). 
2.  IFPUG Function Points (FPs): Each project in the dataset has been sized 
using version 4.3.1 of IFPUG's FPs method.  
3. IFPUG Software Non-Functional Assessment Process (SNAP) Points: Each 
project in the dataset has been sized using version 2.3 of IFPUG's SNAP 
method.  
4. COSMIC Function Points (CFPs): Each project in the dataset has been sized 
using version 4.0 of COSMIC's FPs (CFPs) method.  
5. Total Effort: Effort in terms of hours, including time spent on training, 
requirements gathering, coding, testing, and documenting.  
6. Applications Experience (APEX): Most of the personnel that join UCC's 
development team do not have prior industry experience in similar application 
types, though they have sufficient computer science education. Therefore, 
the Low rating is used for APEX on all data points (as opposed to Very Low 
or Nominal, etc.).  
7. Platform Experience (PLEX): The development personnel have little 
experience in the graphical interface platform and building cross-platform 
applications. Hence, a Low rating for PLEX best describes the development 
teams for all data points.  
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8. Use of Software Tools (TOOL): Currently, the UCC development environment 
only uses tools corresponding to the Very Low rating.  
9. Personnel Continuity (PCON): COCOMO® II's highest personnel turnover 
rating is 48% per year. On average, UCC faces a 90% turnover over four 
months. Two of the authors had to adjust the rating value for this parameter 
in a previous study (Hira, Sharma, & Boehm, 2016). 
10. Documentation Match to Life-Cycle Needs (DOCU): All teams are required to 
document the requirements of the project and summarize the work completed 
and decisions made. However, a couple of projects had substantially more 
documentation with respect to the requirements and earned a High rating for 
DOCU, and one project had less than the required documentation and 
earned a Low rating. 
11. Analyst Capability (ACAP): “Analysts are personnel who work on 
requirements, high-level design, and detailed design” (Boehm et al., 2000). 
Some teams showed high and very high analyst capability, whereas very few 
teams showed low capability in analysis and design.  
12. Programmer Capability (PCAP): Though most of the programming personnel 
were sufficiently capable, some developers had especially proficient 
programming skills.  
13. Product Complexity (CPLX): Although most of the UCC maintenance tasks 
fall within the Nominal or Average rating for CPLX, some were rated Low 
based on the types of control operations and computation operations 
implemented.  
The applicable COCOMO® II effort factors and their corresponding values for each of 
the projects were evaluated by reviewing the source code, deliverables, and Hira's weekly 
notes on teams' progress at the time of data collection. Since items 6–9 are rated the same 
across all data points, they are not included in the causal search algorithm runs. 
Causal Search Algorithms Further Explained 
Causal search algorithms typically take a dataset and hyper-parameters governing 
the search and output a set of graphs whose nodes are the variables appearing in the 
dataset (and depending on the algorithm, may include latent variables) and whose edges 
indicate some kind of direct causal connection between the pair of nodes they join. 
(Optionally, the algorithms also take sets of required and prohibited direct causal 
relationships between pairs of variables, which the user can use to encode the results of 
experiments or elicited domain knowledge.) There are many variations on this simple theme 
among the dozens of search algorithms, but in terms of understanding how they function, 
and thus something of their relative strengths and limitations, it will help to organize them 
into two broad categories: constraint-based and score-based search algorithms (Spirtes, 
2010).  
For both categories of searches, pointwise-consistent convergence has been proven. 
In other words, with increasing datasets drawn from the same population, the algorithm will 
eventually find the correct causal graph(s). Unfortunately, uniformly-consistent convergence 
has not been proven, which could provide the rate of convergence and level of confidence 
for particular causal relationships (Spirtes, 2010).  
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Constraint-Based Search Algorithms 
The first practical constraint-based search algorithm developed was the PC search 
algorithm, the algorithm used in the previous paper by the authors (Hira et al., 2018). In its 
simplest form, constraint-based search involves two stages: Adjacency Search and Edge 
Orientation. Starting with a complete undirected graph, edges are iteratively removed by 
testing for the conditional independence of joined nodes given a subset of neighboring 
nodes. If conditional independence is found, the edge is removed and the conditioning set 
employed is noted for later use in the Edge Orientation stage. This process is continued until 
all edges have been evaluated in this way. The result of this first stage, Adjacency Search, 
is thus an undirected graph. Edge Orientation starts with an undirected graph and iteratively 
orients edges according to a few rules that make use of the conditioning sets noted during 
the Adjacency Search stage. The result is an equivalence class of graphs, called a Markov 
Equivalence Class (MEC), rather than a single graph, because it is often impossible to 
determine the orientation of all the edges in the undirected graph that is output from the 
Adjacency Search stage (Spirtes, 2010).  
For example, suppose we have a dataset featuring three variables, X1, X2, and X3, 
and the only independence discovered among them is X1 is independent of X3 conditioned 
on X2. We also suppose we have no additional knowledge to encode about X1, X2, and X3, 
only the dataset. Then the Adjacency Search stage will output the undirected graph X1 – X2 
– X3 (as well as some kind of note that the conditioning set that made X1 and X3 
independent is {X2}). Then, given that particular independence, it necessarily follows that 
during the Edge Orientation stage, the direction of orientations for the edges of this 
undirected graph will not be able to be determined uniquely. Indeed, any of the following 
three pairs of orientations are valid, constituting the MEC: { X1 → X2 → X3, X1 ← X2 ← X3, 
X1 ← X2 → X3 }. Note that the following sequence of orientations is not part of the MEC: X1 
→ X2 ← X3. This type of relationship among variables is referred to as a collider. In a 
collider, the independence conditioning set is the empty set, because X1 is independent of 
X3 unconditionally. Hence, if the only independence found among X1, X2, and X3 is that X1 
and X3 are unconditionally independent, then the MEC would consist of exactly one graph: 
X1 → X2 ← X3. Thus, colliders provide important clues for orienting edges during the Edge 
Orientation Stage (Spirtes, 2010).  
While the idea of a set of graphs being the output of a causal search may disappoint, 
it is important to note that all graphs in an MEC have the same set of colliders and are built 
on top of the same undirected graph. Thus, all graphs in an MEC manifest the same set of 
correlations present in the dataset but may vary as to the causal orientations for some 
edges. 
The hyper-parameters of a constraint-based search algorithm typically include but 
are not limited to 
1. type of independence test used (e.g., Fisher Z Test, Conditional Correlation 
Test) 
2. confidence level for conditional independence testing (cutoff for p values) 
3. maximum size of condition set 
Constraint-based search makes very significant use of independence tests, and what 
type of independence test to use for what purpose is an ongoing area of research to help 
achieve both accuracy and speed across a range of different assumptions (e.g., non-
Gaussian univariate distributions). Another area of research is how to achieve both accuracy 
and speed in determining edge orientations. The need to conduct search on enormous 
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datasets and a very large number of variables (e.g., one million cases and tens of 
thousands of variables) motivates research for better algorithms. 
Score-Based Search Algorithms 
To those readers more familiar with machine learning, score-based search 
algorithms employ a familiar mechanism: a maximum likelihood-based score (such as 
Bayesian information criterion [BIC]). Like constraint-based search, there are two stages, 
both are iterative, and in each iteration of each stage there is both a currently-considered 
MEC (see the previous section for an explanation of this term, but it is important to note that 
all graphs in an MEC share the same underlying undirected graph and the same colliders) 
and a set of neighboring MECs and that each either possesses an additional edge (first 
stage of search) or has one edge removed (second stage of search; Spirtes, 2010).  
In each iteration of the first stage, from the currently-considered MEC, the algorithm 
scores all neighboring MECs that have one additional edge. The best-scoring neighboring 
MEC then becomes the currently-considered MEC in the next iteration. The algorithm 
continues to iterate, building graphs one edge at a time, until a better score cannot be 
attained. In the second stage, the algorithm proceeds similarly but in reverse, considering 
only those MECs having one edge removed. Again, the algorithm halts when no better score 
can be attained, and the resulting MEC is returned as the output (Spirtes, 2010).  
The advantages of score-based search algorithms over constraint-based search 
algorithms are as follows:  
 They can obtain more accurate adjacencies.  
 They will typically output only directed or undirected edges. There are no bi-
directed edges because equivalence class scoring will almost always favor 
one orientation over the other (or make the rarely-required arbitrary 
selection). A bi-directed edge signifies that there may be an unmeasured 
variable affecting the two variables.  
A limitation of score-based search algorithms is that they can be slow and might not 
scale as well as constraint-based searches. 
Applying Three Additional Search Algorithms (Beyond the First Paper) 
As mentioned earlier, the authors ran the PC search algorithms earlier (Hira et al., 
2018). PC is often cited by data analysts experienced with performing causal search as the 
“go to” causal search algorithm, given its generally high accuracy (generally better at getting 
adjacencies right) and high scalability. In this paper, the authors run three additional search 
algorithms on the same dataset: PC-Stable (constraint-based), FGES, and FASK (both 
score-based), in order to better illustrate some of the other search algorithms and their 
capabilities given a relatively small dataset. 
Here is a short description of the particular niche where each algorithm has some 
relative strengths over the others: 
1. PC-Stable is a variant of PC that addresses the problem that the causal 
graphs output by many search algorithms depend on the order of the 
variables within the dataset (Colombo & Maathuis, 2014).  
2. FGES is a score-based search algorithm and perhaps best qualifies as the 
causal-search data analysts’ favorite “go to” search algorithm after PC 
(particularly if they do not like to deal with bi-directed edges; Center for 
Causal Discovery, 2017).  
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3. FASK, a score-based search algorithm, addresses the problem that 
oftentimes variables have asymmetric distributions. The previously listed 
algorithms assume that direct causal relationships are linear up to an error 
term that is Gaussian, whereas FASK actually exploits skew in error terms’ 
distributions to determine how best to orient edges (Sanchez-Romero et al., 
2018). 
Tetrad 
As part of a National Institutes of Health (NIH) Big Data initiative, the University of 
Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), and Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center serve 
as founding members of the Center for Causal Discovery (CCD). The CCD develops and 
maintains causal algorithms, software, and tools, including the Tetrad2 program with its GUI, 
API, and command-line interfaces (referred to as Tetrad in this paper). Tetrad allows users 
to run causal search algorithms on a dataset as well as estimate and evaluate parametric 
models. The authors loaded the data from the UCC's dataset (described in the section titled 
Unified Code Count) and ran causal search algorithms, which returned causal graphs 
representing the cause-effect relationships discovered in the dataset. 
PC-Stable Causal Search Results 
The PC-Stable causal search is run on UCC’s dataset first with all size-related 
variables (ESLOC, CFPs, FPs, and SNAP), and second, individually with only one size-
related variable at a time. The authors run the algorithm with the simultaneous inclusion of 
all size-related variables to determine whether the size metrics might work together to 
characterize total effort, as represented by the variable TotalEffort. 
The graphical search results from PC-Stable are displayed in Figures 1–5, which 
conclude that product complexity (CPLX) is consistently identified as the single causal factor 
of TotalEffort except for the search with all size metrics included. When all size metrics are 
included, the size metric COSMIC Function Points (CFPs) is identified as the sole causal 
factor on TotalEffort. Interestingly, ESLOC, FPs, and SNAP have an undirected edge with 
CPLX, which thus has a potential causal effect on TotalEffort through CPLX (Figures 2–4), 
while CFPs’ role with CPLX is flipped (see Figure 5). Lastly, each of the figures shows an 
undirected edge between analyst capability (ACAP) and programmer capability (PCAP). 
 
Figure 1. PC-Stable Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 




 https://github.com/cmu-phil/tetrad  
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Figure 2. PC-Stable Result When Only ESLOC Is Included as a Size Metric 
 
Figure 3. PC-Stable Result When Only IFPUG FPs Is Included as a Size Metric 
 
Figure 4. PC-Stable Result When Only IFPUG SNAP Is Included as a Size Metric 
 
Figure 5. PC-Stable Result When Only CFPs Is Included as a Size Metric 
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FGES Causal Search Results 
The graphical search results from running FGES may be seen in Figures 6–10. The 
causal graphs returned by FGES have some different conclusions than those returned by 
PC-Stable. The PCAP factor shows up in all cases as having a causal effect on TotalEffort 
(and an undirected edge with ACAP), while CFPs also have a causal factor on TotalEffort 
(consistent with PC-Stable results). Only with ESLOC is there an undirected edge between 
the size metric and CPLX (see Figure 7; consistent with PC-stable result). 
 
Figure 6. FGES Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
 
Figure 7. FGES Result When Only ESLOC Is Included as a Size Metric 
 
Figure 8. FGES Result When Only IFPUG FPs Is Included as a Size Metric 
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Figure 9. FGES Result When Only IFPUG SNAP Is Included as a Size Metric 
 
Figure 10. FGES Result When Only CFPs Is Included as a Size Metric 
FASK Causal Search Results 
Before conducting the FASK causal search, the authors revisited the distribution of 
each factor as FASK achieves improved edge orientation when distributions are skewed. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of checking for skewness. Since most variables are skewed, 
the authors proceeded to run FASK, aware that the lack of full skewness might render some 
edge orientations incorrectly. 
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Total Effort YES 
The graphical search results from FASK, Figures 11–15, show that the algorithm 
returned some similar and some very different results compared to both PC-Stable and 
FGES. Most interestingly, the algorithm returns the factor Documentation Match to Lifecycle 
Needs (DOCU) as having a causal effect on TotalEffort, along with some of the size metrics. 
Except when all size metrics are included in the analysis, DOCU is identified as having a 
causal effect on ACAP, and there is an undirected edge between DOCU and PCAP. 
Additionally, SNAP is identified as having causal effects on ACAP and DOCU, and FPs as 
having a causal effect on DOCU. 
 
Figure 11. FASK Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
- 393 - 
 
Figure 12. FASK Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
 
Figure 13. FASK Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
 
Figure 14. FASK Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
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Figure 15. FASK Result When All Size Metrics Are Included 
Traditional Stepwise Multiple Regression 
In order to determine the most influential factors and an acceptable prediction model, 
data analysts typically use the stepwise multiple regression approach. As displayed in Table 
2, stepwise regression produces results indicating that PCAP and CFPs remain significant in 
predicting TotalEffort. Although models with three or more factors achieve a reasonably high 
Adjusted R-Squared, the simplified, two-factor model with PCAP and CFPs produces similar 
Adjusted R-Squared results. The details of the resulting prediction model are detailed in 
Table 3, and Figure 16 displays that the residuals of the model are normally distributed and 
do not have multi-collinearity.  
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Table 2. Stepwise Regression Results Summary With Variables Considered 
During Each Run 






































1 57.6 56.1 51.0 35.0 231.50                X       
1 54.6 53.0 47.9 39.3 239.65 X                      
2 84.9 83.8 78.3 -2.3 140.54 X             X       
2 78.5 76.9 67.4 6.9 167.87          X    X       
3 85.3 83.6 76.1 -0.9 141.35 X             X    X 
3 85.1 83.4 77.2 -0.6 142.30 X    X       X       
4 85.4 83.0 73.0 1.1 143.98 X       X    X    X 
4 85.3 83.0 68.6 1.1 144.13 X          X X    X 
5 85.4 82.3 61.9 3.0 146.83 X       X X X    X 
5 85.4 82.3 67.0 3.0 146.89 X X    X    X    X 
6 85.4 81.6 55.2 5.0 149.92 X X    X X X    X 
6 85.4 81.6 59.9 5.0 149.99 X       X X X X X 
7 85.4 80.8 53.0 7.0 153.29 X X    X X X X X 
7 85.4 80.8 52.0 7.0 153.29 X X X X X X    X 
8 85.4 79.8 49.5 9.0 156.90 X X X X X X X X 
Table 3. Coefficients and Corresponding P-Values for the Regression Model 
Predicting TotalEffort 
Term Coef SE Coef T-Value P-Value VIF 
Constant -1791  244 -7.33 0.000  
PCAP 1948  264  7.38 0.000 1.12 
CFPs  76.3 10.9  7.00 0.000 1.12 
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Figure 16. Residual Plots for the Regression Model Predicting TotalEffort 
Displaying the Fulfillment of Linear Regression Assumptions 
Summary of Results 
Table 4 depicts a summary of the results of the PC (Hira, Sharma, & Boehm, 2018), 
PC-Stable, FGES, and FASK causal searches in which the direct and indirect causal factors 
are noted. Contrary to the traditional stepwise multiple regression approach which identified 
PCAP and CFPs as significant factors of TotalEffort, the causal search has uncovered direct 
causal evidence, depending on the algorithm, of FP, SNAP, CFP, CPLX, PCAP, and DOCU. 
The algorithms also identified ESLOC, FP, SNAP, ACAP, and PCAP as indirect causal 
drivers of TotalEffort.  
There remains a number of ways in which this summary may be interpreted. One 
approach would be to look for the complete absence or presence of causal relationships as 
noteworthy new knowledge. Another approach would be to look for direct and indirect causal 
factors showing up across a majority of causal algorithms. Lastly, one could choose to be 
much more inclusive and look at all direct and indirect factors that show up at least once. 
Acknowledging the small size of the data set and the impact of the small sample size 
on the causal search results, one can still see that causal search can inform a researcher of 
alternative independent factors that may actually be the causal force on the dependent 
factor. As such, given the small sample size, there is evidence that CPLX, PCAP, DOCU, 
and several size measures (CFP, FP, and SNAP) may be considered as direct causal 
factors. It is interesting to also note that PCAP only showed up as a direct causal factor on 
TotalEffort using the FGES score-based algorithm, while DOCU showed up as a direct 
causal factor using FASK. Among the size measures, the strongest candidate for a direct 
causal factor for TotalEffort would seem to be CFP. In conclusion, these causal search 
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results should motivate the researcher to collect additional data and continue analyzing 
beyond what a traditional regression approach might offer toward the ultimate goal of 
estimating a quantified actionable model for TotalEffort—an actionable model that is suitable 
for use in deciding how to intervene and change a project’s course toward achieving desired 
target outcomes. Correlation alone really doesn’t provide sufficient insight.  
Table 4. Identified Direct and Indirect Causes of TotalEffort by Algorithm and 
Scenario 
 
Note. Black cells are Not Applicable as factor not present in model. 
Implications for Acquisition Research 
The authors believe the implications of adding causal searches and ultimately, 
causal estimations of causal influence, could transform acquisition research in the following 
ways: 
1. The need to pursue expensive and, more likely, prohibitive experiments of 
acquisition factors could be obviated by use of causal methods appropriate 
for observational data. (Or at a minimum, causal research findings should be 
used to more efficiently focus such experiments.) 
2. Revisiting research data affiliated with the acquisition research arena could 
quickly help filter likely causal factors from the merely correlated factors, 
thereby reducing researcher distraction and accelerating progress in 
acquisition research. 
3. Different acquisition researchers could more easily begin to unite causal 
conclusions into a more holistic causal model of acquisition research 
outcomes. 
4. The acquisition research community could identify and prioritize constrained 
research funding towards causal research outcomes worthy of investment in 
repeatability and reproducibility studies. 
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5. Causal research findings would be more confidently tested by real-world 
acquisition program interventions and risk less in wasteful interventions. 
6. SEI’s acquisition experts indicate specific acquisition outcomes and 
associated factors worthy of causal learning include 
a. delivering required warfighter capability at an affordable price and on 
schedule, driven by potential factors such as lack of competencies in 
the workforce, greater system complexity, and underestimation of cost 
and schedule, 
b. unrealistic assumptions made by decision-makers very early in the 
acquisition lifecycle, 
c. program acquisition strategy (and changes in the strategy), the 
program structure, and the technical challenges facing the program, 
d. leadership incentives to conduct critical thinking and apply evidence-
based knowledge and practice early in a program, 
e. people, process, requirements, and incentives in general, 
f. the overall contracting process in context of changes that are often 
difficult to make and take a lot of time, leading to issues on the 
contractor side,  
g. the technical strength of the government team, 
h. measurement of agile versus more traditional development, and 
i. measured effectiveness of the Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 
mandated reviews. 
Next Steps 
The authors welcome research collaboration making use of causal search and 
estimation, especially acquisition research focused on impacts to acquisition cost and 
schedule. Research collaboration of this nature would complement existing research funded 
through the SEI as part of a three-year (FY 2018–2020) DoD research project titled 
“Investigating the Feasibility of an Integrated Causal Model for Software Cost Control 
(SCOPE).” Many forms of acquisition research collaboration exist, including (1) providing 
subjective and objective research data, (2) connecting our research team with acquisition 
managers and organizations who might provide research data, (3) helping to identify the 
nature of acquisition outcome measures worthy of study along with insights to the potential 
causal factors of those outcomes, and (4) learning how to conduct causal search and 
estimation and working with our research team as a direct contributing member or as a 
reviewer of causal results.  
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Abstract 
We perform a literature review to develop a set of readiness metrics for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) to be used by commanding officers to assess HADR 
readiness in the same way they are now able to assess combat readiness. The scope is at 
the strategic level with tactical and operational inputs. 
Introduction 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations are part of the 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower of the United States (U.S.). In this 
research, we further investigate, through literature survey, whether any metrics can be 
defined and developed to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of HADR operations. Such 
measurement will be instrumental in successfully following a fundamental principle: “If we 
are going to do HADR anyway, then why not do it smartly.” 
In the past two to three decades, the United States Navy (USN) has been the active 
and principal supplier of disaster relief due to its many unique and critical capabilities (Apte 
et al., 2013; Apte, Goncalves, & Yoho, 2016). Whether this effort will continue and be 
sustained in an environment of fiscal austerity and budget cuts is not given. Therefore, it is 
critical to identify resources the USN possesses, due to its core competencies and 
capabilities, that support humanitarian logistics, and to understand the USN’s readiness 
level to utilize these resources in the best possible way.  
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) can rapidly respond to disasters because it 
maintains high levels of readiness on a constant basis. The USMC provides critical 
resources for these missions through their Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), which are 
flexible and adaptable enough to accomplish a wide range of operations, including non-
combat missions (Apte & Yoho, 2014). Given the recent frequency of disasters around the 
world, it is probable that the occurrence of these events will continue, thus creating a 
demand for the relief capabilities. The MEUs have flexible and adept forces that can be 
deployed to austere environments while meeting urgent timelines (USMC, 2009).  
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Background 
There have recently been significant suffering and casualties due to natural disasters 
across the world. Some governments offer humanitarian assistance. Figure 1 shows which 
donors provided the most humanitarian assistance in 2012. The United States spent almost 
twice as much as the next highest donor, the European Union (EU). Since 2008, the United 
States has spent substantial capital on humanitarian aid, as shown in Figure 2. When the 
USN steps in to help, the naval combatant commands, such as Pacific Command (PACOM) 
and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), are the organizations that have to act.  
After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the functional organization and staffing of the 
COCOM had significant gaps in the ability to provide an effective and efficient response. A 
strategic plans officer for the UN said, “The military’s planning capability is not the most 
expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international coordination structure 
would not have stood up if they weren’t there—we tapped into the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
planning capacity” (Joint Center for Operational Analysis [JCOA], 2010, slide 77). Given vast 
AORs, the number of disasters in the last decade, and the lack of lead time to prepare for 
relief for certain types of disasters (Apte, 2009), organizations such as the USN and the 
USMC need to have a playbook with readiness metrics. Therefore, three questions need to 
be answered:  
1. How does an organization know when it is ready to respond to a disaster and 
whether it is capable of delivering relief? 
2. What core competencies are these organizations exploiting to be ready for 
humanitarian missions? 
3. What are the resources that can deploy the capabilities that support these 
core competencies? 
 
Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance in 2012, Top Five Government Donors 
(Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013) 
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Figure 2. Humanitarian Aid by United States 
(Margesson, 2015) 
We studied over 80 documents, including peer-reviewed scholarly articles, 
government documents, white papers, research papers, and DoD briefings. This review 
helped us understand the definitions and descriptions of post-disaster performance 
indicators and pre-disaster readiness metrics. During the process, the literature was divided 
into four categories: disasters and lessons learned, civil and military collaboration, core 
competencies and capabilities, and challenges in humanitarian operations. These topics 
assist us in developing the path for recognizing readiness in humanitarian organizations. We 
follow the path to formulate a conceptual model for readiness assessment. We studied four 
disasters in detail for the lessons learned: the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 2013’s Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines, and 
the 2014 earthquake in Nepal. The literature review process helped us identify a framework 
for readiness metrics in naval humanitarian operations based on the core competencies of 
the USN and the USMC.  
Literature Review 
Many humanitarian organizations (HOs) respond to the disasters around the globe. 
In this research, we define HOs as those organizations that provide humanitarian relief, 
whether military or non-military (NMO) and whether government or non-government (NGO). 
These organizations have core capabilities and competencies (Apte et al., 2016) from which 
they provide humanitarian assistance. When a disaster strikes, the host nation requests 
outside assistance, if needed. When requested, the USN and the USMC, under the 
guidance of USAID, get deployed for HADR. Other HOs also provide assistance based on 
their core competencies and capabilities. Many times, the relief falls short of meeting the 
demand. The reasons why this happens will help us understand how to measure the 
readiness that is embedded into the core capabilities and competencies of the 
organizations. Relief falls short for many possible reasons: 
 The disaster was massive in scope and scale.  
 The distribution and transportation of critical supplies and services was not 
well-managed; hence, the affected region did not receive necessary supplies.  
 Adequate needs assessment was not possible, resulting in mismatching of 
delivered commodities.  
 Information and knowledge was not managed from previous humanitarian 
missions to identify lessons learned.  
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 In some cases lessons were learned, but no after action reports were 
generated, and as a consequence, no metrics were formulated to mitigate the 
next disaster.  
We study the literature to explore, define, and develop these reasons. Some areas 
are endogenous to the organization and some are exogenous. The Endogenous Factors 
section is further divided into the following subsections: 
 Performance Indicators and Readiness Metrics, 
 Core Competencies and Capabilities, and  
 Issues and Challenges in Humanitarian Operations.  
The Exogenous Factors section is further divided into  
 Disasters and Lessons Learned and  
 The “Three Cs” of Civil–Military Organizations.  
Endogenous Factors 
Performance Indicators and Readiness Metrics 
The absence of clear performance indicators and/or readiness metrics in 
humanitarian organizations (HOs) has been recognized by the humanitarian community. 
Davidson (2006) says that, due to the incapability and lack of time, HOs do not measure the 
performance indicators. The organizations lack any fundamental framework to understand 
the readiness metrics since they do not have a good measure of performance indicators 
after the disaster. There are several factors that contribute to the difficulty of defining and 
measuring either the performance indicators or readiness metrics in HOs (Davidson, 2006).  
In the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) literature, there are discussions about 
military readiness metrics. However, these are predominantly about conflict readiness 
(GAO, 2016). In a broad sense, the DoD defines readiness as the ability of the forces to 
combat and meet the demands to achieve security objectives and the needs of the national 
strategy. One observation is that the DoD’s rebuilding efforts for readiness may not work if 
there is not a comprehensive plan in place. A framework is necessary for combat readiness 
(GAO, 2016). This observation further accentuates the lack of any specific framework for 
readiness metrics for missions other than war, and it demands that such a framework be 
developed. Vast amounts of money, to the tune of $350 billion, indicate the importance that 
the DoD places on the readiness of its services for current and future operations (Trunkey, 
2013). The readiness is assessed at the individual service level and at the joint forces level. 
Typically, the DoD reports readiness through the Status of Resources and Training System 
(SORTS). Recently SORTS, due to its limitations, was transitioned into the Defense 
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) which uses a dashboard style display. DRRS is a 
major improvement.  
There are many more aspects to a supply chain (such as material and information 
flow, players of the supply chain), and one prevalent issue, especially in the commercial 
supply chain, is the last-mile delivery problem. With this particular issue, efficiency or 
minimizing the cost is the objective. However, in response supply chains, the goal is more 
than these objectives due to humanitarian concerns. Huang, Smilowitz, and Balcik (2011) 
focus on meeting the need through quick and sufficient but equitable distribution. The 
authors measure the performance of the supply chains based on these three criteria. Their 
observations about number of vehicles, routes, and impact of demand offer practical insight 
into relief operations. The performance measures suggest possible readiness metrics, such 
- 405 - 
as maintaining a larger number of small vehicles for effective and equitable distribution of 
critical supplies and services, and they suggest some rules of thumb for quick decisions. 
Van der Laan, de Brito, and Vergunst (2009) offer a review of literature identifying 
the necessary conditions for performance measures for humanitarian supply chains. The 
authors present a framework that involves two phases, design and implementation. The first 
phase depends on strategically important functions and the will of the organization to 
measure operational performance and implementation of an information system to do so. 
The second phase, which depends on implementation, includes the principles that the 
framework be future-oriented, that it be aligned with the selected strategy, and that it strike a 
balance between financial versus non-financial as well as quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. 
A more focused approach, focused specifically on the rapid needs assessment that 
is defined as a core competency for HOs (Apte et al., 2016), is discussed by Benini and 
Chataigner (2014). Needs assessment being the key objective for determining the affected 
region and population, the authors describe a particular tool “prioritization matrix,” recently a 
prevalent tool in determining demand. They offer expansion of this tool based on logic 
behind it. The matrix is based on composite indicators that are managed through 
spreadsheets and is the intersection of decision science and humanitarian operations. The 
authors use the data from the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines to 
substantiate their analysis.  
Norio et al. (2011) review the causes and impacts of the 2010 Japan earthquake and 
tsunami. The management of the expanded capacity and capability after the 1995 Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake in Japan significantly helped provide disaster relief for the 2010 
earthquake. However, the authors believe more can be done. When there is potential for a 
disaster to turn into a crisis (as in the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Japan), it is 
necessary to deploy a collaborative framework based on available resources. Such a 
framework should take into account the geographic scope of the disaster, thus enabling 
different governance approaches and mutual assistance and recovery systems. The authors 
believe that centralized power for sudden and dispersed disasters is vital, existence of a 
new international platform for joint management is essential, further research of such 
frameworks is needed, and the lessons learned from the 2010 Japan earthquake and 
tsunami mandate that infrastructure around the nuclear power plants be robustly planned 
and designed.  
Figure 2 showed the extent of humanitarian aid provided by the United States. The 
DoD executes humanitarian operations with the budget granted by the State Department, 
since the DoD does not have its own budget for HADR. These humanitarian activities are 
rendered through the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. 
All HOs, including the DoD, currently face the challenge of measuring the impact of their 
work (Bonventre, 2006). Bonventre (2006) lists at least three reasons why the DoD should 
measure the impact of humanitarian assistance programs:  
 First, measuring the impact of HOs offers opportunities for future and mid-
course corrections in the projects through feedback loops enabling planners 
to underscore activities that are cost-effective. 
 Second, collection and sharing of data prevents the duplication of activities 
performed by all HOs. Not duplicating activities helps us understand the core 
competencies and capabilities of HOs. 
 Third, analysis based on collected data offers transparency and quantifiable 
results that do not leave any ambiguity.  
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The key point here is understanding core competencies and capabilities of all the 
organizations involved so duplication of efforts is reduced. 
Core Competencies and Capabilities 
Apte et al. (2016) identify the competencies and capabilities that are core to U.S. 
military and non-military organizations (NMOs) for HADR. The authors’ motivation is that 
both military organizations and NMOs bring assets, skills, and capabilities to a humanitarian 
crisis; however, their competencies and capabilities are very diverse. Identification of the 
specific competencies and capabilities that are core to these types of organizations can 
enable better planning by both military and NMOs, allowing them to achieve greater 
effectiveness and efficiency in their humanitarian responses. Apte et al. (2016) build on 
existing literature on the core competency of the corporations in the private sector. In their 
research, Apte et al. (2016) extend the concept of identifying, cultivating, and exploiting the 
core capabilities of the private sector to other organizations that seek to respond efficiently 
and effectively to disasters. They develop a Core Competencies Test for such organizations. 
The authors list the top five essential services and capabilities for disaster relief as 
Information and Knowledge Management, Needs Assessment, Supply, Distribution and 
Deployment, and Health Services Support. 
One of the substantial players in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief around 
the globe is the U.S. Navy (USN). Roughead et al. (2013) offer an in-depth analysis of the 
USN’s humanitarian assistance, especially in the face of budget cuts and austerity. Their 
research does not focus on a specific disaster, but rather studies the proactive engagement 
or strategic pre-positioning (Apte, 2014) of humanitarian assistance. The authors describe 
the principal benefits of their research: strengthening relations in critical geographic areas 
through greater cultural understanding, improving the capabilities and readiness of the USN 
humanitarian assistance, and reinforcing other capabilities such as health systems of host 
nations.  
HADR by the USN is evaluated by Apte et al. (2013) using a structured, qualitative 
evaluation schema complemented by expert ratings. The authors evaluate the capabilities 
and utility of ships in the USN. They find that there are specific types of vessels with 
significant disaster response utility and recommend a flotilla type that would be best suited 
for the humanitarian operations. Utilizing an exploratory framework that evaluates three 
diverse disaster cases, they scale the utility of each vessel through subject matter expertize. 
They find the type of ships most useful for contributing to effective disaster response.  
Apte and Yoho (2014) study the USMC resources, including the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), that are primarily responsible for the response. They study recent 
HADR events to determine how demands were met by the USMC. They identify the supplies 
that can meet these demands by examining both assets and capabilities of the USMC. By 
exploring significant gaps, if any, that can be improved by the MEU, they suggest ways to 
improve the effectiveness of the USMC’s response to HADR. A primary take-away from their 
work is the challenge faced by the USMC to match the capabilities of the USMC to the 
demand created by future disasters. More issues and challenges in humanitarian operations 
that deliver disaster relief are described in the next subsection.  
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Issues and Challenges in Humanitarian Operations 
Roughead et al. (2013) list the operational challenges for the USN, such as short-
term or discontinuous engagement in HADR lacking enduring coordination and 
development, insufficient integration with host nations and NGO operatives, dependence on 
sole assets of vessels that may not serve the necessary demand, inadequate and irregular 
funding, and most notably, difficulty in measuring alignment of humanitarian efforts with 
strategic goals. The authors recommend that the USN clarify and focus on the motivation 
behind the humanitarian assistance to fund the operations sufficiently and without rigidity, 
and increase the scope and scale of the planning process of HADR allowing coordination 
with NGOs and host nations. But most importantly, they point out that the USN needs to 
develop and implement a robust set of metrics for readiness in humanitarian missions.  
A major challenge in any supply chain management is measurement of the 
performance of that supply chain. In the commercial sector, the focus is on resources for 
optimizing the input (cost) or output (profit). However, for a supply chain established to 
respond to a disaster, a response supply chain (RSC), the focus is on the time required to 
respond or the ability to meet the demand. An RSC is defined to be efficient based on the 
amount or number of resources used to meet the goal of that organization and to be 
effective based on the level at which it meets the preset goal (Beamon, 2004). Developing 
such a system for measurement is one of the issues associated with RSCs. The author lists 
the issues as structure of the RSC, distribution network, inventory control, type of measuring 
system, coordination with other organizations involved in HA, acquisition of supplies, and 
finally, the actual measurement.  
Beamon and Kotleba (2006) describe the stochasticity of the demand of the disaster, 
and if the disaster is large-scale, the strain that it creates on the physical distribution.  
Other issues that are challenging are the inadequate or incorrect estimation of 
demands that yield both further casualties and further suffering in the affected area (United 
Nations, 2007; Duran, Gutierrez, & Keskinocak, 2011; Apte & Yoho, 2011; World 
Meteorological Organization, 2009). Estimating where and when such demand is needed 
(McCoy, 2008; Apte, 2009; Apte et al., 2013) is even harder. Demand after a disaster strike 
in the host nation is external to the organization providing relief. We now focus on such 
exogenous factors.  
Exogenous Factors 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Haiti 
On January 10, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti near Port-au-Prince. 
The earthquake caused 316,000 casualties. In addition to the Haitian losses, the earthquake 
also claimed the lives of members of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. It 
injured 300,000 people, made one million people homeless, collapsed 100,000 houses, and 
damaged 200,000 structures. This earthquake decimated Haiti’s infrastructure. Air and sea 
transportation was reduced to unworkable. Key access roads were impassable. The medical 
facilities also became practically nonexistent. The most critical shortage was fuel. The utility 
infrastructure, including electricity and telecommunications, fell apart. The paralyzed Haitian 
government was overwhelmed and requested immediate assistance from all over the world. 
The Dominican Republic received thousands of refugees, but being a small country, it had 
limitations. Haiti’s urgent request to the U.S. government prompted an immediate response.  
Even before the disaster, Haiti had fuel and water shortages as an underdeveloped 
country. Medical support was scarce. So after the disaster, conditions worsened quickly. 
Poor infrastructure and inadequate disaster preparedness limited the delivery of relief 
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(McCunn et al., 2010). Though access to the airport was limited, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
stepped in to maintain security and air traffic control. After this rapid and successful 
transition, medical support was delivered by many HOs including the U.S. military and other 
military organizations, NGOs, and government organizations.  
The earthquake damaged the Port of Haiti, and it was not operable. The bulk of 
supplies for immediate sustainment had to be delivered by sea. The lack of a designated 
logistics team within the Global Response Team at the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters 
meant that deployment planning had to be done at short notice, thus increasing obstacles to 
an already challenged supply chain. Many in the JTF team were not in the contingency 
status and, hence, were deployed with suboptimal preparation. This resulted in pushing the 
supplies quickly but in an ad-hoc way without formal planning, sourcing, and tracking 
processes. A substantial part of the bureaucracy was eliminated, which enabled a quick 
response. 
The accomplishments of the JTF during Haiti HADR can be divided into the following 
areas: Air Port, Sea Port, DoD medical support, shelters, overall support, and a secure 
environment for the operations (JCOA, 2010, slide 196). Best practices emerged from these 
activities: 
 Deployment and support from strategic level liaisons to tactical level (National 
response) 
 Use of unclassified operation environment for information sharing and 
collaboration between all stakeholders (COCOM) 
 Establishing JTF Force Flow working group (Force projection) 
 Interface between Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and Joint 
Operational Task Center and NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVO)s, 
and UN systems (Coordination) 
 Establishing Joint Interagency Information Cell 
After the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, there were many lessons learned. 
One of the important findings from the HADR provided by the Joint Center for Operational 
Analysis (JCOA) was the swift establishment of response structure (JCOA, 2010). Also, 
civilian and military resources were pushed not only to resolve but to overcome the problem. 
This was done by (1) a pre-established Response Management Team (RMT) that is 
dependent on the classification of the disaster (Apte, 2009) performed in five functional 
areas: management, planning, logistics, administrative, and communications; (2) a Joint 
Staff Team plugging in with RMT which turned out to be the best practice despite not having 
connectivity other than commercial internet. However, USAID had visibility for the movement 
of DoD resources.  
As for long-term planning for future disaster relief, the following are some of the 
implications: 
 The president’s declaration about making the disaster relief a priority would 
help the administration and the country focus on the effort.  
 Civilian and military resources may be pushed to mitigate the disaster by 
establishing the national response structure rapidly. 
 Roles, responsibilities, authorities, and essential capabilities need to be 
clarified at the outset. 
 Division of labor within the DoD should be clearly defined. 
 Integration of HOs may raise many policy issues that need to be resolved. 
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 Incomplete data on the ground at the onset of the disaster is a challenge for 
logistics requirements and priorities.  
LTG Keen, who was in charge of Operation Unified Response had the following 
observations: 
1. Respond quickly and effectively,  
2. Protect the people always,  
3. Build partnerships with key players,  
4. Coordinate and Collaborate (C2) to achieve unity of effort,  
5. Communicate—Communicate—Communicate,  
6. Support the lead Federal Agency within clearly defined roles,  
7. Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force,  
8. Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible,  
9. Work closely with the UN Humanitarian Community, and  
10. Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 
(JCOA, 2010, slide 208)  
Haiti also taught a few lessons to COCOM. They had to overcome internal 
organizational issues, gain situational awareness, and satisfy an extraordinary demand for 
information. Another lesson was that the use of “open” communications and unclassified 
information-sharing over BlackBerry devices allowed for expanded coordination and 
collaboration with DoD organizations. Personal and professional relationships among key 
leaders permeated all levels of interaction and engagement within organizations. And lastly, 
quick establishment of land-based headquarters reassured the affected population and 
enhanced the coordination with the host country, state government, USAID, UN, and NGOs. 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Japan 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan. A tsunami followed 
soon after and the losses incurred were extremely severe. By April 13, there were 13,392 
casualties, 15,133 missing people, and more than 335,000 people without food, water, 
shelter, and medical help (Norio et al., 2011). Several nuclear power plants were heavily 
damaged, resulting in rolling blackouts. The earthquake also affected the transportation 
system, and for a short time, all the ports were closed. Part of the high speed rail line was 
shut down, and the Sendai airport suffered intensive damage due to the tsunami. But the 
devastating blow that pushed this disaster into a crisis was the meltdown of the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant.  
Carafano (2011) assesses the response to the 2011 earthquake in Japan and 
outlines the lessons for the U.S. to evaluate its own capacity to deal with a future crisis. The 
author studies critical areas and the corresponding key findings and resources in the United 
States (see Table 1). 
Wilson (2012) has a focused view based on the response from the U.S., titled 
Operation Tomodachi, to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The response efforts 
and the collective use of the military stationed abroad offers a model for further U.S. efforts 
across the globe. The author identifies the activities that worked well, such as the value of 
maintaining U.S. forces abroad, the use and capabilities of remotely piloted aircrafts, the 
voluntary evacuation of the U.S. dependents, bilateral coordination, and the benefit of social 
media through the disaster response. However, the lessons learned, such as improving 
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bilateral coordination, removing control and command confusion, and preparing for large-
scale decontamination are also critical for handling future disasters. The author concludes 
that describing the success of Operation Tomodachi will induce lesser cuts in the DoD’s 
budget since it will bring humanitarian assistance to the forefront as opposed to combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Table 1. Critical Areas and Key Findings 
(Carafano, 2011) 
 
Terada (2012) notes that during the assistance and relief following the 2011 
earthquake in Japan, information should have been shared and appropriate tasking should 
have been implemented among the participants. There should be more training and 
exercises for USJF as the DoD support for HADR increases so that professionalism is 
enhanced and roles are clarified (Liaison Staff, 2012).  
Japan is a developed nation and fairly self-sufficient in disaster relief. However, it did 
not have much experience in receiving aid from across the world. Thus, one of the lessons 
learned was to institute training for international guidelines (Smart, 2012). It is also 
imperative to establish an effective media strategy for controlling and dissipating information 
when there is a need of receiving real-time facts.  
Katoch (2012) stresses that no silos should be permitted. Clear protocols should be 
set with chain of control at all levels of the departments involved of the host government, 
military organizations, and NGOs. Organizational structures and processes, in compliance 
with humanitarian and military doctrines, must be pre-established at local, national, and 
international levels. Only close ties with such organizations is not adequate for productive 
civil–military coordination. This was evident during the 2011 earthquake in Japan in the 
coordinating pains experienced by the United States and Japan even though they are allies 
(Katoch, 2012).  
Wanlach (2012) emphasizes establishing relationships before a disaster to share 
information. The author also claims that agreements have to be in place for practical 
methods of coordination, and the relief needs to be planned so that the strengths of the 
responding organization are exploited. Finally, better preparation by the host country will 
always help mitigate suffering.  
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The 2011 earthquake in Japan also taught lessons about the geographical 
perspective. Developing a tsunami response system using inundation maps helps disaster 
managers to model the potential effects of a tsunami so that the most suitable shelter 
locations and optional evacuation routes can be planned (Hong, 2012). Such lessons were 
also taught by Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines in 2014. Shallow draft 
adds to the destruction due to the fact that it produces more surges. Therefore, to 
understand threats, warnings must be accompanied by analysis of the impacts on the 
ground (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance [CFE-
DM], 2015). 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Philippines 
On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made landfall in the Philippines, 
causing extensive damage. More than 1.1 million houses were damaged, and 14.1 million 
people were affected. The confirmed death toll was 6,183. Though the Philippines is one of 
the most disaster-prone countries, this typhoon was among the strongest ever to strike the 
country.  
The extensive damage to the internal infrastructure made transportation of goods 
extremely difficult to the point that signs of assistance and relief were only visible three to 
five days after the typhoon struck the Philippines (CFE-DM, 2014). Among the international 
community, both military and non-military, the U.S. DoD, supporting the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, and USAID played a significant role in HADR. UN agencies also responded 
immediately with teams for initial rapid assessment.  
The heavy vertical lift capabilities of the U.S. DoD and other military organizations 
helped in the face of infrastructure destruction. Their capabilities also helped in scouring the 
thousands of affected islands that were remote and almost impossible to access. The 
tactical military forces provided support immediately. There were many assets of the U.S. 
DoD stationed in Japan and Okinawa. These included USS George Washington naval task 
force and 31st MEU to form JTF 505. Approximately 1,000 U.S. DoD personnel were 
deployed. Military aircraft provided support in needs assessments of remote areas, brought 
aid workers and supplies to these remote areas, and evacuated the affected population to 
other locations. The Marines helped clear roads and distribute supplies and services (Lum & 
Margesson, 2014). 
One of the lessons learned (CFE-DM, 2014) during the Super Typhoon Haiyan 
assistance and relief was that civil–military collaboration needs to happen far faster than it 
did. It is also important to have trust among participating organizations, and this could be 
achieved through informal networks formed during training and exercises. It was also noted 
that the affected people from the most dangerous areas have to be evacuated. But two 
concepts that are important and applicable in any disaster are the pre-positioning of supplies 
and the resilience of the local population.  
In addition, visual messaging in the form of accurate scenario-based storm surge 
inundation maps facilitated a shared framework of the operating environment. Every foreign 
disaster response is a bilateral agreement between the assisting state and the affected 
state. The response in Super Typhoon Haiyan showed that the optimal use of defense 
assets is best coordinated through the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC). 
Recognizing the need for the MNCC to operate at strategic and operational levels 
simultaneously, the MNCC in Camp Aguinaldo became fully operational 48 hours before 
Super Typhoon Hagupit the following year made landfall (CFE-DM, 2015). Recognizing the 
need to augment the government’s response capabilities, private sector-led organizations, 
as demonstrated by the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF) 88, began putting 
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mechanisms in place for a disaster operations center aimed at coordinating and 
collaborating disaster risk management initiatives of businesses across all industrial sectors.  
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Nepal 
On April 25, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, followed by 20 
aftershocks. On May 12, 2015, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake with five aftershocks struck near 
Mount Everest. Within a week, there were 7,000 casualties, 70,000 structures damaged, 
and over eight million people affected (Sanderson & Ramalingam, 2015). The earthquakes 
and their aftershocks resulted in over 5,000 landslides, flooding many streams with 
sediments, and causing floods in low lying areas. This made the task of transporting 
supplies and services nearly impossible.  
The U.S. DoD deployed soft and hard assets for HADR. The 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and other forces formed the JTF 505 to respond to this 
disaster under the guidance of USAID. There was substantial support for evacuation by JTF 
aircraft, transportation of local ambulances by JTF 505 medical personnel, including 
squadron flight surgeons and DART physicians. However, being a landlocked country at a 
high elevation presented its own set of unsurmountable issues. This tested rotary wing and 
tilt rotor aircraft endurance. Another unique obstacle in providing relief was complications 
due to diplomatic requirements of coordination in overflight and clearances from multiple 
countries surrounding the affected area.  
In addition to the substantial HADR delivered by the U.S. DoD, the Government of 
India responded within four hours due to the proximity with open borders, close cultural ties 
with Nepal, relationship with the Armed Forces, and bilateral pre-disaster planning and 
training. The Chinese government also responded at the request of the Nepalese 
government with search and rescue teams, helicopters, and 900 personnel. The World 
Health Organization, the UN Cluster System, international military forces, and other HOs 
added their support to the disaster relief. 
One of the dreadful challenges was properly caring for children whose parents were 
missing. Urgent repair of the roads for immediate transportation was also a formidable 
challenge that could have been mitigated through helipads in rural areas. The inadequate 
collection of field information and dissemination of the same turned out to be a major 
handicap. Establishing call centers in each village would help overcome this difficulty. Due 
to damaged government structures, the basic problem of lack of office space, though not 
life-threatening, was a deterrent. This meant the building codes had not been followed and 
strict monitoring should have been implemented. Inadequate search and rescue capabilities 
turned out to be devastating, so one lesson learned was to strengthen the overall search 
and rescue capability through security forces and international support.  
Wendelbo et al. (2016) outline the challenges in executing disaster relief and the 
lessons learned after the Nepal earthquake, as described in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Challenges and Lessons Learned in Nepal 
(Wendelbo et al., 2016) 
 
The overwhelming support from HOs across the globe complicated relief efforts in 
Nepal. Nepal had only one runway airport and very few helicopters to transport relief 
workers to the inaccessible mountainous areas. Unfortunately, the lessons learned in the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were not well understood or implemented (Salmeron & Apte, 
2010). After the tsunami, the donated supplies that could have mitigated needs to a large 
extent could not be distributed due to a single airstrip and a single forklift in Banda Ache 
(Apte, 2009).  
Summary of Lessons Learned 
No amount of planning for disasters can prevent casualties, suffering, and damages. 
But “good” planning, based on lessons learned from past disasters, can mitigate the effects 
of the disaster. However, a significant theme that emerges from the literature review is 
articulated by Markus (2012)—the sharing of information among stakeholders in terms of 
their mandates, activity scope, capacity, technical expertise, and funding capital has to 
happen before a disaster strikes.  
The U.S. DoD is one of the organizations providing HADR in the Asia-Pacific region 
with other government organizations, NGOs. Moroney et al. (2013) claim that the following 
changes need to be made to spread goodwill through HADR: 
 Improve the DoD’s efficiency in HADR  
 Enhance interagency coordination  
 Develop coordination with the host nation 
 Increase work with the UN and NGOs  
 Align security activities and regional HADR capabilities  
Another organization that plays a major role in humanitarian operations is the 
Logistics Cluster of the United Nations (UN). Global Logistics Cluster (2016) has extensively 
studied the relief provided in the past disasters to understand the lessons from these 
experiences. The lessons learned are tabulated in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Lessons Learned by Global Logistics Cluster 
 
The authors recommend that investments should be made in pre-preparedness 
activities that have turned out to be invaluable in certain instances. They also comment on 
the information management tools used, such as having an accessible system to enrich the 
competency further. In terms of accountability, the authors suggest that there should be 
clarification of roles and responsibilities associated with them in addition to pre-established 
tracking system. Most importantly, coordination efforts between the strategic partners in 
preparedness planning and advisory board for decision-makers should be done with priority 
given to logistics.  
Evans (2016) outlines necessity of interagency training as the lesson learned. The 
author describes the lessons as (1) a Mobile Training Team traveling to disaster-prone 
areas and offering training to country teams, (2) adding courses at the end of annually held 
conferences at USPACOM, and (3) incorporating a specific and significant disaster 
management content into existing preparatory courses.  
Advantages from these lessons are that each member of the DoD will go through the 
training so that participants will learn about 
 available resources, 
 utilization of the same, 
 lessons from previous disasters, 
 relevant topics they may face such as basic search and rescue, medical first 
responder, and 
 appreciation of options available during the lifecycle of the disaster. 
Issues and Challenges in the “Three Cs” of Civil–Military Organizations  
Civil–military organizations are needed to establish, maintain, influence, and exploit 
relations between military, government, and non-government organizations, including the 
host country of the disaster. The “three Cs” for civil military organizations are 
communication, coordination, and collaboration. With complimentary capabilities and 
competencies, other government and non-government organizations participate with the 
U.S. in HADR. Therefore it is essential that coordination and communication among all 
these organizations be explored and enhanced. The premise is that such processes will 
enable the DoD to respond efficiently and effectively with the unique capabilities that they 
possess in the future of limited budgets (Apte et al., 2016; Moroney et al., 2013). The type of 
collaboration between military and non-military organizations is predominantly determined 
by the disaster classification. Logistical support and delivery of supplies continues 
irrespective of the alliance (Pettit & Beresford, 2005). The authors propose a model for 
logistical requirements in the affected regions.  
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The authors also present issues and challenges for measuring disaster 
preparedness and response. These factors can help in developing the framework for 
readiness metrics. More importantly, the authors describe the possible conflicts arising from 
military involvement in humanitarian crises. Table 4 describes these conflicts. 
Table 4. Conflicts Arising From Military Involvement 
(Pettit & Beresford, 2005) 
 
In November 2005, a DoD directive defined stability operations as a “core U.S. 
military mission” with a Priority comparable to combat operations” (DoD, 2005). This 
directive recommends the use of outcome-based performance measure and installing 
process for transparency of information. Reaves, Schor, and Burkle (2008) describe the 
gaps in the DoD’s ability to measure the effects of HADR operations when compared with 
international standards. The authors’ analysis reveals that only 0.7% of the 1,000 after 
action reports studied refer to performance measures. The authors conclude that most of 
the humanitarian operations performed by the DoD did not have records to identify the 
activities that could be quantified for most contribution to the HADR. In a focused study, 
Reineck (2004) estimates a readiness and deployability index for emergency center 
registered nurses to prepare for disaster relief.  
U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) maintained necessary coordination and daily workings 
with the State Department (Embassy in Japan) and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF; 
Terrada, 2012). This was informally done without any structured support at operational level 
of command and control.  
Yoshitomi et al. (2012) describe the bilateral coordination between JSDF and USFJ. 
They suggest that the solution to preparedness issues may be establishing a standing 
bilateral coordination center that is staffed with people from both the forces so they could 
share information and plan before the disaster strikes. They also recommend that for 
effective coordination, more activities and exercises are needed. This will enable clarification 
of communications, roles, missions, and capabilities with the counterparts of other nations. 
Acquisition and interagency agreements are necessary to pre-position supplies and 
services. For successful coordination, it is also essential to understand the capabilities and 
equipment of the host nation counterparts.  
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Japan is one of the best prepared countries for earthquake in the world but had 
limited experience in receiving international assistance (Katoch, 2012). Absence of 
institutionalized civil–military coordination is a significant void that is exacerbated when a 
country is facing a super disaster or crisis. In spite of this, the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(GEJE) of 2012 is a great example of coordination between JSDF, USFJ, Swiss 
Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA), and German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW; 
Terada, 2012; Smart, 2012; Fichter, 2012). 
At a national level, cooperation between the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement (RCRC) and military is common, but this cooperation gets complex when military 
assets are involved in an international context in the case of natural disaster (Markus, 2012). 
Guidelines from RCRC state that “while maintaining a dialogue with armed forces at all 
levels, the components of Movement preserve their independence of decision-making and 
action, in order to ensure adequate access to all people in need of humanitarian assistance” 
(Counsel of Delegates, 2005). 
Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was notably one of the best instances of civil–
military coordination (CFE-DM, 2014). There were many previous experiences from the 
disasters in the Philippines that contributed to the disaster relief. However, connections 
between personnel involved in the relief and other players helped expedite the collaboration 
between civil and military organizations.  
There were 57 countries contributing to the relief operations in Super Typhoon 
Haiyan. Multinational Coordinate Center (MNCC) was set up for this purpose with 29 foreign 
militaries that responded to the disaster. The coordination predominantly revolved around 
warehousing, transportation, and distribution—that is, logistics. However, a lack of 
framework for a common operating process and a lack of consensus on needs assessment 
ended up causing a duplication of efforts in the face of scarce resources. The study by 
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management (CFE-DM, 2015) shows the following best 
practices:  
Best Practice 1: A commonly understood “end-to end warning system” 
prepares a nation for crises 
Best Practice 2: Bilateral commitment executed multilaterally on the ground 
through the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) promotes optimal 
civilian use of foreign defense assets. 
Best Practice 3: When closely coordinated with the government, the private 
sector multiplies a nation’s surge capacity to meet the life-saving needs of the 
affected population. (p. 5) 
The authors of CFE-DM (2015) conclude that advances in civil–military coordination 
occur when (1) consensus in the operating environment paves the way for unity of effort; (2) 
systemic changes through an inclusive multi-sectoral approach streamlines disparate efforts 
on emergency response preparedness; (3) a convergence in concepts, frameworks, 
protocols, and procedures maintains a clear distinction of responsibilities and national 
sovereignty; and (4) institutionalized internal and external partnerships augment a country’s 
latent ability to surge. 
The U.S. Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA) served in Philippines during Super 
Typhoon Haiyan. This was not unique to the Philippines; ODA also served in Nepal. In the 
aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, two teams of the ODA, 1121 and 1126, happened 
to be in Khatmandu, Nepal (Elwood, 2016). They stayed on to help with the HADR mission 
since U.S. Special Forces Green Berets are known for their capability in diverse tasks of 
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special warfare during combat missions and in training with partner forces in coordinating 
exercises. This came in critical use in Nepal. The beneficial aspect of ODA can be exploited 
methodically if the team can be incorporated in a contingency plan for military–military 
collaboration. The competencies of Special Forces to react instantly with pre-established 
relationships and resources, critical language skills, and flexibility could then be utilized.  
There was significant anticipation for a catastrophic earthquake in Nepal among 
many international governments and military organizations. This projection helped in a 
broad response from all the organizations when the actual disaster occurred. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) led the effort for civil–
military coordination through the Humanitarian Military Coordination Center (HuMOCC; 
Tarantino, Suter, & Cooper, 2016). In Nepal, the military participation came in the areas of 
logistics and transportation, in addition to health and medical support. 
The model for civil–military cooperation in disaster relief is the support provided by 
Joint Task Force (JTF) 505 and USAID to the 2015 Nepal earthquake (Bock, 2016). The 
author credits the success to the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) Process. The major 
contributions of this tool are as follows: 
 Transparency in information about needs, number of response participants, 
requirements, and coordination challenges 
 Military planners’ ability to expedite the planning process and analyze if JTF 
has the resources and authority to fill it 
 The DoD’s doctrine of supporting USAID 
 Maintaining cost efficiency 
 Constraining focus on specific requirements to avoid mission creep  
Framework Based on Literature Survey 
Unfortunately, the absence of quantifiable or measurable performance indicators or 
readiness metrics in humanitarian organizations (HOs) has been acknowledged by 
organizations that are involved in HADR whether they be military or not. Literature on critical 
best practices for performance measurement describe that the metrics should be aligned 
with the objective. The objective in the case of the U.S. DoD according to the Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is to provide HADR with capabilities that complement 
the capabilities of other HOs in such operations. Learning from the lessons discussed 
previously in this article will help the U.S. DoD be effective and efficient in HADR and at the 
same time spread goodwill through the world by HADR.  
Readiness is defined by the DoD as the ability of the U.S. military to fight for and 
meet the needs of the national strategy. No comprehensive plan exists, thus emphasizing 
that a framework is necessary readiness. There exist marked gaps between the way the 
DoD measures the performance of HADR and international standards. It has been noted 
that out of 1,000 after action reports studied, only 0.7% even mention performance (Reaves 
et al., 2008). 
Some of the reasons, as expressed before, that the DoD should measure the impact 
of humanitarian assistance programs are as follows: (1) Measuring them offers opportunities 
for future and mid-course corrections in the projects through feedback loops enabling 
planners to underscore activities that are cost-effective, (2) the collection and sharing of 
data decreases the likelihood that HOs duplicate activities , and (3) analysis based on 
collected data offers transparency and quantifiable results that do not leave any ambiguity. 
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However, operational challenges exist. Current naval HADR responses are mostly 
reactive, not proactive or preplanned and sustainable engagements. Such activities do not 
necessarily align with the strategic goal. Lessons learned point to deficient integration with 
host nations and other HOs. More importantly, the reliance of the USN on vessels alone 
may not provide adequate HADR due to the complete dependence on the deployment of 
ships irrespective of their capabilities.  
Figure 3 shows the endogenous and exogenous processes of the organizations 
providing relief to the affected region. Core competencies that are based on the assets and 
resources of the organization are endogenous to the organization. Originating from the core 
competencies and capabilities, the organizations establish response supply chains (RSC) 
for products, services, and information. This step is endogenous to the organization. The 
response supply chains have their own issues and challenges inherent to the organization. 
The HADR delivered is at the intersection of establishment of RSC, an endogenous process 
of an organization and the demand due to disaster in the affected region, exogenous to the 
organization. The demand from the disaster in the affected region dictates the relief needed 
that is exogenous to the organization. However, the actual relief delivered is endogenous to 
the organization. The consequences of the delivery of HADR result in a gap of pain that 
originates when needs are not met by the organization. The gap of pain experienced by the 
regions affected by disasters forces the question of “why” to the players of the response 
supply chains. All these consequential steps are exogenous to the organization. However, 
the resulting playbook or a set of readiness metrics in answering of “why” is endogenous to 
the organization itself. The objective of our research in this project was to study existing 
literature to understand the process and ultimately to conceptualize a framework for 
readiness metrics.  
 
Figure 3. Process for Identifying Readiness Metrics in Organizations 
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The Case for Naval HADR Operations 
The essential services and capabilities for disaster response as outlined by Apte et 
al. (2016) for military and non-military organizations are Information and Knowledge 
Management, Needs Assessment, Supply, Deployment and Distribution, and Health Service 
Support. If one focuses on military organizations and on the U.S. DoD, the capability of 
Information and Knowledge Management, for example, can be transformed into what is 
needed to be ready, an awareness of being ready, and a metric for readiness.  
The disasters of the past few decades and the lessons learned from them offer 
insight into the needs of the countries affected, whether their needs were met by the U.S. 
DoD, and the effectiveness of the DoD’s response. After Super Typhoon Haiyan, there was 
massive damage to the infrastructure. The U.S. DoD’s principal capability of heavy vertical 
lift capabilities was critical in delivering disaster relief. This capability helped transport goods 
and people despite infrastructure destruction. This capability also helped rescue the affected 
population stranded on the many islands of the Philippines that are remote and difficult to 
access. USS George Washington naval task force and 31st MEU formed JTF 505 with 
about 1,000 U.S. DoD personnel and were deployed to the Philippines. Military aircraft 
helped in understanding the demand through intelligence gathering. Without the Marines, it 
would have been impossible to clear the roads and distribute supplies and services. 
After the Nepal earthquake, the U.S. DoD service that could be used was the 3rd 
MEB located in Okinawa since Nepal is a landlocked country. Adding to the MEB, JTF 505 
was formed for deployment to help with HADR under the guidance of USAID. The terrain in 
Nepal tested the DoD equipment and the staff. Though rotary wing and tilt rotor aircraft 
supported the mission, the team casualties tried the resolve of the teams.  
The naval missions conducted for HADR in the past, as described in this research, 
help develop the Readiness Assessment Model. The output from the model must answer 
questions such as what is needed, is it there, what must be done, how can it be done, how 
can the gap between demand and supply be closed before a disaster strikes. There are 
many more variables that play a role in the model such as the type of the disaster 
(manmade or natural), onset of disaster (sudden or slow), relations with the host county, 
category of host country, and so forth.  
In future research, we plan to dig deeper and build on the actual experiences of USN 
and USMC officers involved in HADR. The objective is to articulate the strategic readiness 
through operational details and answer the questions posed previously.  
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Abstract 
The U.S. Navy, with its expeditionary warfare and logistics capabilities, is 
increasingly playing a critical role in conflicts involving non-state actors. Given the difficulties 
faced in expeditionary environments, managing expeditionary logistics is particularly 
challenging yet critically important today. In this research, we use case study methodology 
to better understand the current practices and challenges of expeditionary logistics at 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), a subordinate entity of Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC), and to develop a set of concrete recommendations for improving 
expeditionary logistics processes at EOD. We also study the current definitions of 
expeditionary logistics to propose a definition better suited for today’s challenges, analyze 
similarities and differences between expeditionary logistics and commercial logistics, and 
develop concepts for successfully managing expeditionary logistics operations. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, the United States and its coalition partner countries have 
increasingly engaged in conflicts involving non-state actors, and it appears that these 
conflicts are unlikely to subside in the foreseeable future. As a powerful maritime force, the 
U.S. Navy plays a critical role at sea and on land in these conflicts through its expeditionary 
warfare and logistics capabilities. The critical requirement here is to enable operational units 
to carry out a short-duration mission autonomously without the routine support of a base 
network. Given the difficulties faced in non-permissive expeditionary environments, 
managing expeditionary logistics is particularly challenging yet critically important today.  
However, our prior research shows that there exists scarcity of research literature or 
DoD documentation and guidance available on this important topic. The proposed research 
project will therefore begin to address this gap by developing conceptual frameworks and 
concrete recommendations on designing and successfully managing expeditionary logistics 
in non-permissive environments. 
In this research, we adopt a two-phased approach. In the first phase we study a 
specifc instance of current expeditionary logistics (ExLog) operations in practice to (1) better 
understand the key elements and critical success factors of ExLog, and (2) develop 
recommendations for improving logistical processes being studied. In the second phase we 
build on the results of the first phase to develop concepts useful for optimally designing 
ExLog processes and successfully managing them. The specific research questions we 
address in the second phase are: What is expeditionary logistics and what are its key 
components? What are the similarities and differences between expeditionary logistics and 
the traditional commercial logistics? What are some of the best practices of the traditional 
commercial logistics that Exlog can benefit from? How to successfully manage Exlog 
operations?  
As a starting point in this research we conducted an extensive literature survey of 
relevant research published in journals and books as well as documents published by the 
DoD on the topic. To limit the length of this symposium paper, however, we do not provide 
results of that literature survey, and provide instead only an overview of our own past 
relevant research in this area. In FY2014 we worked on an exploratory research project 
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on the topic of expeditionary logistics 
(Apte & Kang, 2015). A team of MBA students assisted us in that research by undertaking 
their MBA project to study the logistical challenges faced by the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) communities (Kundra, Brown, & 
Donaldson, 2014). The study indicated that the main shortcoming of logistical processes 
was in the information systems support, and the capture and analysis of information 
regarding the supplies, materiel, and equipment used in expeditionary logistics. In a follow-
up project funded by IMET, we developed a case based on our earlier research for use in an 
advanced logistics course (Yoho & Apte, 2018). This case is currently used in the capstone 
course of the logistics curriculum at GBBPP. Finally, continuing with our research on the 
same topic, two MBA students studied under our guidance the details of logistical processes 
supporting the deployment cycle of a Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Platoon at EOD 
(Reeves & Baker, 2017). 
We should mention that as of the writing of this symposium paper we have yet to 
complete our research on the topic and the work is ongoing. Specifically, we have 
completed the first phase, but the work in the second phase regarding the developments of 
concepts and theory about expeditionary logistics is ongoing. 
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This research report is organized into five sections. This introductory section is 
followed by the second section describing the organization and the mission of Explosive 
Ordnance Disposa (EOD), the specific instance of ExLog proceses we studied. The third 
section presents details of the logistical processes supporting the deployment cycle of a 
(hypothetical) Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Platoon at EOD, while the fourth section 
provides the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning the management of 
those logistical processes at EOD. We complete the paper in the fifth and final section of 
this working paper with our initial thoughts on the characterization and definition of 
expeditionary logistics as well as the comparison of expeditionary and commercial logistics. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is a subordinate entity of the Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) which is the Navy’s expert command regarding 
expeditionary operations and logistics. The NECC exists to man, train, equip, and sustain 
the Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF) for bridging the gap from operations at sea to sea–
land joint operations. While the NECC command is relatively new, stood up by the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) in January 2006, NEF is old. The NECC is composed of eight 
subordinate entities that are their own respective commands which deliver the unique 
capabilities to the U.S. and its allied forces in the expeditionary realm: Costal Riverine, 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction (Seabees), Expeditionary Intelligence, 
Combat Camera, Expeditionary Logistics, Maritime Civil Affairs and Training, and 
Expeditionary Combat Readiness. 
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is the Navy’s technical expert in locating, 
identifying, rendering safe, and explosively detonating foreign and domestic ordnance. 
Ordnance includes conventional, nuclear, biological, chemical, underwater, and improvised 
types of devices. The ability to control and dispose of these various types of dangerous 
devices enables theater access for Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), Expeditionary Strike 
Groups (ESGs), Naval Special Warfare, and Army Special Forces (SF). 
EOD is a history-rich, proud community that serves alongside many SPECOPS 
forces, as well as traditional Navy mission communities such as ships and submarines. The 
EOD technicians risk their lives to perform complex, technical defusing of mines, bombs, 
and improvised explosive devices (IED) and, of necessity, are required to be physically fit, 
superior swimmers, and athletes. EOD technicians undergo rigorous schoolhouse training 
prior to arriving at their commands and then complete operationally challenging tours filled 
with deployments and stressful workups due to the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO). 
EOD Group ONE, based in San Diego, CA, and EOD Group TWO, based in Little 
Creek, VA, are the two U.S.-based EOD elements. Each EOD group has five battalions and 
various shore detachments, platoons, and companies within them. The groups provide 
specially trained, combat ready, highly mobile EOD forces to support CSGs, amphibious 
ready group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), MCM task forces and groups, NSW 
forces, Army SF, Military Sealift Command, unified theater commanders, CONUS Navy 
Region commander, and Homeland Defense and Contingency Operations. 
EOD Expeditionary Support Unit (EODESU) ONE and TWO follow the same 
geographical structure as their fellow expeditionary forces. EODESUs provide total logistics 
support to the EOD forces through financial, supply chain, and logistics management as well 
as operational planning and global force support. Prior to formation of EODESU, ExLog was 
performed by the EOD teams while simultaneously experiencing stressful OPTEMPOs and 
very dangerous deployments stacked one after the other. The purpose of the EODESU was 
to relieve the EOD mobile units of logistics and maintenance duties so they could focus on 
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their demanding operational duties. Also, the EODESUs are staffed with logistics and 
maintenance experts in order to perform those functions more efficiently and with increased 
precision, ultimately adding greater value to the Navy and improving the result provided to 
the warfighter.  
While ESU commands are not tasked with executing any of the highly technical and 
versatile missions the EOD teams are tasked with, they are tasked with equipping those 
teams with the proper gear and equipment to successfully execute the mission. In order to 
know what is required and understand the details necessary to complete these difficult 
missions, the ESU must be knowledgeable about the EOD missions and the gear and 
equipment EOD teams need.  
Mine Countermeasure Platoon at EOD: A Case Study 
This case study focuses on EOD Mobile Unit (EODMU); in particular on one of its 
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Platoons. The case begins with an overview of the logistical 
processes and information systems used by EODESU TWO to provide the necessary to 
support a (hypothetical) MCM Platoon 1201. That is followed by a description of the MK-16 
equipment—an underwater breathing apparatus—since it is a heavily utilized piece of gear 
by the MCM Platoon. The case then tracks the logistical processes used to support the 
activities of the MCM Platoon throughout its deployment cycle. The case thus provides a 
realistic insight into the operations of the EODMU MCM Platoon and the logistical support 
operations of EODESU TWO. 
EODESU Supply 
The ESU units supply their teams as part of the services they provide. While the 
process by which the individual units perform this function may be slightly different, relatively 
speaking the same outcome is delivered. The EOD units supported by EODESU receive a 
variety of supplies and equipment, including expeditionary logistics overhaul (ELO) and 
general logistics and supply chain support. ELO is similar to the integrated logistics overhaul 
(ILO) process aboard ships but is specifically designed for expeditionary forces where they 
identify the gear needed to be repaired, reconditioned, or replaced. 
ESU teams issue the following types of gear to the EOD teams they support: 
 PGI (Personal Gear Issue) includes items such as uniforms, undershirts, 
socks, and other items that require some specificity to a member’s body and 
measurement.  
 TOA (Table of Allowances) consists of specific gear, equipment, systems, 
and materiel related to expeditionary missions. TOA includes items such as 
inflatable boats, generators, and specific wetsuits. The EOD teams keep this 
gear with them from the start of the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) to 
the post-deployment return. TOA gear represents a challenge to the cost 
savings efforts due to constantly changing and non-standard nature of the 
gear allowed or allotted to the expeditionary teams based on their specific 
missions.  
 COSAL (Consolidated Shipboard Allowance Listing) includes items that the 
ship normally carries on board. The COSAL contains nomenclature, 
operating characteristics, technical manuals, and equipment descriptions as 
described in allowance parts lists (APL) and allowance equipage lists (AEL).  
 Other non-COSAL material.  
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The expeditionary requisitions processes are unique when compared to the standard 
fleet requisition processes. In the standard fleet requisition processes, over 95% of the 
requisitions are filled through the Navy supply system using National Stock Number (NSN) 
items, while less than 5% are open purchases. In comparison, in expeditionary logistics, 
approximately 70% of the requisitions are open purchases and only 30% are NSN 
requisitions (Kundra, Brown, & Donaldson, 2014). The expeditionary environment and 
mission add unique variables, such as distinctive operating environment, the need to stay 
current with technology, and the greater need for speed. Because of its availability, these 
situations force expeditionary units to rely heavily upon open purchases for commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) or local procurement products.  
To track and store information regarding the above gear, the ESU units use multiple 
information systems, including the following:  
 WASP: A warehouse and inventory management system 
 RCRP: Readiness and Cost Reporting System 
 R-Supply: A system that provides the Navy with online inventory, logistics, 
and financial magement tools 
 DPAS: A DoD-required system that tracks property valued greater than 
$5,000.  
The WASP, RCRP, R-Supply, and DPAS are distinctly different IT systems that are 
used to organize about the same type of information. In some cases, the information is 
actually the same, and duplicate efforts are being made to track and store transactions in 
different systems because the systems are not able to automatically share information with 
each other. For example, ESU tracks a transaction first in WASP and then manually enters 
the same information in RCRP. Another example is when supply parts are received from 
vendors at the ESUs and are automatically confirmed in R-Supply. Subsequently, the ESU 
members manually enter the same information that was just confirmed in R-Supply into 
WASP because the ESU teams use WASP as their internal inventory management system, 
and because there exists no interface to automatically share information between the two 
systems. A factor that further complicates the matter is a requirement to store information on 
an Accountable Property System of Record (APSR) system and since WASP is not an 
APSR system. 
Upon completion of the mission, training, or cycle, the gear that is not meant to be 
kept by a member is returned and inventoried. The gear return process is more than simply 
stacking and counting specific clothing articles or ammunition boxes. Given the nature of 
EOD missions, many times the gear gets returned, but in a heavily damaged and potentially 
unusable state. Therefore, ESU inspectors must know what separates returned, quality 
gear, from gear requiring minor maintenance or depot-level repair (DLR).  
In addition to managing the inventory of existing gear, ESU is required to properly 
document missing and damaged gear that is beyond repair. DD Form 200 is the Navy’s form 
for financial liability investigation, required in the process that is initiated by submitting a DD 
Form 200. The Navy must determine, based on DD Form 200, the reason the equipment 
was lost or damaged and who should be responsible, if anyone, for the cost to repair or 
replace. DD Form 200 is required as per DoD Directive 7200.11 for lost DoD-controlled 
property. It is a form that is filled out electronically, but ultimately it is also kept as a hard 
copy and entered into the ESU IT systems manually. ESU members are required to 
physically search archived DD Form 200s when they need to find information. 
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DD Form 1149 is another DoD directive form that is required when shipping through 
certain seaports or airports. The DD 1149 is specifically known as the Requisition and 
Invoice/Shipping Document to verify what was issued against the electronic records in 
WASP. This hard-copy document is also manually entered into systems and kept hard-copy 
for storage or later use when searching for information. There is a large collection of files at 
EODESU TWO of forms that are necessary to conduct business but are only stored as a 
hard copy. 
The MK-16 Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
Navy EOD is the only service manned, trained, and equipped to perform underwater 
render safe procedures and conduct EOD dive operations. Typical EOD mission sets 
include Mine Countermeasure (MCM), salvage diving, ship’s hull diving, search and rescue 
(SAR) operations, and other necessary diving missions. With such a variety of technically 
challenging and highly dangerous diving missions, EOD technicians are trained to perform 
and be successful at nearly any diving mission. The MK-16, therefore, is a common piece of 
equipment used in the EOD teams, and all EOD technicians are well-versed in its use and 
capabilities. 
The MK-16 was developed to reduce magnetic and acoustic signatures emitted by 
diving EOD technicians. The mission of EOD technicians is one that is highly technical, 
diverse, and dangerous. Under such tense work conditions, a superior diving suit is required 
that allows full range of motion but still provides protection from the natural and enemy 
hazards present in the area of operation (AO). The MK-16 breathing medium is maintained 
at a predetermined partial pressure of oxygen (PO2) that is monitored by sensors and 
controls to ensure diver safety. The reason divers are required to maintain a safe level of 
oxygen and are monitored so heavily is that depending on the mission, they may use more 
or less oxygen and cannot follow a standard timetable for bottom time.  
Along with MK-16, a diver’s other essential equipment includes knife, hook knife, 
strobe, smoke or flare, thermal protection, fins, and potentially a weapon as required. The 
knife has many uses, but one of its main uses is to help free a trapped diver from any 
number of hazards. The MK-16 equipment must withstand these conditions and not 
puncture, disconnect, or break easily. Strobes, smoke, and flares are essential safety gear 
for EOD technicians because at the depths required of some of the EOD missions, there is 
absolutely no natural visibility and those pieces of equipment could prove to be life-saving. A 
weapon is a necessity depending on the mission and AO in which the dive will take place; 
this is a harsh reminder that the mission is not a recreational dive but is highly important and 
dangerous. 
EODESU TWO has a team of maintainers as well as a GS civilian employee who 
accounts for and maintains the MK-16 system inventory. The GS civilian employee is known 
as the resident expert on the system. The benefit to having a civilian expert versus a military 
member is that ideally, the civilian remains the expert point of contact for a longer period of 
time, providing a long-term persistent presence as opposed to the routine rotations of 
assigned active duty personnel. This ensures retention of critical corporate knowledge 
regarding program supply and maintenance history. 
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The Logistical Support of MCM Platoon 
This case study focuses on the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Platoon 1201, which 
is a primary end-user of the MK-16. The case follows the supported unit through its training 
cycle, deployment, and ultimate return to the home base. 
Pre-Deployment 
Preparation for any deployment begins with a Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP), 
a codified training cycle. Concurrent with the assigned deployment schedule, the MCM 
Platoon undergoes a FRTP cycle like most other Navy units. The purpose of this process is 
to train, equip, and certify unit mission preparedness. FRTP consists of various milestones, 
including inspections, evaluations, training, and exercises. Each one of these events helps 
to build unit skill and cohesion, starting with basic, individualized training, and working 
toward more advanced, integrated training with external units. The process is designed to 
prepare the unit for the upcoming deployment based on available intelligence data (intel) 
gathered prior to heading into theater. This same intel is what EOSESU TWO uses to 
prepare supply and logistics support. EODESU TWO outfits the units during expeditionary 
logistics overhaul (ELO) and issues all of the required gear aside from what has already 
been issued for the team to be successful on deployment. 
The FRTP for an MCM Platoon begins with a tightly packed schedule of training 
events (also referred to as “workups”) lasting roughly 11 months from the start. Upon 
completion of the workup cycle, the platoon stays in a six-month sustainment phase, when 
they are certified for operations, and thus may be deployed early if necessary. Otherwise, 
they maintain their availability status until departing on a six-month deployment, which 
completes the 24-month deployment cycle. 
Prior to FRTP, the platoon receives expeditionary logistics overhaul (ELO) from 
EODESU TWO and begins workups. Part of the workups include successful completion of 
the requirements of the Training and Evaluation Unit (TEU). TEU does not completely 
oversee the FRTP process for the platoon, but provides training, classes, study materials 
and equipment, and some evaluation for how the unit is able to perform against the various 
elements of the deployment they are likely to face. At times, TEU directly issues some 
duplicate equipment that is required during the training. This prevents the platoon from 
utilizing primary issue equipment, and thereby avoiding any potential damage or loss to 
mission-essential gear, which in some cases can delay deployment or reduce mission 
capabilities of the unit. The TEU has its own supply of gear that it accounts for and 
purchases via EODESU TWO to support the unit training and evaluation process. ESU 
controls the budget used by TEU to purchase their course gear, which they acquire via DoD 
e-mall, GSA Advantage, GSA Leasing Support vendors, prime vendors, or other 
government sources of acquisition. The gear issued by TEU is generally the same as what 
is issued by ESU but a slight variation is possible. 
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ELO/Gear Issue 
At the start of the deployment cycle, platoon undergoes ELO to get outfitted with the 
gear required for training and subsequent deployment tasking. This ELO process facilitates 
the issuing of a baseline of standard gear that EODESU TWO has developed over time 
based on coordination with the EODMUs and their historical tasking. Scheduled six to 12 
months in advance, and based on long-term deployment rotations that are often available 
two years prior, the platoon’s ELO takes approximately three weeks to fully transfer the 
ownership of thousands of required pieces of gear from the ESU to the platoon. The process 
starts with coordination between EODESU TWO and EODMU, to deconflict an appropriate 
start date, based on all units that may need similar support.  
To start preparing for the ELO, EODESU TWO typically designates four Internal 
Airlift/Helicopter Slingable Container Unit 90 (ISU 90), along with a mini flyaway dive locker 
(FADL), for storage of all ELO gear issued to the platoon. At the completion of ELO, the 
ownership of these storage units will be transferred to the platoon. Before the gear is moved 
from the warehouse to the storage containers, EODESU supply personnel generate a DD 
1149 listing all of the items required for transfer. Each commodity manager is responsible for 
populating a DD 1149 with the appropriate items under his purview. These documents serve 
as the official inventory record for equipment ownership, and in the interim, also serve as an 
inventory checklist utilized by both ESU personnel and the platoon commander, for verifying 
all items transferred.  
The DD 1149 information must be entered in two separate systems. First, all items 
must be properly accounted for in the warehouse. The IT system utilized in maintaining an 
accurate warehouse accounting is Wedge Advanced Software Product (WASP). WASP is a 
standalone warehouse management system. ESU personnel must go into WASP to update 
the ownership/location status of each item, as it is transferred to the storage containers. 
Additionally, this same supply/inventory information must be entered into the Navy’s 
Readiness and Cost Reporting Program (RCRP), which is the approved system of record for 
use in official reporting up the Navy chain of command, and which is not connected to 
WASP. Though WASP is not an approved system of record, it is used locally for the 
convenience and simplicity it provides in managing the local inventory.  
DPAS warehouse is another inventory management system that is available to the 
supply community that satisfies about the same requirements as WASP, but adds date entry 
efficiencies such as bar code scanners. EODESUs have yet to implement the new system. 
WASP is utilized for the majority of ELO transfer items, but not for underwater items. Due to 
the much smaller inventory of underwater items, the dive locker works primarily with RCRP 
(for ownership transfer), OMMS (for repair/maintenance), and spreadsheets (for ad hoc local 
tracking). Once the containers have been filled, and ESU and the platoon commander have 
verified the transfer, the platoon commander signs the DD 1149, accepting ownership of the 
containers and their contents. 
While the platoon usually receives the entire complement of gear required for 
deployment, at times, adjustments to the process are made based on supply availability and 
community demand for limited equipment, such as the MK-16. For example, the dive locker 
may delay issuance of the MK-16 if there is excess demand for use at the TEU in preparing 
other units for their own deployment schedule. Additionally, since mine countermeasures is 
a primary mission of MCM platoons, they are typically outfitted with MK-16 at the start of 
workups, regardless of needs of others. However, other platoons that treat mine 
countermeasures as a secondary mission may experience a delay in isuing the MK-16 
during workups. However, in case of delay, they are provided equipment on a short-term 
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basis as they commence specific MK-16 training evolutions during the workup cycle, and 
receive the full issue prior to deployment. 
After about 18 months of training and sustainment, MCM platoon is deployed. During 
sustainment and deployment, the process for acquiring repair and replacement equipment is 
essentially an à la carte version of the ELO process, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
Deployment 
Upon completion of the training cycle, any training-specific gear issued by the dive 
locker is returned, and any outstanding ELO gear requirement is fulfilled by the ESU prior to 
departure. The unit then embarks on the deployment to support real-time tasking from 
theater commanders, execute pre-planned missions, or operate independently, depending 
on theater demands. The MCM Platoon 1201 is tasked with conducting a dive mission to 
clear a port in the Persian Gulf. This is a routine anti-terrorism/force protection (ATFP) 
mission to ensure safe passage for a naval surface action group (SAG), scheduled to arrive 
soon. 
This EOD MCM Platoon is made up of eight EOD technicians. As part of their 
standard complement of gear, they are issued five MK-16 units and one operational support 
kit (OSK), which should be enough to handle the job. After four days of dive operations, two 
of the MK-16 units are in need of servicing. Several O-rings need replacement and one of 
the units needs an oxygen addition valve replaced. Until they are serviced, these MK-16s 
are not safe for use. In order to meet the necessary pace of operations and to avoid any 
extended time on station, they need to get the equipment repaired. Fortunately, these items 
are available within the OSK. After a quick repair evolution, all MK-16 units are fully 
operational. This allows the platoon to meet the mission requirements as scheduled, and 
more importantly, this allows a follow-on naval SAG to pull into port safely and on time. 
The use of parts from the OSK, along with a subsequent replenishment request from 
the platoon, create a demand signal for execution back at EODESU TWO. The goal is to 
maintain a fully-stocked OSK, to provide some maintenance capacity on-site. With other 
commodities, the platoon typically coordinates with the Expeditionary Support Element 
(ESE), based in the theater. The ESE routes these requests through the appropriate 
commodity manager at ESU TWO for processing. However, in the case of underwater 
commodity items such as the O-rings and oxygen addition valve, they typically send e-mail 
to the dive locker personnel directly to request the necessary items. From a supply 
standpoint, this current request can be fulfilled in two different ways. The routine expendable 
items (the O-rings), are available immediately from the supply warehouse. The commodity 
manager enters the request in OMMS, which routes the request through the chain of 
command for approval. Once approved, the request goes to the warehouse to tag the O-
rings for distribution to Platoon 1201. The oxygen addition valve, however, is considered a 
depot-level repair (DLR) item, and therefore is handled somewhat differently. DLR basically 
means that the item cannot be locally serviced, and must be sent to a dedicated repair 
facility. The oxygen addition valve is requested in similar fashion as the O-rings, using e-mail 
and an OMMS job order. However, the platoon must also send the failed part back to the 
ESU for exchange. The exchanged part is turned in to the depot repair facility, where it is 
refurbished or discarded as unserviceable. The repair facility provides a replacement part to 
ESU, likely a refurbished item from a previous repair. The dive locker at the ESU then 
generates a DD 1149 to document the parts delivery, make any necessary updates required 
in RCRP, and ship the O-rings and oxygen addition valve out to Platoon 1201. Upon receipt, 
the platoon has a DD 1149 for their records, and the OSK is back to full operational status. 
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This process repeats throughout the deployment, to facilitate repair and replacement activity 
on the MK 16. 
Post-Deploymnt 
Upon return, the Platoon 1201 follows up with EODESU TWO, to conduct all 
necessary equipment turn-in, along with associated documentation processes. The purpose 
of this effort is to reconcile supply-related activity that occurred throughout deployment and 
close out any outstanding logistics support requirements. While the Platoon 1201 is able to 
turn in its equipment with a materiel loss of about 5%, the record of the past turn-ins show 
that it is not uncommon to experience a materiel loss of as much as 30%. 
Just as when the platoon received initial gear issue, the primary process for gear 
return is also ELO. This involves presenting any remaining gear to the supply warehouse for 
reconciliation. ESU personnel receive the gear, accept functional or repairable gear into 
inventory, and properly account for other equipment that is either unusable or lost. 
Functional gear may be cleaned and prepped for immediate redeployment, while repairable 
gear will be processed for repair or refurbishment before being returned to mission-capable 
status. ELO and associated data reconciliations to RCRP are important steps in the process 
for ensuring accountability for inventory levels. These steps support the ongoing financial 
improvement and audit readiness (FIAR) initiative across the DoD. 
For TOA and PGI gear, Platoon 1201 returns to the supply warehouse at EODESU 
TWO to transfer ownership of the preponderance of ELO. Again, the process takes 
approximately three weeks to complete. Using the original DD 1149 document from ELO 
issue, along with accumulated DD 1149s generated throughout deployment for parts orders, 
the Platoon 1201 commander works with ESU personnel to inventory all returned items. All 
equipment is designated as mission-capable, serviceable, unserviceable, or missing. After 
accounting for all items, ESU personnel return to WASP and RCRP for appropriate 
electronic transfer of ownership. In the case of unserviceable or missing items, a form DD 
200 must be generated to account for the loss. It is the responsibility of Platoon 1201 to 
generate the DD 200 and route it through their chain of command for review. A copy is 
provided to EODESU TWO to facilitate record keeping and to ensure inventory items are 
appropriately removed in WASP and RCRP, to avoid overstating the value and quantity of 
existing inventory. 
Occasionally, due to operationally constrained deployment timelines, there is 
pressure to expedite the ELO process between deploying and returning platoons. A solution 
employed by EODESU TWO is a modified ELO. Requiring a surge of personnel and a tightly 
coordinated schedule, this allows a returning platoon to transfer inventory directly to another 
platoon starting workups. This also requires coordinated commitment from both platoons 
and ESU, and can reduce the typical three-week process down to one week. 
Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding the Logistical 
Processes at EOD 
The problems and shortcoming of logistical processes described in the previous 
section were analyzed using selected tools of Lean Six Sigma (LSS), a process 
improvement methodology. Specifically, we used tools such as the Process Flowchart and 
the Cause and Effect analysis (resulting in a Fishbone Diagram). The Fishbone Diagram is 
provided in Figure 1, while a discussion of the cause and effect analysis follows. It should be 
noted that the analysis is organized as per the major causes shown in the Fishbone 
Diagram. As a sample, the flowchart of ELO/Gear Issue process is provided in the appendix. 
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After preparing flowcharts of all processes, they were analyzed to identify root cause(s) of 
various problems facing the expeditionary logistics operations. 
 
Figure 1. Fishbone Chart 
Information Technology (IT) System Support 
As previously mentioned, EOD represents a very small portion of the Navy’s overall 
manning. Consequently, they are unable to claim funding that would permit them to have a 
written contract tailored with an inventory management program to meet their needs. As a 
result, EOD “makes do” with the systems it has: the commonly available commercial 
products such as WASP for inventory management and Navy-approved systems such as R-
supply for financial management. WASP was implemented as an inventory management 
system several years ago. It is an improvement over their previous methods of using 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The use of multiple systems to perform inventory 
management results in an ad hoc inventory management system that requires double 
entries to maintain duplicate databases, as well as extensive, lengthy periods of on-the-job 
training to master the systems. Multiple systems are required to maintain equipment 
inventories, and specific programs are required to be used for certain categories of 
equipment. Moreover, none of the databases for these inventory management programs are 
able to share information with the software used to track finances (R-Supply). 
The effect this is having on the EOD logistics operations is reduced efficiency and 
effectiveness. For a typical Logistics Specialist, a tour in an expeditionary unit is unusual. 
The requirement to use multiple computer systems negates a key benefit of computer 
technology by multiplying the work required by the user. The need to perform repetitive data 
entries is also an invitation for natural human error. These inevitable errors introduce 
inaccuracies into the inventory and usage data, contribute to a loss of accountability and an 
inability to optimally manage inventory, and reduce buying power for the taxpayer. 
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Most who serve in such a unit do so for only one tour, and the majority in the Navy 
spend an entire career on sea-going ships. As a result, most systems that a logistician 
encounters in an expeditionary command are highly unfamiliar. These programs have no 
formal Navy training available and the Sailor must learn through on-the-job training for up to 
18 months. However, as we understand, the USMC utilizes logistics programs along with the 
associated schools. We recommend further research be conducted to determine if similar 
programs and schools could be adapted for use by Navy. 
Procurement and Contracting 
This study showed that EODESU relies heavily on open purchases using contracts 
or government credit card through the commercial sources. The goal is to have the gear 
fixed or replaced through the fastest means possible. Relying on the readily available 
product allows them to procure and stay current with technology advancement at a much 
faster rate in an effort to always stay ahead of the next potential threat. 
During our research we found that Naval Special Warfare (NSW) possess an organic 
ability to write and administer contracts. This greatly increases the speed with which 
equipment and services are obtained at NSW while reducing the workload on the unit’s 
logisticians. In contrast, EOD is required to use the contracting services of the Fleet 
Logistics Center (FLC). This increases delays and administrative workload. As mentioned 
earlier, EOD represents a very small portion of the Navy’s overall manning. Consequently, 
they are unable to claim funding that would permit them to have a written contract tailored 
with an inventory management program to meet their needs. 
There is a demand for cutting-edge equipment among members of the EOD 
community. This compels their logistics support units to rely heavily on the use of their 
government commercial purchase card (GCPC.) The Navy’s supply system is best suited to 
providing parts and equipment to traditional ships and submarines. Relative to EOD, these 
platforms face threats and challenges that change slowly, and as a result, the equipment 
and supplies they need are slow to change. This is not the case with expeditionary units. 
They operate in a much more dynamic environment. While a ship may have a service life of 
up to 50 years, much of the equipment used by EOD has a service life that is measurable in 
months. This time frame does not permit economical parts support. Incorporating this into 
the traditional maintenance model of a sea-going ship could be meaningful. The GCPC 
permits these commands to obtain the required equipment quickly, but this does not come 
without consequence. The process of purchasing with Government Purchase Card records 
purchase information in a form that is not readily accessible to external organizations. For 
example, you record the total dollar amount spent on a purchase in one system; however, 
the list of purchased items gets recorded individually into a different system. The two 
systems are not compatible with each other. The amount spent and the list of items on that 
purchase can only be reconciled manually by reviewing the original receipt. As a result, 
demand history is lost along with the ability to easily audit expenditures. Without any 
accurate demand history, the task of procurement and inventory management becomes 
significantly more difficult. 
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Equipment Visibility and Accountability 
The process used to issue and maintain accountability of equipment is inadequate, 
particularly during a unit’s deployment. Based on the preliminary information available at the 
time of this research and the interviews of subject matter experts, this study’s researchers 
estimated that loss of materiel accountability is, at times, as high as 30% for EOD. This is 
mainly attributable to the methods used to assign and record accountability for equipment, 
the relative ease with which equipment can be replaced, and the inability to detect trends in 
purchases and/or surveys. 
Prior to deployment, accountability for the equipment is assigned to an individual or 
team using a paper DD form 1149. During the EOD deployment, no supply or logistics 
personnel from the team’s unit are deployed with them to provide support to deployed 
equipment and, as a result, the responsibility for maintaining custody falls to the 
Expeditionary Support Element (ESE) in theater. The ESE is required to do these using 
possibly suboptimal methods such as Excel spreadsheets or a locally maintained database. 
It should be noted that even when the database is a familiar program, if the EOD unit is 
being deployed with another service, the unit is required to use that service’s program. This 
introduces inefficiencies and reduces effectiveness in a manner similar to that previously 
described. 
While deployed, the teams’ focus understandably shifts to the successful 
accomplishment of the mission. Equipment, however, can be damaged or lost and 
replacements are obtained from respective in-theater logistics support units to ensure 
maximum readiness. This use of locally deployed support personnel helps the team 
maintain its capability to accomplish assigned tasks. It is likely, however, that separating the 
functions that maintain accountability from those that use the equipment helps create a 
culture in which containing materiel costs are not a major. 
The paper DD 1149 records are maintained at the team’s homeport and are unable 
to be updated when equipment is lost or destroyed and subsequently replaced. Additionally, 
because gear that is deployed with a unit is by definition “mission essential,” replacing it is a 
high priority. Consequently, a given piece of equipment may be replaced several times 
during a deployment, but it is only upon the team’s return to home port that its equipment 
and equipment inventory records are reconciled. Some gear is deployed and returns with an 
individual Sailor or unit and discrepancies will be detected after the six-month deployment is 
concluded. As described previously, however, because these purchases are likely to have 
been made using a GCPC, the record of any replacements purchased during this time is 
largely obscured. 
Additionally, a significant amount of equipment will only be reconciled after 18 
months or may never be reconciled at all. Certain pieces of equipment are too costly to 
warrant purchasing in quantities sufficient to provide to each unit or too large to 
economically deploy and redeploy with a designated unit. This equipment is designated 
RIP/TOA and is turned over in theatre as units are relieved. Although this equipment may 
have a high value, because it may be more than a year since accountability was first 
assigned and procuring replacements for deployed equipment is relatively easy, this 
equipment may never be reconciled but simply “written off.” 
Because the method required to document and track equipment loss/damage relies 
upon hard copy paper documentation, it is likely that there is no effective means to 
accurately determine the cause of the loss/damage. Also, because of the nature of the 
control systems in place and the culture and attitudes it may engender, it is also unlikely that 
individuals with assigned accountability will be held accountable in the event of loss or 
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damaged equipment. Lost, destroyed, and unserviceable equipment is properly recorded 
using the DD form 200. These forms, however, are produced at a rapid rate and the logistics 
units require several large binders to maintain a record of these forms. The documentation 
process is methodical. It is likely, however, that the sheer volume of paperwork makes it 
very difficult to assure accuracy in individual cases and to discern long-term patterns. 
Instead, the skill and memories of the unit’s leaders and Sailors become the primary means 
for detecting trends. The reliance on paper forms and the volume with which they are 
produced places a significant administrative burden on the EOD logistics support commands 
while simultaneously obscuring trends in the information these forms record. It is probable 
that these factors make it unlikely that an individual Sailor will suffer any consequences in 
the event of a loss of accountability. This is because the same factors also make it difficult to 
detect a loss due to negligence or theft. The systems may also create the perception that 
the forms are a “paperwork drill.” With this perception, it is likely Sailors prioritize their core 
mission responsibilities above any fiduciary accountability they may be assigned. In such an 
environment, it would also be inappropriate to punish the Sailor for responding to the 
incentives which he has been given. 
Organization and Culture 
The case study identifies a number of areas that offer the possibility of improved 
financial and operational efficiency. When considering the nature of these opportunities and 
the circumstances that brought them about, it becomes apparent that several key factors are 
at work. First among these is the miniscule size of the EOD community relative to the size of 
the traditional Navy. Because the expeditionary community makes up a relatively small 
portion of the Navy in terms of both manning and the number of mission sets to which it 
contributes, it is likely that the community’s requirements are naturally assigned lower 
priority than those of the maritime force. The Navy must make choices regarding how it 
spends its resources to obtain the most satisfaction from its large, but nevertheless finite, 
resources. Consequently, it is plausible that an organization the size of the Navy would be 
unable to completely meet the needs of a minority of stakeholder organizations like EOD. 
Another factor that contributes to the inefficiencies observed in the case of EOD is 
the diverse nature of the commands which make up NECC and their relative sizes. NECC is 
composed of 10 separate commands, with SEABEEs claiming more than half of NECC’s 
personnel. At least on the West coast, this has resulted in the SEABEE culture dominating 
the NECC community and its requirements being given de facto higher priority. 
Environment 
Every expeditionary mission is different. While there are some similarities, the 
composition of the units deploying, the duration, and the environment where units are 
deployed can vary greatly. The following are some unique aspects of the operating 
environments that the expeditionary units face that make providing logistical support more 
challenging: 
 Local vendors are used to provide as many supplies as possible.  
 The dynamic, high-risk environment requires the latest technology to give the 
units that are deployed the best “edge” or competitive advantage possible.  
 Information technology support is often unavailable during deployments due 
to the remote and/or austere environments.  
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Recommendations 
The cause and effect analysis described earlier has led to the following set of 
recommendations for improving the logistical processes of EODESU: 
 Information systems are highly inadequate and require multiple manual entry 
processes. Develop and introduce new information systems that will support 
expeditionary logistics. As an interim step, develop interfaces to enable single 
entry of data. 
 Two important considerations to keep in mind before designing new 
information systems are (1) to first streamline the logistical processes and 
then design the information systems to fit the needs of that process, and (2) 
identify the data that will be needed to optimally manage the inventory and 
then design the information to capture those data elements.  
 Currently, everything is on-the-job training with little knowledge capture or 
dissemination. Develop and deliver specific logistics training and education.  
 When purchasing using government credit card (GCPC), the information is 
not tracked about which item is purchased, or how much or how often it is 
purchased. GCPC is a financial system and not a logistics system; it is used 
for tracking the amount of purchase but not what was purchased or its 
quantity. 
 Given the large amount of money that passes through EODESU, having a 
full-time contracting official could possibly save money and time. 
 There is a temptation to believe that because each expedition is unique and 
that the organization has always been able to “make it happen,” there is no 
need to improve processes from both efficiency and effectivity perspectives. 
However, there are always some commonalities between different 
expeditions and those commonalities should be identified and leveraged to 
achieve process improvements.  
Expeditionary Logistics: Preliminary Concepts 
Joint Publication 4.0 defines logistics as “planning and executing the movement and 
support of forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Expeditionary logistics falls on the line 
between the operational and tactical levels. There are several definitions for expeditionary 
logistics available in various military instructions and publications. NECC adopted the 
expeditionary logistics definition stated in Navy Tactical Reference Publication 1–02, which 
defines expeditionary logistics as 
the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign 
county. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operation 
that deal with design and development, acquisition storage, movement, 
distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, 
evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, 
maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or 
furnishing of services. 
The levels of logistics correspond directly to the three levels of war: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Strategic logistics focuses on organizing, training, and equipping 
the SOF forces, whereas operational logistics provides the link between tactical 
requirements to strategic capability in order to accomplish operational goal. They provide 
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theater-wide logistical support, closely monitor in-theater shortfalls, communicate shortfalls 
to strategic sources, and continuously match tactical requirements with strategic recourses. 
Finally, tactical logistics primarily focuses on providing key services to support battles and 
engagements. 
Two primary key areas of focus for ExLog are Sustainment and Combat Service 
Support. Sustainment provides forces the necessary equipment and services to maintain 
and/or prolong operations until successful mission completion. Effective sustainment allows 
combat commanders and expeditionary forces to have depth to seize, retain, exploit, and 
conduct decisive operations. Combat Service Support allows forward operating forces to 
have necessary supplies, equipment, transportation needs, and various services to support 
elements in theater at all levels of war. 
Expeditionary logistics is challenged with the “tyranny of distance” since it often 
operates in areas far from Navy supply and distribution chains. Expeditionary logisticians 
often rely on host nations for support and make heavy use of local contracts, vendor 
support, and commercially available supplies. 
ExLog: Functional Areas 
Expeditionary Logistics is comprised of six functional areas: supply, maintenance, 
transportation, general engineering, medical, and other service (food, disbursing, postal, 
MWR, etc.). The main three components of logistics are supply, maintenance, and 
transportation. 
 Supply functions as a materiel and financial management support that is 
similar to Supply Department afloat. The functions include ordering, 
procurement, receipt, stowage, and inventory control of repairable and 
consumables items. 
 Maintenance functions as a team responsible for developing and performing 
all maintenance policies and procedures. In addition, they are also 
responsible for all equipment maintenance that preserves, repairs, and 
maintains reliability. 
 Transportation takes care of movement of personnel and materiel from one 
point to another. They are well versed in worldwide ports of embarkation, 
debarkation, inter-theater, and intra-theater locations. 
 Expeditionary Engineering is primarily a function of the Naval Construction 
Force, commonly referred to as “Seabees.” Seabees can be deployed 
independently or can be imbedded into other expeditionary units. Seabees 
are capable of a wide range of construction services such as combat 
engineering, rapid runway repair, facility damage repair, combat engineering, 
bridge and road construction, and maintaining facilities ashore. In addition, 
they also provide responsive support in disaster recovery operations and 
perform civic action construction projects to improve relations with other 
nations. 
 Health services include all medical, dental, and all health-related functions 
(combat and non-combat) to include: health maintenance, entomology, 
medical readiness of personnel, food service sanitation, treatment of 
casualties, and medical evacuation. 
 Other Logistic Services function as a general area that includes services such 
as food, post, disbursing, exchange, billeting, legal, barber, laundry, and 
other administrative services and functions. 
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Comparison of Expeditionary and Commercial Logistics 
Table 1 shows a comparison of expeditionary logistics and traditional commercial 
logistics along multiple dimensions. Expeditionary logistics often operates in foreign 
countries, in areas far from traditional Navy supply and distribution chains. Consequently, 
expeditionary logisticians often rely on host nations for support and heavily depend on local 
contracts, vendor support, and commercially available supplies. 
Expeditionary logisticians support expeditionary situations that are substantially 
different and challenging as compared to those faced by the logisticians supporting 
traditional commercial operations. The stock keeping unit (SKU) variety-to-volume ratio—
which describes the ratio of the number of different types of SKUs relative to the total 
volume of demand—is typically much higher in expeditionary operations. Meaning, the 
assortment of items is relatively high given the overall relatively low volume of logistical 
support demand. Table 1 provides a comparison of expeditionary logistics and commercial 
logistics along several dimensions. 
Table 1. Comparison of Expeditionary vs. Commercial Logistics 
Nature of Operation Expeditionary 
Logistics 
Commercial Logistics 
Location Foreign Country Domestic and/or 
Foreign 
Duration Short Term Long Term 
Occurrence Irregular Routine 
Demand Variable  More predictable 
SKU Variety-to-Volume Ratio High Low 
Operational Tempo Unpredictable Steady 
Level of Risk High Low 
Desired Service Level Very high due to low on-
hand inventory levels 
Medium to high due to 
the availability of local 
or regional distribution 
hubs 
Distribution Dispersion Low demand across 
many locations to serve 
few customers at each 
location 
Use of large distribution 
centers or retail 
locations to serve many 
customers 
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Appendix: ELO/Gear Issue Process 
Mobile unit submits requirement request using a DD Form 1149 (Requisition and 
Invoice/Shipping form). Supply Department (for PGI) or Materiel Department (for TOA) 
checks its WASP if the item is in stock. 
(a) If the item is in stock, it is delivered to the unit. 
(b) If the item is out of stock, check if it is a Navy NSN item. 
(i) if Navy NSN item (30%):  
Order through R-Supply 
The order goes through Navy Supply System and funds are 
subtracted 
When the item arrives, R-Supply is updated 
The item is issued to the platoon and WASP is manually 
updated 
(ii) If Non-Navy NSN (70%):  
If cost > $3,000 or performance period > 90 days, send to 
Contracting; otherwise, open purchase:  
Order through R-Supply 
Funds are obligated using GCPC and paid to the 
vendor 
When the item arrives, R-Supply is updated 
The item is issued to the platoon and WASP is 
manually updated 
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Abstract 
The defense acquisition system has been the source of intense scrutiny and calls for 
reform for over four decades. This research is to examine the contributions of Systems 
Theory to enhance prospects related to acquisition reform. Systems Theory offers a set of 
principles, laws, and concepts that explain the behavior of complex systems. Although the 
acquisition system and constituent programs have been critiqued and examined from 
multiple perspectives, they have never been the subject of exploration from Systems 
Theory. Recent advances in Systems Theory have identified 83 different potential system 
pathologies that can result in degraded system performance or outright failure. System 
pathologies have been previously defined (Keating & Katina, 2012) as “a circumstance, 
condition, factor, or pattern that acts to limit system performance, or lessen system viability, 
such that the likelihood of a system achieving performance expectations is reduced.” 
Following a brief introduction to Systems Theory, this paper reports on efforts to (1) briefly 
examine the current state of the defense acquisition system and programs, focused on 
successes, failures, major reform themes, and critical challenges for moving forward; (2) 
mapping of systems pathologies to provide a different “Systems Theory” based perspective 
of acquisition system reform as well as acquisition system development; and (3) suggest 
implications for acquisition system development based on contributions from Systems 
Theory. The paper concludes with future research directions for Systems Theory 
contributions to the acquisition field and reform efforts. 
Introduction 
The defense acquisition system has remained under continual scrutiny since its 
inception. Failures in acquisition have been as numerous as are the attempts to explain 
those disappointments (Berteau, Levy, Ben-Ari, & Moore, 2011; Francis, 2008, 2009; 
Rascona, Barkakati, & Solis, 2008). Unfortunately, problems in acquisition continue to exist, 
and arguably are increasing in frequency and severity. Arguably, the defense acquisition 
system falls short on the traditional essential attributes that are used to delineate a “system.” 
These attributes, following decades of systems literature (Kramer & de Smit, 1977; Beer, 
1978; Sykttner, 1996; Clemson, 1984; von Bertalanffy, 1968) include minimal characteristics 
of boundary (specifying what is included and excluded from the system), environment (all 
that exist external to the system boundary), input (matter, energy, resources, information 
crossing the boundary), transformation (processing of inputs to produce something of 
value), outputs (products of value consumed external to the system), and feedback (support 
for regulatory adjustment to make corrections necessary to maintain stability). The Defense 
Acquisition Management System has been referred to by the DoD 5000 as both a 
“framework” and an “event-based process.” Processes and events, while they can be 
aspects of a system, fall short in the most fundamental characteristics for classification as a 
system.  
Our point is not to criticize defense acquisition, or to challenge different formulations 
of defense acquisition as a “system.” However, simply calling something a “system” does not 
make it a system, except in the very loose interpretations of the term. In fact, the 
mischaracterization may preclude discoveries and insights that might accrue from the more 
formal appreciation of, and accountability for, making attributions. Instead, our objective is to 
suggest that a more rigorous formulation and classification as a “system” may yield new 
insights into familiar unresolved acquisition system reform issues.  
In previous work (Keating et al., 2017) related to acquisition system difficulties, there 
have been several “systemic” inconsistencies identified, coupled with the suggestion that a 
reformulation of issues from a stronger Systems Theory base might deepen understanding. 
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Among these “systemic formulations” were included (1) Sprawling Complexity—
exponentially increasing complexity that exceeds the present capacity to sufficiently absorb 
to limit negative impacts, (2) Process and Event Centric Orientation—emphasis on the 
critical processes and milestones as the central focus for execution and development, (3) 
Complication as a Response Strategy—increasing the regulation and proliferation of 
controls to address increasing system complexity, (4) Output versus Outcome Emphasis—
focus on the output based cost, schedule, and technical performance aspects of systems as 
primary versus the outcome based problem/need fulfillment aspects of systems, and (5) 
Achievement of Control Through Excess Regulation—emphasizing control of complexity by 
additional regulation by ad hoc and fragmented additions versus purposeful “systemic” 
design for control. While Systems Theory is not being offered as a panacea to this situation, 
nevertheless it does offer an alternative viewpoint from which the dialog might be shifted.  
Systems Theory is a somewhat polarizing term, without a substantially agreed-upon 
definition. In fact, following the work of Adams et al. (2014), Table 1 depicts several 
definitions for Systems Theory.  
Table 1. Definitions for Systems Theory 
Definition Source 
The formal correspondence of general principles, irrespective of the kinds of 
relations or forces between the components, lead to the conception of a “General 
Systems Theory” as a new scientific doctrine, concerned with the principles which 




General systems theory is the skeleton of science in the sense that it aims to provide 
a framework or structure of systems on which to hang flesh and blood of particular 




A new way of looking at the world in which individual phenomena are viewed as 
interrelated rather than isolated, and complexity has become a subject of interest. 
Klir (1972)  
General Systems Theory and the Systems Approach grapple with the issue of 
“simplicity” and “complexity” by which the relationships among systems and 
subsystems are decided. The problems of “optimization” and “suboptimization” are 
central to explaining the fruitless efforts of systems designers who reach for the 
“summum bonum” while settling for a “second best.” 
van Gigch 
(1974)  
Systems theory is a unified group of specific propositions which are brought together 
to aid in understanding systems, thereby invoking improved explanatory power and 
interpretation. It is precisely this group of propositions that enables thinking and 
action with respect to systems.  
Adams et al. 
(2014); 
Whitney et al. 
(2015) 
Interestingly, the extension of Systems Theory into the domain of system acquisition 
is noticeably absent in the literature. While not totally unexpected, it is somewhat surprising 
that a field so heavily steeped in the acquisition of complex systems has somehow not 
routinely incorporated the most fundamental aspects of Systems Theory into the field. Given 
the scarcity of Systems Theory in acquisition, we suggest that there are three major 
contributions that Systems Theory can make related to a new and novel perspective of 
acquisition reform (Figure 1). The incorporation of Systems Theory might provide new 
insights and contributions into the past “failures,” “present” challenges, and “future” 
trajectory for acquisition reform. 
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Figure 1. Contributions of Systems Theory for Acquisition 
1. Concepts and language of Systems Theory can provide a basis to drive 
different thinking, decision, action, and interpretation related to understanding 
and explaining acquisition system difficulties. We think through language, and 
if we are to engage in a different orientation for potential breakthrough in 
acquisition reform, Systems Theory provides a conceptual foundation that 
has been largely absent from acquisition system development. 
2. Conceptual grounding provided by Systems Theory offers acquisition 
system development and practice a theoretical grounding that appears to be 
absent in the field. The strong theoretical basis of Systems Theory can offer a 
rigorous theoretical grounding for the acquisition field and provide the basis 
for a stable and sustainable foundation. This can provide the acquisition field 
with a consistent reference point against which system development and 
reform can be anchored. 
3. Systemic worldview provided by Systems Theory is consistent with the 
complex domain facing the acquisition system and practitioners. The 
systemic worldview is consistent with the complexity, ambiguity, contextually 
bound, and holistic nature of acquisition. This worldview can support thinking, 
decision, action, and interpretation that may provide potential new and novel 
insights to “move the equation” for acquisition reform. 
This paper is focused on providing an alternative paradigm, Systems Theory, for 
viewing failure in acquisition system reform. This does not diminish the work, efforts, or 
results achieved by the individuals and entities engaged in trying to improve the acquisition 
system. On the contrary, our intention is to invite a dialog to further explore and understand 
the contributions that an alternative paradigm (Systems Theory) might provide to move the 
acquisition reform dialog in new and fruitful directions. To achieve our purpose, the 
remainder of the paper is organized around four primary objectives. First, we provide an 
overview of the state of acquisition reform, focused on highlighting several failure modes 
that delineate the system. In the section following, we elaborate a Systems Theory 
perspective through the introduction of pathologies (aberrations from healthy system 
- 450 - 
functioning) as violations of underlying system propositions (concepts, laws, principles). 
After that, in the section titled Systems Theory Implications for Acquisition System Reform, 
we suggest implications of pathologies in relationship to acquisition system reform. The final 
section concludes the paper with implications for further research and development of 
Systems Theory as an alternative and insightful paradigm to better understand, and 
potentially shift the trajectory, related to failures in defense acquisition system reform.  
State of Defense Acquisition System Reform 
The state of the acquisition system is generally not considered to be strong. 
However, like many other topics in government, that assessment is not an entirely fair or 
straightforward answer to an extremely complicated question. The importance of the 
acquisition of weapon systems and other materials and supplies to equip the nation’s armed 
forces cannot be overstated. If the Armed forces did not have the tools they need to fight, 
their existence would be threatened and so too would the existence of the nation itself. 
However, this acquisition is a function of government and not a function of industry, and 
therefore subject to the rules and regulations governing government. In his last report on the 
performance of the acquisition system, Under Secretary Kendall (2016) suggested that there 
were only four major steps to insuring success in acquisition. “(1) set reasonable 
requirements, (2) put professionals in charge, (3) give them the resources that they need, 
and (4) provide strong incentives for success.” Kendall does, however, go on to say that the 
current system is much more complicated than this and, in many cases, does not allow 
basic good management to be the only factor in the development of systems.  
These following sections focus on review of the current state of the acquisition 
system and provide some of the history of how the system was developed and the contracts 
that make the system operate in the ways that it does. 
The Acquisition System 
The acquisition system, as defined by the federal government, consists of many 
different parts and is not exactly the same in all parts of the government. The most complex 
version of the federal acquisition system is the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
system. Since complexity is critical to issues with the acquisition system, we will concentrate 
on the defense acquisition system. 
The defense acquisition system is actually three different systems that are linked 
together. These systems are (1) the acquisition system, which creates the systems and 
delivers them to the warfighter, (2) the requirements system (JSIDS), which generates the 
requirements from which the acquisition systems develops products, and (3) the Planning, 
Programing, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which is the way the Department of 
Defense (DoD) asks for and gets the money it needs from Congress.  
So, in reality there are three very complex processes that make up the DoD 
acquisition process. One of the most well-known attempts to document of complexity of the 
acquisition system is captured in the wall chart illustration of the DoD acquisition system 
(Figure 2), which is basically a flow chart of all three systems put in a single place. It does 
look complicated because the process is complicated. The processes level of complexity 
comes from several major sources. The first driver of complexity of the systems is the 
complexity of the programs (e.g., a Navy aircraft carrier is considered the most complex 
system ever designed). The second driver of complexity is the need to integrate defense 
systems into a very complex existing system with many interphases and relationships 
already in place. The next driver of complexity is the very harsh environment that defense 
systems must operate in; this drives complex and lengthy testing protocols. Also, complexity 
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is driven do to all of the government rules and regulations that must be followed by the 
participants in the acquisition processes. Additionally, complexity is driven from the fact that 
many different stockholders, including many for profit companies, are trying to influence the 
processes in their favor. Finally, complexity is driven from a last major factor adding 
complexity to the system—the buildup of rules, processes, and reviews built into the system 
from each new leader and from generation after generation of Congress.  
 
Figure 2. The Department of Defense Acquisition Chart (Wall Chart) 
Success and Failure in the Acquisition System and Programs 
Overall the defense acquisition system and the programs and products (plans, ships, 
weapons, etc.) that it produces can be evaluated as both a great success (delivering 
a wide range of very capable, very lethal systems) and also great failure (many 
programs overrunning cost and schedule, some to the point of cancellation). There 
have been many studies into the failures of the acquisition system. Some of the best 
documented failures include the following: 
1. The Future Combat System (FCS)—First introduced in 1999 by Army Chief 
of Staff Eric Shinseki, FCS was supposed to be a family of networked, 
manned, and unmanned vehicles and aircraft for the 21st century battlefield. 
With the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) intended to 
support the FCS, it was supposed to be a wholesale re-envisioning of the 
ground force. However, the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, short-circuited a 
15-year operational pause that the military was hoping for to implement the 
- 452 - 
program. Spiral development and shifting requirements by the Army also 
resulted in costs ballooning by 25%. Finally, after $19,000,000,000 already 
spent and the program in the System Design and Demonstration phase, 
Secretary Gates cancelled the program in 2009. 
2. The RAH66 Comanche—22 years, $6,900,000,000 spent and zero 
helicopters. Originally conceived at the height of the Cold War, it was 
supposed to become the next generation of armed reconnaissance air 
support for the Army, replacing the Huey, Cobra, and Kiowa helicopters in the 
process. A textbook case in technology being superseded by current events, 
the Comanche also faced serious concerns over its ability to simply get off 
the ground when fully loaded. The program was cancelled in 2004 with two 
prototypes now on display. 
 
Figure 3. RAH66 Comanche Helicopter 
3. The XM2001 Crusader—Intended to be the Army’s next-generation mobile 
gun system, the Crusader (see Figure 4) was conceived in the early 1990s as 
a powerful new self-propelled howitzer (SPH). While it was designed to be 
lighter and faster than the existing M109A6 Paladin SPH, it was too similar to 
the existing, upgraded inventory. A system designed for a Cold War army, it 
was not widely supported by the Army Staff as it no longer aligned with the 
new operational concept. Ironically, many of the Crusader technologies were 
incorporated in the FCS family of XM1203 Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) 
cannons, which were subsequently cancelled as well. 
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Figure 4. XM2001 Crusader Mobile Gun System 
4. CG(X)—Known as the Next-Generation Cruiser in the early 1990s, it was part 
of the Navy’s Surface Combatant for the 21st century program (see Figure 5). 
However, budget cuts resulted in the program being split up in 2001 with the 
destroyer variant being renamed the DD(X) and then the Zumwalt-class of 
destroyers. While the DD(X) is a case study in and of itself, the CG(X) 
actually looked like it might increase its allocation of ships before being 
abruptly cancelled in 2010. Deemed too similar in capability to the existing, 
upgraded Arleigh Burke-class of destroyers, the ship was never built, but not 
before spending more than $200,000,000 in development costs. 
 
Figure 5. CG(X) Next Generation Cruiser 
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Equally, there are many success stories to be told in defense acquisition, including 
the following: 
1. MC-12W Aircraft—The U.S. Air Force needed more Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capability and so launched the Project 
Liberty program. The result was the low-cost MC-12W aircraft, which flew its 
first combat mission in June 2009, just eight months after receiving funds. It 
has since flown thousands of successful missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
2. Harvest Hawk—The U.S. Marine Corps needed a boost in close air support 
capabilities. In October 2010, just 18 months after announcing the program, 
the Harvest Hawk was in the fight. This inexpensive, reversible mod to a KC-
130 not only puts steel on difficult targets, but also gets eyes on previously 
unseen locales.  
3. Virginia-Class Submarine—The U.S. Navy began the Virginia-class 
submarine program after terminating the unaffordable Seawolf program (see 
Figure 6). The USS New Hampshire, first of the Block II Virginias, came in 
eight months early and $54 million under budget, and that’s on top of the 
$300 million cost savings which were already achieved on the Block II design. 
 
Figure 6. Virginia-Class Submarine 
Themes of Acquisition System Reform 
oday’s defense acquisition system is a product of decades of reform initiatives, 
legislation, reports, and government commissions. Major reform efforts began in earnest in 
the 1960s with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. His main reform efforts centralized 
control within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and created the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System for resource allocation. Throughout the latter half of 
the 20th century, each administration left its own mark on defense acquisition, focusing 
primarily on the acquisition process itself, as well as DoD management. However, many of 
the reforms recycled various schemes to shift decision-making authority from the services to 
the OSD, realign oversight and accountability responsibilities, and alter the process (adding 
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and removing milestones, phases, and so forth). Despite these initiatives, cost and schedule 
growth continue. 
The Pentagon has wrestled with reforming defense acquisition procedures for over 
40 years and, during that period, over 120 defense acquisition reform actions and policies 
have been implemented. Of these, the 1986 Congress of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Bill has been one of the most wide-ranging and had the largest impact. This 
landmark legislation was intended to add both significant discipline and accountability to the 
defense acquisition process and focus the management and oversight of defense research 
development test and evaluation, which now consumes over $600 billion annually and 
continues to grow. 
One of the major actions in the legislation was the establishment of the position of 
under secretary of defense for acquisition, or USD(A), to vest in one person the overall 
oversight responsibility of the defense research development test and evaluation process of 
the numerous systems in various stages of development and fielding. The hope was that 
this position would enable the defense secretary to have a single line of command, one 
office responsible for overseeing and streamlining the activities of the hundreds of large 
Acquisition Category I defense programs, such as ships and missile defense, all the way 
down to the smaller Acquisition Category IV programs, like small arms and body armor. But 
development times and costs went up, not down. A few years later, recognizing that 
injecting research and development breakthroughs was vital to retaining weapon superiority, 
the job was expanded to under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology, or 
USD(A&T), to assure that this cross-pollination was taking place efficiently. Again, 
development timelines and costs both increased The latest reorganization effort (splitting the 
function of the under secretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics into two), mandated 
by the FY17 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) will undo one of the major changes 
made by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which codified the acquisition chain of 
command and was based largely on the recommendations of the 1985 Packard 
Commission. On the positive side, the creation of the new under secretary for research and 
engineering comes at a time when the DoD is working to regain its technological advantage, 
notably through its pursuit of a third offset strategy to renew and perhaps advance the 
competitive advantage of the United States and its military allies. This change should 
increase the emphasis on these efforts. On the negative side, this new organization may 
introduce an element of confusion and competition into the decision-making process by not 
having a single end-to-end process owner. Although acquisition reform continues, no reform 
processes or approaches have yet to overcome the challenges of complexities of the 
defense acquisition system. 
Critical Issues and Challenges for Acquisition System Reform 
Many issues and challenges remain for the acquisition system and for acquisition 
reform efforts. The next generation of acquisition reform will need to address many of the 
same issues as earlier reform efforts. However, given the many failures in parts acquisition 
reform, the answers and approaches need to be very different to meet the needs of an ever-
more-quickly-changing world. The first priority of the next generation of acquisition reform 
will continue to be the need for speed. Whether the acquisition is a software development 
that takes two years and needs to take three months, or a new airplane that takes 15 years 
and needs to take four years to develop, we must find ways to make the acquisition system 
faster. The next major area that cannot be avoided is the need to somehow address the 
requirements process, to make it faster, more flexible, and more responsive to changes in 
technology and the future needs of the warfighters.  
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In order to make a faster and more flexible acquisition system work, we also need to 
find ways of delegating authority and accountability that empower key individuals to do their 
best work and deliver products in ways that will continue to be significant successes. Lastly, 
reform efforts will also need to address major congressional actions required to change 
many of the legal roadblocks that create problems in the defense acquisition system, 
including but not limited to, funding management and added levels of review and oversight.  
In the following section, a path forward is forged through articulation of deep 
systemic issues (pathologies) affecting acquisition systems. While this is not posed as “the 
answer” to acquisition system woes, Systems Theory does offer a substantial departure 
from other attempts at modification of an unwieldy system. 
Systems Theory Pathologies Perspective for Acquisition System Reform  
For our present purposes, the nature of system pathologies in complex systems can 
be captured in the following critical points and their suggested relevance to acquisition 
practitioners and system development: 
1. All systems are subject to the laws of systems—Just as there are laws 
governing the nature of matter and energy (e.g., physics law of gravity), so 
too are our systems subject to laws (principles, laws, concepts defining the 
behavior, and performance of complex systems). These system laws are 
always there, always on, non-negotiable, non-biased, and explain system 
performance.  
2. Violations of systems laws carry consequences—Irrespective of noble 
intentions, ignorance, or willful disregard, violation of system laws carries real 
consequences for system performance. In the best case, violations degrade 
performance. In the worst case, violations can escalate to cause catastrophic 
consequences or even eventual system collapse.  
3. Violations of systems laws generate associated pathologies—
Pathologies are circumstances, conditions, factors, or patterns that act to limit 
system performance, or lessen system viability, such that the likelihood of a 
system achieving performance expectations is reduced. When system 
performance fails to meet expectations, violations of systems laws are always 
in question. 
In the examination of failures in the acquisition system, programs, and projects, 
violations of Systems Theory (manifest as system pathologies) should be considered as 
potential sources contributing to failures and dysfunctions. Following the systems pathology 
research (Katina, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Katina & Keating, 2014, 2016) based 
in violations of systems propositions, the following summary table (Table 2) is provided. 
Three notes are necessary to guide interpretation of the table. First, we have referred to the 
principles, laws, and concepts simply under the banner of “propositions,” following the 
nomenclature of Adams et al. (2014) so as not to overburden the presentation with the finer 
distinction between principle, law, and concept. In the end, they all inform our understanding 
and explanation of systems behavior/performance and their violation jeopardizes system 
performance. Second, we have presented the set of pathologies from a pragmatic 
perspective, attempting to remain free from a barrage of scholastic verbiage. While some 
depth will naturally be sacrificed in this delivery, our intent is to make the principles more 
approachable to meet our present objectives. A more thorough and “scholarly” deep 
accounting of the principles can be found in other composite works (Adams et al., 2014; 
Clemson, 1984; Hammond, 2002; Katina, 2015b, 2016b, 2017; Katina & Keating, 2016; 
Lespier et al., 2015; McDermott & Alejandro, 2017; Skyttner, 2005; Troncale, 1977; 
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Warfield, 1999; Whitney et al., 2015). Third, the principles are intended to provoke 
consideration related to the design, execution, and development of systems (e.g., 
acquisition). The role of the propositions is analogous to the use of “illities” (e.g., reliability, 
usability, affordability) in their system design role of informing design considerations, 
performance tradeoffs, and guiding development. Similarly, the systems propositions serve 
to inform complex system design, explain sources of performance variation, and support 
more enlightened inquiry to potentially drive system development from a different 
perspective.  
Table 2 presents a set of Systems Theory derived propositions, a concise statement 
of their violation producing system errors, and speculation of applicability for Acquisition 
System Reform (ASR) and the Acquisition System (Acq Sys). The ASR and Acq Sys 
implications are speculative and anecdotal at best. However, lacking more rigorous 
explication, they broadly suggest that inclusion of Systems Theory (propositions) in 
Acquisition System Reform and Acquisition System development might better inform future 
acquisition system design, execution, development, and reform.  
Table 2. Summary of Systems Theory Propositions (Principles, Laws, Concepts) 
System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  
(Acq Sys) Reform  
(ASR) Implication 
Complementarity  
A situation in which an entity ignores other 
perspectives/models that are not entirely compatible with 
the established-predominate perspectives of elements such 
as missions, goals and objectives. An entity in this case 
mistakenly assumes that there is only one “right” 
perspective. 
ASR can benefit by 
inclusion of multiple “new” 
perspectives provided by 
Systems Theory. 
Diminishing returns  
Mistakenly assuming that continually increasing resources 
(e.g., number of staff) will have a corresponding increase in 
the productivity or performance of the system as a whole 
Expecting more of the 
same approaches to ASR 
to be fruitful can be 
shortsighted. 
Requisite hierarchy  
There is insufficient regulatory capacity (levels of 
organization) to provide sufficient control of a system 
necessary to match that required by the environment. 
Fragmented ASR system 




Sufficient knowledge is either not available, accessible, or 
actionable to provide sufficient regulatory capacity 
necessary to sustain consistency in system thinking, 
decision, action, and interpretation in response to 
environmental turbulence and internal system flux. 
ASR is hindered by the 
knowledge system that 
appears somewhat 
incongruent to needs. 
Requisite 
parsimony  
System failure due to exceeding human capacity to 
simultaneously focus on multiple complex tasks. This 
number is limited to seven plus or minus two. 
Acquisition System and 
workforce are stretched 
beyond capacity to 
respond. 
Requisite saliency  
System productivity is reduced due to having 
undifferentiated importance of system priorities—resulting 
in inconsistencies in priorities, decisions, actions, and 
interpretations.  
Criticality in priorities for 
ASR do not appear to be 
congruent across entities. 
Requisite variety  
Regulatory capacity of the system fails to match that 
required to provide stability and sustain consistent 
performance in the midst of environmental turbulence and 
internal flux. 
ASR environment 




Inability of internal structures of a system to change at a 
pace necessary to match that required in response to 
external disturbances to preserve system performance 
ASR must address a 
system outpaced by the 
rate of external change. 
Autonomy  
Excessive limitations or lack of balance concerning the 
degree of freedom and independence of decision, action, 
and interpretation for constituents in a system 
Increasing centralization of 
Acq Sys control/regulation 
diminishing local 
autonomy. 
Balancing system Inappropriate system balance in Design (ranging from self- Acq Sys appears to be 
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System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  
(Acq Sys) Reform  
(ASR) Implication 
tensions organizing to purposeful), Change (ranging from stable to 
unstable) and Control (ranging from autonomy to 
integration) 
fragmented, unstable, and 
overly complex (regulated). 
Basis of stability  
Failure to provide sufficient resources or energy to move a 
system past a threshold to a new stable state, resulting in 
an inevitable return to the former stable state (maintain 
status quo) 
ASR has not generated 
sufficient movement to 
significantly shift status 
quo. 
Buffering  
Lack of sufficient surplus resources, to provide for system 
stability beyond immediate needs, when confronted with 
unexpected increases in demand (threatening continued 
stability) 
Exceeding cost, schedule, 
and performance targets 
questions sufficient buffer.  
Circular causality  
System failures due to nonlinearities that cannot be 
reduced to simplistic cause effect relationships, requiring 
consideration of multiple, and perhaps ill understood, 
causal relationships  
ASR response appears to 
be piecemeal fixes largely 




A system is only capable of producing what it produces, 
nothing more and nothing less—this does not necessarily 
match what was designed, intended, or desired. 




Cybernetic stability  
A system has an insufficient number of external 
connections necessary to provide stability and ease of 
adaptation to changing circumstances. 
Ability of Acq Sys to adapt 
to volatile change appears 
inadequate. 
Darkness in a 
situation  
Knowledge/understanding of a system is always 
incomplete, fallible, and emergent over time with increasing 
experience gained through operation of a system. 
ASR has been attempted 
with apparent limited and 
fallible system knowledge.  
Dialectism  
Inappropriate inquiry balance for detection and correction of 
error in a system between first order (staying within design) 
or second order (adjusting system design) learning 
emphasis 
ASR modifications seem to 
skew to the first order 
versus second order 
inquiry and learning. 
Emergence  
Failure to compensate in system design or execution for 
occurrence of behaviors or performance in a system that 
could not be predicted in terms of timing, nature, or impact  
Emergence in acquisition 
does not appear 




Limitation in integrated design, strategies, and actions to 
deliberately and proactively attempt to influence the 
environment 
Acq System appears to be 
reactive to env turbulence. 
Equifinality  
Failure to recognize that from different initial starting points, 
the same end state can be attained through different 
pathways and means—not just a singular path/design to 
achieve desirable states 
Detail Acq event-process 
mapping appears to be 
rigid in the pathway to 
completion. 
Equivocation  
Inefficient communication channels not providing the 
intended signal (information/message) from one point 
(entity) to the next, resulting in lack of clarity, excessive 
noise, or misinterpretation 
Anecdotal observation 
suggests that ASR lacks 
clarity of communication.  
Eudemony  
Overemphasis on a preferred set of affairs and motives 
(e.g., financial profitability) of a system above all other 
measures, sacrificing balance with other potentially 
meaningful measures 
Acq Sys near exclusive 
focus on cost, schedule, 
and performance are 
limiting. 
Events of low 
probability  
Focus on events of a system without distinction as to their 
probability of occurrence, attempting to control for all 
scenarios and thus potentially jeopardizing fundamental 
system objectives 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Feedback  
Inadequacies in system scanning to identify fluctuations 
requiring adjustments to maintain system stability 
Not apparent that ASR has 
been formulated as a 
system. 
Flatness  
Reduction of system stability by an inappropriate balance in 
the distribution of system control—generating an imbalance 
between administrative and productive functions  
ASR does not appear to be 
under central control or 
development oversight. 
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System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  
(Acq Sys) Reform  
(ASR) Implication 
Frame of reference  
The lack of consistent standards by which a system can be 
judged or existence of a common vantage point from which 
a system can be viewed 
Acq Sys regulatory 
standards do not appear to 
present a common frame 
of reference. 
Hierarchy  
Lack of sufficient structure of a system (levels of 
organization) to provide sufficient regulatory capacity 
necessary to control a system to maintain stability  
Acq Sys does not appear 
to have regulatory capacity 
sufficient for stability. 
High-flux  
The rate of arrival of correct resources in response to 
system failure is insufficient to provide continuing stability in 
response to a correctable perturbation. 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Holism  
Focus on individual system entities as the source of system 
performance, as opposed to performance stemming from 
interaction of those entities to produce what individually 
they cannot 
The Acq Sys exists as a 
fragmented aggregate set 
of entities and standards. 
Homeorhesis  
System lacking mechanisms that provide ability to return it 
to a pre-set path or trajectory following an environmental 
disturbance 
Other than generalities, 
ASR trajectory is not clear. 
Homeostasis  
System lacking ability to maintain essential variables, within 
limits necessary to maintain stability, in response to 
external disturbances  
Arguably, the Acq Sys has 
not been in a stable state. 
Internal elaboration  
Excessive tendency of a system to increase 
interconnections, constraints, and controls (regulations) 
over time in ways that make them increasingly complicated 
and complex 
ASR must deal with the 
sprawling complexity and 
complication of the system. 
Iteration  
Failure to move through repetition cycles in system 
development allowing quick error identification and 
increasingly deep understanding  
ASR has not be explicitly 
developed or performed in 
an iterative fashion. 
Least effort  
Selection of high resistance (resources, constraints) paths 
to maintain system performance where less resistance 
paths could provide the same results with less expenditure 
of energy 
ASR is engaging with high 
resistance for maintenance 
of the status quo as 
preferable. 
Maximum power  
Limitations in ability to increase intake capacity and 
transformation rate necessary to realize system productivity 
potential. Failure to keep up with demand. 
There is not sufficient 




Introducing system constraints beyond those minimally 
necessary to maintain system performance—
overconstraining system entities, wasting resources, and 
not improving performance 
The Acq Sys appears to be 
overregulated to the 
detriment of performance. 
Multifinality  
Failure in realizing that from the same initial starting point 
radically different end states are possible—assuming 
approaches based on prior experiences will yield similar 
results is flawed.  
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Omnivory  
Inability of a system’s internal structure to be modified to 
accommodate a more diverse set of input resources to 
increase stability  
There is not sufficient 




Incongruence in the essence of a system that provides 
coherence in system identity—providing consistency and 
unity in thinking, decision, actions, and interpretations for 
system related matters  
The identity of the Acq Sys 
and ASR appear to lack 
clarity. 
Over-specialization  
An excessive degree of specialization such that a system 
lacks the ability to change and adapt to shifting 
circumstances and conditions 
The Acq Sys appears slow 
to adapt to increasing 
change and rates of 
change. 
Pareto  
Expenditures of system resources to enhance productivity 
are not directed proportionally to those offering the greatest 
contribution for improvement. 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Patchiness  
Limited system design capacity to accommodate a diversity 
of resources from the environment, without needing to be 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
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System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  
(Acq Sys) Reform  
(ASR) Implication 
structurally modified to accept different types of resources this proposition. 
Polystability  
Failure to appreciate that stability of system entities does 
not imply stability can be directly translated to stability of the 
larger system 
ASR should consider the 
constituent Acq systems. 
Redundancy of 
potential command  
Limitations in subsystem authority and independence to 
make decisions and take action on behalf of the system, 
limiting speed of response to identified opportunities, 
novelties, trends, and treats from the environment 
Consolidation of decision 
authority limits autonomy 
and decision efficiency in 
the Acq Sys. 
Redundancy of 
resources  
Failure to provide redundant critical resources beyond 
those identified as necessary under ideal conditions—this 
optimal efficiency perspective assumes unforeseen 
circumstances will not occur. 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Relaxation time  
Introduction of too many simultaneous changes rendering a 
system incapable of processing or assimilating the changes 
and resulting in continual instability 
ASR is being undertaken 




Following a disturbance, lack of capability of a system to 
withstand the disturbance, either operating at a degraded 
level or outright failing to return to operation 
The ability of the Acq Sys 
to withstand disturbances 
and function is speculative. 
Robustness  
Inability of a system to withstand a wide range of 
environmental disturbances without the necessity for 
system modifications 
Constant flux in ASR 
suggests lack of 
robustness. 
Safe environment  
A system not acting to create a level of stability in the 
environment to reduce disturbances that might have a 
detrimental impact on system performance 
The Acq Sys environment 
is not explicitly mapped, 
modeled, or understood. 
Satisficing  
Attempting to resolve issues by seeking the optimal (best) 
solution as opposed to a less resource-intensive solution 
that will work 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Self-system  
Failing to gain efficiencies by increasing autonomy of 
system entities to make decisions and initiate actions more 
their local level and require less energy (resources) to 
maintain  
The Acq Sys does not 
appear to provide high 
levels of autonomy for 
decisions. 
Separability  
Failure to account for designs that permit such tight 
coupling of subsystems that small variations can spiral out 
of control to cause major negative consequences 
The Acq Sys is tightly 
coupled making escalation 
of failures possible. 
Steady state  
Failure to account for overall system steady state being 
dependent on the continuing steady state of constituent 
subsystems—if a subsystem moves out of steady state, so 
too does the overall system. 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Suboptimization  
A focus on optimization of subsystems results in sacrifice of 
(optimal) performance of the larger system—all subsystems 
and the overall system cannot be simultaneously optimized. 
ASR would benefit by 
representation as a system 
with defined subsystems. 
Subsidiarity  
Elevation of a local system issues/conflicts for resolution by 
a higher level (authority) system, when the resolution could 
be accomplished locally in harmony with higher level 
system objectives 
ASR would benefit from 
close examination of 
decision authority level. 
System context  
Addressing a system independent of the context (unique 
circumstances, factors, trends, patterns) within which the 
system exists 
The Acq Sys appears to be 
designed and regulated as 
a context free system. 
First cybernetic 
control  
System lacking ability to compare behavior/performance, or 
to make corresponding adjustments, based on continuous 
monitoring against a set standard 
The narrow focus on cost, 
schedule, and performance 
is limiting in design for 
control. 
Red Queen  
System failure due to the inability to compete with other 
systems in the same environment—continually falling 
behind other systems by failing to make minimal improves 
to “just keep up”  
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Second cybernetic Communications fail to provide regulatory capacity ASR should consider 
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System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  
(Acq Sys) Reform  
(ASR) Implication 
control  necessary to address disturbances that impede system 
performance. 
communications capacity.  
Third cybernetic 
control  
Attempting to make modifications (tinkering) to a system 
that is in control—a system cannot be brought into control if 
it has not first gone out of control. 
ASR is attacked piecemeal 
with limited modifications 
for a problem system. 
Transcendence  
Failure to recognize that understanding might lie beyond 
rational, scientific, or determinate explanation—sometimes 
requiring explanation be taken on “faith” as belief without 
question 
ASR lack of consideration 
of limitations in holistic 
knowledge is problematic. 
Ultra-stability  
Design sufficiency to fend off anticipated disturbances, but 
lacking the ability to fend off unknown disturbances without 
changing internal structures 
The Acq Sys design ability 





Failing to value knowledge or understanding that which 
cannot be attributed to direct observation of results and 
objective human sensing  
ASR focus on “intangible” 
indicators would provide 
more holistic perspective. 
Unity  
Lack of an integrated system purpose or having an identity 
that establishes system uniqueness and serves to easily 
distinguish the system from other systems 
Identity for ASR or Acq Sys 
could be more explicit, 
clear, and subject to 
development. 
Viability  
Failure to keep key system parameters in control and 
maintained within their set limits—questionable balance 
between autonomy and integration and between stability 
and adaptation 
ASR might consider 
examination parameters 




Operating on a system as though the frame of reference is 
consistent and complete—when in actuality it is not free 
from assumptions, infallible, or necessarily complete 
ASR frame of reference 
does not appear as explicit. 
Information 
redundancy  
Insufficient reduction of probability for communication errors 
in a system due to a lack of “redundant” means used to 
transmit the communication 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Morphogenesis  
System failure to maintain stability following creation of a 
new and radically different structure 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Morphostasis  
Reduction of stability of a system by resisting change in 
favor of a preference for maintaining the existing status quo 
The Acq Sys appears to 
have an emphasis on 
maintaining the status quo 
unthreatened. 
Pareto optimality  
Undertaking an activity to improve one aspect of a system 
with the mistaken belief that there will be no adverse effects 
on other aspects of the system 
ASR appears as a well-





The purpose of the system is unguided and primarily based 
on intended, desired, or designed results as opposed to 
what the system produces. 
Acq Sys purpose is not 
examined beyond stated 
intentions. 
Recursiveness  
Incorrectly assuming that a system exist independent and 
mutually exclusive of all other systems—in reality a system 
exists within a larger system and is comprised of (lower 
level) systems 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Reification  
Failure due to treatment of an abstract system (e.g., 
representation) as though it exists as a concrete reality  
Much of the Acq Sys exists 
as incomplete 
representations. 
Channel capacity  
Inability of a communication channel to transmit different 
messages without being modified—design insufficiency to 
account for noise such that a message is not understood as 
intended 
There is not sufficient 




Failure to initiate and maintain forming structure through 
communications (flow of information among elements) 
necessary for continued system viability (existence)  
The Acq Sys appears to be 
largely self-organizing 
directed by higher 
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System 
Proposition 
Concise Statement of Proposition Producing Errors 
(Pathologies) 
Acquisition System  




Phenomena about a system appears to be meaningfully 
related but is ignored since its explanation is impossible in 
terms of cause-effect relationships and therefore not 
deemed meaningful. 
ASR might focus on 
examination beyond simple 
cause-effect relationships. 
Communication  
Failure due to receiver(s) of information unable to receive 
information as intended by the sender—where the receiver 
does not understand the meaning and is not influenced as 
intended by the sender 
There is not sufficient 
knowledge to speculate on 
this proposition. 
Control  
Inadequacy in the means necessary to provide regulatory 
capacity required to preserve identity of a system, 
permitting adaptation a maintenance of viability (continued 
existence) 
Acq Sys regulatory 
capacity is in question as is 
clarity of system identity. 
Dynamic 
equilibrium  
Failure to maintain stability stemming from insufficient 
adjustment based on environmental shifts requiring system 
adjustments in response to maintain an equilibrium state 
Acq Sys equilibrium 
appears questionable in 




Failure to take into account that a system may experience 
long periods of stasis (relative calmness) that are 
interrupted by sudden bursts of change that were not 
expected and possibly catastrophic 
ASR has gone through 
periods of fundamental 
change and periods of 
stasis. 
Sociotechnicality  
Failure due to misplacing preference, favoring either 
“technical” or “social” aspects of a system—when in 
actuality every complex system has both aspects and may 
shift their importance over time 
ASR should focus on the 
social as well as technical 
aspects of the Acq Sys. 
System boundary  
Improperly establishing the demarcation between a system 
and its environment—without clear delineation of separation 
causing confusion as to what is to be included/excluded 
from the system 
ASR should delineate the 
multiple system boundaries 
that denote the Acq Sys. 
System 
environment  
Lack of clarity for what lies outside the system and potential 
treatment of things outside of control/influence of the 
system as though they are within control boundaries of the 
system 
The nature and articulation 
of the Acq Sys 
environment appear 
underdeveloped. 
The presentation of this set of Systems Theory principles must be acknowledged for 
several considerations. First, this listing, although it is born from a wide breadth of existing 
literature of systems, cannot make the claim of being either absolute or complete. Second, 
the principles create the impetus for a different level of thinking, decision, action, and 
interpretation in creating conditions for improvement in fields (e.g., acquisition) struggling 
with increasingly complex systems and their problems. Third, the principles only create the 
conditions for different understanding of the acquisition system, and as such offer 
explanatory power as well as predictive power as to the future prospects for acquisition 
reform. We now shift our discussion to deeper examination of the implications of Systems 
Theory for acquisition system reform.  
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Systems Theory Implications for Acquisition System Reform 
As we have seen from our present development, the acquisition literature is replete 
with calls for reform, improvement, and modification. However, a closer look at the 
acquisition literature suggests that the emphasis has been focused on the more tangible 
level of processes, tools, methods, and “new” structural ways of attempting to improve future 
prospects for meeting cost, schedule, and technical performance expectations. In a recent 
review of literature for acquisition system development, Keating et al. (2017) examined a 
distribution of the literature over an 11-year period for 151 journal articles across five major 
classification categories (Figure 7), including the following: 
 Tools—Implements used to support accomplishment of a specific task or 
purpose 
 Methods—Systematic approaches that are performed to achieve an 
objective 
 Models—Representations that capture attributes against which comparisons 
can be made 
 Methodologies—Generalized frameworks that guide applications for the field 
 Conceptual—Fundamental underlying philosophical, theoretical, and 
axiomatic foundations that serve as a basis for the field 
 
Figure 7. Literature Distribution for Defense Acquisition System 
There are four primary conclusions based on this work: (1) There appears to be a 
heavy inclination toward the “practice” side of the acquisition system literature (Tools, 
Methods, Models) as fully 127 articles (84%) fit into these categories, (2) there was a 
noticeable absence of literature steeped in Systems Theory based domains, (3) a meager 
14 articles (9%) address methodological aspects of defense acquisition, and (4) there was a 
noticeable scarcity of conceptual/theoretical articles (8 articles, 5%) where Systems Theory 
would be captured (although there were no Systems Theory based works).  
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In consideration of the present work in relationship to acquisition system 
development, five primary implications are offered: 
1. Acquisition system reform has proceeded without inclusion of Systems 
Theory—this is not totally unexpected. Acquisition has developed as a 
practice based field. Notwithstanding the absence of System Theory, there is 
also a recognizable absence of consistent grounding in any theoretical basis. 
Therefore, the conclusion is offered that suggests an emphasis on a stronger 
theoretical linkage, which may include Systems Theory, might be beneficial 
for acquisition system reform. 
2. Systems Theory offers a different perspective and inquiry framework for 
examination of acquisition system reform—Systems Theory places emphasis 
on understanding system design, execution, and development from the 
perspective of a well-grounded, mature, body of knowledge. Systems Theory 
provides a language, given as the set of propositions, which serves to explain 
the behavior/performance of complex systems while providing some 
predictive power. 
3. Acquisition system development breakthrough might be supported by 
focusing on the underdeveloped “conceptual” emphasis—the scarcity of 
literature targeted to the conceptual (philosophical, theoretical, axiomatic) 
aspects of the acquisition system, suggests that this might be an area with 
substantial promise for enhancing acquisition system reform. As the 
preponderance of work has eluded this area, there might be significant 
breakthroughs to reform dilemmas. 
4. Focus on Systems Theory (propositions) violation might provide new and 
novel insights for acquisition system reform—since the Systems Theory 
propositions have not been previously deployed in the development of the 
acquisition system, there is potential for new and insightful thinking. This 
might offer a shift in trajectory of acquisition system reform that has not yet 
been achieved. 
5. Acquisition Systems Theory—a scan of comprehensive scholarly literature 
databases for “Acquisition Systems Theory” produced not a single article. 
This is consistent with finding that the conceptual (theoretical, philosophical, 
axiomatic) limited literature in the body of knowledge for the acquisition field. 
This suggests that there might be opportunity to “change the conversation” of 
acquisition system reform by the inclusion of theoretical development.  
Systems Theory has broad-ranging implications for acquisition system reform. By 
any reasonable acknowledgement, acquisition system reform has met with difficulties. 
Nevertheless, as we have articulated, this has not prevented the success of multiple 
programs under the acquisition system. In looking for new and novel paths forward for the 
acquisition field, Systems Theory has been introduced as a body of knowledge with potential 
to elevate the acquisition field. We now turn to closing this work with an examination of 
conclusions and research directions. 
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Conclusions and Research Directions  
In this paper, we have laid a foundation for the nature and role of Systems Theory in 
advancing present efforts related to acquisition system reform. Systems Theory has been 
presented as a potential contribution to better understand acquisition system reform. 
Additionally, Systems Theory might advance the acquisition field by introducing a new and 
novel language (to acquisition). This language can provide the basis for a different level of 
corresponding thinking, decision, action, and interpretation for acquisition system reform. In 
conclusion for this effort, three primary points are offered: 
1. Systems Theory as a Basis for Insights—Systems Theory was presented as 
a set of propositions (laws, principles, concepts) that have been organized as 
an informing body of knowledge for the field. The set of propositions are 
applicable across systems, including the acquisition system. They serve to 
explain, and provide predictive power, for the behavior/performance of 
complex systems. As such, Systems Theory can provide explanatory analysis 
and insights to the acquisition system that have been elusive. 
2. Acquisition System Reform—Systems Theory offers an enhanced 
perspective for acquisition system reform. It is interesting that the acquisition 
field has been relatively free from inclusions of Systems Theory. Even a 
rudimentary examination of Systems Theory provides a different perspective 
on acquisition. Perhaps acquisition system reform, continually being criticized 
for falling short of expectations, would benefit by the deeper examination from 
Systems Theory.  
3. Explaining Success and Failure—The acquisition literature/programs are 
replete with both successes and failures. However, there has never been a 
thorough examination of the nature of success (and failure) from the 
perspective of Systems Theory. While Systems Theory has not been offered 
as a panacea to advance the acquisition system reform, it is portrayed as a 
new and novel approach to better understand critical issues in acquisition 
system development. 
4. Foundation for New Generation of Supporting Tools—Bringing Systems 
Theory to life to support acquisition system reform requires movement 
beyond the conceptual (philosophical, theoretical, axiomatic) level. New 
Systems Theory based methods, tools, and techniques can be developed 
and tailored to the acquisition field to support practitioners faced with 
increasingly complex systems and problems. 
Based on current explorations in Systems Theory application to acquisition system 
reform, several developmental avenues are suggested. While not offered as a complete set, 
these developmental directions will provide the foundation for a coherent (making sense for 
the acquisition field) and congruent (fit to address acquisition system reform) contribution to 
acquisition system development. These areas include Systems Theory for Acquisition, 
Methods Development, and Applications (Figure 8). 
Systems Theory provides a knowledge base to explain the behavior/performance of 
complex systems. However, there is a noticeable absence of Systems Theory application to 
acquisition system reform. Although we do not know the reason for this absence, there are 
significant opportunities to expand acquisition system reform horizons through Systems 
Theory. While the essence of Systems Theory is not in question, there needs to be 
examination as to the direct application to acquisition field systems. We might certainly 
expect to make modifications in how the language is adjusted based on nuances of the 
acquisition field. 
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Figure 8. Simultaneous Development of System Theory, Methods, and 
Applications 
Methods involves engineering of the science-based artifacts (tools, techniques, 
methods) to support enhanced capabilities that promote improved acquisition practice. 
Thus, methods finds its basis in Systems Theory and bridges the world of Systems Theory 
to the world of application through engineering of methods. Finally, application is focused on 
the deployment of methods-based capabilities to enhance acquisition practice. In the case 
of acquisition, this implies enabling practitioners with more sophisticated (Systems Theory 
based) methods to perform in their roles as acquisition professionals. 
The path forward for application of Systems Theory for the acquisition field and 
practitioners is not without challenges. However, we have shown the promise that Systems 
Theory holds for acquisition system reform. There are no guarantees for the utility that will 
accrue for the application of Systems Theory to acquisition system reform. However, this 
exploration provides a level of confidence in knowing that Systems Theory offers a new, 
novel, and insightful perspective for engaging acquisition reform.  
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Industrial White Paper Briefing: Monterey Bay Regional 
Spaceport Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable COTS 
Launch System1 
Kelly Keith Weigel—is a Space Commerce Entrepreneur; Co-Founder of Trans Universal Energy, 
LLC (Monterey Spaceport Operations); and Project Site Lead for the Monterey Bay Regional 
Spaceport. [weigel@transuniversalenergy.com] 
Abstract  
Proposed DoD Acquisition Study to focus on COTS Space Launch System for 
government and commercial markets. Level of interest is in the broad cost savings to the 
government and commercial customers. 
Research Issue: The cost to launch vehicles and payloads into orbit and to station 
them in the upper atmosphere is prohibiting innovation and limiting the total number of 
systems that can be deployed. There is a need to study the life cycle of current and future 
COTS Launch Systems and their benefits to government and commercial procurement 
cycles. 
Research Result: Lower costs via Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) 
COTS launch solutions and systems are the desired research result. Smaller payloads and 
delivery vehicles with more capabilities will increase the amount of work being done while 
less money is being spent. Overall cost savings to the government activities and the civilian 
population they serve will be the outcome of the research result as well. 
Center of Excellence Model to Protect Intellectual Property 
During the compilation of this Acquisition Research Proposal, Intellectual Property 
Rights created parameters which restricted certain research materials from being published. 
A University of Florida suggestion is being deployed as a remedy solution. U. of Florida has 
suggested that a Center of Excellence (CoE) for Commercial Space Transportation (CST) 
chapter be assigned to Monterey. The CoE model would allow for the sharing and 
throughput of information as well as enable “unlimited distribution” of materials. The CoE 
acronym is likely to be CoE CST Monterey. 
Proposed Consortium of Acquisition Research Partnerships: 
 Academia: UCMBEST UC Santa Cruz, CSUMB, NPS, DLI Army Garrison 
Facilities 
 Prime contractors: As specified in the MBRS Project Site SoCE 
 Government: FAA AST CST, DoE ~ LLNL/Sandia Livermore, CA, DoD ~ 
DARPA 




 Federal FY 2018 Q3; FY 2018 ~ FY 2038 Range Activity Projection 
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LPTA COTS Launch Areas of Endeavor: 
 Range Work: Flight Field at the Marina, CA, Municipal Airport, OAR (KOAR) 
 Sea and Air Launch activities in the Pacific Ocean 60 ~100 mi from OAR 
Launch System Components: LTAVs, Legacy G.A. Approved Airframes, ATC 
UASoS Network, Other Experimental Horizontal Flight Frames, Hybrid Engines, Hybrid 
Space Vehicles, Energy Tech for Power Train 
Proprietary: T.U.E., LLC (MSO) MBRS-MBSDC ~ Range Operations Opportunities 
MBRS Project Site Relevant Information 
 Worked for the Presidio of Monterey’s DFMWR as IT/MIS-GISO, 2005 to 
2012 
 Became iGATE Client Company as “FOTDDO / T.U.E., LLC,” 2012 to 2013 
 Launched the MBRS Project Site in 2013 as Trans Universal Energy, LLC 
(2013 to Present) 
Company Interest in Space Commerce Background 
 Company Time Line—iGATE Client: March 1, 2012, to October 1, 2013 
 MBRS Project Site Sole Focus—October 1, 2013, to the present day 
Work with the DoE Incubator called the iGATE in Livermore, CA, from 2012 to 2013: 
“My long term interest in Astrophysics from the late 1970s was finally able to blossom in 
2012. Elements and components for the advanced energy and space launch system were 
discovered at the iGATE. A clear path to commercialization was illuminated by the DoE and 
DOD GOTS examples for spin off technologies.” 
On March 1, 2012, our company signed up as an iGATE client, known as 
FOTDDO.biz. On January 14, 2013, our company incorporated as Trans Universal Energy, 
LLC. In March 2013, contact with the FAA AST CST was established which formed the basis 
of the current and ongoing reporting cycles. The specialized focus on the Flight System 
Operators license began in August 2013. From October 1, 2013, to the present day, our 
company has singularly focused on the MBRS Project Site. Guidance from the FAA AST 
CST continues to provide the milestones for commercial space launch activities, 
transportation operations, and related services. The Flight System Operators license will 
establish the required parameters for the MBRS “Spaceport” license. The MBRS Spaceport 
license is likely to be granted to the municipal airfield now known as OAR (KOAR) in the 
2020s. 
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Acronyms Used in This Industrial White Paper Briefing 
ATC   Air Traffic Controller 
CoE   Center of Excellence 
COTS   Commercial Off the Shelf 
CSUMB  California State University Monterey Bay 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DFMWR  Directorate of Family Morale Welfare and Recreation 
DLI    Defense Language Institute 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DoE   Department of Energy 
FAA AST CST Federal Aviation Administration Air and Space Transportation 
Commercial Space Transportation 
FOTDDO  Fort Ord Technology Development and Deployment Office 
G.A.   General Aviation 
GOTS   Government Off The Shelf 
LLNL   Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
LPTA    Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable 
LTAV    Lighter Than Air Vehicle 
MBRS    Monterey Bay Regional Spaceport 
MBSDC  Monterey Bay Spaceport Development Center 
MSO   Monterey Spaceport Operations 
NPS    Naval Postgraduate School 
OAR (KOAR)  Call letters of the Marina Municipal Airport 
SoCE   Scope of Contracting Environment 
T.U.E., LLC   Trans Universal Energy, LLC 
UASoS   Unmanned Aerial System of Systems 
UCMBEST University of California Monterey Bay Education Science and 
Technology Center 
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In the Fullness of Time: Towards Realistic Acquisition 
Schedule Estimates 
Raymond Franck, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret.)—retired from the faculty of the Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy (GSBPP), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 2012. He retired from the Air 
Force in 2000 in the grade of Brigadier General. His active duty career included a number of 
operational tours and staff positions, and head of the Department of Economics and Geography, 
USAF Academy. His published work includes a number of journal articles and research reports in 
military innovation and defense acquisition management. [cfranck215@aol.com] 
Gregory Hildebrandt, USAF (Ret.)—has had an Air Force career including assignments as an 
acquisition officer, Air Force Academy faculty member, and assignments at the Central Intelligence 
Agency and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Following his Air Force retirement, he has continued 
service with the RAND Corporation and NPS. His published work includes a number of journal 
articles in defense economics and RAND reports on acquisition issues. [ggh324@gmail.com] 
Charles Pickar, USA, (Ret.)—is a member of the NPS faculty where he teaches project 
management, defense acquisition, and systems engineering. Before joining NPS, he led the Applied 
Systems Engineering Program Area at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He 
is a retired Army officer with extensive experience in the U.S. defense industry, to include director and 
VP levels at Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and SAIC. He is the current Chair of the Systems 
Education Technical Committee of the IEEE Systems Council. His research and published work 
focuses on applying systems engineering and system dynamics analytical approaches to defense 
acquisition problems. [ckpickar@nps.edu] 
Bernard Udis—is a Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He 
has also served at the U.S. Air Force Academy and the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency. 
His NATO research fellowship examined the costs and benefits of offsets in defense trade. A 
recognized authority on the economics of defense, his published work includes three books, plus a 
number of book chapters and journal articles. [bernard.udis@colorado.edu] 
Abstract 
This paper continues a research agenda started in 2016 with an aim of more realistic 
acquisition program scheduling estimates, especially for the development (SSD) phase. 
This, our third look at the scheduling problem, starts with a discussion of scheduling data, 
and how that data could be applied to help the DoD address this challenge. This section 
includes ideas on how to use acquisition data for the scheduling problem. Next, we present 
a case study that is the result of field interviews with senior DoD leaders. Finally, we present 
a discussion on using the system performance as a metric. 
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Introduction 
Weapons system development projects are infamous for exceeding time and cost 
limitations. Often the reaction to this notoriety is changes at the policy level of acquisition. 
However, the problem may well lie somewhere else. This paper, like the two preceding 
papers in this series, suggests we may well be “lookin’ … in all the wrong places” (to 
paraphrase an old country song1) for the causes, because the causes may well lie inside the 
project and therefore not be readily addressed by policy changes.  
While cost, performance, and schedule are critical variables in any acquisition 
program, Congress, the media, and policymakers generally focus on cost, with little attention 
devoted to the issues of schedule. Moreover, although the DoD has engaged in significant 
efforts to develop methods for realistic acquisition cost estimates, it has paid considerably 
less attention to schedules—their estimates and execution. To emphasize the challenge of 
schedules, Figure 1 provides a macro level view of the schedule problem. Over the past 20 
years, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), as reported in Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs), averaged schedule overruns of more than 24 months. Schedule overruns 
occur for many reasons and this study examines some of those reasons. 
 
Figure 1. Sum of Schedule Overruns, 1998–2017 (Months) 
We use a multi-faceted approach to examine weapons systems development 
scheduling to assess the current state and contributing causes of schedule estimating 
methodologies and suggest different ways to accomplish this difficult process. The 
overarching research question is as follows: 




 From the words to a song written by Wanda Mallette, Bob Morrison, and Patti Ryan, and recorded 
by American country music singer Johnny Lee in June 1980. 
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What analytical techniques and approaches can be applied to schedule 
development/analysis to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of schedule 
estimating and execution? 
As long ago as 1988, Morris and Hough were critical of the practice of project 
management: 
Curiously, despite the enormous attention project management and analysis 
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally 
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are 
common. Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. 
Projects are often completed late or over budget, do not perform in the way 
expected, involve severe strain on participating institutions or are cancelled 
prior to their completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money. 
In fact, project management in general, and DoD project management in particular, 
has been dealing with these problems described by Morris and Hough for decades. We 
hope to inform these problems because, “when problems persist, practitioners and scholars 
are getting something wrong” (Christensen & Bartman, 2016).  
This paper is the third in a series of investigations into alternatives to the way we do 
schedule estimation today and builds on the research agenda proposed by Franck et al. in 
2016 and furthered in Franck et al. in 2017 (Franck, Hildebrandt, & Udis, 2016; Franck, 
Hildebrandt, Pickar, & Udis, 2017). We start with a discussion of scheduling data, and how 
that data could be applied to help the DoD address this challenge, and how system 
dynamics can inform. Next, we present a case study that is the result of field interviews with 
senior DoD leaders. Finally, we present a discussion on using parametric analysis.  
The Dynamics of Project Management 
The concept of time in project management can be divided into two steps: estimating 
task duration and building the schedule. Both processes require technical expertise and 
management savvy. First the technical process of estimating the duration of the project task 
must be determined. Once duration is established, the management process of project 
sequencing and scheduling must be defined.  
Estimating Activity Duration 
Surprisingly, little information is available in the literature on the “how” to estimate the 
elements of a schedule—the task duration. While the major defense contractors have formal 
in-company processes, little formal literature is available on the specifics of task estimation. 
Further, most available information on estimating task duration is found in project 
management textbooks, but even then, the specifics are scarce.  
The PMBOK (Project Management Body of Knowledge) lists five methods for 
estimating project activity duration. These methods include (Project Management Institute 
[PMI], 2017): 
 Expert Judgment  
 Alternatives Analysis  
 Published Estimating Data  
 Project Management Software  
 Bottoms-up Estimating 
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Expert judgment acknowledges that technical and engineering experts should be 
able to estimate the effort necessary to accomplish tasks and translate those estimates to 
duration. This assumes the chosen experts have significant experience in the execution of 
those tasks, and are therefore competent to judge time required (Hughes, 1996). 
Alternatives analysis recognizes that activities or tasks can be accomplished in 
different ways—alternatives. These different ways include defining different techniques, 
differing levels of resources, and using different machines. 
Published estimates are databanks that gather resources measures. These 
measures include hourly rates by skill level, acknowledged production rates for various 
development, and manufacturing activities. In most cases, this data is available internal to 
the organization. However, there are data companies that track and report this data. An 
example is the IEEE-USA Salary & Benefits Survey. This data is often available for different 
locations in the United States as well as worldwide.  
Project management software is not really an estimation method. Instead, it provides 
a means to identify and organize information necessary for resource estimates.  
Finally, an engineering or bottoms-up estimate is a comprehensive schedule (and 
cost) process that starts at the work package level and aggregates costs to build a complete 
estimate. Bottoms-up estimates are necessary when schedule activities cannot be 
accurately estimated using another technique. As the name implies, bottoms-up estimates 
start at a level of activity or task that can be confidently estimated. The activities are then 
rolled-up to the required level. These estimates are extremely work intensive but are also 
the most accurate.  
Other recognized methods include parametric techniques. A parametric or top-down 
estimate builds an activity estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. All the methods listed are used to 
estimate the length of time each of the activities or Work Breakdown Structure tasks lists. 
“Simply stated, the duration of an activity is the scope of the work (quantity) divided by a 
measure of productivity” (Hendrickson, Martinelli, & Rehak, 1987, p. 278). 
Thus, activity duration estimation establishes the actual time required to complete 
discrete tasks in an overall project, while project scheduling fixes the start and end dates, as 
well as execution approaches of the project. Once the overall schedule is established, 
management activities driven by either time and/or resource constraints will determine the 
actual execution of the project (Schwindt & Zimmerman, 2015). The analogy that comes to 
mind is that of an orchestra. The individual instruments (and of course, the musicians) are 
the discrete tasks of the project. The orchestra leader is the project manager, and the music 
score is the “plan” the orchestra leader uses to execute the “project.” Building on this 
information, the next step in this effort is to identify schedule data that can be used to 
augment these estimating activities. 
Schedule Data  
While there is significant information available on DoD procurements, the 
overwhelming majority of that information is on cost. In order to effectively examine project 
schedules, we must be able to better understand those schedules. It is common knowledge 
that weapons system development projects overrun their schedules. However, we need to 
be able to determine what causes schedule overruns, as well as an actual measure of the 
development time.  
Data for this research was obtained from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD Selected 
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Acquisition Reports (SARs). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of selected Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Table 1 provides a list of delay factors, as well as 
maximum and minimum delays as reported in the SAR during the period 1997–2017.2   
Table 1. Delay Factors, Maximum Delays, and Minimum Delays, 1997–2017 








Administrative changes to schedule 
including updates to APB, ADM changes, as 
well as changes resulting from Nunn-
McCurdy processes and program 
restructuring 
460 168 5 
Technical 291 60 4 
Testing delays 283 66 1 
Delay in availability of key 
capabilities/facilities (launch vehicle/testing 
facilities/IOT&E units) 
3 13 6 
Budget/Funding Delays 52 43 1 
Delays attributed to the Contractor 50   
Delays because of Rework 16 4 1 
External events such as inflation, 
earthquakes, labor strikes, etc.  
(Force Majeure) 
4 4 1 
Delays due to Contracting/Contract 
Negotiation/Award delays 
29 27 1 
Actuals (updating previously reported dates 
to actual occurrence) 
172 13 -39 
These delay factors suggest program managers (PMs) should plan for the time 
necessary to deal with oversight, information reporting and both the time takes, as well as 
the impacts of decisions—internal and external to the program. As the GAO pointed out in a 
2015 study, the program office overheads associated with administrative activities added, on 
average, two years to complete: 
Programs we surveyed spent on average over 2 years completing the steps 
necessary to document up to 49 information requirements for their most 
recent acquisition milestone. This includes the time for the program office to 
develop the documentation and for various stakeholders to review and 
approve the documentation. 




 The data described are from an unpublished study by the author of the delay factors for DoD 
program 1997–2017. The study is an initial attempt at quantifying schedule delays in program 
execution with the intent of using those delays to better inform project planning. 
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Figure 2 provides a trend line and forecast of the delays identified. Using this data, 
the forecast total delay hours across all programs in 2019 would be 712 hours, and in 2020 
that forecast would increase to 729 hours. 
 
Figure 2. Trend Line Showing Forecasted Schedule Increases 
Applying the Data 
Our previous paper introduced the rework concept, shown in Figure 3. As noted, the 
CPM/PERT approach to scheduling precludes the use of data at the program schedule 
level. And, while some companies track task estimation data, that data is often proprietary 
and more focused on technical process estimation (Godlewski, Lee, & Cooper, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. The Rework Cycle 
The basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network from start to 
finish is naïve at best (Franck et al., 2017). System dynamics can account for the feedback 
that results from decisions made in the execution of a project. A project network using 
CPM/PERT techniques depends on each task being completed in the defined order 
established. While most PMs attempt to maintain that order, the reality of dynamics 
intervenes. That reality means that network analysis cannot capture the progress of a 
project (Williams et al., 1994).  
A tool used in system dynamics to capture cause and effect is a causal map. The 
causal map becomes a tool used for the development of a model of the delay factors 
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identified. Figure 4 is an initial causal map capturing some of the identified factors in 
weapons system program schedule delays. The factors shown are a subset of those 
identified for brevity in this paper.  
Delay factors plus the effects of rework, decision wait time, tasks start delay, and 
other disruptions result in the PM (or PMO) recognizing a schedule problem (delay in the 
critical path). Invariably, the PM must take action to attempt to return the project to the 
equilibrium expressed as being on schedule. Thus, the PM could approve overtime, 
reschedule, or take some other mitigation. The pressure to get back on schedule is driven 
by many factors including cost considerations, pressure from the oversight organizations, 
and in weapons systems development, the necessity of delivering capability to the 
warfighter in the most efficient time. Regardless the reason, the PM “does something.” The 
plus and minus signs indicate the effect of the actions taken.  
 
Figure 4. Delay Factors Triggers for Project Delays 
(Howick, 2003) 
A project is a dynamic system with feedback loops and, invariably, decisions taken to 
address one problem have an impact on, or create new problems. For example, approving 
overtime does initially address schedule issues as more work is being done in shorter 
periods. However, a recognized problem of overtime is fatigue. Fatigue causes workers to 
make mistakes, and those mistakes result in having to redo the work, thus perpetuating 
problems that were thought solved.  
Similarly, hiring more workers causes more problems. Assuming the new workers 
have the requisite skills, they need to be trained/acclimated to the actual project situation. In 
the Mythical Man Month, Brooks (1995) explained how this concept works in software 
development. In reality, it is universal.  
Finally, while many of the delay factors identified from the SAR analysis can be 
explained in Figure 4, others require further examination. One of the biggest challenges is 
the area of decisions, both internal and external. The internal decisions drive many of the 
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actors discussed above. However, the PM must also deal with external decisions that can 
eventually impact the development. 
Figure 5 is a notional graphic that represents a generic decision cycle in the context 
of the rework cycle. While the results of this data analysis included rework, the majority of 
the identified delay factors were decision focused. Those decision centric factors included 
represent this decision cycle. The notation is shown between the work to be done and work 
completed boxes because many of the decisions identified occur outside the project 
manager’s purview. The exogenous factors identified cause either reactions to those factors, 
or force other internal decisions. While not normally a part of the rework cycle, we suggest 
that a formal appreciation of a decision cycle, and the time it takes for decisions to be made 
both internal as well as external to the program management cycle, must be considered. 
 
Figure 5. Notional Decision Cycle Added to Rework Cycle Diagram 
Conclusion 
This section continued the discussion on using system dynamics to better 
understand, plan, and execute defense acquisition programs. This section presented 
schedule information gleaned from Selected Acquisition Reports, and suggested a model to 
show how that information can be best understood in the context of the decisions necessary 
to model weapons system acquisition programs. To be clear, we are not advocating to 
replace the CPM/PERT methods used today. At best, system dynamics is an adjunct to 
those methods in use. Instead, we suggest that we should recognize the dynamics at play in 
any weapons system development, and once recognized, use the appropriate tools to better 
our execution.  
No program manager sets out to overrun a schedule; “However, clients increasingly 
value not only cost and schedule control but cost and schedule certainty” (Godlewski et al., 
2012, p. 18). Those clients for defense acquisition products seek certainty as well, both in 
cost and schedule. It is no secret that current methods for estimating and executing 
schedule are insufficient. In fact, certainty is one of the potential benefits of this examination 
of schedule factors. Project certainty starts in effective schedule planning by using the right 
tools. 
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F-35 Case Study3 
Much has been written about the F-35 program, in many venues. Defense 
acquisition professionals know a lot about “what” has happened. “How” and “why” it has 
happened is less clear. Our last essay (Franck, Hildebrandt, Pickar & Udis, 2017) undertook 
an inquiry as to the “hows” and “whys” of this case. We asked how a program that traces its 
lineage to the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter became the F-35—which is not very 
common (Bogdan, 2012), definitely not lightweight, of debatable affordability (see GAO, 
2017; Capaccio, 2018), and arguably not a fighter (Airpower Australia, 2017). 
The publicly-available literature was not terribly enlightening, although a few 
interesting clues were discernible. We closed with an intent “to learn more in future inquiries” 
(Franck et al., 2017, p. 420). Since then, the field interview method has brought new insights 
to many aspects of the F-35 program. 
Given space limitations, we concentrate on some useful hypotheses we’ve 
gleaned—the assessment of which is for further inquiry. These hypotheses4 concern 
program management, technology and engineering, and the lure of new technologies. 
Careful readers will note that they are not mutually exclusive and are interrelated in a 
number of ways. 
Program Management 
The management narrative can be organized as poor program structure from the 
start: an underequipped and over-burdened program office—all of which enabled bad 
decisions. 
Program Structure 
The program turned out to be well-designed to fail. Basically, Lockheed-Martin (LM, 
the prime contractor) had considerable discretion and control over a highly complex program 
with a vague set of requirements. Moreover, the incentive structure was not well designed 
(“poor” according to at least one authority). This produced a Principal-Agent problem (e.g., 
Kreps, 1990, Chapter 16) with the Principal (DoD) unable to fully monitor the agent’s (LM’s) 
behavior, or to incentivize good behavior. One result was a strained relationship between 
LM and DoD (“worst I’ve ever seen”; Bogdan, 2012). 
The program strategy reflected a number of optimistic framing assumptions. These 
included joint programs saving money, plus new, but untried, methods expected to 
significantly reduce risk and time. This latter set included the assumed benefits of recent 
acquisition reforms and better simulation methods expected to reduce flight testing. All this 
led to an aggressive schedule—involving tight timelines with a high degree of concurrency 
accepted a priori (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 37).  
When these assumptions were not borne out, schedules stretched out and costs 
grew. The RAND Root Cause Analysis, for example, concluded “optimistic cost and 
schedule estimates” constituted a major cause of program difficulties (Blickstein et al., 2011, 
p. 37).  




 We are greatly indebted to a highly-placed, well-informed DoD official for many of the insights that 
underpin this section of our paper. Chatham House Rule applies. 
4
 Although readers will likely not agree with all the details, few, if any, will be surprised. 
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Program Office 
The F-35’s DoD management team was assigned a task that included serious 
complexities in both technical and management dimensions. Moreover, the management 
difficulties included coordination of 11 stakeholders (three U.S. and eight international) with 
varied operational needs while complying with the U.S. ITAR (International Trade in Arms) 
regime. 
Additionally, cascading effects of program difficulties made the work even more 
complex. One example was weight growth early in the program (precipitated in part by 
entering development with a slender weight growth margin), which necessitated a larger 
engine, which in turn necessitated a major redesign of the fuselage to accommodate the 
larger engine (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 53)—with one major result being cost growth and 
schedule delay. The acquisition strategy turned out to be something of a “house of cards.” 
Given its highly complex and demanding mission, the F-35 Program Office was 
woefully underequipped at crucial junctures. Requirements discipline in the formative period 
has been characterized as “weak” and unable to deal effectively with a number of changes 
internal to the program (e.g., tech insertions, revised development plans) and external (e.g., 
threat evolution). In addition, there were, at times, mismatches between Program Office 
needs and personnel skills aboard. 
Some tools of program management were inadequate—particularly for schedules. 
From a program management perspective, schedule management tools proved hard to use, 
not well tied to resource use, insufficiently flexible to account for risk and program 
perturbations, and not supported with data from historical experience. As program difficulties 
arose, there was no credible means available to estimate schedule implications.  
These are, of course, difficulties that afflict any defense acquisition program. 
However, new, complex, difficult, advanced systems like the F-35 suffer more. Another 
difficulty was rotating new program executive officers (PEOs) every few years. Accordingly, 
both the opportunity and incentive to reorient the program were in very short supply. This 
particular pattern was broken in 2012 with an indefinite-term PEO. 
In addition, as problems continued, the Program Office was subject to a rather 
onerous oversight regime, with attendant political pressures and constraints. The one-year 
F-35B probation period is one example (Franck et al., 2012, esp. pp. 57–59). 
Program Execution: Bad Decisions 
The factors cited above facilitated bad decisions. The flawed assumptions that 
underpinned the acquisition strategy did not receive sufficient scrutiny (perhaps related to 
leadership tenure). In an atmosphere of pervasive optimism, relatively pessimistic 
assessments (such as the CAIG report in 2001) had little apparent effect on program 
management (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 37). Requirements remained in some degree of flux 
well into the program life, with corresponding effects on program stability.  
Heavy reliance on test data (e.g., reliance on simulations and test data from non-
scale airframes) greatly delayed the test program when those presumptions proved 
inaccurate. 
The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) was a major technical advance—with 
great promise but high risk and no guarantee of success. However, a natural programmatic 
hedge, head-up display (HUD), was cancelled early in the program. This meant that lags in 
HMD development became a major threat to program success (Bogdan, 2012). 
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Program Office personnel clung closely to a commonality standard among the three 
models, with cost growth and delays associated with fixing one model’s problems among all 
three models. (This seems to make sense if the F-35 is one unified program; less so, if there 
are three programs with commonalities.5)  
Technology and Engineering 
The optimism that set the theme for the management strategy also pervaded the 
technology assumptions. There was a strong proclivity to underestimate the difficulties and 
risks. While, for example, there was a fair amount of experience with stealthy aircraft 
designs within the U.S. defense industrial base, the F-35 was nonetheless a major leap 
forward. As RAND’s Root Cause Analysis noted, the basic technical requirements were very 
demanding. This is illustrated in Table 2. Given the high degree of commonality specified for 
the F-35, if one model needed to meet the design objectives in the table, all models need to 
achieve those objectives. It took considerable ingenuity to design an airplane whose 
morphology accommodated all these requirements (Blickstein et al., 2011, esp. p. 37). 
Table 2. Required Features for F-35 Design 
(Adapted from Blickstein et al., 2011, Table 4.6, p. 49) 
 STEALTH STOVL SUPERSONIC 
Engine Inlets Small Large Specific shapes 







Specific (speed regime 
transitions) 
Materials Stealthy airframe 
skin 
Light skin for vertical 
landing 
Strong skin (speed regime 
transitions) 
Accordingly, there was little margin for error or unexpected difficulties; one example 
was the 6% allowance for increased weight. That reserve was exceeded early in the 
program, which necessitated a major redesign exercise (Blickstein et al., 2011, pp. 47, 53). 
Given the demanding nature of the original design and slender margins for error, 
there was nonetheless a definite willingness to push the technical envelope. Thus, for 
example, the Helmet Mounted Display (discussed above) was a major technical advance—
with a natural hedge (HUD) discarded early.6 
There was likewise a propensity to trust new and promising, but not fully validated, 
engineering methods. These included computer simulations substituting much of the testing 
normally accomplished in the air. The result was a test program generally behind and in a 
catch-up mode (e.g., see DOTE, 2016, esp. p. 31). 




 LtGen. Bogdan (2012) eloquently stated the separate-programs perspective. 
6
 Reasonable people can disagree as to whether this is a management issue, technical issue, or both. 
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The Attraction of New Technologies 
Technology insertions occurred with some frequency during the F-35 development 
program. These included the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and the 
Helmet-Mounted Display. ALIS seems to have been regarded as merely the logical 
extension of onboard aircraft diagnostics (Steidle, 1997, p. 9). However, more than a 
decade later, problems with ALIS were (rightly) viewed as an existential threat to the entire 
program (Bogdan, 2012). 
Likewise, the evolution of the F-35 from an affordable, limited-capability companion 
for the F-22 (inter alia) to a “situational awareness machine” seems to be related to some 
major advances in sensor capabilities that the F-35 program adopted. (It’s also true that the 
stakeholders were involved: “JAST … was … designed to have the smallest possible sensor 
suite and be dependent on external information sources … [But] most of the export 
countries did not have (those sources) in their inventory” and the F-35 became a battlefield 
information producer [Keijsper, 2007, p. 135]).  
Such initiatives, taken in isolation, were undoubtedly viewed as sensible at the time. 
However, the cumulative effect of a series of sensible decisions can be a horrible end result.  
The last word on the new technologies and platform performance issues might well 
come from General Deptula (2016): 
Current systems are largely expected to operate in a semi-autonomous 
fashion, with a basic level of collaborative engagement with other platforms. 
These shortcomings place pressure on individual assets to possess 
numerous internal capabilities. The complexity inherent to this approach 
drives lengthy development cycles, which in turn leads to requirement creep, 
time and cost overruns, and delays in capability. (pp. 6–7; emphasis added) 
This looks like an indirect reference to the F-35 we’re getting. 
Some Questions for Further Investigation 
1. Can an acquisition program schedule become self-stretching? A simplified 
version of this hypothesis goes something like this. System complexity entails 
a lengthy development program. Over time, various technical improvements 
present themselves—some of which are adopted. These technical insertions 
(even if done well) nonetheless add to system complexity or estimated 
program schedule (or both). This cycle is summarized in Figure 6. 
While this influence diagram seems plausible, the strength of these connections and 
their total effects on program schedules are subjects for further inquiries. 
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Figure 6. Self-Stretching Acquisition Program Schedules? 
2. To what extent do weak schedule estimation and management tools affect 
program performance? There are excellent reasons to believe that 
scheduling estimates are sometimes not realistic. What schedule 
management tools do program managers and program offices lack? How can 
those gaps be addressed? 
JCIDS Manual (CJCS, 2015, p. A-9) recommends tradeoffs among system cost, 
performance, and schedule. Program managers have reasonably good cost estimation 
tools, reasonably good indicators of system performance, but not good ways to estimate 
schedules—especially if the original program experiences requirements growth.  
This question offers some scope for gap analysis—to be investigated through case 
studies and interviews with subject matter experts. 
Measuring System Performance7  
Updating combat system performance measures is important for at least two 
reasons. First, a better understanding of combat capability in the information age could 
significantly improve defense policy and planning. Second, a credible (preferably scalar) 
measure of combat capability could contribute much to schedule estimation—through better 
schedule-estimating relationships.  
We’ve chosen to start with air-air combat systems. In a previous paper (Franck et al., 
2017, esp. pp. 423–425), we explored a Lanchester aimed-fire model with various 
complications: stealth and command control, in addition to lethality and relative numbers. 
Results were interesting, but just a start.  
Air combat in the near future will involve weapons committed from various types of 
platforms. Accordingly, we extend our previous model to include engagements “called in” 




 This particular discussion has been abridged to fit the Proceedings’ space limits. A more detailed 
version is available on request at cfranck215@aol.com. 
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from other platforms. One variant along this line is using non-stealthy aircraft (such as F-15s 
and B-52s) as weapons carriers whose targets are identified and assigned by fifth-
generation aircraft—such as the F-35.  
Accordingly, some aircraft (“scouts,” S) will use their situational awareness 
capabilities to acquire hostile assets and then assign other aircraft (“weapons carriers,” W) 
to engage them.8 This assignment entails a useful networking capability. In this concept of 
operations, the shooter aircraft are primarily weapons carriers—and consumers of offboard 
sensors.  
A Lanchester-Type Variant for Contemporary Air Combat9  
Consider a stylized air battle scenario about one decade in the future:  
During the opening days, fighting focuses on the battle for air superiority as 
aircraft from both sides clash over contested territory. As the conflict 
continues, fifth-generation aircraft seek out, degrade, and destroy advanced 
SAMs in contested territory, creating a more moderate threat environment. 
This enables legacy aircraft to operate alongside their fifth-generation 
counterparts. (Harrigian & Marosko, 2016, pp. 7–8) 
This suggests two major changes expected in the foreseeable future. The first is 
heterogeneous air combat forces: consisting of stealthy aircraft, plus a force of “legacy” 
combatants. The initially contested airspace contains stealthy fighters, with any older aircraft 
being quickly eliminated in that area (Barrett & Carpenter, 2017, esp. p. 5). However, those 
non-stealthy platforms can actively participate as weapons launchers whose fires are 
assigned by the fifth-generation aircraft acting as scouts—or other assets with command 
control capabilities.  
Second, air combat will no longer be merely platform-on-platform engagements, but 
rather network-on-network, information-centered combat. One manifestation of this line of 
reasoning is the “kill web” concept, which features highly-networked forces with 
decentralized lethality and sensor capabilities, but most importantly decentralized decision 
making. Kill-web units take independent action, and are not “micro-managed” (Timperlake, 
2017). 
A related idea is the “combat cloud”: “a model where information, data management, 
connectivity, and command and control (C2) are core mission priorities. The combat cloud 
treats every platform as a sensor, as well as an ‘effector’” (Deptula, 2016, p. 1). In particular, 
operational decision making is spread throughout the network, with the “entire area of 
responsibility … functioning as a CAOC [Combined Air Operation Center]” (Deptula, 2016, p. 
7). 




 Given the F-35’s limited internal weapons carriage, the role of finding hostiles and assigning others 
to engage is likely the primary role. We (Franck & Udis, 2016) have suggested “joint scout fighter” as 
a more descriptive name than “joint strike fighter.” 
9
 Taylor, Vol. II (1983, Section 6.13, pp. 318 ff.) provides a rigorous exposition of a starting point for 
our model. 
- 486 - 
The Data-To-Decision Problem 
Kill webs and combat clouds are very promising. However, proficiency in network-
based combat is a military advantage only to the extent it leads to better decisions than the 
enemy’s (Gouré, 2018). Moreover, decentralized decision making is integral to the kill web 
and combat cloud concepts of operation. That makes achieving a reasonable degree of 
unity of effort a significant problem. 
A simple example suffices to illustrate the point. Suppose there are two targets (A, B) 
of equal value, with associated (decentralized) decision makers (DA, DB). Suppose also 
there are two remotely-located weapons available for assignment (a, b), and that probability 
of kill varies with both weapon and target, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Simple Weapons Assignment Problem 
WEAPONS TARGETS 
A B 
a .9 .8 
b .7 .2 
Clearly the optimal assignment is Weapon “a” to Target “B,” and Weapon “b” to 
Target “A”—with 1.5 targets destroyed on average. However, structuring and solving such 
an assignment problem generally assumes a central authority with information that’s both 
timely and sufficient.  
In a decentralized decision mode, both Decision-Makers A & B (DA & DB) will note 
that Weapon “a” is better for his target. But there’s only one Weapon “a.” If DA happens to 
call in Weapon “a” first, then DB is stuck with Weapon “b,” and targets destroyed declines to 
1.1. (If DB calls in Weapon “a” first, then all is well, and 1.5 targets are destroyed on 
average.)  
Timperlake (2017), in fact, proposes that the DA and DB simply ask which weapon is 
best for their target. That may or may not work out well. One ACC Commander, Gen Hawk 
Carlisle, posits (take everything from) “subsurface to on orbit,” automatically piece it 
together, and “put it into the warfighter’s hands in a way that … now they become the 
decision-makers” (as cited in Church, 2016).  
Two comments: First, both perspectives assume a degree of situational awareness 
that goes beyond standard definitions such as “knowing real-time the current position, 
classification, condition and recent history of all items of military interest in both the physical 
and virtual battlespace” (Franck, 1995). Both Timperlake and Carlisle apparently assume 
that those decentralized decision makers also know target-weapons matchup characteristics 
well enough to make good choices among weapons available. This entails, inter alia, 
knowing plans (especially near future) of all relevant, friendly decision makers. 
In short, the open literature indicates that translating shared situation awareness 
through a web of decentralized decision makers to produce a reasonable approximation of 
unity of effort is not yet completely understood, let alone solved. And the Air Force Air 
Superiority Flight Plan (U.S. Air Force Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, 2016) 
apparently shares this opinion, recommending, 
 a “data-to-decision campaign of experiments (to) examine how to fuse data 
from cloud-based sensor networks into decision quality information” (p. 7), 
 “non-tradition concepts” for Battle Management Systems (p. 8), and 
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 development of new Command Control capabilities to provide “materiel and 
non-materiel solutions (that) should provide commanders in 2030 with the 
ability to synchronize forces across domains” (p. 8). 
Assessing Air Combat Performance 
Effective air combat forces are proficient in accomplishing the following tasks—which 
are generally accomplished sequentially, with accomplishment of all of them needed to 
ensure success: 
 Cueing friendly forces of enemy activity (or early warning)—accomplished by 
assets with intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities 
 Detecting, identifying, and tracking enemy forces—accomplished by 
surveillance systems 
 Assigning forces to targets—command and control (C2) assets 
 Engagement of targets—combat platforms and associated weapons 
 Assessment of engagement results—surveillance systems 
Timperlake (2017) essays a framework for contemporary combat capability called 
“payload utility.” This is the ability to acquire, engage, and destroy targets. What’s important 
for assessing near-future air combat is that the associated tasks are assigned to an entire 
network, with individual units calling on offboard resources within the network. For example, 
a target can be cued and detected by an early-warning sensor suite; identified and tracked 
by surveillance assets; be assigned to friendly forces by C2 assets; localized by a combat 
system—which engages the target through a weapon fired by yet another system; and then 
followed by an assessment of engagement results.  
Simple models suggest that force sizes, weapons, stealth, and coordination are key 
variables in a credible measure of air combat capability. One look appears in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Combat Results VS. Detection and Lethality 
The figure highlights important aspects of combat capability. First is the importance 
of “matchups” such as ISR versus stealth, and weapons versus targets’ countermeasures. 
Second is that (from a Blue perspective) it’s important to find Red targets (defeat Red 
stealth) and to have weapons that can defeat Red self-protection countermeasures. These 
aren’t terribly profound insights. However, they suggest we might be better off with fifth-gen 
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weapons on fifth-gen airplanes than with fourth-gen weapons on sixth-gen airplanes. Finally, 
substitutions are indeed possible. For example, shortfalls in detection and tracking can be 
overcome with better weapons. 
Next Steps 
First, improve the model above to better account for the problem of coordinating a 
decentralized decision-making process. Among other things, we’re hoping that the 
recommended Air Force studies and experiments along this line will include some 
unclassified results. 
Second, try a more fine-grained approach to modeling future air combat. Agent-
based simulation might be a useful method. This would, of course, be a major effort but with 
potentially major insights. 
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Abstract 
Many prime contractors use subcontractors to meet the DoD requirements for Small 
Business Utilization, to incorporate specialized skills and to perform tasks that are not the 
prime contractors' core business. Some of these subcontractors are not explicitly made 
public for a variety of reasons, including security or competitive advantage. In such cases, 
because the involvement of these subcontractors in certain aspects of acquisition is not 
known, they can pose the risk of becoming a weak, stress point despite careful planning by 
the DoD. This paper examines whether such undisclosed contractors can be inferred 
through a combined analysis of both the published purchasing data (Federal Procurement 
Data Systems—Next Gen) and of additional pieces of information freely available on the 
web. In particular, this paper investigates employment data in an attempt to correlate 
changes in employment with negative modifications to contracts. It is possible that, when a 
contract is cut, the prime contractor may terminate a subcontract, resulting in layoffs of the 
subcontractor's employees. Employment numbers are published regularly and broken down 
to county and industry codes. This paper provides a preliminary analysis showing that drops 
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in employment occur when small contractors have relatively large reductions in DoD 
contracts. 
Introduction 
It is not uncommon for DoD contracts to involve multiple entities, and for some prime 
contractors to employ subcontractors to perform specific parts of the job. For a variety of 
reasons, including security, confidentiality, or competitive advantage, some of these 
subcontractors are not publicly disclosed. One large research question is whether the open 
society and transparent government of the USA provides the means to uncover some of 
these undisclosed subcontractors. A bounty of useful information is published by the local 
and federal government as well as private companies and individuals. While no single 
government source would likely allow such information to be determined, the combination of 
multiple data repositories might do just that, especially if the same undisclosed contractor is 
part of multiple contracts. 
The work presented here is a preliminary exploration of whether a correlation exists 
between procurement data and employment information. The main contribution is examining 
whether reductions in contract amounts influence employment levels in certain industries 
and locations. While the longer term goal would be to find hidden contractors, the first step, 
and the topic of the paper, is to look at known contractors who suffered cuts and see if 
anything can be observed in (un)employment data around the time of the cut. The reasoning 
is that if employment data shows a reduction in most cases of contract reductions, then the 
chance of discovering undisclosed contractors would be high. Note that the discovery 
problem would likely not have an exact answer, but rather have a probabilistic one in the 
sense that certain locations might be found to have a high likelihood of being the home of an 
undisclosed contractor for a given type of industry, while others would have a negligible 
chance. 
The preliminary data, as explored in this paper, reveals that reductions in contracts, 
which are large relative to the contractor's size, are correlated to a drop in employment in 
more than two thirds of the cases. The paper used two types of metrics, one linked to 
absolute employment levels for a county and industry type and the other, location quotient 
(2008), providing a relative measure of a county's employment in an industry sector relative 
to the nation. The second metric would be able to register a drop even if a particular location 
had an actual increase in employment, but that increase was not as large as the national 
trend. The location quotient showed a decline for 75% of the contract cuts studied. 
The paper covers related work in the next section, followed by an explanation of the 
methodology used to obtain and process the data. Results, conclusions, and future work are 
the topics of the last two sections. 
Related Work 
One approach that used public acquisition databases combined with publicly 
available data is based on the Company ORganization and Firm name Unifier (CORFU) 
technique (Álvarez-Rodríguez et al., 2013). This is a stepwise (step-by-step) method that 
was used to reconcile corporate names in public contracts metadata. The research study 
used GeoNames REST Services for contextual information, and for filtering, the study used 
Google Refine to validate and reconcile the data. The corporate data was from multiple 
sources including databases from Forbes, Google Places, Google Maps, Foursquare, 
LinkedIn Companies, and Facebook. “This technique is applied to the ‘PublicSpending.net’ 
initiative to show how the unification of corporate names is the cornerstone to provide a 
visualization service that can serve policy-makers to detect and prevent upcoming 
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necessities” (Llorens, Álvarez-Rodríguez, & Vafopoulos, 2015). In the study, there were over 
40 million names that were extracted from public procurement datasets from Australia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the CrocTail Project.  
Another approach involved using nonprofits or commercial entities to create tools for 
finding and leveraging public data. Among the services that are provided were cross 
indexing with other data sources as well as data visualization tools. This project combined 
government data with information services from outside sources to provide context to the 
data. This technique is referred to as “mashups with other data sources” (Felten et al., 
2009). 
Search engines like Google are handicapped because they do not have access to 
agencies’ internal databases. Search engines have progressed, in spite of this limitation, 
and perform “a significantly better job at identify relevant information.” Even with this barrier, 
“private actors have repeatedly demonstrated that they are willing and able to build useful 
new tools and services on top of government data” (Felten et al., 2009) that provide better 
insight into the data. 
Methodology 
The data used in our analysis originated from Federal Procurement Data Systems—
Next Gen (FPDS) and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The first source provides 
lists of federal contracts awarded during specified years, while the second publishes 
employment data. The data used in the research covered the period of 2013 through 2017. 
Federal Procurement Data Systems (FPDS) 
Our initial focus was to obtain information from FPDS on contracts for the 
Department of the Navy. The intention was to identify contracts with a funding reduction 
larger than at least a yearly salary of a qualified, skilled employee that was affecting small 
and medium-sized entities. From over 1.1 million entries pulled for the Navy, about 3,300 
modifications to a contract were found that met the following criteria: i) the contract was 
reduced by more than $100,000, and ii) the vendor had between 10 and 200 employees. 
Both contract modification value and number of employees for the vendor are fields in 
FPDS. 
The correlation between FPDS and BLS data is in the process of being automated, 
thus for this work the analysis was performed manually. This limited our ability to process all 
contract modifications identified in the Navy data to a more manageable 33 instances of 
reductions in the amount of the contract, which amount to 1% of the Navy contract 
reductions for the studied period. 
The selection focused on instances which had been the largest drop in contract 
amount per unit of annual revenue. We also restricted the industry to manufacturing (NAICS 
code beginning with 3) and IT services (NAICS code beginning with 581). Finally, to avoid 
some noise in the FPDS data, the selection only included entities whose revenue was larger 
than $100,000 (both NAICS code of the product and annual revenue of vendor are fields in 
FPDS). 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employment Data 
The employment data provided monthly absolute employment levels and monthly 
location quotients for each county and type of industry. The industry codes were also using 
NAICS (2017) to identify the type of employers. BLS uses the NAICS code slightly differently 
than FPDS in that BLS identifies the type of employer, while FPDS codes the type of 
product provided by an employer. It is possible that one employer may have products in 
different, yet related industry types. 
Given that the single NAICS code existing in FPDS can be too rigid, a bundle of 
related industries were considered for any given location and date, as sampled in Figures 1 
and 2. This approach is further supported by a secondary analysis we performed, which 
revealed that in about one third of counties (912 counties), a drop in employment in one 
industry was accompanied by a drop in related industries. 
 
Note. The bars show relative change in employment from the quarter before to the next 
quarter. 
Figure 1. Sample Industry-Type Bundle for Honolulu, HI, Third Quarter 2013 
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Note. The bars show relative change in employment from the quarter before to the next 
quarter. 
Figure 2. Sample Industry Bundle for Essex, MA, Fourth Quarter 2014 
Two metrics were used to estimate any potential changes in the employment 
situation: absolute employment level and location quotient (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2008). The latter, location quotient (LQ), measures the local economy, county in our data, in 
relation to the rest of the nation. As such, it can capture cases where the absolute 
employment moves up or down in response to national trends unrelated to any local factors 
(local factors such as a cut in a Navy contract). A drop in LQ value is likely explained by a 
worsening of the local economy unrelated to national trends. Note that LQ can decrease 
even when employment increases, signifying that the increase is not taking place as quickly 
as in the rest of the USA. 
Results 
The 33 contracts studied in this paper are listed in Table 1 together with the two 
labor metrics of interest. This analysis took into account three months preceding and three 
months following the contract change to determine its impact. Averages were computed for 
both of the three month periods. The difference between those two averages, in percentage, 
is used for the rest of the analysis, both for absolute employment levels and location 
quotient.  
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Table 1. List of 33 Instances of Contract Modifications 
Name of Vendor / Cut Date Percent change in 
employment level (the three 
months before the cut 
compared the three months 
after) 
Percent change in 
employment location quotient 
(the three months before the 





9/10/2014 -2.69% -3.47% 
12/10/2014 -1.82% -2.31% 
ARNOLD DEFENSE AND 
ELECTRONICS 
-18.09% -17.38% 
8/19/2015 -24.23% -24.25% 
7/15/2016 -12.63% -11.27% 
BARBER-NICHOLS INC. -15.52% -15.16% 
9/28/2016 -15.52% -15.16% 
B-K MANUFACTURING CO. 1.29% 1.72% 
6/3/2014 1.29% 1.72% 
BOSTON SHIP REPAIR -53.26% -51.10% 
12/5/2016 -53.26% -51.10% 
CD BIOSCIENCES INC 57.38% 4.10% 
10/3/2014 57.38% 4.10% 
CHAE&NAM UNIVERSE INC -5.67% -5.75% 




9/25/2014 -12.10% -12.68% 
DUCWORKS 10.05% 7.95% 
7/6/2016 10.05% 7.95% 
EAG-LED -8.24% -10.24% 
11/22/2016 -8.24% -10.24% 
FORM FIT AND FUNCTION -5.98% -6.59% 
7/3/2013 -5.98% -6.59% 
G I INDUSTRIAL-MARINE 414.68% 1173.90% 
9/16/2016 414.68% 1173.90% 
G SYSTEMS LP 1.03% -8.07% 
9/23/2014 1.03% -8.07% 
H L TECHNOLOGIES 2.08% 0.48% 
3/8/2013 2.08% 0.48% 
LOGAN ENERGY CORP. -2.98% -4.69% 
4/15/2015 -2.98% -4.69% 
MANTEC SERVICES INC. 0.64% -3.28% 
5/20/2013 0.64% -3.28% 
MOBILE TECHNICAL -46.62% -47.53% 
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SYSTEMS 
3/8/2016 -46.62% -47.53% 
OWL INTERNATIONAL INC. -8.38% -12.04% 
8/8/2013 -8.38% -12.04% 
PACIFIC ENGINEERING INC. -16.25% -18.94% 
4/21/2015 -16.25% -18.94% 
PELATRON -8.53% -10.75% 
9/4/2013 -8.38% -12.04% 
5/6/2014 -8.67% -9.57% 
RIBCRAFT USA -11.98% -11.88% 
11/5/2014 -11.43% -10.61% 




11/20/2013 141.25% 37.46% 
1/15/2015 98.89% 24.04% 
1/14/2016 151.49% 45.60% 
SUMMIT SOLUTIONS OF 
COLORADO 
-6.68% -6.88% 
11/20/2014 -9.98% -7.99% 
3/26/2015 -3.39% -5.77% 
SWIFTSHIPS -51.04% -47.73% 




5/12/2014 3.39% -1.04% 
WHITAKER TECHNOLOGIES -5.67% -8.84% 
6/10/2014 -5.67% -8.84% 
Note. Aggregated data for each vendor as well as individual reductions by date are provided. 
In a clear majority of the cases included in the study, a reduction in a contract is 
correlated with a drop in employment indicators, when comparing the average employment 
numbers the quarter (three months) before the reduction date with the quarter after. The 
absolute employment level was reduced in 22 out of 33 instances, or 66.6% of time. 
Similarly, the location quotient displays a drop in 25 out of 33 cases (75.7%). Figure 3 
shows an overview of the two metrics. The data has a few outliers, especially on the positive 
side of the change, where the location quotient increased significantly in one instance. 
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Note. The x-axis lists all 33 cases of contract reduction and is ordered by location quotient. 
The right-most red bar is not shown in its entirety as it would reach up to almost 1,200%. 
Figure 3. Percentage Change in Employment Level (Blue) and Location Quotient 
(Red) Before and After a Reduction in a Federal Contract 
The study also examined the correlation between the magnitude of the reduction and 
the magnitude of the change in employment indicators, but in the limited cases (33) that 
were available, the correlation was relatively weak. Even when removing positive outliers 
(the right side of Figure 3), R2 was about 0.3 for both employment level and quotient. For the 
revenue of a vendor to change in employment, the correlation was only marginally better (R2 
≈ 0.4).  
Conclusion and Future Work 
The paper presented a preliminary study that shows that large reductions in federal 
contracts are correlated in a majority of cases (66% or 75%, depending on the metric used) 
to drops in employment in a given region and industry. This finding shows that it is possible 
to determine the location of an undisclosed contractor by examining public employment data 
at the times when large contracts are reduced or simply reach the end of their period. Such 
undisclosed contractors are typically employed by larger government contractors to achieve 
confidentiality, security, or a competitive advantage. Depending on the situation, acquisition 
experts may need additional planning to protect such hidden contractors if security is 
desired, or may rely on data science to identify these contractors and avoid them becoming 
a weak link in the acquisition process. 
The main contributions of the paper, besides the study itself, are the development of 
a framework for joining acquisition and employment data and the testing of the industry-type 
bundles for a given location and time frame. However, the main limitation of this study is the 
reliance on the quasi-manual joining of the acquisition (FPDS) and employment (BLS) data. 
As such, future work will focus on extending the database of DoD contracts and employment 
information and on automating the process of correlating industry types, locations, and 
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dates. This will result in thousands more entries being analyzed, and the possibility of 
employing powerful statistical methods to better filter external factors (noise) from the 
analysis. Finally, in addition to studying reductions in contracts, we can analyze the effect 
that awarding new contracts or increasing the amount of existing contracts has on local job 
metrics. 
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Abstract 
Acquisition programs continue to struggle with increasing complexity. High degrees 
of emergence, interconnectedness, and uncertainty are the norm rather than exception. The 
purpose of this research is to explore extension of ongoing research in complex system 
pathologies for acquisition programs. Significant advances have been made in development 
of deeper understanding of the nature of pathologies (deviations from healthy system 
function) and their implications for performance of complex systems. Complex system 
pathologies represent “violations” of underlying system principles. These violations 
negatively affect system governance functions (control, oversight, accountability) resulting in 
degradation of system performance. Greater understanding of complex system pathologies 
offers insights to enhance complex system performance. This paper reports on the current 
state of development of a method to identify, represent, and assess systemic pathologies in 
complex systems. The method examined (M-Path Method) supports enhanced capabilities 
for pathology discovery, support for prioritization based on impact ranking, and provision of 
guidance for feasible strategic response across a spectrum of pathologies. Thus, the 
acquisition field and practitioners will benefit from results reporting on (1) acquisition field 
advancement through system science-based research into impediments to system 
performance, (2) providing a research-based method to improve acquisition program 
performance, and (3) reporting on successes and lessons learned from preliminary 
application of the method. The paper concludes with discussion of initial applications of the 
method, developmental areas, and guidance for acquisition practitioners. 
Introduction 
There seems to be a high level of agreement that acquisition of major systems 
continues to experience difficulties in meeting expectations under increasingly complex 
circumstances. There are plentiful accounts of “failures” of the acquisition system to produce 
on schedule, on cost, and on technical performance systems. This sentiment is echoed in 
the near constant criticisms from oversight bodies (e.g., Government Accountability Office) 
suggesting that there is much room for improvement in the acquisition field. There have 
been numerous attempts to explain the factors contributing to acquisition failures (Berteau et 
al., 2011; Francis, 2008, 2009; Rascona, Barkakati, & Solis, 2008; Smith et al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, without resolution, the demonstrable failures in acquisition programs and calls 
for reform persist. For example, Cilli et al. (2015) examined recent Government 
Accountability Office assessments of major acquisition programs, concluding that while 
attempts were being made to improve, the difficulties remain. Irrespective of a lack of reform 
success, efforts at Acquisition System reform continue (Bucci & Maine, 2013) and recognize 
the need to streamline the system and craft a more agile and flexible Acquisition System. 
Regardless of noble efforts and attempts to “improve” the acquisition system, the realistic 
conclusion persist that reforms have not had the desired impact. Instead, the continuing 
outward appearance of the acquisition system is that of a monolithic system. This system 
has not demonstrated that it is well suited for the complexity, speed, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity that exist in warfighting needs and environments characteristic of the 21st 
century.  
There has been a continuing legion of reports, critiques, and calls for reform in the 
acquisition system. In fact, Fox (2012) was quick to point out that the calls for defense 
acquisition reform have been levied for decades and have continued to persist despite the 
continuing calls for change. There have been multiple corresponding investigations 
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attempting to identify and explain the underlying causes contributing to unsuccessful 
acquisition efforts (Berteau et al., 2011; Francis, 2008, 2009; Rascona et al., 2008; Smith et 
al., 2016). Yet, the criticisms of the acquisition system persist and seem to be resilient to any 
of the remedies suggested to reform. The present state appears to be a system that, in the 
best case, appears to be severely debilitated. And, in the worst case is outright 
dysfunctional and “broken.” Programs that can be offered as exemplars of successful 
acquisition endeavors seem to be a rarity. There is a short supply of successful exemplars 
of acquisition excellence, judged against usability, budget, and delivery schedule 
performance that meets or exceeds expectations. Successful acquisition endeavors are 
frequently studied in hopes that they will answer the riddle as to why acquisition programs 
so often fail and what might be done to improve the chances for success of future programs 
(Boudreau, 2007; O’Rourke, 2014). Presently, there is no satisfactory, or widely held 
consensus as to the path forward, much less the feasibility of successfully embracing that 
path. Looking to other countries for benchmarking and innovation in the hope that their 
smaller acquisition portfolios might provide a different vantage is an option. However 
extensive reviews like that of Joiner and Tutty (2018) comparing Australia’s and the United 
States’ defense acquisition systems, show that the U.S. initiatives provided at scale appear 
to deal better with complexity and that therefore the complexity problem for allies is worse. 
There is not consensus on directions necessary for acquisition system development 
and reform. Characterizing reports critical of defense acquisition, Cilli et al. (2015) 
suggested, “In general, these reports call for early, robust, and rigorous assessments of a 
broader range of alternatives across a thorough set of stakeholder value criteria to include 
life-cycle costs, schedule, and performance” (p. 587). Given the present state of acquisition, 
this appears laudable, and possibly even to some extent infeasible. In a most recent 
publication, the Section 809 Panel (focused on making the DoD’s acquisition system bold, 
simple, and efficient) January 2018 report provided recommendations such as marketplace 
framework, commercial buying, earned value management, and establishing of “offices” 
among other recommendations. The incorporation of these “recommendations” has yet to 
be established, much less their impact. Based on the present “disagreeable” state of the 
acquisition system, we must ponder the question, “Why after over 40 years of acquisition 
reform do the critical performance issues not only persist in this field but seem to be 
worsening?” In examination of a response, we suggest that, given the vexing nature of 
acquisition system problems, coupled with our inability to provide satisfactory reform, a 
different vantage point might provide insights. To this end, acquisition failure has not been 
rigorously examined from a systems theoretic perspective to formulate “systemic 
deficiencies” in the design, execution, and development of acquisition as a true “system.”  
There is much to be gained in deeper application of a systems theory perspective of 
acquisition to provide a different vantage point. To foster this perspective, the purpose of 
this paper is to explore extension of ongoing research in complex system pathologies for 
acquisition programs. There have been significant advances made in the development of 
pathologies (aberrations from normal or healthy system conditions) as a key to deeper 
understanding sources of failure for complex systems (e.g., acquisition). For this exploration 
we have focused on achievement of four primary objectives, including: (1) identify a 
perspective and method for identification of pathologies in a complex system, (2) suggest 
implications for pathology analysis for acquisition program development, (3) present a 
demonstration of results from pathology identification and assessment for acquisition 
programs, and (4) suggest implications for further development and deployment of 
pathologies as potential sources to advance acquisition system development. To achieve 
these objectives, the paper is organized to first suggest a systems explanation for current 
difficulties being experienced in the acquisition system. Second, as a deeper systems 
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elaboration of systemic sources of failure in complex systems, we elaborate the concept of 
system pathologies. This elaboration anchors the notion of complex system failure sources 
to violations of underlying systems principles fundamental to the design, execution, and 
development of all complex systems. Third, a method for the discovery and characterization 
of systems pathologies is developed. A short demonstration of the implications of the 
method for deployment in the acquisition system is presented. The paper closes by 
suggesting a direction for further development and elaboration of pathologies for complex 
systems in general, and implications for the acquisition system in particular.  
A Systems Perspective of Challenges in the Acquisition System 
To begin a dialog on the systems formulation of acquisition difficulties, we posit six 
central themes (Figure 1), consistent with and extending several earlier works (Keating et 
al., 2017a, 2017b; Bradley, Katina, & Keating, 2016). These considerations provide a 
systemic frame of reference (views) for the modern landscape of defense acquisition. While 
these characteristics are endemic to modern systems in general, the particular emphasis of 
the Defense Acquisition System is intended to invite a different level of dialog, exploration, 
and “systemic” understanding. 
 
Figure 1. Six Systems Perspectives (Views) for the Defense Acquisition Field 
1. Sprawling Complexity Exceeds Capacity of the System to Absorb. As the 
complexity of systems being acquired have increased exponentially, so too 
has the acquisition system which procures them. Such system elaborations 
are expected. However, lacking integrated, purposeful, and accountable 
management of increasing complexity, leaves the acquisition system behind 
and lacking capacity to “match” the complexity in the system(s) they are 
charged to acquire. For the Defense Acquisition System this suggests that 
the calls for reform, increased agility, boldness, simplicity, and efficiency, as 
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well as other such suggestions by numerous authors, are perhaps summed 
up in Kendall’s (2014) congressional testimony stating, “Our system over time 
accumulated excessive levels of complex regulatory requirements that are 
imposed on our program managers and other acquisition professionals. … 
One thing I hope we can all agree on is the need to simplify and rationalize 
the bureaucratic burdens we place on our acquisition professionals” (p. 6). 
Similarly, Australia’s First Principles Review (Peever et al., 2015) found, 
“Acquisition teams must comply with over 10,000 Defence Materiel 
Organisation specific policies and procedures which includes 35 policy and 
procedure artefacts totaling around 12,500 pages on procurement processes 
and controls” (p. 14). Despite these intricate processes, that review went on 
to find that acquisition had “great difficulty measuring and monitoring real 
performance” and that there was “a disconnect between customers and the 
purchaser as well as multiple and unnecessary handover points which 
increase complexity and risk.”  
2. Process and Event Centric Focus. The Defense Acquisition System is 
proclaimed to be a “system” without further qualification. However, facing the 
most rudimentary articulation for classification as a system (e.g., defined 
boundary, entities, transformation, outputs/outcomes, etc.), the Acquisition 
System falls short. In reality, the “Acquisition System” is a collection of 
elements for which the precise representation is not presented, operated, or 
evolved holistically as a system. The DoD 5000 reference to the Defense 
Acquisition Management System as both a “framework” as well as an “event-
based process” supports this conclusion, as the “system” falls short of the 
notion of system from the most basic articulations of a system in the 
literature. The ramifications of a focus limited to process and event focus 
include missing development opportunities from a systems perspective 
(versus process or event perspective). The intent of pointing out this systems 
perspective is not to discredit defense acquisition. On the contrary, by inviting 
a more “systemic” perspective of the Acquisition System, the potential for 
future shifts in design, analysis, and development might become available. 
3. Response to Increasing Complexity Relegated to Increasing Complication. 
The original intent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was quite 
straightforward, as it attempted to provide an efficient approach to the 
acquisition of material necessary to support government functions. However, 
since the introduction of the FAR, it has continued to elaborate in structure, 
volume, and become increasingly complicated (having many parts and 
pieces). New regulations, extended processes, and implementation of new 
controls have all acted to make the FAR much more complicated than the 
original document. As an example of this increasing complication, Federal 
Acquisition Regulation expanded from 1,953 pages at introduction in 1984 to 
2,193 pages by 2014, with the DFAR supplement adding another 1,554 
pages and each of the services initiating a host of their own “specialized” 
implementation guides, instructions, directives, and memorandums (Friar, 
2015). This “explosion” has served to make the FAR more complicated, as 
deficiencies and calls for reform have continued, and arguably, escalated. 
4. Emphasis on an Output Versus Outcome Focus. The Defense Acquisition 
System is clearly focused on achievement of outputs. Outputs are those 
tangible, verifiable, and objective elements that serve as products of a system 
and provide value consumed external to the system. Outcomes are the not 
- 505 - 
necessarily tangible effects of a system. These effects are more related to the 
fulfillment of purpose/need, not easily verifiable, subjective in nature, and 
primarily focused on meeting expectations for problem resolution. As such, 
outcomes exist as related, but removed in nature and scope, from outputs 
achieved from a system (Salado & Nilchiani, 2017). The “iron triangle” for 
acquisition programs has been, and remains, focused on the outputs of cost, 
schedule, and performance. It is hard to read a criticism of the current state of 
affairs for acquisition that is not targeted to one or more of these tangibly 
measurable (output) elements. However, we suggest that these indicators are 
“systemically” limited in their ability to capture the true indication of 
performance in acquisition. While these indicators (cost, schedule, 
performance) are necessary indicators of system performance, they alone do 
not provide sufficiency as a set of judgments of Acquisition System 
performance. For example, Cilli et al. (2015) point out the sunk costs of five 
programs between 2006 and 2011 in excess of $32 billion. While this “failure” 
is easily marked from the cost metric, it is disingenuous to capture the 
essence of program failures only on the cost dimension. Deficiencies that 
permitted those failures might be found beyond the cost, schedule, and 
technical performance triad. This invites consideration of a much wider view 
for examination of acquisition reform, beyond the simple cost, schedule, and 
performance triad.  
5. Global Control. From a systems perspective, control is about providing 
constraint of a system only to the degree to which is necessary to assure 
continued performance (Keating et al. 2014). Excess constraint in a system 
(control) wastes resources and limits local autonomy (independence of 
decision, action, and interpretation). Thus, for acquisition, the less control 
invoked makes for a more cost-efficient system—since constraint is not free 
and escalates costs of a system. Acquisition programs aptly refer to these 
excessive controls with such terms as overregulation, bureaucracy, and 
excessive constraint without evidence of commensurate value added to the 
system. The near constant state of acquisition reform (Fox, 2012; Schwartz, 
2014) supports the increasing elaboration of system controls in ways that do 
not necessarily enhance performance. This does not demean the 
improvements achieved, or those suggested (e.g., Panel 809 
recommendations) in reform processes, but instead suggests that a different 
(systemic) viewpoint of control might shift the landscape for acquisition 
program design, execution, and development. 
6. Reductionism as a Driving Paradigm. At the basic level reductionism is 
understanding systems by ever deepening “reduction” to more finite 
components whereby system performance is held in understanding 
component level behaviors. For acquisition, this frame of reference is evident 
in the development of the “acquisition system” as a fragmented assemblage 
of processes, procedures, regulations, and standards. It is not a large leap to 
surmise that the present acquisition system has emerged through a series of 
well-intentioned additions over time. One would be hard pressed to claim that 
the current acquisition system was either purpose built as a whole, or 
currently performs as a unity. In contrast to reductionism is holism, a central 
tenet of Systems Theory. Holism is focused the central notion that 
understanding of system performance or behavior is achieved by 
understanding the interactions among components, rather than the 
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components themselves. This shift in thinking paradigm lies at the center of a 
more holistic, versus reductionist, perspective of acquisition. Arguably, the 
acquisition system has been developed and evolved from a reductionist 
perspective. This has placed primary emphasis on the constituent element 
development (e.g., processes, laws, offices, procedures, regulations) as 
opposed to the interactions of those elements to understand system 
performance and drive reform. 
This systems perspective for the Defense Acquisition System is intended to suggest 
that a different frame of reference might be helpful. Our intention is to invite a dialog to 
further exploration and understanding of the current system, while offering insights into 
issues in design, execution, and development of the system from an alternative frame of 
reference. For our purposes, the alternative frame of reference is focusing on understanding 
system difficulties through discovery of underlying pathologies (aberrations from “healthy” 
functioning of a system). To achieve our purpose, the remainder of the paper is organized 
around four primary objectives. First, in the following section, we provide a grounding 
perspective of “system pathology” in relationship to complex system dysfunctions. Second, 
we elaborate a method for discovery of system pathologies in complex systems. This 
method, the M-Path Method (Metasystem Pathologies Method), suggests that the source of 
system dysfunction might be found in the metasystem (higher level integrating functions) 
that ultimately produce system behavior/performance. Third, we examine a preliminary 
application of the explanation of acquisition difficulties based on the perspective provided by 
pathologies. Fourth, in the final section of the paper, we conclude with implications for 
further research, contributions, and application development of pathologies for a different set 
of insights to support Acquisition System development.  
Pathologies as a Source of Dysfunction in Complex Systems  
Certainly, understanding of system performance, including acquisition, involves 
discovery of conditions that might act to limit that (i.e., acquisition system) performance. 
Previous research related to systems theory and systems theory-based methodologies 
offers insights that provide explanation for aberrant conditions affecting performance 
(Keating & Katina, 2012). These aberrant conditions have been labeled as pathologies, 
defined as “a circumstance, condition, factor, or pattern that acts to limit system 
performance, or lessen system viability <existence>, such that the likelihood of a system 
achieving performance expectations is reduced” (Keating & Katina, 2012, p. 214). 
Pathologies have a rich development and have been anchored in Systems Theory (the set 
of laws and principles that govern behavior of all complex systems) and Management 
Cybernetics (the science of system structural organization).  
For grounding our present exploration, we introduce two key points related to the 
nature and role of pathologies in complex systems—pathologies and their relationship to 
Systems Theory. First, pathologies have been extensively developed for application to the 
design, execution and development (governance) of complex systems (Keating & Katina, 
2012; Katina, 2015). Complex System Governance (CSG) provides a set of “coordinates” to 
locate the existence of a pathology. This location is identified to nine different functions 
essential to continued viability of a complex system. For succinctness, Table 1, drawn from 
the work of Katina (2016) presents a summary of the nine essential metasystem functions of 
a complex system. The “metasystem” acts to provide governance (design, oversight, 
accountability) of a complex system (following Keating & Bradley, 2015; Keating et al., 2017) 
through the following: 
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 Control: constraints necessary to ensure consistent performance and future 
system trajectory. 
 Communications: flow and processing of information necessary to support 
consistent decision, action, and interpretation throughout the system. 
 Coordination: providing for effective interaction to prevent unnecessary 
instabilities within and in relationship to entities external to the system. 
 Integration: maintaining system unity through common goals, designed 
accountability, and maintaining balance between system and constituent 
interests. 
Table 1. Metasystem Functions for a Complex System 
Metasystem Function Primary Role of the Function 
Metasystem five (M5): Policy 
and identity 
To provide direction, oversight, accountability, and evolution of the system. 
Focus includes policy, mission, vision, strategic direction, performance, and 
accountability for the system such that (1) the system maintains viability, (2) 
identity is preserved, and (3) the system is effectively projected both internally 
and externally. 
Metasystem Five Star (M5*): 
System context 
To monitor the system context (i.e., the circumstances, factors, conditions, or 
patterns that enable and constrain the system). 
Metasystem Five Prime (M5'): 
Strategic system monitoring 
To monitor measures for strategic system performance and identify variance 
requiring metasystem level response. Particular emphasis is on variability that 
may impact future system viability. Maintains system context. 
Metasystem Four (M4): System 
development 
To provide for the analysis and interpretation of the implications and potential 
impacts of trends, patterns, and precipitating events in the environment. 
Develops future scenarios, design alternatives, and future focused planning to 
position the system for future viability. 
Metasystem Four Star (M4*): 
Learning and transformation 
To provide for identification and analysis of metasystem design errors (second 
order learning) and suggest design modifications and transformation planning 
for the system. 
Metasystem Four Prime (M4'): 
Environmental scanning 
To provide the design and execution of scanning for the system environment. 
Focus is on patterns, trends, threats, events, and opportunities for the system. 
Metasystem Three (M3): 
System operations 
To maintain operational performance control through the implementation of 
policy, resource allocation, and design for accountability. 
Metasystem Three Star (M3*): 
Operational performance 
To monitor measures for operational performance and identify variance in 
system performance requiring system level response. Particular emphasis is 
on variability and performance trends that may impact system viability. 
Metasystem Two (M2): 
Information and 
communications 
To enable system stability by designing and implementing architecture for 
information flow, coordination, transduction, and communications within and 
between the metasystem, the environment, and the systems being governed. 
A second essential and fundamental grounding for development of pathologies is 
their linkage to Systems Theory–based laws/principles. For our present purposes, the 
nature of pathologies in complex systems can be captured in the following critical points and 
their suggested relevance to acquisition practitioners and system development: 
1. All systems are subject to the laws of systems. Just as there are laws 
governing the nature of matter and energy (e.g., physics law of gravity), so 
too are our systems subject to laws. These system laws are always there, 
always on, non-negotiable, non-biased, and explain system performance. 
Acquisition practitioners must ask, “Do we understand systems laws and their 
impact on our system(s) design and performance?” 
2. All systems perform essential system functions that determine system 
performance. These functions are performed by all systems, regardless of 
sector, size, or purpose. These functions define what must be achieved for 
maintaining viability of a system. Every system invokes a set of unique 
implementing mechanisms (means of achieving system functions) that 
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determine how system functions are accomplished. Mechanisms can be 
formal-informal, tacit-explicit, routine-sporadic, or limited-comprehensive in 
nature. These functions serve to produce system performance which is a 
function of previously discussed communication, control, integration, and 
coordination. Acquisition practitioners must ask, “Do we understand how our 
system performs essential system functions to produce performance and 
maintain viability?” 
3. Violations of systems laws/principles in design, execution, or 
development of a system carry consequences. Irrespective of noble 
intentions, ignorance, or willful disregard, violation of system laws carries real 
consequences for system performance. In the best case, violations degrade 
performance. In the worst case, violations can escalate to cause catastrophic 
consequences or even eventual system collapse. Acquisition practitioners 
must ask, “Do we understand problematic system performance in terms of 
violations of fundamental system laws?” 
4. System performance can be enhanced through development of 
essential system functions. When system performance fails to meet 
expectations, deficiencies in governance functions can offer novel insights 
into the deeper sources of failure. Performance issues can be traced to 
governance function issues as well as violations of underlying system laws. 
Thus, system development can proceed in a more informed and purposeful 
mode. Acquisition practitioners must ask, “How might the roots of problematic 
performance be found in deeper system issues and violations of system laws, 
suggesting different development directions?” 
Given this brief introduction to pathologies in complex systems, following the recent 
work of Katina (2016) and earlier work of Keating and Katina (2012) a set of 53 pathologies 
have been develop in relationship to the metasystem functions provided earlier (Table 2). 
These pathologies are organized around the nine metasystem functions and serve to 
identify aberrations to normal (healthy) functioning of a complex system (e.g., acquisition).  
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Table 2. Pathologies Corresponding to Metasystem Functions 
Metasystem Function Corresponding Set of Pathologies 
Metasystem five 
(M5): Policy and 
identity 
M5.1. Identity of system is ambiguous and does not effectively generate consistency 
system decision, action, and interpretation. 
M5.2. System vision, purpose, mission, or values remain unarticulated, or articulated but 
not embedded in the execution of the system. 
M5.3. Balance between short-term operational focus and long-term strategic focus is 
unexplored. 
M5.4. Strategic focus lacks sufficient clarity to direct consistent system development. 
M5.5. System identity is not routinely assessed, maintained, or questioned for continuing 
ability to guide consistency in system decision and action. 
M5.6. External system projection is not effectively performed. 
Metasystem Five 
Star (M5*): System 
context 
M5*.1. Incompatible metasystem context constraining system performance. 
M5*.2. Lack of articulation and representation of metasystem context. 





M5’.1. Lack of strategic system monitoring. 
M5’.2. Inadequate processing of strategic monitoring results. 




M4.1. Lack of forums to foster system development and transformation. 
M4.2. Inadequate interpretation and processing of results of environmental scanning—
non-existent, sporadic, limited.  
M4.3. Ineffective processing and dissemination of environmental scanning results. 
M4.4. Long-range strategic development is sacrificed for management of day-to-day 
operations—limited time devoted to strategic analysis. 
M4.5. Strategic planning/thinking focuses on operational level planning and 
improvement. 
Metasystem Four 
Star (M4*): Learning 
and transformation 
M4*.1. Limited learning achieved related to environmental shifts. 
M4*.2. Integrated strategic transformation not conducted, limited, or ineffective. 
M4*.3. Lack of design for system learning—informal, non-existent, or ineffective. 





M4’.1. Lack of effective scanning mechanisms. 
M4’.2. Inappropriate targeting/undirected environmental scanning. 
M4’.3. Scanning frequency not appropriate for rate of environmental shifts.  
M4’.4. System lacks enough control over variety generated by the environment. 




M3.1. Imbalance between autonomy of productive elements and integration of whole 
system. 
M3.2. Shifts in resources without corresponding shifts in accountability/shifts in 
accountability without corresponding shifts in resources. 
M3.3. Mismatch between resource and productivity expectations. 
M3.4. Lack of clarity for responsibility, expectations, and accountability for performance. 
M3.5. Operational planning frequently pre-empted by emergent crises. 
M3.6. Inappropriate balance between short-term operational versus long-term strategic 
focus. 
M3.7. Lack of clarity of operational direction for productive entities (i.e., subsystems). 
M3.8. Difficulty in managing integration of system productive entities (i.e., subsystems). 





M3*.1. Limited accessibility to data necessary to monitor performance. 
M3*.2. System-level operational performance indicators are absent, limited, or 
ineffective. 
M3*.3. Absence of monitoring for system and subsystem level performance. 
M3*.4. Lack of analysis for performance variability or emergent deviations from expected 
performance levels—the meaning of deviations. 
M3*.5. Performance auditing is non-existent, limited in nature, or restricted mainly to 
troubleshooting emergent issues. 
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M3*.6. Periodic examination of system performance largely unorganized and informal in 
nature. 
M3*.7. Limited system learning based on performance assessments. 
Metasystem Two 
(M2): Information and 
communications 
M2.1. Unresolved coordination issues within the system. 
M2.2. Excess redundancies in system resulting in inconsistency and inefficient utilization 
of resources—including information. 
M2.3. System integration issues stemming from excessive entity isolation or 
fragmentation. 
M2.4. System conflict stemming from unilateral decisions and actions. 
M2.5. Excessive level of emergent crises—associated with information transmission, 
communication, and coordination within the system. 
M2.6. Weak or ineffective communications systems among system entities (i.e., 
subsystems). 
M2.7. Lack of standardized methods (i.e., procedures, tools, and techniques) for routine 
system level activities. 
M2.8. Overutilization of standardized methods (i.e., procedures, tools, and techniques) 
where they should be customized. 
M2.9. Overly ad-hoc system coordination versus purposeful design. 
M2.10. Difficulty in accomplishing cross-system functions requiring integration or 
standardization.  
M2.11. Introduction of uncoordinated system changes resulting in excessive oscillation. 
A Method for Discovery of Pathologies in Complex Systems  
Katina (2016a) has developed a method for deploying pathologies in complex 
systems, entitled the M-Path Method (Metasystem Pathology Method). This method extends 
previous research related to problem formulation (Katina & Keating, 2014; Katina, 2015; 
2016a; 2016b) and complex system governance pathologies (Katina & Keating, 2014; 
Keating & Katina, 2012). With respect to application of the M-Path Method, there are three 
qualifications necessary. First, the pathologies are of a generalized form. Therefore, their 
manifestation in “different” complex systems may be evidenced by surface level 
“symptomatic” conditions. The pathologies are rooted in the underlying dysfunctions of a 
system that produce “observable” surface symptomatic conditions. Thus, pathologies are 
not directly observable, but rather are inferred from observable/demonstrable conditions in a 
system. Second, pathologies have a degree of existence. They are not binary reducible, and 
thus have a “degree of existence,” rather than a binary present/not present attribution. Third, 
pathologies represent “deficiencies” in the system design (structural organization of a 
system to achieve desired behavior/performance), execution (performance of the system 
design), or development (evolution of the design and design/execution interface). As such, 
pathologies produce real consequences related to system performance which can be 
measured across a range of possible impacts for a system. Given this essential grounding, 
we present the M-Path Method in five phases (Figure 2, adapted from Katina, 2016a). 
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Figure 2. Phases of the M-Path Method for Pathologies 
In essence, the M-Path Method is an approach that guides identification and 
assessment of specific pathologies that exist in a complex system. While not presented as 
complete or absolute, Table 2 was presented as the current state of pathology development 
for complex systems. This includes the 53 unique possible metasystem pathologies that can 
be assessed with respect to varying degrees of existence, impact, and feasibility to resolve. 
For conciseness we provide the following summary of the five phases of M-Path and their 
implications for pathology development. 
Phase 1: Identification involves the identification and discovery of the degree to 
which the 53 pathologies exist for a given situation/system in focus. A determination is made 
with respect to the perceived existence and impact of pathologies. This determination is 
from the perspective of those practitioners who must design, operate, maintain, and develop 
the complex system. 
This phase produces three essential pieces of information related to each of the 
pathologies: degree of existence, impact on system performance, and feasibility of 
addressing the pathology. Degree of existence is the level to which the pathology is deemed 
to be present—ranging from negligible to extreme. Impact is offers an assessment as to the 
degree to which the existence of the pathology is influential in affecting system performance. 
Feasibility captures the degree to which the pathology might be addressed (e.g., limited by 
technology, infrastructure, resources, safety, legality, authority, culture, etc.) with a 
reasonable confidence of success. Previous research has used a Web-based instrument 
(e.g., see Katina, 2016a) to capture this information. The data is represented in aggregate 
form (centroid of cluster for each pathology) and summary statistics (variance from cluster 
centroid). This provides input to a set of representations of the perspectives and their 
variability for the pathologies in a complex system of interest. Thus, support for further 
pathology analysis and exploration is supported by the process of “binning” pathologies 
based on levels of existence, their potential impact, and the feasibility of resolution.  
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Phase 2: Analysis examines the nature and implications of the unique landscape of 
pathologies for the system being examined. This phase is targeted to exploration of the 
specific implications each pathology holds for the particular system of interest. Pathologies 
do not have the same relevance, impact, or feasibility for resolution in a complex system. 
The first phase only identifies the presence and impact of the 53 metasystem 
pathologies. The second phase involves an examination of nature and implications of the 
unique landscape of pathologies for the system interest. Driven by the kind of tools used in 
data collection of Phase I, the analyst collects and synthetizes the data into meaningful 
representations for further exploration of the pathologies. Invariably, this phase provides a 
deeper reflection on the pathologies identified from Phase 1. The following caveats apply to 
this phase: 
 This analysis should enumerate metasystem pathologies using measures of 
existence and impact, and permit dialog concerning different notional 
evidence and support for the capture of the centroid of the pathology. 
 The analysis should also indicate variability in measures of degree and 
impact as suggested by participants—in this case as taken from survey data. 
It is expected that each participant will not provide the same measure for the 
same pathology. This variability provides insights that might be further 
examined in Phase 3. 
 The analysis should provide articulation of the interpretation of feasibility to 
address the pathologies identified by participants. This permits an explicit 
capture of the tacit nature of the pathology to be confronted and addressed, 
without a call for justification or loss of anonymity in the assessment.  
Phase 3: Exploration guides an investigation into the meaning and system 
development implications for identified pathologies. An important preparatory aspect of this 
phase is the search for additional sources of data, anecdotes, and other supporting 
examples supportive of the classifications for the pathologies. This phase also maps existing 
initiatives and their expected potential contribution to identified pathologies. The result of this 
phase is a strategy and corresponding feasible actions designed to positively influence 
pathologies. Performance of this phase is critical to begin to make the pathology exploration 
actionable. 
The results of Phase 2 are made available to system owners in preparation for 
further guided investigation into the meaning of the identified pathologies as well as their 
implications for system development. This phase involves a two-way dialogue between 
system owners and the analysts involving the general meaning of pathologies and 
exploration of the meaning in context for the system of interest. This dialogue is instrumental 
for articulating and/or voicing system of interest development implications in response to the 
discovered pathologies. Care must also be taken so as to provide support for the 
classification of pathologies along existence, impact, and feasibility. This might require 
gathering additional data, anecdotes, or supporting/refuting attributions for pathologies. It is 
during this phase that the existing initiatives (development activities underway in the 
organization) must be mapped against pathologies. This mapping enables discovery of 
strengths and weaknesses in system development in relationship to the existing 
pathologies. The results of this phase include a prioritized enumeration of pathologies based 
on feasibility. Feasibility is an indicator of the anticipated success should the pathologies be 
engaged for resolution. Ultimately, the output includes a set of strategies and corresponding 
actions designed to impact the identified pathologies. 
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Phase 4: Implement deploys selected responsive strategies and corresponding 
actions to address pathologies and provide for integrated system development. As with any 
system implementation, the response to pathologies will involve the potential for emergent 
conditions. Care must be taken to ensure that the implementation actions/strategies are 
monitored for their impact on the pathologies targeted for resolution.  
The purpose of this phase is to ensure that selected responsive strategies are 
effectively deployed. Activities are based on what is decided in the previous phase. For 
example, this might include “develop and install a coordinated process for assessment of 
strategic monitoring” in response to metasystem pathology M5’.2. {Inadequate processing of 
strategic monitoring results} as identified in Table 2. Identifying this as an issue starts in 
Phase 1 by the initial identification and assessment of the suspected existence, impact and 
feasibility for resolution. Phase 2 continues to provide a more detailed examination and 
analysis of the pathology to identify sources and confirm existence of the pathology and 
veracity of attributions concerning the pathology. Phase 3 continues with a detailed 
examination to develop new initiatives while understanding and integrating current initiatives 
in relationship to the pathology. Phase 4 focuses on the planning for implementation of the 
responsive strategies and corresponding actions to address the pathology situation. An 
additional aspect of this phase is to set time expectations with respect to strategy/action 
deployments as well as definition of the expected contributions to address the pathology 
(reduction of existence, reduction of impact, or shifting feasibility to address). 
Phase 5: Follow-up is focused on the examination of the impact for strategy and 
action execution in response to pathologies. While direct cause-effect is not possible, 
conclusions concerning the application of pathology responses should be examined for 
further implications. 
This final phase is focused on examination of the effects of the strategies and actions 
undertaken to address pathologies. An established timeline, coupled with predetermined 
contribution expectations, can serve as a place-maker for a re-evaluation of the system by 
fulfilling two primary purposes: (1) to measure the effects of the strategies/actions as 
implemented in Phase 4 and (2) identification of new pathologies. Such efforts serve the role 
of continuous system development. This is essential since the system of interest is operating 
within a dynamic and most likely turbulent environment. Moreover, the deployment 
strategies might lose effectiveness over time, new pathologies might emerge, and new 
technologies might shift the landscape of pathologies along existence, impact, and feasibility 
dimensions. Therefore, navigating through the M-Path Method is truly continuous with each 
phase complementing and interrelated to the previous phases. 
The application of pathologies for acquisition represents a new and novel 
perspective for understanding the nature of deficiencies in the acquisition system. A cursory 
look at the most recently recommended reforms (e.g., Panel 809 report), suggests that (1) 
while the reforms might be beneficial, they have been constructed and presented in 
independent actions, (2) the nature of targeting the recommendations does not suggest that 
the acquisition system is truly being addressed as an integrated system, and (3) without a 
direct linkage to systems based pathologies, several of the recommendations could be 
identified as addressing one or more pathologies. 
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Using System Pathologies: An Application Perspective for Acquisition 
The CSG paradigm, and corresponding systems pathologies, has been written from 
first principles. This has been largely on a clean sheet, especially with respect to the current 
breakdown of disciplines in capability management in areas like defense acquisition. Those 
with experience working all aspects of such bureaucracies will know that they largely are 
beholden to four disciplines, and their corresponding systems, which are also societal 
memberships: project management, engineering, finance, and contractual law. It is possible, 
and often necessary, to be members of, and competent in, multiple disciplines. However, it 
is extremely difficult to be an effective change agent or foster a reform movement operating 
to shift a bureaucracy with all four disciplines simultaneously satisfied. In fact, the existence 
and propagation of pathologies in a system are just as likely to occur at the interfaces of 
these memberships, as to location within a specific membership. Bureaucracies like defense 
acquisition have largely operated on a project model to implement capability changes for the 
last 40 years, giving what appears superficially to be an ascendancy to project 
management, whereas engineering is responsible for developing, checking, certifying, 
verifying, validating, reviewing, gating and so forth—in short, the handbrake mechanisms. 
This portrayal explains why acquisition policies are so amorphous and unwieldly (Keating et 
al., 2017b), and acquisition reviews have called for common-sense changes (Peever et al., 
2015; Patanakul et al., 2016; Fowler et al., 2017; Kendall, 2017; Keating et al., 2017b). 
CSG, and the associated M-Path Method is clearly a means to achieve simpler “due 
process” and thus governance without the need to revert to intuition. However, such 
approaches face a politically-charged battle involving the four disciplines. 
Thus, the first challenge in implementing CSG and discovery of pathologies is one of 
recognition of the need for deeper exploration of familiar terrain from a vantage point that is 
not familiar. The issue for project management (PM) or systems engineering (SE) becomes 
if you begin with, “you do not understand,” then the bureaucracy will not understand CSG or 
the value of engaging M-Path for discovery of deeper systemic issues. The complex 
systems in CSG speaks of SE, yet governance in modern projects, while it adheres to SE 
gating, is primarily run by the P3O model of portfolio, program, and project management 
offices; that is, the PM discipline (PMI, 2003). Even then, while the P3O model usually is 
drawn as a hierarchy, the portfolio and program management offices are relative new-
comers, ironically put in for better project governance, and thus projects have usually 
remained as pre-eminently powerful instantiations of funded futures for the chief executives 
of operations. This is often reflected in the portfolio and program officers being under-
resourced and performing mostly administrative coordination. It is an easy step to 
understand the increasing complexity introduced by a model such as P3O, and the inherent 
pathologies stemming from a lack of purposeful design corresponding to the increased 
complexity. Also, the management hierarchies above acquisition projects have often 
remained in place with program and portfolio offices as add-ons—intensifying emergent 
“pathologies” where there is already a battle for control across projects. Arguably, the first 
P3O attempts at good governance of projects is still in relative infancy and being 
championed largely by the PM discipline, albeit with encouragement from the other 
disciplines. The inclusion of CSG, and the corresponding system pathologies perspective, 
could cynically be seen as a too-late version of P3O brought by the SE discipline. Thus, the 
risk-value-resource value proposition of engaging such an endeavor likely would be met with 
skepticism, particularly where there is a lack of understanding, desire, or intensity to move 
from a fragmented status quo. This status quo would be an ignorant view of the elegance 
and potential efficacy of the fresh thinking which cuts across both disciplines and offers a 
new and novel set of eyes to a fragmented, and admitted status quo delineated by existing 
and emergent problems—thus far resistant to resolution by existing paradigms, 
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methodologies, or status quo thinking. However, the axiom that “culture eats strategy for 
breakfast every day” has to factor into how to get CSG and pathologies thinking into use. 
CSG pathology thinking offers nine new metasystem functions that are not beholden to 
either PM or SE, yet both disciplines would claim to perform these metasystem functions 
already. The key of course is to establish a structured dialogue on how efficiently and 
effectively they are done. This is particularly the case in the examination of status quo 
acquisition issues against the CSG metasystem and corresponding pathologies. Here the 
nine standardized dimensional metrics of CSG have a distinct advantage over current P3O 
governance measures, as they are directly linked to systemic deficiencies attributable to 
underlying violations of systems theory principles. 
Another issue of resistance to CSG and pathologies incorporation is branding. For 
the terms “CSG paradigm” and “System Pathologies” to be embraced and sustained, there 
needs to be a simplistic power to attract and retain converts. Yet each word of CSG, 
metasystem, and pathology is, if anything, anathematic to simplistic power—complex, 
systems, governance, metasystem, pathology—are like five bullets capable of killing the 
best intentions and noble notions to improve systems. So, if CSG and the M-Path Method 
are to achieve implementation, especially in bureaucracies and not the utopia of a Silicon 
Valley start-up, they might need to be, unfortunately, deployed first from a Machiavellian 
perspective. Most importantly, CSG is unlikely to succeed if it does not leverage extant P3O 
management efforts towards good governance—the absence of already accepted 
approaches misses the opportunity to approach the unfamiliar from a familiar point. What is 
sacrificed in inappropriate assumptions might be made up in being able to continue the 
conversation. The remainder of this section outlines a suggested implementation approach 
aligning to these significant cultural barriers.  
In pursuit of our goal, the next task is to target where within the P3O construct to fit 
the CSG paradigm and focus on pathologies. As CSG aims to govern systems for viability 
through the identification and reduction of pathologies (as threats to viability), CSG is more 
logically aligned with program management. Projects by definition are meant to be unique 
and to open and close, whereas acquisition programs are intended, designed, and focused 
to sustain operational capability. That both CSG and program management use biological 
adjectives like evolutionary acquisition, system viability, and pathologies indicates a healthy 
alignment.  
If CSG is to constructively leverage the extant governance of program management, 
then the 53 pathologies developed in CSG around the nine metasystem dimensions are key. 
This is necessary to avoid introduction of CSG as an independent and mutually exclusive 
approach in competition to existing development methods. Currently, program management 
offices, where they seek improvement, usually do so for standardization and accreditation 
and through project management institutes. These institutes wield considerable influence 
and provide recognition predominantly within the PM domain of acquisition bureaucracies, in 
part equalizing established recognition within engineering disciplines. The PM institutes 
have been working on standards and metrics for P3O, with some proposals looking 
foundationally at aggregating assessment of realized benefits across a portfolio/program 
while others set generic standards. The most commonly used PM metrics focus on 
organizational maturity, developed from the four basic process improvement phases of 
standardize, measure, control, and continuously improve, but with program and portfolio 
governance added, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Common PM Metrics  
(PMI, 2003, p. 28) 
The maturity model metrics assess how the organization’s processes compare to the 
model, usually as part of organizational accreditation for program or portfolio management. 
Scales are usually aggregated across project divisions and typically range up to five, where 
a three would be having defined project management processes and some measures of 
project achievement and feedback control, while a five would involve continuous and 
documented process improvement linked to better project achievements. Clearly, the CSG 
pathologies offer a substantially improved method to diagnosis program and portfolio 
governance, and if used correctly, ought to offer targeted process improvement, aligned with 
the first principles of CSG based in Systems Theory. Thus, P3O assessments offer a means 
for CSG pathologies to be adopted by accretion and improvement, analogous with how 
many manufacturing and some service industries use the six-sigma techniques without 
wholesale adoption and overt branding (Evans & Lindsay, 2014; Stamatis, 2016).  
Adopting the CSG pathologies may be challenging for the PM disciplines alone, 
since as documented earlier, many governance elements remain relatively weak. A logical 
way to help achieve their use is to coopt the engineering domain, who, to be brutally honest, 
constructed most of the bureaucratic policies that beset acquisition as a check on projects 
delivering inadequate equipment. Much of the engineering hierarchy are skeptical at the 
vagueness of P3O project reviews and certainly of the traffic-lights and scoring of program 
office maturity. Putting the elegance and robustness of CSG pathologies into reviews of how 
program offices are structured and perform ought to gain engineering support. Thus, the PM 
discipline would lead the organizational reform, but using a robust model and CSG 
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pathologies so the SE discipline can improve acquisition processes in a sound way. Put 
simply, CSG is not challenging the existence of PMOs, but is, rather, giving them better tools 
and techniques to refine the acquisition processes for more timely and effective governance. 
A feature of CSG and the corresponding pathologies with potential to be a powerful 
change agent in PMO reviews, is the use of standardized assessment questionnaires. 
These questionnaires, taken by staff, can measure not only how effective the present state 
of governance is, but also how effective governance ought to be given the program 
objectives. This effectiveness can be examined in detail through the nine CSG meta-
functional dimensions and their corresponding pathologies. In educational environments this 
is often referred to as the “actual” and “preferred” and is about the “fit” of an environment for 
an individual (Caplan & Harrison, 1993; Su, Murdock, & Rounds, 2015). Effort is therefore 
directed to where most P3O staff see governance is most deficient and it ought to lead to a 
satisficing level of necessary governance rather than constant pressure for utopia of an 
open five-point scale. Such a model is shown in the nine-point spider chart in Figure 4, 
where the actual web and preferred web show where there is the least fit and where effort in 
one dimension where governance exceeds assessed demand (e.g., capacity exceeding 
demand for the uncertainty dimension) can be traded off in another dimension where 
governance capacity falls below assessed demand (e.g., the complexity dimension; Jaradat, 
Keating, & Bradley, 2017). Such assessment of organizational governance and existence of 
pathologies depends on surveying the full spectrum of P3O; that is, both the governed and 
governing for 360-degree coverage of the system. 
 
Figure 4. Complexity—Systems Capacity Versus Environmental Demand  
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Therefore, with that background, a general process of adopting the CSG paradigm 
and the constituent pathologies intent in industry, defense or other government acquisition 
department would be as follows: 
1. With support from senior Systems Engineers, the portfolio of acquisition 
selects a program or series of program offices to undergo the CSG self-
assessments of extant governance under the oversight of that program(s). 
The assessments are to compare the efficacy of CSG dimensions and 
pathologies against any existing program maturity improvement processes 
and metrics. 
2. Each PMO doing entry-level CSG examines the preferred versus actual 
governance ratings of their P3O staffs to identify areas of expectation 
mismatch. 
3. The associated pathologies, for areas of mismatch, are then workshopped 
with a representative sample of surveyed staff and affected process 
specialists to identify improvements which are then implemented. 
4. After a suitable period of process embedding, the CSG self-assessments are 
repeated to examine if the mismatch(s) have been redressed and what, if 
any, further improvements are needed. 
This approach has assumed a level of P3O management exists and has some form 
of self-assessment already focused on governance that can be leveraged. Where P3O 
management does not exist in name, it should exist in function and even if the self-
assessment is ad hoc and not independent of general management, there exists a basis 
from which to acknowledge and begin. The M-Path Method is easily modifiable to fit to the 
approach proposed above. 
Conclusions, Implications, and Directions of Pathologies for Acquisition 
In conclusion, we examine two interrelated facets for further development of CSG 
and the corresponding M-Path Method for both practice and research for acquisition. The 
application of the current state of CSG and M-Path for the acquisition field holds promise in 
several areas. 
Ultimately, CSG and the M-Path Method to discover deficiencies in the performance 
of CSG functions, offers significant contributions to help practitioners address some of the 
most vexing current, as well as future, system problems they must confront. CSG is not 
suggested as a panacea for all problems facing the acquisition system and programs. 
Instead, CSG is advocated as an emerging field with significant opportunity to provide value 
in the following areas (Figure 5): 
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Figure 5. CSG M-Path Method Value Adding Across Multiple Levels  
 Rigorous Guided “Self-Study” into CSG can provide significant insights 
into how the system (program, project, portfolio) actually functions. Although 
enterprises and their systems function routinely and successfully on a daily 
basis, as a matter of course practitioners are not particularly skilled, nor do 
they engage in deep reflection as to why, how, and what they do from a 
systems point of view. The gains to be made by reflective self-examination, 
from a systemic point of view, can reveal insights far beyond traditional 
methods of examination (e.g., Strategic Planning, SWOT analysis, Maturity 
Modeling, etc.). Thus, practitioners can examine a different level of analysis 
through “self-study” and experience insights in a “safe-to-fail” setting. 
Additionally, self-study might suggest the level of education/training that 
might be necessary for individuals and the organization to increase individual 
capacity and organizational competence necessary to engage in higher levels 
of systems thinking. 
 Coherent Decision Support can be achieved by the big picture view of the 
governance landscape. This includes identification of highest leverage 
strategic impact areas and their interrelationship to the larger CSG 
performance gaps (through pathologies assessment). Thus, decisions for 
resource allocation can be better targeted. This allows steering away from 
activities that are simply intriguing without demonstrating the highest 
substantial benefit to the larger systemic governance concerns (e.g., 
pathologies high in existence, impact, and feasibility). In light of CSG 
development priorities, low contribution efforts can be eliminated, or 
resources shifted appropriately. 
 Governance Metrics Baseline can be established to identify the present 
state of CSG functions as indicated by the pathologies. The set of unique 
indicators developed for a specific system of interest can provide a baseline 
that can be used to longitudinally establish the continuous progression of 
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governance improvement. In effect, the degree of improvement stemming 
from initiatives undertaken to improve CSG can be established. Therefore, 
the state and shifts in governance can be purposefully and actively planned, 
deployed, monitored, and adjusted as necessary. 
 Systems Thinking Capacity of individual practitioners to engage in the level 
of systems thinking necessary to more effectively deal with the entire range of 
complex system problems can be enhanced through CSG application. These 
problems are a byproduct of modern acquisition enterprises and their 
systems. Effectiveness is achieved through development and propagation of 
CSG language, methods, and tools to assist practitioners in their efforts to 
design, analyze, execute, and evolve complex systems and their associated 
problems (Jaradat, 2015). 
 Organizational Systems Competencies at the system (project, program, 
portfolio) level for dealing with complex systems and their derivative problems 
can be enhanced. This involves generation of knowledge, development of 
skills, and fostering abilities beyond the individual level to embrace problems 
holistically. For CSG, holism suggests competency development that 
expands beyond narrow technology centric infusions and the limiting cost-
schedule-technical performance paradigm. Instead, enhanced competencies 
that span the entire range of sociotechnical considerations endemic to 
complex systems are an outcome from CSG engagement to identify, analyze, 
and address pathologies. 
 Enhanced Contextual Awareness is a direct byproduct from the 
examination of system pathologies. Context exist as the circumstances, 
factors, conditions, or patterns that serve to enable or constrain performance 
of system functions. Thus, the wider consideration of system impediments 
provided by the M-Path Method can open the aperture of consideration of 
aspects for development of the system.  
 Assess Infrastructure Compatibility necessary to support systems-based 
endeavors. This compatibility is necessary to formulate contextually 
consistent (feasible) approaches to problems, create conditions necessary for 
governance system stability, and produce coherent decisions, actions, and 
interpretations at the individual and organizational levels. The most 
exceptional system solutions, absent compatible supporting infrastructure, 
are destined to outright fail in the worst-case scenario and underachieve in 
the best-case scenario. 
 Governance Development Capacity can be determined to help establish 
the feasibility of initiatives that can be undertaken with a higher probability of 
successful achievement. This does not minimize the degree of CSG 
discovered inadequacies that might exist in a system. However, it does take 
into account the current sophistication in system governance, the 
limiting/enabling context, and the individual systems thinking capacity that will 
influence what can be reasonably taken on with confidence of success. 
Minimally, consideration of feasibility for addressing M-Path Method 
generated issues can provide new insights into past successes/failures as 
well as cautions for impending future endeavors. 
 Enhanced System Models generated through CSG M-Path Method 
deployment efforts can provide insights into the structural relationships, 
context, and systemic deficiencies that exist for governance of a system of 
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interest. These insights can accrue regardless of whether or not specific 
actions to address issues are initiated. The models can be constructed 
without system modification. Therefore, alternative decisions, actions, and 
interpretations can be selectively engaged based on consideration of insights 
and understanding generated through modeling efforts. 
 Purposeful Development Blueprint development can provide focus for 
targeted advancement of the CSG functions. This accrues through resolution 
of priority M-Path derived issues in performance of system functions 
necessary to maintain system viability. While all viable (existing) systems 
perform the CSG functions and have pathologies, it is rare that they are 
purposefully articulated, examined, or addressed in a comprehensive fashion. 
Purposeful CSG development to resolve M-Path Method identified 
pathologies can produce a blueprint against which development can be 
achieved by design, rather than serendipity. This includes establishment of 
the set of “dashboard indicators” for CSG performance. These performance 
indicators exist beyond more traditional measures of system/organizational 
performance. 
Ultimately, the CSG M-Path Method seeks to increase the probability of achieving 
desirable system performance (viability, growth, etc.) in the flux of a turbulent environment. 
Further development of CSG pathologies for acquisition systems is focused on four 
critical challenges: 
1. Increasing Ease of Engagement. CSG and corresponding pathologies are not 
easily understood, applied, or accessible for practitioners and the systems 
they manage. If CSG and pathologies are to become more mainstream there 
must be an increased emphasis on making the technologies (methods, tools, 
techniques, applications) accessible to practitioners. Accessibility must 
include the ease of engagement of pathologies, including (1) reduction of 
perceived risk for practitioners and systems subject to a thorough external 
analysis of design, execution, and development effectiveness, (2) efficiency 
in application resource demands, including time as well as cost, (3) emphasis 
on demonstrable value that can accrue from engagement in a CSG 
pathologies endeavor, and (4) potential linkage to ongoing or historical 
system development initiatives. Only by addressing these four areas can the 
probability of adoption of CSG pathologies be increased.  
2. Products-Insight-Action Triad. Additional emphasis of CSG must focus on 
what tangible products (e.g., pathologies representation mappings) can serve 
as tangible artifacts of engagement in CSG activities. Absent tangible 
products, CSG is left at a conceptual level and is not likely to achieve full 
impact potential. Additionally, emphasis on the development of insights 
stemming from products will require processes that serve to guide exploration 
and interpretation of meanings generated from the CSG products. Finally, 
CSG pathologies insights must be made actionable to redesign, modify, and 
evolve governance for the system of interest. Irrespective of the intellectual 
grounding and products from CSG pathology applications, without 
corresponding actionable results, there is little possibility to make sustainable 
system improvements. 
3. System Ownership and CSG Accountability Acceptance. Every system has 
owners who are ultimately responsible for the design of the system 
(functions), execution of the system (performance of functions to produce 
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results), and development of the system (to adapt to changing 
internal/external circumstances and address pathologies). Short of active 
engagement of “system owner” responsibilities and acceptance of 
accountability for CSG functions, there is little possibility to achieve the aims 
of CSG. Even though ownership might be agreed upon, the CSG 
responsibilities (e.g., pathology elimination) inherent in that ownership must 
be embraced. Without this mindset for CSG, the feasibility of effective 
engagement is minimal. 
4. Requisite Systems Capacity. CSG pathologies are based in a strong 
underlying conceptual basis anchored in Systems Theory. Lacking a 
sufficient grounding, mindset, and acceptance of the “systemic” perspective, 
it is not likely that CSG pathologies will be effectively engaged or understood. 
Thus, care must to taken to ensure that an appropriate level of systems 
thinking capacity exist to adequately engage in CSG pathology related 
endeavors. Lacking the requisite systems capacity is likely to produce 
unsatisfactory results from CSG pathologies related efforts. 
The acquisition field and practitioners are being called upon to deal with increasingly 
complex systems and the corresponding issues in their development. The emerging 
research in CSG and system pathology (e.g., see Troncale, 2013) pathologies can offer a 
new and novel way of framing acquisition issues across multiple levels, including projects, 
programs, and portfolios. CSG enables the design, execution, and evolution of critical 
metasystem functions necessary to maintain system viability. The identification of system 
pathologies provides a basis for a different level of thinking, corresponding decision, and 
alternative responsive actions. It is from this vantage point that we suggest engaging 
acquisition systems and their issues from a more systemic perspective creates possibilities 
for acquisition reform that, although desired, has yet to be realized. 
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Abstract 
This paper is intended to disseminate some initial outcomes of the NPS Research 
Acquisition Program’s “Tradespace Exploration for Better Verification Strategies” project. 
The research addresses the design of verification strategies in large-scale systems. 
Verification activities provide the evidence of contractual fulfillment. Thus, the importance of 
adequately defining verification activities in any acquisition program is unquestionable. Its 
significance extends beyond contracting though. The biggest portion of the development 
financial budget is spent in executing verification activities, and verification activities are the 
main vehicle in discovering knowledge about the system, which is key to reduce 
development risk. In current practice, the definition of verification strategies is driven by 
industry standards and subject matter expert assessment. This research addresses the 
main question of whether tradespace exploration can support the definition of more valuable 
verification strategies than current practice. We present in this paper a mathematical 
framework that enables the application of tradespace exploration to the design of verification 
strategies. 
Introduction 
Requirements lay at the core of system acquisition, given their contractual nature. 
Verification activities are executed to demonstrate fulfillment of those requirements. Hence, 
verification provides the evidence of contractual fulfillment. Actually, in several cases 
reaching an agreement about when a requirement is considered fulfilled is more important 
than agreeing on the requirement itself. Thus, their importance for acquisition in contracting 
is unquestionable. 
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Verification activities, which may take the form of a combination of analyses, 
inspections, and tests, consume a significant part, if not the biggest part, of the development 
costs of large-scale engineered systems (Engel, 2010). Verification occurs at various levels 
of a system’s  decomposition and at different times during its life cycle (Buede, 2009; Engel, 
2010). Under a common master plan, low level verification activities are executed as risk 
mitigation  activities, such as early identification of problems, or because some of them are 
not possible at higher  levels of integration (Engel, 2010). Therefore, a verification strategy is 
defined as 
aiming at maximizing confidence on verification coverage, which facilitates 
convincing a customer that contractual obligations have been met; minimizing 
risk of undetected problems, which is important for a manufacturer’s 
reputation, and to ensure customer satisfaction once the system is 
operational; and minimizing invested effort, which is related to manufacturer’s 
profit. (Salado, 2015) 
Essentially, verification activities are the vehicle by which contractors can collect 
evidence of contractual fulfillment in acquisition programs. 
In current practice, the definition of verification strategies is driven by industry 
standards and subject matter expert assessment. Usually, the resulting strategy requires a 
higher cost than the initial budget allocated by the project. De-scoping activities are then 
performed, with qualitative evaluation of resulting risk, until agreement is reached by the 
engineering and project management teams. Such verification strategy is then agreed on 
with the customer, following similar dynamics. Sometimes in parallel, but often after 
agreement with the customer, the prime contractor tries then to impose its verification 
strategy to the lower level assemblies (developed by its subcontractors). This yields new 
negotiations and local trade-offs with each supplier. The same dynamics and approaches as 
described earlier are exhibited in these cases. Because the financial resources for such 
activities are usually committed at the early phases of a system’s life cycle (INCOSE, 2011), 
succeeding in finding an optimal strategy is often limited by the amount of time and 
resources that are invested in its definition, which are often scarce.  
Furthermore, current practice relies on non-normative methods that are based on 
subject matter expert assessments rather than on measurements, which questions the 
optimality of verification strategies currently defined in industry (Salado, 2015). This context 
leads to four major risks. First, there is a high uncertainty associated to the optimality of the 
selected verification strategy in terms of mitigated risk with respect to verification cost. 
Second, there is a lack of a quantitative risk associated to chosen verification strategy, 
which jeopardizes any mindful effort to execute informed trade-offs regarding execution of 
verification activities. Third, there is a high risk associated to the verification coverage of the 
selected verification strategy, which threatens the successful integration of components and 
the successful operation of the system. And fourth, there is a lack of alignment between 
stakeholder objectives and verification strategy, which leads to suboptimal decisions 
regarding the execution of verification activities. 
Informed by the benefits of tradespace exploration in conceptual design (Ross & 
Hastings, 2005), the use of tradespace exploration was piloted in an actual industrial project 
to define a test strategy for a major satellite optical instrument (Salado, 2015). The results 
were positive, being able to identify a test strategy with the same level of value and lower 
risk to the customer with a 20% lower cost than using the industry benchmark (Salado, 
2015). However, the work presented a number of limitations related to generality and 
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normativity. This paper presents a modified framework to apply tradespace exploration to 
the design of verification strategies that overcomes those limitations. 
Background 
Tradespace Exploration 
Traditional point design methods have been found to be ineffective in traditional 
concept design (Ross & Hastings, 2005). Such methods quickly anchor to a few solutions, 
limiting the perspective on potentially better solutions available in the larger solution space. 
As a response to such need, tradespace  exploration techniques have been proposed (Ross 
& Hastings, 2005). They recognize  that in multi-attribute decisions, a set of optimal solutions 
exists, as opposed to a single optimum solution. In this context, tradespace exploration 
consists in comprehensively populate the solution space with as many solutions as possible, 
identify its Pareto frontier or front (which is a set of solutions that provide maximum return for 
a given level of investment), and let the stakeholder choose a solution (Mattson & Messac, 
2003; Ross & Hastings, 2005; Ross et al., 2004). Tradespace exploration has been proven 
to support design methods that are effective in resolving ambiguity and facilitating 
communication, understanding, and agreement between multiple stakeholders (Golkar & 
Crawley, 2014; Ross et al., 2004). 
Verification in Large-Scale Engineered Systems 
Verification of large-scale engineered systems may occur in every phase of their 
lifecycle (Engel, 2010), can take the form of a variety of methods (e.g., analysis, inspection, 
demonstration, test, or certification; Engel, 2010), and can take place at different integration 
levels (INCOSE, 2011). Designing a verification strategy consists of deciding which 
verification activity occurs at which point in time and on what integration level. For example, 
method  selection may be driven by programmatic constraints imposed by customers  and 
business goals, credibility of method validity by customers, and feasibility of the 
method  (Engel, 2010; Larson, et al., 2009). Similarly, early verification, both in terms of 
assembly level and of lifecycle phase, may be desirable for mitigating the risk of failure or 
error (Engel, 2010; Firesmith, 2013), or because some system properties, attributes, or 
functionalities are not verifiable at higher levels of the assembly, or cannot be verified in 
some specific configurations (Firesmith, 2013). Respectively, late testing may also be 
desirable for mitigating the risks of damage during the integration and test campaign and of 
emergent behavior or properties of all constituting elements integrated together (Firesmith, 
2013), or simply because some system properties, attributes, or functionalities can only be 
verified once a number of elements are operating together (Firesmith, 2013). 
In addition, designing a verification activity is driven by finding the right balance 
between verification cost and the cost of failure corresponding to those ones not discovered 
by the verification strategy (Engel, 2010). Since the cost and time allocated to verification 
activities represents a significant amount of the whole system development cost and time, 
optimizing verification is important in the development of large-scale systems (Engel & 
Shachar, 2006). Using cost and time as target values, several optimization techniques have 
been proposed as underlying mathematical/numerical models to identify a preferred 
verification strategy: loss function optimization, weight optimization, goal optimization, and 
genetic algorithm optimization (Engel, 2010; Engel & Shachar, 2006). Despite the diversity 
of methods though, all of them output a single optimum solution, i.e., they are point design 
strategies. Hence, they present the same limitations as point-design methods employed in 
conceptual design, which have been identified in the previous section. 
- 528 - 
Tradespace Exploration Applied to the Verification Domain 
The application of tradespace exploration to the domain of verification was piloted in 
an industrial project to design the test strategy for a satellite instrument (Salado, 2015). The 
approach provided positive results, enabling the project team to uncover a test strategy that 
was less risky at 20% lower cost than the solution that was initially defined by the expert 
team using conventional definition approaches (Salado, 2015). Figure 1 shows the process 
that was developed for applying tradespace exploration in that project. Essentially, the 
processes starts with a test campaign that contains all potential test activities as described 
in Space Engineering—Testing (ECSS, 2012), which is then parsed into its elemental test 
activities. Such activities are then characterized in terms of cost and value to the customer, 
together with some general rules that account for couplings between the various activities. 
Finally, combinations of the different activities are generated to populate the solution space 
and evaluated. 
 
Figure 1. Tradespace Exploration Process Applied to the Design of a Test 
Strategy  
(Salado, 2015) 
While the application of such a process yielded positive results, the process had 
some limitations that disable it from being generalizable to other projects. Three limitations 
stand out. First, the process was defined only for test activities and not verification activities 
in general. This implied that each activity was associated to a particular system 
characteristic. As a result, the process did not cover cases in which various verification 
activities are employed to build up together the verification evidence for a single system 
characteristic. Second, the sequence in which the test activities were to be executed was 
fixed. That is, the solution space only contained alternatives created by selecting which 
verification activities would be performed, but only for a generic sequence. Therefore, a 
large portion of the solution space, containing different sequences of activities, was not 
explored. Third, valuation of verification strategies was qualitative and assumed a separable 
value function with respect to each verification activity. As we will discuss later, valuing 
verification strategies is not straightforward and demands a more sophisticated approach. 
Salado’s (2015) work was expanded to overcome some of its limitations. In 
particular, mathematical foundations of verification engineering were proposed to enable the 
generalization of the application of tradespace exploration to defining verification strategies 
(Salado, 2016). Of particular importance is the realization that the purpose of verification 
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activities is to discover knowledge about the system of interest (Salado, 2016). 
Consequently, the value of a given verification activity is not absolute. Instead, it is a 
function of the previous knowledge about the system of interest. Hence, the value a 
verification activity depends, among others, on the verification activities that have been 
performed before it (Salado, 2016). This leads to two critical conclusions. First, sequence is 
a key driver of the value of verification strategies. Second, the value function for a 
verification activity may not easily be a separable function of its verification activities.  
While the value of these dependency notions were showcased with a toy example, 
the mathematical foundations also present some limitations that disable it from facilitating 
automation in the population of the solution space, as well as on adequately valuing 
verification strategies. In particular, the mathematical framework did not capture sequence 
of activities, although it was recognized in the sample case, and valuation was done 
qualitatively, without identifying a rigorous mathematical framework to enable computations. 
In this paper, we present a comprehensive framework that overcomes all limitations 
of previous work in the application of tradespace exploration to the design of verification 
activities. 
A Tradespace Exploration Framework to Design Verification Strategies 
Framework 
We propose a framework that builds upon the two main activities of tradespace 
exploration: generation of solutions and positioning of solutions in the tradespace. The 
framework is depicted in Figure 2. The generation activity consists of creating as many 
solutions as possible leveraging a structural model. The location activity consists in 
evaluating the generated solutions with respect to a set of predefined criteria, which would 
then result in positioning every solution within the tradespace. 
 
Figure 2. Proposed Framework to Apply Tradespace Exploration to the Design of 
Verification Strategies 
The framework consist of three main elements, which are described in detail in the 
next sections. First, we make use of a mathematical model that describes the underlying 
structure of verification strategies. This model enables automating the generation of 
verification strategies through computational algorithms to populate the solution space of 
verification strategies. The model is built with set theory and graph theory. Second, we add 
machinery to the structural model of verification strategies to compute the knowledge they 
discovered. In other words, how verification strategies shape beliefs on the system 
containing or not containing errors as verification activities are executed. This machinery is 
built on Bayesian networks. Third, we valuate the consequences of executing a verification 
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strategy. In particular, we provide expected value models to compute the cost associated 
with executing the verification strategy, as well as the expected cost to perform rework 
activities in case errors are actually found by a verification strategy. 
A Mathematical Model to Generate Verification Strategies 
In order to capture the dependencies between verification activities, we define a 
verification strategy 𝑆 as a simple directed graph 𝑆 = (𝑉,𝐷), where 𝑉 is a set of verification 
activities and 𝐷 is a set of tuples of the form (𝑎, 𝑏) such that 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑉. Then, 𝑉 describes the 
verification activities that will be executed as part of 𝑆 and 𝐷 the sequence in which they will 
be executed. The solution space of verification strategies for a system 𝑧0, denoted by 
∑(𝑧0, 𝑅), will therefore be given by all simple directed graphs that could be generated using 
all possible verification methods or procedures 𝑅 on 𝑧0. Mathematically, ∑(𝑧0, 𝑅) =
{𝑆 = 𝑉, 𝐷): 𝑉 = Υ(𝑧0, 𝑅)}, where  Υ(𝑧0, 𝑅) is the set of all potential verification activities that 
could be executed to provide information about 𝑧0. This is given by 
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where  
1. 𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛 are the systems that decompose 𝑧0 in all of its constituent elements 
on which formal verification occurs. They are traditionally referred to as 
subsystems, components, or parts, among others.  
2. 𝐻𝑖 = {𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑖,1, 𝑧𝑖,2,… , 𝑧𝑖,𝑚} is the set of systems that are homomorphic images 
of system 𝑧𝑖, as defined in Wymore (1993). Note that a system is 
homomorphic to itself and hence it is included in the set. This set represents 
all models of system 𝑧𝑖 that are used for verification. In practical terms, they 
can take the form of a mathematical model, a prototype, or the final product, 
for example. 
3. 𝐹(𝑧) = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑘} is a parameterization of system 𝑧, where the definition of 
parameterization in Wymore (1993) is used. This parameterization is finite 
and represents the set of parameters of system 𝑧 that need to be formally 
verified. For example, those parameters may represent the set of 
requirements that system 𝑧 has to fulfill, and for which fulfillment needs to be 
proven through formal verification. 
4. A verification activity 𝑣 is defined as a tuple (𝑝, 𝑟) , where 𝑝 ∈ 𝐹(𝑧) and 
𝑟 ∈ 𝑅. A verification activity is therefore understood as the application of a 
verification procedure 𝑟 to the discovery of knowledge about a system 
parameter 𝑝.  
This mathematical framework overcomes the limitations of previous work. First, it 
recognizes the existence of various verification activities and the notion that different 
activities may be used simultaneously to verify a single system characteristic. Second, it 
incorporates the capability to distinguish verification strategies as a function of their 
sequences, not just their verification activities. Third, it does not impose any limitation on the 
valuation function in terms of separability. This will be shown later in the Valuing a 
Verification Strategy section. 
A Bayesian Network to Capture Information Dependencies 
Since the mathematical construct for describing a verification strategy presented in 
the previous section is a directed graph, it enables seamlessly embedding a Bayesian 
network to enable calculations related to beliefs or probabilities of errors existing in the 
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system being developed and of the verification activities discovering those errors. We define 
now the Bayesian network machinery, as applied to model the knowledge discovery of a 
verification strategy. A detailed description of how to create the Bayesian network is given in 
Salado, Kannan, and Farkhondehmaal (2018). A summary follows. 
Using the mathematical model presented in the previous section, consider a system 
𝑧0 built from components 𝑧1,1, … , 𝑧1,𝑛 and a verification strategy 𝑆 = (𝑉,𝐷), where 𝑉 is the set 
of verification activities 𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑚 and 𝐷 is the set of tuples that capture information 
dependencies between the various verification activities {(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗),… , (𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑘)}, with 𝑛,𝑚 ∈ and 
𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 , 𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑘 ∈ 𝑉.  
A Bayesian network that models such verification strategy can be constructed by 
combining three graphs. The first one contains directly the graph of the verification strategy, 
𝑆1 = (𝑉, 𝐷). The second graph the Bayesian networks contains captures the prior belief on 
the absence of errors in the various components that form the system and the system itself 
and the first verification activities executed on them. Mathematically, we can denote such 
graph as 𝐼 = (𝑍, 𝐴), where 𝑍 = {𝑧0, 𝑧1,1, … , 𝑧1,𝑛} and 
𝐴 = {𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 ∶ ∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 such that 𝑃(𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠|𝑧)  ≠ 𝑃(𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠)}   and the outcomes of each verification 
activity 𝑣 can only be 𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 and ¬𝑣𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠. This graph captures the dependency between the 
prior knowledge about the components forming the system, including the system itself, and 
the first verification activities that are carried out in the verification strategy. Finally, the 
Bayesian network must contain the belief on the absence of error on the system 𝑧0 as it 
relates to the belief on its components being absent of errors. Mathematically, we can 
denote such graph as 𝐹 = (𝑍, 𝐵), where 𝐵 = {(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) ∶ 𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑃(𝑧𝑖|𝑧𝑗) ≠ 𝑃(𝑧𝑖)}. This graph 
captures the coupling between the different components forming the system, that is, how 
they inform the confidence on the proper functioning of the system. 
In summary, the resulting Bayesian network is given by  ,BN V Z D A B    . 
Valuing a Verification Strategy 
We have defined four value metrics for verification strategies: 
1. The probability of the system exhibiting an error during operation, given that 
all verification activities were successful (note that this type of error relates to 
malfunctioning, not derived from reliability). 
2. The minimum cost associated to the verification strategy, that is, the cost of 
the verification strategy assuming that no error is found during the execution 
of the whole verification strategy. 
3. The maximum cost associated to the verification strategy, that is, the cost of 
the verification strategy assuming that errors are found and corrected as late 
as possible. 
4. The expected cost associated to the verification strategy, which considers the 
possibilities of finding and correcting errors along the execution of the 
verification strategy. 
The four metrics can be combined in a common tradespace, where cost and 
probability of the system exhibiting an error are on the axes, and the different ranges of cost 
are shown with bars. Now we define the four metrics mathematically. 
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Metric 1. The probability of the system exhibiting an error during operation, given 
that all verification activities were successful, is directly given by the Bayesian network 
described in the previous section. Hence, no further description is needed. 
Metric 2. The minimum cost associated to a verification strategy is directly the 
investment necessary to execute the verification strategy. Simplistically,    ex ex
v S
c S c v

  , 
where 𝑐𝑒𝑥(𝑣) is the cost of executing verification activity 𝑣. 
Metric 3. The maximum cost associated to a verification strategy is given by the 
investment necessary to execute the verification strategy and the cost of fixing all possible 
errors, which are identified on the last verification activity where they could be identified (in 
terms of sequence of activities). 
Metric 4. The expected total cost of a verification strategy is given by 
     TOTAL ex fE c S E c S E c S           , where  fE c S    is the expected cost of fixing 
errors. We assume in this paper that an error is fixed as soon as it is discovered and that a 
fixed error does not reemerge once it has been fixed. Under these conditions, we define 
       
#
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V
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
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       , where 𝑃(𝑒𝑖,𝑗) is the probability that the 
system exhibits error 𝑒𝑖 when verification activity 𝑣𝑗 is executed, 𝑃(𝑑𝑖,𝑗|𝑒𝑖,𝑗) is the probability 
that verification activity 𝑣𝑗 can discover error 𝑒𝑖 (the discovery event is denoted by 𝑑𝑖,𝑗), and 
𝑐𝑓(𝑒𝑖,𝑗) is the cost of fixing the error 𝑒𝑖 when discovered by activity 𝑣𝑗. An error 𝑒𝑖 will be 
exhibited by a system during the event 𝑣𝑗 if at least one of two conditions is met. The first 
one is met when the error emerges after completion of 𝑣𝑗−1 and before completion of 𝑣𝑗. The 
second one is met when the error has emerged earlier, but has not been discovered by 
previous verification activities. Hence, 𝑃(𝑒𝑖,1) = 𝑃(𝑒𝑖  em 1) and 
, 
for 𝑗 ≥ 2 , where 𝑃(𝑒𝑖  em 𝑗) is the probability that error 𝑒𝑖 emerges after completion of 𝑣𝑗−1 
and before completion of 𝑣𝑗 , and 𝑃(𝑒𝑖  em 0) = 𝑃(𝑑𝑖,0|𝑒𝑖,0) = 0. The effect of the entire 
strategy is then incorporated by noting that the probability of an error being exhibited during 
a certain verification activity depends on its inherent nature of appearing at that point, as 
well as on the inability of the verification strategy to identify it earlier, if it emerged at an 
earlier point. It should be noted that these dependencies are defined by the Bayesian 
network presented in the previous section. 
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Challenges in Implementing the Framework to a Sample Case 
Overview of the Problem 
The application of the presented framework to a sample case is an ongoing effort. 
While the results will be presented at a different venue, we discuss in this section the 
challenges associated to operationalizing the mathematical framework presented in this 
paper. 
The sample case in Salado et al. (2018) is used as a starting point. The system of 
interest is a simplified version of the Electric Power System (EPS) of the FireSat satellite 
(Wertz & Larson, 1999). A hierarchical breakdown of the system structure is depicted in 
Figure 3. The system model captures different levels of development maturity in the 
components that build the system (ECSS, 2009). Specifically, it is assumed that the EPS 
and PCDU need to be fully developed, the SA is based on an existing unit but needs some 
modifications, and the battery is recurring from a previous program.  
 
Figure 3. Simplified Firesat EPS Physical Hierarchy  
(Salado et al., 2018) 
For simplicity, we also assume that there is only one system characteristic that is 
verified and that verification can be achieved by analysis, test, or analysis and test on each 
building block in Figure 3. 
Process 
As discussed in the previous section, we start to populate the tradespace by applying 
the combinatorial effort to a fixed pattern of sequences of verification activities. This is done 
to limit the necessary computational effort, in particular in terms of eliciting conditional 
probabilities. We use as a base case the notional verification strategy defined in Salado et 
al. (2018), which is depicted in Figure 4. It reflects the order in which verification activities 
are executed (from top to bottom), as well as the information dependencies between them in 
the form of arrows. The verification strategy is defined as generic, without targeting any 
specific system characteristic.  
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Figure 4. Base Case Verification Strategy  
(Salado et al., 2018) 
Therefore, the first tradespace is formed by all verification strategies that can be 
formed by applying or not applying each of the verification activities in Figure 4. Then, we 
incorporate a relative sequence change, leading to the modified base strategy and 
incorporate to the tradespace all verification strategies resulting from the combinations of 
applying or not applying each of the verification activities. Finally, we incorporate another 
relative sequence change, leading to a second modified base strategy and repeat the 
operation. 
Valuation of verification strategies is also performed in two stages, in order to limit 
computational effort. First, each verification strategy in the tradespace is characterized by its 
minimum cost and the knowledge they discover. As previously described, minimum cost is 
defined as the execution cost of the strategy and knowledge discovery is defined as the 
probability of the system exhibiting once operational after all the verification activities in the 
sequence have been successful. Second, a subset of verification strategies that provide a 
similar knowledge discovery is selected and their expected and maximum costs, which 
depend on the actual finding of errors and exercise of repair costs, are calculated, forming a 
new tradespace. 
Challenges and Way Forward 
Operationalizing the presented mathematical framework into a computational code 
has presented some challenges. Two deserve particular attention.  
The first one, inherent to tradespace exploration, is the exponential growth of the 
tradespace with verification activities and system characteristics. However, problem size 
becomes larger and more intricate due to the dependencies between the activities. In 
particular, it should be noted that given a set of 𝑛 possible verification activities, there are 2𝑛 
sets of verification activities, and 4(
𝑛
2) directed graphs for each one of the sets of verification 
activities. In addition to the common methods employed in tradespace exploration to reduce 
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the size of the problem, identifying in advance the independence between knowledge 
generation helps in identifying equivalent sequences, thus reducing the size of the problem. 
The second issue is related to the availability of conditional probability tables for 
each verification strategy. Conditional probability tables depend heavily on the specific 
sequences and reusing and adjusting them seems to be non-trivial. In a worst-case 
scenario, a dedicated set of conditional probability tables would need to be created for each 
verification strategy in the tradespace. Of course, this is infeasible. Furthermore, the nature 
of conditional probabilities in verification strategies makes it difficult to create a model that 
can be used to automate the generation of conditional probability tables. This problem can 
be overcome with a sufficiently large database of historical performance of verification 
strategies executed on systems similar to the system of interest. Given the lack of a publicly 
available database of such kind, we are currently developing a synthetic database of 
verification strategies for Earth observation satellites to support this study. 
Conclusions 
We have presented in this paper a framework to apply tradespace exploration to the 
design of verification activities. The framework is built on mathematical machinery that 
enable the automated generation of verification strategies, the computation of the 
knowledge they discover, and the valuation of the consequences of executing them.  
The proposed frame.work overcomes the limitations of previous work. In particular, 
the proposed framework recognizes the existence of various verification activities and the 
notion that different activities may be used simultaneously to verify a single system 
characteristic. Moreover, it is able to capture the dependencies between verification 
activities, enabling distinguishing verification strategies as a function of their sequences, not 
just their verification activities. Furthermore, the proposed framework does not impose any 
limitation on the valuation function in terms of separability.  
Finally, we have discussed the challenges that we are finding when operationalizing 
the mathematical framework to apply it to a sample case. The effort is ongoing and is 
planned to be completed within the timeframe of the NPS Research Acquisition Program’s 
“Tradespace Exploration for Better Verification Strategies” project. 
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A Review of Trusted Broker Architectures for Data Sharing 
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Abstract  
Sharing data across organizational boundaries must strike a balance between the 
competing data quality dimensions of access and security. Without access to data, it can’t 
be used and, consequently, is of no value. At the same time, uncontrolled access to data, 
especially sensitive personal data, can result in dire legal and ethical consequences. This 
paper discusses the trade-offs between security and access for three styles of trusted 
broker architectures in hopes that this will provide guidance for organizations trying to 
implement data sharing systems. 
Background 
There are three important topics that provide the background for the discussion of 
data sharing architectures. These topics are 
1. The difference between data sharing and data exchange 
2. The need for persistent data integration to enable data sharing 
3. The trusted broker as a vehicle for data sharing 
Each of these topics is explored in the following sections of this paper. 
Data Sharing Versus Data Exchange 
Although data exchange is a form of data sharing, it carries a particular connotation 
with respect to control and time. Data exchanges in which one organization transfers data to 
another organization are typically one-to-one, episodic exchanges. Even though there may 
be a standing agreement between the two organizations, the actual exchanges are usually 
time-bound in the sense that the sourcing organization provides a snapshot of its data at the 
time of the transfer to the consuming organization with no further interaction or updating of 
the data by the sourcing organization. Often the data sharing agreement will require the 
consuming organization to stop using and delete the data within a specific time period. Even 
in the case that there is not a specific end date, the fact that the quality and utility of 
unmaintained data tends to decrease over time has essentially the same effect. 
The transfer of data also implies a transfer of control. Once in the hands of the 
consuming organization, the data are processed and manipulated by the consuming 
organization without the direct participation of the sourcing organization. The sourcing 
organization only has indirect control vis-à-vis any requirements or constraints in a written 
“exchange agreement.”  
Furthermore, the benefits of using the exchanged data accrue primarily to the 
receiving organization. Even if there is a reciprocal transfer of data from the receiving 
organization back to the sourcing organization (true data exchange), the benefits derived 
from the aggregation of the data are not necessarily reciprocal. Each organization may 
receive some type of benefit from the exchange, but these are not necessarily the same 
shared benefit.  
On the other hand, data sharing posits a system accommodating participation by 
several organizations all having joint control and continual access and all deriving mutual 
benefit from the use of the data. Although data sharing can be done for all types of entities 
(persons, places, and things), the data sharing systems discussed here are those designed 
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to share data about people (person entities) and organizations (legal entities). In the master 
data management parlance, data about persons and organizations are referred to as “party” 
data. Examples of organizations benefiting from data sharing systems include healthcare 
(providers and payers sharing patient data), law enforcement (city, state, and national 
agencies sharing criminal and persons-of-interest data), and government (service agencies 
sharing data about their clients). 
The primary mutual benefit derived from data sharing systems is an improvement in 
the data quality dimension of completeness. Whereas each organization holds a “piece of 
the puzzle,” when the data are shared, all organizations have the complete picture. At the 
same time, better completeness leads to better data analysis and insights. For example, a 
physician is able to make a better diagnosis when he or she is able to view all previous tests 
and treatments rather than just those done within his or her clinic. 
In order to gain a complete view of party information over time, the data sharing 
needs to enable persistent data integration based on shared, persistent identifiers of the 
parties (people and organizations). The next section discusses the concepts of transient and 
persistent data integration. 
Transient Versus Persistent Data Integration 
Data integration processes can be classified into two different categories based on 
the persistence of the integration. The two processes are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Transient Versus Persistent Data Integration 
There is a difference between data integration processes used to support projects 
such as data analytics as opposed to data integration supporting ongoing operations such 
as MDM. Both processes rely on ER to link together the information related to the same 
entity of interest (e.g., the same patient).  
In a transient data integration process, ER alone is sufficient. Once the analysis of 
the integrated information is complete, the process (project) is over. Transient data 
integration represents data integration on demand. Each time a new analysis or project is 
needed, the ER process is run again to re-integrate the information. Bringing together data 
on demand for analysis is sometimes referred to as “data wrangling,” a quick and dirty data 
integration process not intended to be operationalized. 
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On the other hand, there are many other data operations for which transient data 
integration is not well-suited. In particular, MDM cannot be managed effectively using 
transient data integration. The two motivations for using persistent data integration instead 
of transient data integration are reuse of effort and changes in characteristic information 
over time. 
Taking the same sources of information and re-integrating them again and again can 
expend a lot of time and effort, especially if the volume of information is large. For example, 
suppose you want to generate a report of total sales by customer on a weekly basis. With 
transient data integration, all of the customer sales transactions must be merged and the ER 
process run against the combined file. In a persistent data integration process, the groups of 
sales records from one week are saved, and only the new sales from the next week are 
incrementally added to the previous groups. 
Another reason for persistent data integration is that the characteristic information 
describing real-world entities changes over time. Characteristic information represents the 
properties that, taken together, uniquely define a specific entity. Characteristics are also 
called “identity attributes.” For example, there may be many students in a college with the 
first name LINDA. Fewer students, but more than one, may have the last name 
HENDERSON. But only one student will have 1987-11-06 as her date of birth and live on 
ELM STREET. The values of these attributes taken together identify a particular student. 
The problem is these identity attributes are not immutable. LINDA may move to a 
new address, or she may marry and begin to use her husband’s surname. These changes 
speak to the need to store and manage identity information in order to consistently identify 
the same entity over time. 
Identity Management and Persistent Identifiers 
An Entity Identity Information Management (EIIM) system is an additional layer of ER 
functionality, namely, the ability to assign the same identifier to references to the same entity 
over time (i.e., from process to process). EIIM is the collection and management of identity 
information with the goal of sustaining entity identity integrity over time (Zhou & Talburt, 
2011). Entity identity integrity is the state where each entity managed by the system is 
assigned a unique identifier, and distinct entities are assigned distinct identifiers 
(Maydanchik, 2007). Entity identity integrity is a basic requirement for MDM systems.  
EIIM comprises several processes. Each EIIM process uses aspects of ER and data 
structures representing the entity identities to accomplish specific goals. These work in 
concert to maintain the entity identity integrity of master data over time. EIIM is not limited to 
MDM. It can be applied to other types of systems and data as diverse as RDM systems, 
referent tracking systems (Chen et al., 2013), and social media (Mahata & Talburt, 2014).  
Although ER is a necessary component of MDM, ER is not in itself sufficient to 
manage the life cycle of identity information. EIIM is an extension of ER in two dimensions, 
identity knowledge management and time. The knowledge management aspect of EIIM 
relates to creating, storing, and maintaining identity information. The knowledge structure 
representing a master data object (entity) is an entity identity structure (EIS).  
An EIS is essential to assuring an entity under management in the MDM system is 
consistently labeled with an identifier from process to process. The EIS stores the identity 
information of the entity along with its identifier so both are available to future processes. 
Persistent entity identifiers are not inherently part of ER. At any given point in time, the only 
goal of an ER process is to correctly classify a set of entity references into clusters where all 
of the references in a given cluster are equivalent. The labels (identifiers) of these clusters 
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serve as the identifier of the entity. Without storing and carrying forward identity information 
in the EIS, the identifiers assigned to entities and entity references may change in future 
processes.  
Figure 1 illustrated the problem. It shows three references, References 1, 2, and 3. 
References 1 and 2 are equivalent references, and Reference 3 is to a different entity. 
References 1, 2, and 3 are in File 1 along with other references when the first ER process 
runs. The same References 1, 2, and 3 are also present in File 2, and the same ER process 
is run against File 2 at a later time. In both cases, if the ER process is accurate, it will 
classify References 1 and 2 as equivalent and place Reference 3 in a different cluster. The 
problem is that where there is no communication between the processes, even though the 
references are clustered properly, they will most likely be labelled differently (i.e., given 
different identifiers), as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. ER With Consistent Classification but Inconsistent Labeling 
In the first run, the cluster containing References 1 and 2 is identified as Cluster 543, 
whereas in the second run, the same cluster is identified as Cluster 76. The purpose of the 
EIS is to provide the communication between processes so that a reference to an entity in 
one process is labeled by the same identifier to the same entity in later processes. 
ER that only classifies records into clusters representing the same entity is 
sometimes called a “merge-purge” operation. In a merge-purge process, the objective is 
simply to eliminate duplicate entity references. In this context, the term “duplicate” does not 
mean that the references are exactly the same in content. Instead, it means the references 
are for the same entity. To avoid this confusion, the term “equivalent” is preferred (Talburt, 
2011) to describe references to the same entity.  
The term equivalence also avoids confusion arising from designation of “matching” 
references. References to the same entity do not necessarily have matching information. 
For example, two records for the same customer may have different names and different 
addresses. Conversely, matching references do not necessarily refer to the same entity. 
Two references can be quite similar when important identity information is missing. For 
example, references to John Doe, Jr., and to John Doe, Sr., may be classified as matching 
records if the suffix Jr. or Sr. has been omitted from one or both of the references.  
Unfortunately, many authors use the term “matching” to mean two references are 
very similar and also to mean they reference the same entity. The result can often be 
confusing for the reader. Reference matching and reference equivalence are different 
concepts and should be described by different terms.  
The ability to consistently assign a cluster the same identifier when an ER process is 
repeated at a later time requires an EIS to carry forward identity information from process to 
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process. The storage and management of identity information in the EIS is what enables the 
persistence of entity identifiers. Persistent identifiers are the value add EIIM brings to ER.  
Different EIIM systems implement different strategies for identity information 
management. Figure 3 shows one example from the OYSTER open source system (Talburt 
& Zhou, 2013; Zhou et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 3. Example of an EIS in XML Format Created by the OYSTER ER System 
During processing, the OYSTER EIS exists as in-memory Java objects. However, at 
the end of processing, the EIS are serialized in an XML document. The XML structure 
encapsulates extensive metadata to reflect not only the entity identifier (OID value), but also 
many other aspects of the process such as the sources of the references, the label of the 
matching rule that linked a reference into the cluster, the identifier of the process (run) when 
the reference was brought into the cluster, and other information. The XML format also 
serves as a way to serialize the EIS objects so that they can be reloaded into memory at the 
start of a later ER process.  
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Components of Entity Information 
To better understand the implementation of EBDI, it is helpful to think of entity 
information as having three components: 
1. A unique and persistent entity identifier. This is a single value assigned as the 
unique identifier of a particular instance of the entity. It is used to label all 
information related to the entity. The intent is the identifier should not change 
(persist) over time. However, processing errors may mandate changing the 
identifier. An important EBDI goal is to continually improve the identification 
process and thereby minimize changes to entity identifiers. Best practice is to 
make the identifier entirely anonymous, such as using a Really Simple 
Syndication (RSS) hashing algorithm on some identity fields to create an 
identifier value. An example is the entity identifier “X9KTZ5GOQ5RVHOWV” 
shown in Figure 2. Encoding information into the identifier can increase the 
likelihood the value of the identifier may have to be changed to reflect 
changes in the encoded information. 
2. Entity identity specific information. These are identity attributes, sometimes 
called characteristic information (ISO 8000), that, when taken together, 
distinguish one entity from another. Another important goal of EBDI is the 
reuse of identification effort. In the EBDI process, the identity attribute values 
of entity records are resolved to the entity identifier. The entity identifier is 
then used to label the record. Later processes can then simply use join or 
sort records by the entity identifier to aggregate entity information, relieving 
these processes of the need to apply their own (and possibly less accurate) 
matching logic. 
3. Application specific information associated with an entity (multiple values). 
The identity management components are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The Identity Management Component 
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Entity-Based Data Integration (EBDI) 
Entity-Based Data Integration (EBDI) is the process of bringing together information 
about the same real-world entity. From an EBDI perspective, an entity is a set of real-world 
objects that have distinct identities, for example, customers of a business, patients of a 
hospital, students of a school system, products of a manufacturer, and locations of service. 
The fundamental issue with EBDI is that in the modern world, we describe these entities as 
data records in an information system. As we all know, the blessing and curse of storing 
information in a computer is how easy it is to copy and replicate information. As a result, 
there are often many different records in the information system all describing the same 
entity.  
Entity-based data integration has a broad range of applications in areas such as law 
enforcement (Nelson & Talburt, 2008), education (Nelson & Talburt, 2011; Penning & 
Talburt, 2012), and healthcare (Christen, 2008; Lawley, 2010). For example, a hospital 
patient will have separate records for each hospital visit. In addition, each visit or encounter 
will generate many additional records such as a record for each laboratory test, each 
treatment, each drug administered, and so on. Aside from the records of medical treatment, 
there will also be billing records associated with each visit and treatment. 
Consequently, EBDI is a two-step process (Talburt & Hashemi, 2008). When 
integrating entity information from multiple sources, the first step is to determine whether the 
information is for the same entity. Once it has been determined the information is for the 
same entity, the second step is to reconcile possibly conflicting or incomplete information 
associated with a particular entity coming from different sources (Holland & Talburt, 2008, 
2010; Zhou, Kooshesh & Talburt, 2012). Master data management (MDM) systems play a 
critical role in successful EBDI by providing an EIIM process, enabling the MDM system to 
consistently identify and label references to the same entity.  
Three Trusted Broker Architectures for EBDI 
 External Reference Architecture 
 Registry Architecture 
 Transaction Hub 
(Berson & Dubov, 2011) 
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External Reference Architecture 
In the external reference architecture (shown in Figure 5), the IKB is a large cross-
reference table connecting equivalent references located in the various client systems. The 
EIS in the IKB are entirely virtual, only containing pointers to the references to a particular 
entity. None of the actual entity identity information for a particular entity is stored in the IKB.  
 
Figure 5. The External Reference Architecture 
Both the identity attribute values and the application-specific attribute values of the 
source record reside in the client system, as shown in Figure 6. The advantage of external 
reference architecture is that changes to an entity identifier taking place in one system can 
be more easily propagated to all other client systems where the same entity is referenced.  
 
Figure 6. External Reference Schema 
The external reference architecture works best when the governance policy allows 
for distributed authority to make master data changes in several different client systems. It 
does not work as well in systems where a large number of new source records must be 
ingested and identified on a regular basis. In systems implementing external reference 
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architecture, the identity information needed for matching must be marshaled on demand 
from the client systems where it resides.  
External Reference Architecture Pluses 
 The hub (broker) does not retain identity information between updates, so 
there is less risk of identity leakage. 
 Identifiers are anonymous. 
 Lightweight IT Infrastructure, periodic bulk processing, no transactional 
processing, less staffing. 
 Less complex ER processing is required. 
 Detection of ER linkage errors is done by client personnel. 
 When found, errors are reported to the hub, where they are corrected during 
periodic processing. 
External Reference Architecture Minuses 
 Linkage between client records is only as current as the last update. 
 All clients must provide all of their identity information at the same time to the 
hub in order to update the cross-reference table. 
 Because the hub does not hold identity information, inquiries for specific 
entities must be made through a client. 
 Only after an entity is identified by a client can the hub can tell if other clients 
have records for the same entity. 
 Analytics is less agile. Must first collect and combine information from each 
agency onto one platform before starting analysis. 
Registry Architecture 
A more common architecture for MDM applications ingesting and managing large 
volumes of input data is registry architecture. In registry architecture, each EIS in the IKB 
contains a collection of identity attribute values representing the entity under management. 
Each EIS has an identifier serving as the master identifier for the entity across all client 
systems. The amount of identity information retained in the EIS will vary from system to 
system and on the choice of EIS strategy as discussed earlier (e.g., survivor record, 
attribute-based, record-based, etc.).  
In registry architecture, each reference is divided into two parts, as shown in Figure 
7. The values for the identity attributes are kept in the IKB. The IKB must retain sufficient 
identity information so that when a new source record is introduced, the system can 
correctly determine if it references a previously registered entity already having established 
entity identifiers or if it references a new entity which must be registered in the IKB with a 
new entity identifier.  
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Figure 7. The Registry Architecture 
 
Figure 8. Registry Architecture Schema 
A third possibility is if a new source record carries additional identity information 
providing evidence that two EIS initially thought to represent distinct entities are actually 
references to the same entity. For example, a source record having both a current and 
previous address for a customer connects an EIS created for that customer at the previous 
address and another EIS created for the same customer at the current address. As a result, 
one of the entity identifiers is retired, usually the most recently assigned, and the identity 
information in the two EIS are merged.  
In registry architecture, the values for client-specific attributes are retained in the 
source records residing in the client systems. The two halves of the source record the 
identity values and the client-specific values are linked together by the entity identifier. The 
shared link identifier also does away with the need to store the identity values of the 
reference in the client system. The replacement of entity identity values with a unique 
identifier for the entity is called semantic encoding. Semantic encoding is one of the 
fundamental principles of the ISO 8000-110:2009 Standard for Master Data Quality.  
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In registry architecture, the IKB and the systems are loosely coupled. It is usually the 
responsibility of each client system to synchronize its entity identifiers with the identifiers in 
the registry through periodic batch or interactive inquiries to the registry. The registry 
architecture is typical for most CDI systems primarily providing an identity management 
service (i.e., appends link identifiers to source records on demand).  
Registry architecture is sometimes used to provide anonymous entity resolution to 
several external clients in a trusted broker configuration (Talburt et al., 2005). Trusted broker 
architecture can be useful when each external client holds some information for entities also 
known to other clients but also manages information for some entities unique to the client 
organization. The clients want to collaborate and share information about common entities 
but do not want their exclusive entity information shared or exposed to other clients. This 
situation often arises in law enforcement, healthcare, and information sharing among 
government agencies.  
The name comes from the fact that all of the clients must trust one neutral 
organization to host the hub of the registry. In addition, even though the hub internally 
maintains only one set of entity identifiers, it issues a different set of entity identifiers to each 
client. This means even though two different clients hold information about the same entity, 
the hub will give each client a different identifier for that same entity. The hub mediates the 
translation between client identifiers. In this way, the trusted broker also incorporates some 
features of the external reference architecture.  
If Client A wants to know whether Client B is holding information about an entity of 
interest, Client A sends an inquiry to the hub organization. The hub organization can then 
translate the Client A identifier into its internal identifier and determine if Client B has 
information on the entity. The hub organization can also mediate policies or regulations on 
access. If, according to policy, Client A’s inquiry is valid, then the hub can send the 
information from Client B to Client A using the entity identifier of Client A.  
Registry Architecture: Pluses 
 Clients can update information in the hub according to their own schedule 
and are not required to coordinate with other clients. 
 Depending upon client update schedules, the linkage between clients can be 
more up-to-date than the external reference. 
 Because the hub holds identity information, inquiries for a specific entity can 
be made at the hub and immediately find which clients hold information for 
that entity. 
 Detection of linkage errors can be done by both hub and client personnel. 
Registry Architecture: Trade-Offs 
 The hub (broker) retains all identity information between updates, so there is 
a greater risk of identity leakage. 
 Analytics on business information is still less agile.  
 Must first collect business information from each agency onto one platform 
before starting analysis. 
 Requires heavier IT infrastructure and staff to service ongoing updates and 
linkage corrections. 
 Requires more complex ER functions including a system for publishing 
identifier changes (due to linking errors) to clients. 
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Transaction Hub: Manages Identity and Business Information 
The transaction hub architecture is also a hybrid. It attempts to solve both the 
attribute partitioning problem and the synchronization problem at the same time. In this 
case, the hybridization is between the IKB and its client systems. In a transaction hub, the 
IKB stores the complete source record, both identity attributes, and application-specific 
attributes.  
By incorporating the source records into the IKB, the transaction hub is 
simultaneously an MDM system and an application system. The transaction hub can be a 
good solution for situations where the system must process large volumes of new source 
references while at the same time servicing high volumes of inquiries for application-specific 
information because the application information is immediately at hand. There is no need to 
fetch the application information from a client system in order to service the inquiry. 
However, this is only feasible if only one or two applications are integrated with the hub; 
otherwise, the maintenance of the system becomes too complex to manage. Many financial 
systems incorporate the transaction hub architecture for MDM.  
Transaction Hub Architecture 
The transaction hub architecture is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. The Transaction Hub Architecture 
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Transaction Hub: Pluses 
 The biggest advantage is that analytics is simpler than with registry or 
external reference. All of the information to analyze is already in one platform. 
There is no need to request and join information from clients. 
 Clients can update information by their own schedule. 
 Depending upon client participation, the linkage between clients can be more 
up-to-date than the external reference. 
Transaction Hub: Trade-Offs 
 The hub (broker) retains all identity and business information between 
updates, so there is a greater risk of not only identity leakage, but also 
leakage of business information. 
 Requires more complex ER functions including a system for publishing 
identifier changes (due to linking errors) to clients. 
 The ER system requires additional functionality to store and retrieve business 
information with different schemas. 
Conclusion 
The selection of an appropriate architecture to support data sharing depends 
primarily on finding an acceptable point of balance between data exposure risk and 
operational agility. Following the progression from data exchange agreements, external 
reference, and registry to full transaction hub leads to increasing aggregations of sensitive 
data in one system for longer periods of time. However, the same progression provides 
increasing ease of access and agility to support maintenance and data analytics. The real 
key to successful data sharing is a strong data governance program that implements and 
enforces compliance with the policies, assuring that the privacy and regulatory compliance 
of all the participating organizations are satisfied. Data sharing and MDM systems lacking 
strong data governance programs are doomed to failure. 
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Abstract 
Game Theory has been applied to drive strategies for contract negotiations in the 
business world. This paper investigates the idea of applying game-theoretic utility models 
and strategies to provide a means to illuminate better contracting tradeoffs for the 
government. This additional insight is intended to provide strategies that move potential 
contractors into the government’s preferred negotiation point and expedite the decision-
making process in acquisition. The case studies presented in this paper focus on developing 
accurate utility functions that would enable such a game theory framework. 
Introduction  
Game theory has been a dominant research paradigm for studying conflict, 
bargaining, and negotiations for more than 50 years. It is widely applied throughout business 
to develop strategies that reflect priorities and tradeoffs. The government has an opportunity 
to leverage game theory in the federal acquisition system to improve outcomes and increase 
the agility of government acquisitions. As programs become more technical and complex, 
game theory can help decision makers identify strategies and leverage information to make 
data-driven decisions that reflect government priorities and tradeoffs. This paper explores 
the applicability of game theory to the federal acquisition process and provides a framework 
to help decision makers identify critical attributes and develop implementable negotiation 
strategies. 
Industry plays a high-stakes game of survival as they act as a testbed for new 
technologies, and refine processes and strategies in their efforts to compete. Business, 
competitive, and technological pressures on industry necessarily drive a rapid pace of 
change and decision making. Industry has successfully applied game theory to develop 
business strategies that reflect for strategic decisions and negotiations in the business 
world. The government experiences similar decisions as competing missions, interests, and 
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strategies actively shape acquisitions and budgets. Game theory provides proven insights 
and approaches that help both industry and the government develop baselines and 
strategies to create mutually beneficial solutions. 
The federal acquisition process is governed by a system of clearly defined rules and 
regulations codified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2017). The codification, 
publication, and adherence to a uniform acquisition system establishes a common 
understanding or common knowledge of the rules of engagement. Common knowledge, a 
central tenet of game theory, encourages industry to develop and execute rational business 
strategies that differentiate solutions and reflect tailored cost, schedule and performance 
tradeoffs. This creates the framework for achieving best-value through competing strategies 
and decisions. As a rulebook, the FAR ensures fairness and transparency in the acquisition 
process for all players, including both industry and the government. Structure and process of 
federal acquisitions seem to be well positioned to leverage game theory. 
In game theory, successful negotiations require clear communication of the 
attributes. Federal source selections adhere to this principle by the mandatory disclosure of 
evaluation criteria as key discriminators or attributes. By advertising its source selection 
criteria and relative order of importance, the government signals its tradeoff considerations. 
Industry acts as players in the game by tailoring and offering solutions to the government to 
meet these considerations. One of the initial applications of game theoretic concepts is 
therefore helping the government identify and develop the key attributes or criteria as well 
as their importance relative to each other. To support such applications, game theory 
assumes rationality and that players attempt to maximize the outcome or their utility. 
Defining the utility for the government is one of the main challenges, as rarely all criteria can 
be measured in monetary values. Industry seeks to maximize their expected outcome or 
utility (e.g., profits, market share, etc.) by tailoring solutions that reflect the government’s 
evaluation criteria. Similarly, the government maximizes its expected outcome or utility of 
industry solutions through its best-value tradeoff considerations. The government can 
leverage game theory to develop and execute negotiation strategies to improve decision 
making under uncertainty and contract performance.  
Table 1 summarizes some of the similarities between game theory and the 
government source selection process and shows how the government inherently 
implements several key aspects of game theory. 
Table 1. Similarities of Game Theory and Government Source Selection 
Game Theory Principles Government Source Selection 
Players know the “rules of the game” Federal acquisition process governed by well-
defined rules and regulations codified in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Requires clear communication of attributes, 
priorities and outcomes 
Mandatory disclosure of evaluation criteria that 
will be used to evaluate the proposal and their 
relative importance 
Players are rational and seek to maximize their 
expected outcome or utility 
Government maximizes expected outcome or 
utility through best-value tradeoff 
Applying a game theory approach allows the government to objectively manage risk 
without compromising its cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs. It provides insight into 
decision attributes and negotiating strategies that move industry into a preferred negotiation 
point while also considering the government’s best value tradeoff constraints. 
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Quantitative Decision Support in Acquisition 
The current federal acquisition system typically follows a structured and serial 
process outlined in the FAR to guide the government in navigating the complexities and 
cumbersome nature of the source selection process. This regimented system ensures both 
a fair and transparent acquisition and compliance with oversight stakeholders and the FAR. 
Unfortunately, these standard acquisition practices can result in the government spending 
too much time and money in negotiating and establishing contracts. Fortunately, FAR 1.102, 
Statement of Guiding Principles for the Federal Acquisition System, outlines an opportunity 
to introduce the agility and efficiencies of game theory by allowing strategies, practices, or 
procedures that are in the best interests of the government that are not specifically limited or 
prohibited by the FAR, Executive Order, or regulation. By enhancing negotiations and 
discussions, game theory complements the fairness and transparency provisions of the 
FAR. Game theory and utility theory offer an innovative and agile approach for driving bids 
closer to the desired attributes of most value, thereby saving time and money through 
improved negotiations and contract outcomes. FAR 1.102 grants government agencies 
tremendous acquisition flexibility, but the risk-averse nature of some agencies and 
acquisition professionals may limit their desire to leverage this flexibility. We are pursuing 
with this research a quantitative decision support framework that is intended to reduce risk 
and introduce acquisition agility and efficiencies for government and offerors. This game 
theory approach is consistent with FAR 15.305, Proposal Evaluation, as evaluations may be 
conducted using any rating method or combination of methods, including color or adjectival 
ratings, numerical weights, and ordinal rankings. Additionally, this approach is consistent 
with the April 1, 2016, Department of Defense (DoD) Source Selection Procedures (Section 
2.3: Develop the Request for Proposals) where evaluation criteria may be quantitative, 
qualitative, or a combination of both. Although numerical or percentage weighting of the 
relative importance of evaluation criteria may not be used in DoD, assigning quantifiable or 
value tradeoffs in evaluating an offeror’s proposal is allowable and harmonious with the 
game theory approach. 
Applicability of Game and Utility Theory for Acquisition Support 
The application of game theory and utility theory can help facilitate the decision-
making process in acquisitions. Utility functions provide a framework to translate player 
preferences into mathematical functions to which standard optimization techniques can be 
applied. Over a finite set of tradeoffs, there is a utility function that represents a rational 
preference ordering. This allows decision-makers the insight to tradeoff attributes and 
criteria based on their expected utility and affords decision makers a framework to make 
decisions among several alternatives that may result in several possible uncertain outcomes 
(e.g., what is the likelihood that Proposal X best matches the cost/schedule/performance 
tradeoff).  
While government solicitations or Request for Proposal (RFP) identify the evaluation 
criteria and relative importance, the qualitative and subjective nature of evaluations may 
result in suboptimal tradeoff and selection analysis. By providing a mathematical framework, 
utility models have the capability to generate initial bids that reflect the government’s 
underlying preferences, help to compare and balance alternatives, and are transparent to 
everyone partaking in the bidding process. They have the potential of providing additional 
insight to objectively evaluate the government’s critical attributes and tradeoff considerations 
of the desired product. Moreover, through integrating the government’s utility function with 
cost constraints established by industry, a process for generating better initial bids can be 
established. One high level framework, originally suggested in Simon and Melese (2011), 
presents such a concept and is based on executing the following high level technical steps: 
- 554 - 
 Formulate the government’s preferences that are modeled as utility functions 
parameterized by critical non-cost attributes, criteria or discriminators; 
 Publicize government utility functions in RFP for industry to formulate and 
submit cost functions parameterized by the critical non-cost attributes, criteria 
or discriminators;  
 Assess the uncertainty distribution or likelihood of success of various 
solutions; and 
 Evaluate and optimize government objective function subject to industry 
provided cost functions and government utility functions to select preferred 
alternative subject to uncertainty distribution. 
A wealth of research questions, however, present themselves when further designing 
and implementing this type of a framework in a real-world acquisition scenario, the first of 
which pertains to the type of utility model and the accurate and efficient calibration of the 
model for use as the foundation of such a framework. This paper focuses on utility models 
that can be used in this framework. 
Survey of Game Theory Literature Relevant to Acquisition 
Every scientific endeavor begins with a review of solutions and constraints that help 
to better define the research to be conducted. Therefore, in the early stages of the 
underlying research, our team conducted a literature survey. While we originally searched 
for applications of game theory in the context of procurement and related government 
activities, we realized quickly that we needed to address two additional topics as well.  
As game theory and the optimization using game theoretic approaches relies heavily 
on the underlying value function, we extended our search to include utility theory with 
emphasis on utility functions that not only measure monetary values, but also express 
priorities and intangible preferences.  
These led us to the third topic, multi-criteria decision making, as these methods are 
needed to support the utility-value functions that then can be used to optimize decisions and 
strategies using game theoretic approaches. The next three subsections will present a small 
subset of the literature evaluated by us with focus on the approaches we utilized in our 
study. This selection is neither complete nor exclusive. 
Literature on Multi-Criteria Decision-Making 
One of the most challenging tasks in acquisition is the selection of the criteria that 
have to be evaluated to reflect the preferences of the government. Wallenius et al. (2008) 
provide a good overview of the various methods that are currently in use, placing them into 
a historical perspective as well, as the same author group also conducted a similar review in 
1992. Their overview is written from a management perspective. A more engineering 
leaning perspective is given among others by Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson (2011). 
Velasquez and Hester (2013) conducted a literature review and analysis of multi-
criteria methods. They observe that outranking methods, which were prevalent in early 
approaches, were overtaken by value measurement approaches. Further they show that 
deficiencies can be overcome by combined approaches, although this requires a clear 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the individual approaches, which are 
captured in a summarizing table in their conclusion section. Their paper assessed the more 
common methods of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making in order to benefit practitioners to 
choose a method for solving a specific problem, and they state clearly that this can only be 
the first step in selecting the right approach. 
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Agarwal et al. (2011) provide an alternative viewpoint on the selection of the best 
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making method by focusing on the proper evaluation and selection of 
suppliers, which is highly relevant in acquisition as well. An additional insight provided by 
them is the need to evaluate the suppliers based on the inputs of the strategic, functional 
and operational levels. They present that the  
implication of lean manufacturing and popularly used JIT approach has 
forced the researchers to shift the focus from the efficiency based model to 
quality based approach. The single criterion approach of the lowest cost 
supplier is no more accepted in this challenging and continuously changing 
environment. Thus, price or cost shifted down the line with respect to its 
importance in evaluating the suppliers, while the quality and delivery 
performance climbed up the hierarchy. (Agarwal et al., 2011, p. 808) 
This insight is relevant for the government as well and needs to be addressed in the 
selection of the appropriate methods. 
Both recent literature reviews show that there is no universal best solution, but that 
the selection of the best method is determined by the problem and may even require the use 
of problem-specific hybrid solution that require an in-depth knowledge of the problem as well 
as of the tools. 
Literature on Utility Theory and Utility Functions 
While the literature highlighted in the previous section focuses on the aggregation of 
multiple criteria in support of decision making, the references given in this section were 
evaluated regarding the definition of utility functions to reflect the preferences of the decision 
makers. Slantchev (2012) provides sound definitions of preferences and utilities to support 
decision making, including those to be made under uncertainty. As he is writing for political 
scientists, explanations and examples are easy to follow and do not require an in-depth 
education in gem-theoretic mathematical foundations. 
If data is available that reflects preferences of earlier decision-making processes for 
either side of the negotiating partners, the methods and algorithms described by Afrait 
(1967) are still relevant. We assumed to be able to find more on the application of big data 
methods in support of the definition of utility functions, but it seems that this is still a topic of 
ongoing research and not predominant methods emerged so far. 
An interesting variant for multi-issue closed negotiations addressing multi-time as 
well as multi-lateral negotiation strategies is described by Matsune and Fujita (2017), who 
developed not only the concept, but demonstrated it in an agent-based simulation 
environment. Theoretically, nothing speaks against applying these ideas for acquisition 
specific challenges as well, but we did not see any applications in this domain within our 
survey. What makes the application described in this paper so interesting is the ability to 
learn the opponents’ utility information from observing their bidding choices within a 
strategy. 
While the mathematics behind utility theory and utility functions is well understood, 
how to elicit the knowledge about their preferences from decision makers is still a challenge 
in itself. Our survey did not reveal any predominant strategy. 
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Literature on Game Theoretic Application for Government Solution 
Obviously, every game theoretic insight can be applied to support government 
solutions better, but two of the evaluated papers deserve special attention, as they directly 
apply game theory to acquisition and government decision making. 
Levenson (2014) provides an overview of the constraints of DoD procurement, 
showing why typical solutions from commercial markets are often not applicable and lead to 
undesired and unforeseen results. He describes the effects of fixed price and competitive 
price contracts and comes to the conclusion that 
only when one or more competitors offer innovations that truly reduce the 
costs of development and production does the government substantially 
benefit from competition over sole-source procurement without the adverse 
side effects of cost overruns. Distinguishing between true innovation and 
optimistic cost estimating, however, can pose a challenge for DoD acquisition 
officials. (Levenson, 2014, p. 437) 
Blott et al. (2015) compiled a set of auction and game theory based 
recommendations for DoD acquisitions by synthesizing literature into specific military 
acquisition categories: procurement with unknown cost and no risk, items with known costs 
and existent but understood stochastic risk, and items with unknown costs and/or unknown 
stochastic risk. Some examples further evaluate if multiple competing vendors participate, 
and if the lot to be procured from several bidders, potentially at different stages of the 
project. 
In summary, the literature survey provided sufficient examples of successful 
applications, but also the need for continuous research, in particular on how to elicit 
preferences and utilities from decision makers and apply these methods in a multiple criteria 
environment under the special constrains of acquisition. 
Optimization With Game Theory 
Before we go into the details of specific research conducted, the following section 
shall give an overview of the general concepts that will be addressed in the Selected 
Approaches section and the Case Studies and Results section.  
The following optimization problem drives the application of the utility model. A 
decision maker has to choose from a set of solutions provided by vendors. The solution is 
defined by a set of weighted attributes. Furthermore, each vendor is involved with the 
mathematical optimization that is specific to their own individual cost constraints. 
Max 𝑉(𝑥) =∑𝑤𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 
subject to: ∑𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 < 𝐵 
where: 𝑥𝑖  = is the level for attribute 𝑖 
𝑤𝑖 = the weight for attribute 𝑖 
𝑣𝑖  = the single attribute value function for attribute 𝑖 
𝑐𝑖  = the offeror cost function for attribute 𝑖 
𝐵 = budget constraint for maximizing utility 𝑖 
Solving this optimization formulation allows for vendors to generate bids reflecting 
their specific cost constraints. This yields initial bids that are more consistent with the 
government’s preferences based on the levels of the key non-cost attributes of interest. The 
- 557 - 
solutions to the above optimization formulation allow for stronger initial bids by the interested 
vendors. These solutions aren’t necessarily final solutions or final bids but are an efficient 
means to getting the bidder close to what the government is looking for. This can more 
efficiently set up the next stage of proposal tweaking and negotiation on both sides. The 
rigor of this approach also allows for unambiguous documentation of the negotiation, 
selection, and provides means for repetition and further evaluation. 
Moreover, RFP language can make it difficult for potential bidders to extract out what 
the most important attributes are for the government (e.g., when too many attributes are 
included and the evaluation criteria are unclear). Using this quantitative mathematical 
programming formulation instead allows for bidders to move directly towards those key 
attributes through an automated means. 
To show the applicability of game-based approaches as discussed in these 
introductory sections, we selected three approaches to evaluate in more detail, which is the 
topic of the rest of this paper.  
Selected Approaches 
After conducting the literature survey, we applied three candidate approaches in our 
research. We selected them due to their perceived potential in being implemented in an 
acquisition procedure: 
 Best/Worst Method (Rezaei, 2015),  
 Multi Swing Method (Schmidt, 2017), and  
 Functional Dependency Network Analysis (Garvey, Pinto, & Santos, 2014). 
Beside their potential for application in an acquisition setting, all three approaches 
have calibration procedures that are not overly burdensome to the decision maker. They 
also complement each other. Testing of these methods, as discussed in the Case Studies 
and Results section, will further reveal the features of the acquisition scenarios where each 
approach does well. In order to conduct our research, we applied all three approaches to a 
small decision problem that involved just five attributes to get decision maker accustomed to 
the steps and procedures needed to be conducted. Furthermore, we applied the Best/Worst 
method to a larger, 20 attribute problem. These test cases are discussed in more detail in 
the Case Studies and Results section. 
Initial collaborations and discussion with a government sponsor identified three best 
practices or considerations that impacted our utility function assessment procedure and 
resulted in the application of multiple assessment techniques. 
The first is that the level of effort in developing the assessment procedure must be 
commensurate with the size, scope, and complexity of the acquisition. A day-long interview 
process to fit a model may be realistic for a highly complex multi-billion-dollar Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) 1 program but is not realistic for all acquisitions, and surely not for 
supporting a smaller research effort like ours. In contrast, a one-hour discussion may be 
sufficient for many complex acquisitions. Decision makers must balance competing 
objectives and may not have the luxury of time or resources to support a lengthy and 
involved process to support the development and calibration of assessment procedure. A 
long and drawn out initial assessment procedure may result in fatigue and complacency, 
which may lead to inconsistencies in preference articulation. 
The second consideration is that assessment procedures must be adaptable so that 
they can be effectively applied to decision makers who are either more quantitative or 
qualitative in nature. However, our research showed that most acquisition professionals are 
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comfortable with relative importance and prefer qualitative descriptions of their preferences. 
Introducing descriptive adjectives in place of numerical values, in many questions, can help 
alleviate this issue. Finally, there are many acquisition situations where there is a large 
attribute set that influence the decision. The size of this attribute set can be overwhelming 
for any decision maker. Therefore, preference modeling methods must be able to screen out 
attributes of minimal significance to isolate the critical non-cost attributes and the critical 
tradeoffs between those attributes. This supports an acquisition best practice of focusing on 
critical non-cost attributes to avoid diluting the importance of key discriminators. 
Overview of Best/Worst Method and Extensions 
The Best/Worst method originates from Rezaei (2015) and this research has 
extended the approach to work more smoothly for cases where there are a large number of 
attributes at hand and when the attributes are binary in nature (result in either a 0/1 or 
yes/no value). One of the Best/Worst method’s features is its ability to perform calibration in 
a short series of questions. Moreover, these questions have the ability to be phrased to not 
be overly burdensome to the decision maker. From our observations, having simple and 
clear acquisition questions to identify key discriminators facilitates the acquisition and 
conforms to best practices.  
Consistent with source selection practices, the procedure for the Best/Worst method 
starts with selecting the attributes or discriminators that effect the decision. Then feasible 
ranges are assigned for each of these attributes. The next step is the assignment of weights 
for each attribute reflecting the preferences and importance. This applies specifically to the 
attribute to identify key discriminators and does not apply numerical weights to proposals in 
the source evaluation process. This step begins with selecting the most important attribute 
as well as selecting the least important attribute. From there, comparisons are made to 
understand the relative importance of the most important attribute to each of the other 
attributes. In a similar manner, comparisons are then made to assess the relative 
importance of the least important attribute to each of the other attributes.  
The question phrasing to the decision maker is the key to getting this approach to 
work effectively. The decision maker needs to be directly asked how much more important is 
the most important attribute for each of the other attributes individually. Mapping qualitative 
scales to numerical scales was shown to work well in our studies for preserving rank order. 
For instance, levels, such as, “just as important,” “slightly more important,” “more important,” 
“significantly more important,” and “extremely more important” were applied with good 
success while being mapped on a scale of 1–5. 
The end goal of the Best/Worst assessment procedure is to obtain a preference 
function in the form: 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑤1𝑣1(𝑥1) + 𝑤2𝑣2(𝑥2) + ……𝑤𝑛𝑣𝑛(𝑥𝑛). The Best/Worst procedure 
primarily focuses on the weights. Suggestions in this paper for extending to the assessment 
of the single attribute utility functions 𝑣1(𝑥1) focus on fitting a function across sample points 
for each individual attribute. Sampling can be effective with just four points on the utility 
curve. When doing a qualitative mapping, those points can be referenced as the min, 
midpoint, target, and max. On a [0,1] scale those reference points were mapped to values of 
0, 0.5, 0.75, and 1 respectively. The qualitative assessment questions can first focus on the 
target. Here the question is asked, “What is the value of this attribute that you would really 
want to have?” Then the level representing satisfactory for the attribute is assessed: “What 
level for this attribute is acceptable and would not hinder my use? It can be considered 
being like a minimum requirement that is not ideal but gets the job done.” Then the 
maximum level for the attribute can be assessed: “What is the level for the most functionality 
that you could possible handle need—any more wouldn’t make life any better.” Finally, the 
minimum level for the attribute is assessed: “What is the maximum attribute level where 
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there is zero utility or where you would have absolutely no use for this product if this 
attribute was at this level.”  
The Best/Worst method was extended to a large number of attributes (>20). In 
acquisitions we observed with our government sponsors, the number of attributes was 
typically quite large. The Government Acquisition Case Study With Large Number of 
Attributes section provides details on the application of the Best/Worst method extension to 
a government acquisition study. For large number of attributes, the procedure was updated 
in the following manner: 
1. First do pairwise comparisons across adjacent pairs of attributes start at 
attribute #1 and then work down the attribute list. 
2. Bin the attributes based on whether the attributes were more important than 
two attributes, one attributes, or no attributes. End up with three bins: prime, 
mid, low. 
3. Reassess attributes in each bin to make sure they are in the right place. 
a. Ask for best and worst for each bin. 
b. Do pairwise comparison of best in mid and low bin with worst in the 
higher-level bin. 
c. Repeat 3A and 3B until no more changes are made. 
4. Identify the attributes for inclusion into the Best/Worst method 
a. Take all attributes in prime bin. 
b. Take best and worst in mid bin. 
c. Take best and worst in low bin. 
5. Best/Worst method is then implemented on attributes in the prime bin. 
6. Best/worst method is then implemented on all other attributes kept above. 
7. Ask the level of difference between the worst attribute in prime and the best 
in mid. This level of difference then becomes the difference level for the 
weights in prime bin and the weights in the remaining bins and the weights 
are then scaled accordingly. 
After these assessment procedures are made the weights for the preference function 
can be solved through the optimization outlined in Rezaei (2015). The pairwise comparisons 
given at the beginning of the assessment procedure can also be used to solve for the 
weights more effectively as well as for validation of the results.  
Multi-Swing Rollup Method 
The Multi-Swing Rollup Method (MSRM) was developed by MITRE as a new 
aggregation method for multi-attribute decision problems (Schmidt, 2017). As discussed in 
the Literature on Multi-Criteria Decision-Making section, rolling up multiple values into one 
representative value is a general challenge, as already discussed in our literature survey. 
The MSRM is using a generalized addition tallying organization (GATO) approach. While the 
classical approach uses the weighted sum of the contributing decision factors, MSRM/GATO 
uses a non-linear combination in areas in which the simple addition leads to counterintuitive 
results. 
MSRM starts with the definition of multi-swing tables to collect data and combine 
getting weights and utility functions in one user-driven process. These multi-swing tables are 
then multiplicatively rolled up and calibrated to fit to a percentage scale. The four steps of 
the methods are as follows: 
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1. selecting and quantifying the metrics for each contribution; 
2. defining a scale for quantifying the overall score; 
3. constructing the multi-swing tables for each contribution; 
4. constructing and calibrating the rollup function. 
Selecting and quantifying the metrics for each contribution starts with identifying the 
qualities the user is interested in. The result is a quality tree that identifies the contributions 
and the metrics used to quantify them. Examples are the resolution (metrics) for the display 
(contribution), or the battery capacity in minutes (metrics) that keeps the device functional 
(contribution). These examples will become clearer with the application presented in the Cell 
Phone Example section. 
Defining a scale for quantifying the overall score of the attributes (not numerical 
scoring of proposals) ensures consistency when assessing the overall value increase or 
decrease when evaluating the individual contributions. MSRM recommends using a 
mapping of generally understood expressions to numerical values, such as ideal = 100%, 
very good = 90%, good = 70%, indifferent = 50%, poor = 30%, very poor = 10%, and not 
acceptable = 0%. The scale does not have to be symmetric. It is more important that it 
reflects the weighting priorities and preferences of the user. 
Constructing the multi-swing tables is conducted for each contribution, starting with 
defining baseline with typical and acceptable values for each contribution. For each 
contribution, we define next a set of swing scores that can be better or worse than the 
baseline. For each contribution, a set of swing scores spanning all values that can occur in 
the selection process are collected and the swing rows constructed. If the value of a 
contribution is a show stopper, e.g., the battery life is too short to support operational use of 
the item, it is marked as such. In acquisition settings, every attribute that falls under a 
minimal value becomes a show stopper. 
The baseline and all swing rows are then captured in one multi swing table. In this 
table, in each row only one of the values is changed in comparison with the baseline, so that 
a comparison with the baseline can be used to access an overall score using the 
expressions identifies in step 2 of the MSRM. While the baseline may be seen as good, a 
less screen resolution may decrease the value to indifferent, poor, or may even become a 
show stopper, while longer life span may result in a very good overall value. 
Constructing and calibrating the rollup function uses the multi-swing tables as its 
foundation, As each row in the multi-swing table captures how the overall value changes 
when we swing one contribution at a time, a multiplicative roll-up approach can now be 
applied to compute how the value changes when several of such changes occur at the time. 
If, for example, the resolution decreases, resulting in a change value decrease of 20%, and 
the battery life gets shorter as well, decreasing the value by 10%, then the occurrence of 
both changes should result in a decrease of 28%. The idea is to multiply the individual 
effects to generate the combined effects. 
While the approach naturally results in the elimination of all show stoppers (as the 
multiplicative approach results in a zero whenever one of the contributions is not 
acceptable), the positive results can multiply up to more than 100%, which can be 
addressed using rescaled proportion retention multipliers that ensure that no combination 
exceeds the 100% limits. 
One of the remaining challenges is the combinatorial explosion with the increasing 
number of contributions. Our initial application shown in the Case Studies and Results 
section was limited to five attributes, but still required more than 45 minutes to build all multi-
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swing tables. On the positive side, the method allows the linear integration of new 
contributions after the initial set-up: a new attribute can be integrated without having to 
change the trade-offs between the already existing attributes. 
Functional Dependency for Network Analysis 
The last approach utilized in our research was originally developed for a systems 
engineering setting, but due to its general applicability, we decided to include it in our 
evaluation. The application of the Functional Dependency for Network Analysis (FDNA) 
methodology involves 
1. data gathering, 
2. preference inference, 
3. quantifying accuracy, and 
4. making predictions. 
The data gathering step involves constructing an experimental design to capture 
data on the different attributes of the product in accordance to the decision maker’s input. 
The preference inference step involves proposing specific preference models and using the 
gathered data to infer the defining parameters which are most consistent with the data. The 
quantifying accuracy step involves the application of cross-validation to assess the accuracy 
of the fitted preference model. Finally, the making prediction step entails converting a test 
case to the form selected in the first step and make predictions using the parameters 
inferred in the second step.  
For data gathering with FDNA it is necessary to create a dictionary of qualitative 
descriptions of product attributes and an assigned numerical representation to each. In the 
acquisition setting, the dictionaries are highly reusable according to our experiences, 
although no study has been conducted to verify this observation. As a general practical 
matter, many spirals of potential dictionaries should be generated and tested to ensure that 
the definitions are neither to narrow or too broad so that the decision maker who is being 
models will be assigning a broad ranges of numerical preference scores to the anticipated 
set of optional designs. Then a set of optional designs of interest can be generated. 
Assuming the absence of a priori knowledge of the decision maker’s preference, the designs 
are randomly generated.  
Motivated by the work of Garvey and Pinto (2009) and Servi and Garvey (2017) two 
different preference models are included in the approach1:  
         𝑓𝑠(𝑃𝑠 , 𝛾) = min𝑖[ 𝑃𝑠
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖]           (1) 
or 
    𝑓𝑠(𝑃𝑠, 𝛾) = 𝛼0 +∑𝛼𝑖
𝑖
𝑃𝑠
𝑖    
(2) 




 If there were a larger amount of experimental data, it would have been more desirable to use the 
precise FDNA model documented in the references. Due to the limited size of the data, two different 
aspects of the FDNA were used for this analysis. 
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where 𝑃𝑠
𝑖   is the numerical level of preference of the ith characteristic of the sth experiment. 
With the decision maker’s evaluation of different attribute combinations, the values of 
𝛽𝑖 or 𝛼𝑖  computed using the training data, which are rows comprising all attribute values 
and the resulting evaluation by the decision maker, it is possible to estimate the preferences 
of the decision maker.  
For the case study discussed in the following section, the accuracy using (1) was 
found to be superior to that using (2), it is recommended that when predicting the 
comparative preferences of the decision maker to two alternatives, the prediction is made 
using only (1) and, in the case of a tie, (2) is used to break the tie. 
Case Studies and Results 
The model assessment procedures are applied and tested on two case studies to 
test their applicability in the acquisition setting. The first case study, described previously, is 
a cell phone purchasing example, easily understood by everyone, and was used for internal 
testing for all three selected approaches. The second case study, described in the section 
titled Government Acquisition Case Study With Large Number of Attributes, is a real-life 
acquisition scenario that added complexities not existing when methods like these are 
tested and presented in literature. We only discuss the Best/Worst method example 
exemplifying the challenges. 
Cell Phone Example 
A case study for buying a cell phone was first used to work through the question 
phrasings of each method in a simpler environment. The test subject or decision maker was 
given the scenario of purchasing a new smartphone, such as an iPhone or Samsung 
Galaxy. The decision maker was made known that there are dozens of alternatives to 
choose from. They are then made to envision that there are five main attributes that will 
affect their decision as to which smartphone to buy. Here are the five attributes that were 
told that effected their decision: 
A. Weight [0–5 pounds] 
B. Lifespan [0–10 years] 
C. Screen resolution [0–4,000p] 
D. Processing speed [0–10x] 
E. Storage amount [0–500 Gigs] 
Included above are the ranges of values that each attribute can take. The ranges are 
meant to exceed what is true in reality. For example, one cannot obviously have a cell 
phone of no weight and there are no phones in the market that weigh 5 pounds. After 
reading through the example and taking the role of the purchaser, a series of questions was 
conducted about their preferences in accordance to the assessment procedures for the 
three preference functions tested. 
Application of Best/Worst Method  
The application of the Best/Worst method began with the assessment of the weights 
for the five attributes of interest. The test subject was asked a series of trade-off questions 
and identified processing speed as the most important attribute and lifespan as the least 
important attribute. Through a series of questions relating the level of importance of each 
attribute with respect to processing speed the following vector was obtained: 𝐴𝑏 = 
[5,4,1,1,2]. The numerical values in this vector specify how much more important processing 
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speed was with respect to weight, lifespan, screen resolution, and storage amount. The 
scale for importance is on a range of 1–5. So, the first value of 5 represents processing 
speed being extremely more important than weight. As indicated by the 4 assigned to the 
second slot, processing speed is considered significantly more important than lifespan. The 
remaining values show that processing speed is equally important to screen resolution, to 
itself, and more important than storage amount. These are the same mappings to numerical 
values introduced in the Selected Approaches section.  
After this the same questions regarding relative attribute importance were asked with 
respect to the attribute noted as the least important. This resulted in the following vector 𝐴𝑤 
= [1,1,4,5,3]. As shown in Rezaei (2015). These two vectors representing relative 
importance between each attribute and the best and worst attribute, respectively can be 
used to perform a least squares approximation to solve for the weights. The following 
numerical weights were obtained: [0.04, 0.12, 0.28, 0.39, 0.17]. 
The final step was to solve for the single attribute value functions pertaining to each 
attribute. Here the test subject was asked for each attribute to specify the minimum, 
midpoint, target, and maximum values for each of the five attributes and the question 
wordings introduced in the Overview of Best/Worst Method and Extensions section were 
applied. Table 2 presents the values obtained for the min, midpoint, target, and max for 
each attribute.  
Table 2. Subject Responses to Min, Midpoint, Target, and Max Levels for Each 
Attribute 
 Min Midpoint Target Max 
Weight 1 lb. 0.75 lb. 0.5 lb. 0.33 lb. 
Lifespan 1 year 3 years 4 years 6 years 
Screen resolution 400p 720p 1080p 2000p 
Processing Speed 0.5x 1x 3x 5x 
Storage Amount 64 gigs 128 gigs 250 gigs 500 gigs 
The values in Table 2 are used to solve for the single attribute value functions 𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 
for all five attributes in this case study. For this case study, a simple second order 
polynomial was applied for fitting these single attribute value functions and the method of 
least squares was used for fitting. The weights for all five attributes can then be integrated 
into the single attribute value functions to obtain the following function for the preference 
model: 
𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑤1𝑣1(𝑥1) + 𝑤2𝑣2(𝑥2) + 𝑤3𝑣3(𝑥3) + 𝑤4𝑣4(𝑥4) + 𝑤5𝑣5(𝑥5)   (3) 
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In order to test the accuracy of the Best/Worst method, a series of comparisons 
across six purchasing alternatives was performed. The following pairwise comparisons 
across all combinations of these purchasing options below were performed by the decision 
maker.  
A.  [2, 2, 2000, 0.75, 256] 
B. [0.5, 5, 720, 2, 128] 
C. [4, 1, 4000, 1, 64] 
D. [1, 4, 720, 1, 256] 
E. [2, 3, 1080, 2, 256] 
F. [0.5, 3, 4,000, 4, 64] 
The results of these pairwise comparisons can be applied to generate a ranking. The 
rankings obtained here are compared to rankings generated through the preference model 
sampled under these same alternatives. In addition, the proportion of the pairwise 
comparisons that are consistent between the decision maker and model was measured. 
There were 15 different combinations of pairwise combinations resulting from the six 
scenarios above. The preference model resulting from the calibration involving the 
Best/Worst method resulted in consistency amongst all 15 pairwise comparisons. That 
meant when the subject specified, for example, that alternative B was more preferable than 
alternative A, that the preference model outputted a larger value when inputting in the 
attribute levels for alternative B than when inputting the attribute levels for alternative A. As 
naturally follows, the rankings for all six alternatives were consistent as well. The case study 
demonstrated promise in the Best/Worst method to generate an accurate model in a short 
amount of time. 
The entire assessment procedure was done in roughly 45 minutes for this scenario 
involving five attributes. The process can be supported by tools, and our research resulted 
in the definition of new tool support that is currently prototypically developed to support data 
collection, calibration, and presentation of the results. The acquisition professional doesn’t 
have to provide all the details captured in this section, but should provide the comparisons 
and evaluate the rankings. 
Application of MSRM Method  
The Multi-Swing Rollup Method (MSRM) was applied in the same setting as the 
Best/Worst method, using the same experts to conduct the experiments. Using the same 
attributes as enumerated in Table 2, we defined one positive and one negative swing for 
each attribute, as shown in this Table 3. 
Table 3. Attributes and Swing States (Green Variations Are Positive, Red Are 
Negative) 
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Next, we defined the utility factor terms to be used to rate the comparisons between 
the baseline and the swings. In the discussion with the experts and decision makers, we 
ended up with a table that showed the semantic equivalencies between different families of 
terms describing comparisons, status descriptions, and grades, which the group was 
comfortable with (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Utility Value Terms 
 
Having five attributes with two swing states each does result in eleven entries. Using 
the utility terms, each entry was compared individually with the baseline to identify the 
overall change in utility by changing one attribute. Table 5 shows the individual utility 
contributions in percent that resulted from our discussions with the experts. 









negative -6.7 -26.7 -26.7 -46.7 -20.0 
positive 13.3 20.0 33.3 33.3 26.7 
Using this information, the full multi-swing rollup table with all 243 entries can be 
created. The resulting table contains all possible combinations of multi-swings plus the 
baseline. The resulting overall utility is calculated by multiplying the individual changes. 
When ordering the table, the entry with all negatives obviously is the lowest, and the entry 
with all positives the highest, but all possible permutations in between are listed as well, 
showing the ranking of all alternatives, including the selected subset used in the Best/Worst 
method. As we derived the same ranking, this should at least consistency in the evaluation, 
no matter which of the first two approaches was used. 
The assessment procedure conducted with our decision makers was shorter than for 
the Best/Worst method, but only because several of the results could be reused. In an 
internal comparison with in-house experts, the amount of time needed for the first two 
methods was approximately the same for the cell phone example. 
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Application of FDNA  
In a previous section, we introduced the two different preference models that were 
motivated by the work of Garvey and Pinto (2009) and Servi and Garvey (2017). First, the 
term needs to be defined. The dictionary shown in Table 6 is comparable to the terms 
defined in Table 5 for the utility terms used in the MSRM. 
Table 6. A Dictionary Assigning a Numerical Preference Level to the Preference 




















apps and photos 
2 - Good light 3 
great images, 
good enlarging 
good for video 
huge for apps 
and photos, 
some videos 
3 - Great ultra light 3+ 





Next, we generated possible solutions for the five attributes important for the 
selection of the cell phone: weight, lifespan, screen resolution, processing speed, and 
storage amount. Table 7 shows the 27 generated cases, using the index numbers defined in 
the dictionary to specify the solution. The decision maker that graded the various solutions 
as captured in the column “evaluator.” 
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Table 7. The Experimental Training Data 







1 3 3 0 0 0 0 
2 2 2 3 2 2 3 
3 2 2 3 2 2 3 
4 3 3 1 0 0 0 
5 2 2 2 1 3 2 
6 0 1 1 2 3 1 
7 2 1 0 3 0 0 
8 1 2 2 1 0 0 
9 3 2 1 2 2 2 
10 2 1 2 2 3 3 
11 3 1 2 0 1 0 
12 2 1 0 3 0 0 
13 3 1 1 1 1 1 
14 1 0 3 2 3 2 
15 1 3 0 3 1 1 
16 2 2 0 2 1 1 
17 1 1 2 2 2 2 
18 0 3 0 0 1 0 
19 0 1 1 2 2 1 
20 1 3 0 1 3 1 
21 1 0 2 2 2 2 
22 1 0 1 1 3 1 
23 1 1 1 2 2 2 
24 2 0 3 3 3 3 
25 3 3 3 2 1 2 
26 2 2 2 3 3 3 
27 1 0 1 3 1 1 
Given the data in the Cell Phone Example section, it is possible to exhaustively 
search for the integer values of 𝛽𝑖    most consistent with the data in terms of the mean sum 
of squares error, 𝛼0 = 1, 𝛼1 = 8, 𝛼2 = 6, 𝛼3 = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼4 = 0 as well as analytically solving for 
the values of𝛼𝑖  most consistent with the data,(𝛽0  =  −1.6204, 𝛽1 =  0.2101, 𝛽2  =
 0.2219, 𝛽3 =  0.4290, 𝛽4 = .4375, and 𝛽5  =  0.5724). This leads to mean sum of square error 
of 0.19 when using equation (1) and a worse mean sum of square error of 0.44 when using 
equation (2). 
For FDNA, however, the more precise approach to quantifying the error is using the 
method of cross-validation. Here, the values of 𝛽𝑖 or 𝛼𝑖  are computed using a random set of 
8/9 of the data in Table 7 and then the accuracy of the prediction is computing using the 1/9 
of the data not trained on. This was repeated numerous times. This lead to the conclusion 
that the mean sum of square when using equation (1) was 0.19 (and a standard deviation of 
0.24) and when using equation (2) was 0.54 (with a standard deviation of 0.23). The 
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conclusion, for this data, is that equation (1) leads to a superior model of this decision 
maker, which means that 𝑓𝑠(𝑃𝑠, 𝛾) = min𝑖[ 𝑃𝑠
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖] is the better model to capture 
preferences. 
These examples given in the Cell Phone Example section exemplify the different 
application possibilities of the three approaches as well as their strengths and mutual 
support, reemphasizing the need for having a toolbox of different solutions in support of 
acquisition decisions.  
Government Acquisition Case Study With Large Number of Attributes  
An additional case study was also performed with a government sponsor involving 
an acquisition scenario consisting of 20 attributes to show the scalability of approaches. This 
is a more challenging case study in that the decision maker must go through a lengthy 
assessment procedure to make comparisons among a very large set of attributes. Another 
twist to this problem was that these attributes were binary in nature. Each attribute had an 
objective value and the government was only interested in if the attribute exceeded that 
value. So, each attribute has two levels (0, 1) to represent whether it met the objective or 
not. A new modification of the Best/Worst method was applied as presented in the Overview 
of Best/Worth Method and Extensions section to handle this scenario of having a large set 
of attributes. The types of attributes cannot be discussed in this paper, but the 
implementation of the procedure can be discussed. The first portion of the assessment 
procedure involved doing pairwise comparisons across the adjacent pairs of attributes 
starting with the first attribute. The resulting table of the results to these pairwise 
comparisons is shown to help further explain the approach (see Table 8). 
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Table 8. Pairwise Comparisons Across Adjacent Attributes  
Attribute 1st Comparison 2nd Comparison 
1 1 > 2 1 > 20 
2 2 < 1 2 > 3 
3 3 < 2 3 < 4 
4 4 > 3 4 > 5 
5 5 < 4 5 > 6 
6 6 < 5 6 < 7 
7 7 > 6 7 < 8 
8 8 > 7 8 > 9 
9 9 < 8 9 > 10 
10 10 < 9 10 < 11 
11 11 > 10 11 > 12 
12 12 < 11 12 < 13 
13 13 > 12 13 > 14 
14 14 < 13 14 < 15 
15 15 > 14 15 > 16 
16 16 < 15 16 > 17 
17 17 < 16 17 > 18 
18 18 < 17 18 > 19 
19 19 < 18 20 < 19 
20 20 < 19 20 < 1 
After this initial pairwise comparison is done, the attributes are binned based on 
whether they were more important than two attributes, one attributes, or no attributes. This 
results three bins, which are named prime, mid, low, respectively. The resulting bins are 
shown in Table 9 to further exemplify the approach. 
Table 9. Binning of Attributes After Initial Pairwise Comparisons 
Prime Bucket Mid Bucket Low Bucket 
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 
Attribute 4 Attribute 11 Attribute 6 
Attribute 8 Attribute 7 Attribute 10 
Attribute 5 Attribute 9 Attribute 12 
Attribute 13 Attribute 16 Attribute 14 
Attribute 15 Attribute 17 Attribute 19 
 Attribute 18  
 Attribute 20  
The next step is to reassess the attributes in each bin to make sure they are 
allocated properly. This is done through asking the test subject to first identify the most 
important and least important attribute in each bin. Then pairwise comparisons are done 
between the most important attribute in each bin and the least important attribute in each 
bin. After any reassignments are made, the test subject is then asked to identify again the 
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most important and least important attribute in each bin. If there are any changes to these 
assignments, the process is repeated and the most important attribute in each bin is 
compared again with the least important attribute in each bin. The process repeats until no 
attributes can be exchanged between bins in this manner. The final binning of attributes for 
this case study is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Final Binning of Attributes After Extra Validation Questions 
Prime Bucket Mid Bucket Low Bucket 
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 18 
Attribute 4 Attribute 11 Attribute 3 
Attribute 16 Attribute 7 Attribute 6 
Attribute 5 Attribute 9 Attribute 10 
Attribute 13 Attribute 8 Attribute 12 
Attribute 15 Attribute 17 Attribute 14 
 Attribute 20 Attribute 19 
At this point the Best/Worst method can be executed across a subset of these 
attributes. The first step in doing this is to identify the most important and least important 
attribute in each of the three bins. Note that due to the initial pairwise comparisons being 
made between adjacent attributes it is not necessary to compare every attribute with the 
most important attribute and every attribute with the least important attribute. In the prime 
bin, each attribute is compared with the most important and least important attribute. Then 
for the mid bin, the only the most important and least important attribute are compared with 
the least important attribute in the prime bin. Likewise, these attributes are compared with 
the most important attribute in the low bin. Then finally, the most important and least 
important attribute of the low bin are compared to the least important attribute in the mid bin. 
These measures of relative importance are again done on a scale of 1–5. After all of these 
comparisons are made, there is enough information to perform a least squares estimation to 
approximate the weights for all 20 attributes.  
The nice feature about having attributes with a binary value is that it is not necessary 
to assess a single attribute utility function for each attribute. If the attribute meets the 
threshold then the utility is mapped to a value of 1 and if it does not meet the threshold it is 
mapped to a value of 0. Therefore, the weights can be used with 0, 1 terms for the attribute 
values directly to result in this equation for the preference model: 𝑉 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑖 where 𝑡𝑖 = 1 if 
the value for attribute 𝑖 meets its threshold level for the objective. 
The most notable result of this new assessment procedure was that the interaction 
time with the test subject to train this preference model with 20 attributes was done in less 
than one hour. For this amount of time, it is expected that the decision maker can stay 
engaged for the duration of the assessment procedure and remain accurate and limit 
inconsistencies. Another promising feature of this method is that the initial pairwise 
comparisons can be held out from training of the model and used for validation. When 
reserving eight for validation, the model resulted in matching the decision maker in seven 
out of eight (87.5%) of the test cases. 
As we did not conduct any further experiments on the degree to which these results 
are scalable or generally applicable in other domains as well, we do not want to oversell any 
results, but the observed trends do make sense within our experience. Due to time and 
budget constraints, we did not conduct similar experiments using the MSRM or FDNA 
methods. 
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Conclusions 
This paper suggests the idea of applying game-theoretic models as a foundation for 
a quantitative decision-making framework in support of acquisition. Through successful 
calibration of utility functions, we suggest there is a strong potential to develop a framework 
that can more effectively illuminate strategies that move industry into the government’s 
preferred negotiation point and expedite the decision-making process in acquisition.  
The case studies presented in this paper focus on the potential for developing 
accurate utility functions that would enable such a game theory framework. The 
government’s utility functions, representing their level of preference for attribute levels 
involved in a proposal, are the cornerstone for enabling such a decision support framework 
to be utilized effectively and accurately. In this paper, we examined three potential utility 
function calibration procedures from literature and adapt these procedures to examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The three methods were applied in a case 
study involving the acquisition or purchasing of a cell phone. All three reveled benefits for 
different acquisition scenarios. The Best/Worst method showed robustness in handling a 
small or large number of attributes effectively. The MSRM method demonstrating the ability 
to capture sharp drops in utility in individual attributes. This is an important feature when 
some attributes present thresholds where the entire product becomes unusable by the 
government. The FDNA method showed the ability to work effectively when the decision 
maker is more qualitative in nature than quantitative. 
The Best/Worst method was also extended to be more applicable to acquisition 
scenarios involving a large number of attributes (20 plus attributes). These situations are 
more common than the small number of attribute examples that are often provided in the toy 
examples in the literature. This paper provided an efficient procedure for screening and 
implementing the Best/Worst method when the attribute set is large. It was tested on a real-
world government acquisition example and was shown to be able to calibrate an accurate 
preference function in under one hour of decision maker engagement time. 
Future work involves integrating these utility function assessment procedures into a 
decision support framework that can enable potential bidders to maximize the fitted utility 
function with respect to their own specific cost functions, which are parameterized by the 
same attributes as the utility function. The sampling procedure of these cost functions along 
with the best optimization algorithm to apply is another area of research needing attention. 
The optimization algorithm must have the ability to generate solutions in near real-time in 
order for this decision support framework to be usable and effective. 
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Abstract 
This paper looks into the process known as concurrent contract modification (CCM) 
and proposes a solution to automate it. While CCMs are not inherently disallowed, they do 
present contract logistical and administrative problems. The larger projects become, the 
more difficult it is to track, administer, and document proposed changes. Without an efficient 
means toward managing incoming changes, gaining any tangible and accurate reporting on 
project outcomes proves significantly challenging if not impossible. 
What this paper proposes is a new approach to contract change management 
utilizing a software tool designed for ground-level operations that scale up to Contract and 
Program responsible stakeholders. Instead of relying on the output of contract writing 
systems, this system can be used to manage the execution of several related contracts 
under a single project with shared sources of funding. Focusing on automated infrastructure 
and a process for contract change management will allow for greater insight and 
accountability at program execution levels, in the case of the Navy, at the Regional 
Maintenance Center or Shipyard level. 
Concurrent Modifications, The Act of Optimizing Multiple Contract Changes Under 
One Universal Modification in the Acquisition, Maintenance, and Program 
Management of Large Military Sea, Land, and Air Platforms 
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Introduction 
This project explores whether current processes for contract modifications can be 
optimized to better respond to today’s environment of rapidly changing requirements due to 
unforeseen events that occur during the building and maintenance of large military sea, 
land, and air platforms that affect delivery, cost, program management, and planning.  
Critical variables that affect acquisition and maintenance efficiency include emergent 
technologies that impact outcomes and contribute directly to unforeseen cost overruns. The 
rapid pace of technological change creates challenges to the acquisition community due to 
requirements that may not always be fully known at the time of contract award. Currently, 
changes for any reason require multiple contract modifications, which over time have 
become unwieldy and inefficient to manage; moreover, the cost impacts of multiple contract 
modifications have become difficult to assess, therefore making auditability difficult if not 
impossible.  
Using the Navy’s shipbuilding environment as the point of departure for the analysis, 
this project develops a proof-of-concept alternative contracting system that allows 
concurrent contract modifications, whether executed in parallel or sequentially, to be 
prioritized according to tailorable rule sets in a manner that allows users to monitor, 
manage, change and report total contract award in real time. This proof-of-concept also 
aims to provide solutions to other complexities inherent in today’s contracting environment, 
such as allowing for multiple contract types within and between Contracting Line Item 
Number (CLIN) structures and within a single contract award, and the management of 
multiple Technical Instructions, CLINs, and SubLine Item Numbers (SLINs).  
The aim of the final contracting system is to create the required data relationships in 
a single system for the purpose of monitoring contract cost and technical scope in real-time, 
thereby increasing transparency and auditability. 
 Examples abound regarding the difficulties the DoD has in forecasting cost and 
managing changes that affect key elements in the building and maintenance of large 
platforms. This is especially true regarding seagoing platforms such as submarines, carriers, 
littoral combat ships, and destroyers. These examples include the following: 
 Through the course of a decade, the Littoral Combat Ship’s program went 
from an estimated cost of $220 million per ship to an average currently at 
$478 million apiece, with more changes afoot (GAO, 2016). 
 The Navy’s number one budget priority, the Columbia Class Submarine, has 
already projected cost overruns before the first platform is even built due to 
uncertainties regarding critical emergent technologies (GAO, 2016). 
 DoD Contract Management, Weapons Acquisition, and Support Infrastructure 
Management are all represented on the GAO’s High-Risk Ledger. 
 Cost overruns are imprecisely estimated and continue to provide challenges 
to the DoD that significantly impact performance and outcomes, in particular: 
shipbuilding. Multibillion-dollar cost overruns are common and, in many 
cases, expected.  
 Documenting these challenges has proven difficult, affecting auditability, 
transparency, and effectiveness. This impacts the nation’s leading edge in 
maintaining global military superiority. 
Providing an optimized automated process for concurrent contract modification that 
reports situation awareness in real time will significantly add to the goal of excellence in DoD 
acquisition.  
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The aim of this proposed approach to concurrent contract modification is a process, 
supported by an agile software tool, to coordinate serial changes in projects that involve one 
or multiple contracts to increase acquisition excellence through concurrent modification, or 
“real-time” situational awareness. To quote Socrates, “Knowledge of the right leads 
necessarily to right acts” (Gilje & Skirbekk, 2017). Therefore, the aim of this project is to give 
direct real-time access to the execution of program funds and activities via the reporting of 
contractual transactions at an elemental granular level “in real time.” This will allow 
Acquisition and Program Management stakeholders to have access to global and granular 
information that is critical to effective real-time decision-making that affects cost, planning, 
and delivery outcomes. In short, the purpose of this project is to provide knowledge in the 
form of global, granular, structured contextual reporting on all acquisition program 
management parameters in real time as to ensure the right actions are taking place.  
The federal government has struggled with providing a consistent award and 
budgetary data repository that includes truly accurate information. For example, the Digital 
Accountability and Transparency of 2014, or DATA ACT, requires the federal government to 
transform its spending information into open data (Data Coalition Organization, 2018). 
However, there have been speed bumps along the way to its implementation. For example, 
in a report released by the GAO in November 2017 regarding DATA Act compliance, the 
GAO found that the consistency of required data submittals to BETA.USAspending.gov was 
faulty at very high levels. The agency found that “approximately 94% of all records … 
differed sharply between budgetary and award records,” making any real decision-making 
and analysis based on those records false at the outset. Regarding award sub data, the 
GAO reported that the actual award information was “inconsistent with agency sources for 
62 to 72 percent of all awards” (GAO, 2017). Another GAO report found that personal 
services contracts from the DoD lacked accurate data, therefore, “proper management of 
personal services and other contracts contained inherent difficulties that impact 
performance, reporting, auditing, and closeout” (GAO, 2017). This anomaly makes the 
lessons learned process, the budgeting process, and other critical elements affecting 
optimal acquisition all but impossible.  
While this project could involve the creation of an entirely new acquisition 
infrastructure, this approach is not designed to replace enterprise-wide software systems for 
contract writing and reporting. The method proposed is intended to reside at the Contract 
and Program Management level to provide Concurrent Change Management to bring full 
accountability to all program elements, including budgets, task order, technical/task 
instruction, and funds expenditure. It is intended to provide for seamless collaboration, all 
integrated into one enterprise that provides real-time visibility and reporting capability into all 
project activities in “real time.” This project provides for accurate reporting to the penny, 
cross-referenced to one or all relevant acquisition activity. In other words, truly accurate 
information that is currently lacking. 
What Are Concurrent Contract Modifications? 
Concurrent contract modification (CCM) is the process of simultaneously processing 
multiple contract changes against numerous contract vehicles that affect a project or 
program—for example, the $800 million maintenance project (Harper, 2017) for an Ohio 
Class Submarine in San Diego, CA. One concurrent modification of $800 million could 
include, but is not limited to, a dearth of actions including additions, deletions, new work, 
payments, new funding, additional option exercise, delivery schedule extensions, stop 
orders, and terminations. CCM exists due to the operational need to adjust contracts to suit 
ever-changing requirements rapidly in venues such as the Navy shipbuilding environments. 
CCM has no precedent in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), but the process is a 
- 576 - 
unique agency-specific interpretation of the FAR regarding contract modification. The 
agency using this process is the Navy. Further complicating the matter is the scale of 
interaction between government staff and contractors in support of ship maintenance 
projects. As of 2017, the operating costs for the U.S. fleet was $56 billion a year. However, 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Committee projected that total Navy operating costs would increase to an average of $102 
billion per year through 2047 (Labs, 2017). Shipyards such as Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
and Intermediate Maintenance Facility IMF in Bremerton, WA, executed nearly 2.3 million-
man days of work and employed approximately 12,340 civilians, accounting for a large 
percentage of the current budget (Bradlet et al., 2017). Managing these budgets and 
reporting on them in a format acceptable to key stakeholders inside and outside the DoD, 
including Congress, has proven to be a challenge. It’s normally accepted that the DoD, 
particularly the Navy, is “un-auditable” (Nader, 2014). One of the current priorities of the 
Navy is to be fully auditable by fiscal 2018. An optimized Concurrent Modification Process 
and automated infrastructure contribute significantly to this purpose.  
A simple analogy follows for the purpose of illustrating the logistical challenges of a 
large project with many contractors. This is a fictional example but with relevance to any 
project manager. In this analogy, there are contractors working on a multimillion-dollar boat 
overhaul project. This boat’s maintenance schedule calls for it being homeported no more 
than three months. The boat arrives, and work begins with the 10 contractors and their 
subcontractors. About three weeks into the overhaul, one of the contractor engineers find 
that the engine assembly’s wiring is in a complete state of disrepair and requires an urgent 
fix. The maintenance schedule did not foresee the need for the wiring to be worked on. 
Therefore the project management staff has to decide whether to issue a new contract, 
issue a change order to one of the 10 contractors, or issue an instruction. The staff decides 
to issue a change order for one contractor who specializes in electrical engineering. The 
electronic engineering firm tasked with rewiring the engine block has to replace the wiring as 
fast as possible because it will delay other contractors. That forces other engineering 
contractors to stop their current work. That stoppage prevents the other contractors from 
continuing or completing their work and so on and so forth. The work change order then 
forces the project management staff to adjust the other contracts to reflect a new period of 
performance, delivery or start dates, etc., for some tasks. As the project staff begins making 
changes to contracts, it creates a ripple effect that eventually will throw off the project’s 
timeline, including the budget and the ultimate release of the boat back out to sea. 
Therefore, as a result of constantly modifying contracts, the project management 
staff develops a way to make changes in bulk against all contracts and at a later date 
officially modify the contracts affected. In this way, the staff has a running list of all changes 
made to the project’s contracts and can promptly issue work orders, changes, or 
modifications to keep tasks on schedule. For small projects, this is potentially workable, but 
for larger projects, this creates opportunities for errors, miscalculations, and reporting 
mistakes. For instance, what happens if the project has to make a change to a change? If 
there is a list of changes not yet officially modified into the contracts, what is the actual value 
of the contracts currently? How much has been actually spent compared to the budget of 
the contracts? In essence, the aforementioned antidote is what concurrent modifications 
are—the struggle of keeping projects on time and on budget while at the same time 
conforming to regulations on contract administration.  
Continuing with concurrent modification, the main issue in the discussion toward 
optimal practice is the management of hundreds of requests for contract changes from end-
user stakeholders, program managers, on-the-ground engineers, specialists, and project 
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managers against multiple contract vehicles with various periods of performance, contract 
types, cost types, cost ceilings, and various contractors with different reporting 
requirements. Additionally, each contract could have separate administrative staff that could 
be geographically spread across multiple jurisdictions. Without a viable concurrent 
modification engine, tracking changes, ensuring funds are available, and handling critical 
actions such as technical reviews become more and more unmanageable. As a result, 
without a Concurrent Modification Infrastructure, changes are aggregated and the 
responsible contracting officers then “modify” the appropriate contracts at a later date. 
In the meantime, contracting officers can, under certain conditions, authorize work to 
commence with the expectation that the contract will be confirmed later (Naval Regional 
Maintenance Center, 2013). The only issue here is that in most cases, the contract is never 
confirmed. This makes closeouts, accurate reporting audits, and other critical elements of 
the process all but impossible. These challenges reoccur with every class of ship and are an 
ongoing problem for the Navy. Adding yet more confusion to this process is the effect of 
change orders on different contractors and their ability to deliver on time and within 
projected costs. Additionally, chains of changes on one contract can have a domino effect 
directly as well as indirectly, forcing other contracts to be changed that affect a project. 
Without effective Concurrent Modification Protocols, the result is a significant administrative 
and paperwork backlog to conform contracts, resulting in significantly less efficient reporting 
and often no reporting at all. It’s been said many times in Navy Pentagon Program 
Shipbuilding Offices that the choice is obvious: “Do we focus on building new ships or on 
closing out old platforms where there is no information available?” (Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 2015). We focus on building new ships. The fallacy here is that building new 
ships depends on lessons learned from building, maintaining, and closing out retired ships. 
If that data is consistently not available or outright lost, the problem is obvious. The Navy 
proposes alleviating this reality with Optimal Concurrent Modification functionality using new 
technology. This technology is at the forefront of this document.  
Looking at the root issue of CCM from a pragmatic perspective, building and/or 
maintaining a ship presents a logistical problem regarding the program and contract 
administration. There exists no way to effectively track changes that everyone expects are 
bound to occur during the build or maintenance lifecycle. The lack of accurate and 
documented contract and program changes, especially those regarding award data, can be 
extremely detrimental. Take, for example, mandated systems such as the Federal 
Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS–NG) and data integrity. A December 
2016 Congressional Research Service Report on Defense Acquisitions Spending and 
Reporting warns that “decisionmakers should be cautious when using reported obligation 
data from FPDS to develop policy or draw conclusions. In some cases, the data itself may 
not be reliable” (Schwartz, 2016). While this paper will not make a judgment against the 
efficacy of FPDS–NG, the main theme of complaints regarding FPDS–NG is the lack of 
accuracy and missing information in system data sets. The Department of Commerce, Office 
of Inspector General (IG) in 2015 found that the department needs to improve the “process 
for entering accurate and reliable data into FPDS–NG and its controls to properly maintain 
and safeguard contract files entered into the system.” The IG found that undefinitized 
actions (UAs), contract actions issued as letters contracts, and other instruments used to 
meet an urgent requirement of an agency contained coding errors due to a lack of training. 
However, more distressing, the IG also found that actual “contract files and FPDS–NG data 
sheets were missing” (Office of Inspector General, 2015), rendering the information all but 
useless to the informed user.  
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In the DoD, the lack of an adequate process to track contract changes and their 
award dollar obligations has had disastrous effects on public and congressional 
relationships. These issues range from the Army’s $6.5 trillion of “wrongful adjustments” in 
2016, where the Army lacked receipts and invoices or simply made them up (Paltrow, 2016), 
to the Navy’s massive procurement scandal involving the ongoing investigation within the 
Navy involving ship support contractor Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), a subsidiary of 
the Glenn Marine Group, “Fat Leonard” scandal (Paul, 2017).  
The key takeaway from one review of these events is the need to improve methods 
for creating, managing, and generating award data that allows for a contextual 
understanding of the data sets. Understanding such sets will improve efficiency, create 
effective work solutions, and as an added benefit, catch waste fraud and abuse. An 
improved method for creating, managing, and generating award data will also enable easy, 
intuitive learning curves for end users on the ground, those that live and breathe the project. 
By giving end users easy to learn, easy to understand, and easy to use methods for direct 
involvement into the processing and reporting of contract changes, users in the field will 
acquire easy tools to do their work and contribute to efficiency and delivery outcomes. 
Rather than waiting for official audits and reports, the system proposed will give end users, 
privileged managers, and stakeholders the ability to recognize anomalies quickly and 
provide for prompt cost and time-saving response. For example, in a 2016 paper on 
procurement fraud in the DoD, the authors posit that “shifting the first line of defense against 
procurement fraud should be the procurement workforce managing the contracting process,” 
not the contract auditors and fraud investigators. They added that “missing from the DoD’s 
response to procurement fraud risk is a more strategic approach to fraud deterrence and 
detection that includes emphasizing procurement workforce training, contracting process 
capability, and internal control effectiveness” (Rendon & Rendon, 2016) 
The challenge to solve is not only to automate the submission of changes, types of 
changes, contractual conditions, approvals, and notifications, but also to also track these 
actions in real time, with the end goal of producing elemental or granular data on each 
contract action. Information such as who made the request, who approved the changes, 
which account/ACRN was obligated, who is the contractor, where exactly is the place of 
performance, what was ordered, when invoices were paid and by whom, and lastly, why 
does this change need to happen and how does this change impact the outcome of the 
project.  
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Proposed Design Proof of Concept Research for Concurrent Modification 
Management and Alternative Contracting System 
This section will explain system design, processes, and outcomes. As an overview, 
the proposed method addresses the following challenges in concurrent modification: 
1. Multiple modifications executed in parallel with numerous accounting 
classification reference numbers (ACRNs) targeting various Subline Item 
Numbers (SLINs)  
2. Various task or technical instructions 
3. Multiple Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) dictating different contract 
reimbursement types, i.e., fixed fee vs. cost reimbursable vs. a combination 
of the two 
4. Reconciling the previous items to determine total contract award in real time, 
for monitoring and managing CLIN ceilings 
5. Warehousing large volumes of ancillary data electronically in an easily 
accessible format 
This section is broken down into two parts: the design philosophy and business 
process explanation. From a computer software design and acquisition perspective, the 
wording and terminology are simplified. The particular case with concurrent modifications is, 
generally, a Navy-centric process, and terminology and policies may not or do not apply to 
other branches. This section attempts to encapsulate and generalize procurement process 
concerning software systems. The intent of the authors is to break down the government 
procurement process to the root elements and define capabilities for the design of a system.  
Design Philosophy 
The system is designed to address several challenges in the contract modification 
process. 
1. Efficiently managing contract change requests with large groups of 
contracting specialists, requirement holders, managers, and contractors 
2. Tracking approved changes and budgetary implications 
3. Aggregating changes and applying legal modifications to groups of related 
contract vehicles 
4. Creating data model linkages between budgetary accounts, contract level 
funds, and expenditures on the line item level 
5. Enabling detailed expenditure reporting against contract modifications, in real 
time. 
To summarize the process, a method of rapid change management and tracking 
called the Rapid Contract Change Management Model, or bicycle model, is introduced in 
Figure 1. The procedure outlines three areas of focus: the contracts represented as the 
seat, the left cycle representing change management process for requirements holders and 
managers. The gear or center represents the aggregation and reporting of priced and 
unpriced changes; the right sequence represents the legal contract modification process for 
contracting specialists. Lastly, reporting represent the handlebars that connect the contract.  
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Figure 1. Bicycle Model 
The model is designed to support three different stakeholder groups: requirements 
holders/managers, contracting officers, and specialists. The model is also designed to bind 
the various stakeholder groups together in an interactive environment that tracks overall 
contract changes and gives managers elemental level reporting capabilities necessary for 
effective decision-making. The model has four components. 
Component 1: The Contract—Seat of the Change 
The driver of change, the contract, is the platform for directing the entire change 
management process (see Figure 2). This presentation of the main contract file is designed 
for ease of use, ease of readability, and ease of learning. In the system, the primary 
determinants of change are new non-structural requirements and fund availability. The fund 
management functionality will be addressed later in the paper. The contract document itself 
is a pseudo-representation of the Uniform Contract Format (FAR, 2018) where critical 
performance is highlighted and focused. In this model’s case, sections A, B, C, and G are 
primary, while the remaining sections are indirectly linked. For example, section F, deliveries 
or performance, and section E are connected to section B at the line item level. The purpose 
of this arrangement is to enable users to focus on the critical aspects of the contract’s 
management and at the same time generate the required compliance data as the user 
works through the system. In other words, spend time managing procurements to achieve 
outcomes first rather than spending time filling paperwork for paperwork’s sake. The result is 
a user experience that lets the system automate the mundane and free up critical attention 
to other areas of contract administration, all within the same infrastructure. The result is a 
focus on the optimal outcome while having the confidence that the system will manage 
compliance automatically. 
- 581 - 
 
Figure 2. Contract Module of Bicycle Model 
Line Item Level Management and Insight  
A critical section of the contract and what the system brings to the fore is real time 
line item level management. From a data model perspective, the CLIN and SLIN 
relationships are what binds the contract together with stakeholder groups. Table 1 
illustrates that data relationship. 
Table 1. Data Relationship 
 
Each column represents a relationship that builds the contract, binds parties 
together, and is subsequently affected when making contract changes. Any changes made 
to these data points result in a contract change that needs to be tracked, categorized, 
approved, consolidated, and legally modified. The overall goal of this approach is to make 
the contract file genuinely interactive, reportable, and friendly to end users. 
Cost Type Management 
In the system, cost type indicates how CLIN/SLIN pricing is determined and 
accounted for. Each line item has a cost type that requires the contractor(s), whether for 
new awards, modifications, or changes, to provide the relevant pricing information. The 
contracting user is presented with different template interfaces based on cost type. This 
allows contractors to price line items and at the same time allow government users to 
perform Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCE) for each line item. The result is 
the ability to compare directly, line by line, the contractor’s reported price and the 
government’s estimates. 
Contract Level Reporting Functionality 
Key to this model is the idea of contextual, elemental, and relationally linked data. In 
other words, the data an authorized user can see is easy to read, understand, and 
comprehend. Rather than looking at aggregates, the system gives an elemental level at 
contract line level(s), fund expenditure level(s), vendor/contract level(s), task order/technical 
instruction level(s) and user level(s). To this effect, the data is organically generated as a 
result of utilizing the system rather than keying in data. In the model, every action during the 
change management process is documented, tracked, and reportable in required and ad 
hoc formats depending on user preference and privilege.  
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Component 2: The Change Management Cycle  
The first construct in this model is the Master Contract File (MCF). The MCF is the 
simple data model representing component 1 addressed earlier. Any user attempting to 
create changes automatically generates a local Contract Branch visible to the user and 
those the user has chosen to collaborate with. The master and branch concept is the 
primary mechanism for organizing changes with a multitude of users against multitudes of 
contracts with multiple contractors. 
 
Figure 3. Change Management in Bicycle Model 
This cycle involves the end-user assigned to enforcing contract performance and 
building change requests. This cycle has built-in workflow and is designed to receive 
changes continually. The sequence can handle multiple users making multiple applications 
for contracts.  
1. A user would create a request for contract change (RCC). An RCC is a local 
copy of a contract, called a branch. 
2. Depending on the scale of changes or collaboration, the user can invite other 
users to collaborate on an RCC. 
3. Users then begin their work by making additions, subtractions, deletions, and 
other changes to line items, statement of works, fund management. They 
issue technical instructions/task orders and issue stop orders when 
applicable. 
4. The system categorizes and analyzes the changes and determines each 
difference as either unilateral or bilateral.  
5. Bilateral changes, depending on the nature of the modification, generate a 
need for contractor concurrency to conclude a supplemental agreement. In 
the event of a technical instruction or new work, a request for change is 
created and sent to the contractor to gather pricing and other information. 
The contractor sends back their response, and the data is applied to the 
requisite branch of the contract. 
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6. Once all changes are made, the initiating user then checks for duplicate or 
overlapping changes. Should there be overlapping or conflicting changes, the 
initiating user adjudicates the conflicts and merges the changes into one 
coherent document. Keep in mind that nothing is official until changes are 
approved. 
7. The user then decides whether to continue allowing changes or stopping their 
acceptance. If the user leaves the branch open, more changes can be made 
and merged. If the user is ready, the changes are submitted to workflow. 
8. The initiating user then sends the package of contract changes into a 
workflow process based on agency organizational rules and policies. 
9. If the package of changes is approved, the package becomes a part of the 
concurrent modification. As mentioned previously, concurrent modification 
means one official action consisting of many changes rolled up into one 
universal modification. All concurrent changes can be rejected using this 
model. 
In ending, the change cycle allows for continuous and controlled change 
management within a localized version of the contract. The deltas or changes are 
categorized and sorted by their FAR-defined types of modification. Finally, the cycle allows 
the user to continue making changes without a need for a pause in the process. As an 
aside, the next section continues the discussion on the format of the contract file. 
Interactive Contract File Data Model 
The goal is to transform the traditional electronic contract file, as specified by the 
UCF FAR 15.204-1, and treat the electronic contract file (ECF) as genuinely electronic. In 
other words, be a central repository for contract and award data that legally complies with 
the definition of an ECF that can be managed electronically. This includes the tracking of 
contract modifications, task instruction/orders, stop orders, funding allocations, 
administrative changes, protests, and close out—a “living contract” document so to speak. 
The contract file itself is the vehicle for direct management versus being a reference point 
on which to base managing the action.  
The concept of a paperless contract file is not a new idea. Since 2000, the DoD has 
been implementing paperless contracting processes. To list a few cases, Standard 
Procurement System (SPS), Wide Area Work Flow, and many other systems geared toward 
support of a paperless environment (Sherman & Freeman, 2007). 
The fundamental difference between a paperless contract file and a genuinely 
electronic one is the degree of interactivity between contracting stakeholders and resource 
owners. The second facet is the degree of use the data represents. To be clear, this is not 
an electronic filing system but a systematic automated method to manage changes and 
track them in real time—in other words, concurrent modification. 
Pooling of Approved Changes 
The act of pooling or aggregating approved changes serves as a controlled 
intersection for incoming contract changes. The point, represented as a gear, serves as the 
gatekeeper from changes or sub-modifications made from contract branches before they are 
released into the next cycle. Critical to this model is the reporting module sitting directly 
above the changes. 
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Figure 4. Change Pooling and Reporting in Bicycle Model 
The reporting module is the central repository of change tracking—logging and 
analyzing contract deltas. Deltas, the real alphanumeric changes between the branch 
contract and master contract. The centrality of this reporting center allows managers and 
audit users to peer into the ongoing changes on any contract at any time. The reporting 
module will be revisited later in this paper. 
A final note on this section revolves around compliance and adherence to the DATA 
ACT. As part of the user design, a more straightforward interface is used for the best user 
experience, but the back-end data model is structured with compliance in mind. The data 
model is represented twice—a simpler relational structure of the contract, the related 
changes, and the DATA ACT Compliant Extensible Markup Language (XML), and 
(extensible Business Reporting Language) (XBRL) based on Data Act Information Model 
Schema (DAIMS). The latter format option allows for seamless output to external systems 
for compliance while the former preserves a simpler user interface and experience. 
Component 3: The Contract Conformance Cycle 
The next cycle is the domain of the contracting officers, contract specialists, and 
resource managers (see Figure 5). The themes of this cycle are resource obligation, legal 
reviews, consultations, and notifications. 
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Figure 5. Contracting Conforming Process in Bicycle Model 
The following section explains the process step by step. 
1. A contracting officer (administrative or not) reviews contract changes 
incoming from the pool.  
2. The contracting officer “opens” the affected contracts for legal modification 
and confirmation. 
3. The contracting officer organizes what changes are going to be made in this 
modification cycle. While the contract is open for modification, transitions 
originating from the first cycle are allowed to pass through. 
4. The contracting officer formally rejects or approves the collective batches of 
changes. Rejected changes are sent back to the originating user for 
adjustment and resubmission. 
5. Once satisfied, the contracting officer “closes” the contract for modification. 
As a result, all incoming changes are held in the pool. 
6. The contracting officer then “conforms” the changes into the master contract. 
The act of conforming does the following: 
a. Obligate/modify/remove funding from the affected CLINS/SLIN 
b. Textual changes in the document such as statements of work 
c. Confirms the task/technical instructions, task orders, work and work 
stop orders 
d. Changes the value of the CLINS/SLINS and therefore the value of the 
contracts 
e. Add/edit/remove contract provisions/clauses 
f. Add/remove CLINS/SLINS/ELINS 
g. Generate a “modification changelog” 
In essence, the conformation process is the application of the pooled 
changes into the master contract file.  
7. The master contract file is updated. 
The cycle is designed to handle not only changes against a single contract, but to 
manage changes against multiple contracts, all at the same time. 
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Component 4: Notifications and Reporting 
The cycle now comes full circle as the originating users and contractors are notified 
(see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Notifications and Reporting in Bicycle Model 
Contractors/vendor users receive several types of notifications depending on the 
nature of the change. In the event of a supplementary agreement, official contractor sign-
offs are required by the contractor point of contact as part of the modifications process. If it’s 
administrative and concerns the contractor, a summary of changes is sent that the 
contractor POC acknowledges. 
End users—defined as on the ground engineers, project managers, contracting 
specialists, and contracting officers—are notified of the changes. Each end user who made 
a request receives a report of the summary of their differences that were modified and those 
that were not. The end user, looking at the master contract again, will see the updated 
contract and can initiate a new change. 
Reporting Revisited 
Approved changes have been conformed, and the result is exported to the reporting 
module. As mentioned previously, the reporting module looks at the two phases of the 
contract change process—the changes as they are made and the changes that were 
incorporated into the contract. The double entry of change allows auditors or managerial 
users critical insight into each contract as it changes in real time. These actions are 
available for review, desk audit, and official audit long after the contract is completed and 
closed out. Adopting this understanding Navy-wide would render Navy shipbuilding a fully 
auditable endeavor.  
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Business Logic 
This section will show how each of the principled features is individually addressed. 
The format will be of a statement and direct answers. 
1. Multiple modifications executed in parallel with numerous accounting 
classification reference numbers (ACRNs) targeting various Subline Item 
Numbers (SLINs)  
a. The change cycle, the left side, is responsible for managing all 
changes. Users would make their adjustments to the CLINS/SLINS 
and associated ACRNS as if they were editing the contract. The 
system analyzes and categorizes the changes and applies the 
relevant business logic. In the case of ACRN, where fund 
management comes into play, the act of adding/removing a fund cite, 
adding/lifting funding, or moving funds constitutes three separate 
changes. 
b. As explained in the previous section, the collection of changes goes 
through a vetting and approval process to remove duplicates and 
mediate conflicts. Once completed, all approved changes are pooled 
awaiting formal processing by the contracting officer(s) for the various 
contracts. 
c. Once the contract(s) are opened for conforming, the changes are sent 
through to the right side of the cycle. 
d. As soon as the modification has been grouped, approved, and funds 
appropriated, simultaneously, the package of changes are applied to 
the affected contracts. 
2. Various Task or Technical Instructions (TI) 
a. Tis follow a similar process; however, should an instruction require 
pricing information, the vendor must respond. The response then 
must be reviewed and approved. Once approved, the task or technical 
instruction exists on the CLIN/SLIN structure or references a 
CLIN/SLIN structure. 
b. The procedure of generating Tis generates a series of indirect 
changes such as funding allocation. 
c. The group of changes related to a TI’s preparation is added to the 
more prominent catalog of changes made, which are then pooled, as 
mentioned earlier. 
3. Multiple Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) dictating different contract 
reimbursement types, i.e., fixed fee vs. cost reimbursable vs. a combination 
of the two 
a. The CLIN/SLIN cost type determining reimbursements as specified in 
the master contract can be edited and adjusted by end users. 
b. As part of the analysis of the type of changes, the system prompts 
users to adjust the pricing/costs associated with the line if the type 
changes. 
c. These changes are made as are other bilateral edits to the change 
package that will be reconciled, approved, and finally submitted to the 
pool, ready for conforming. 
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d. Funding requirements are taken into consideration when making 
changes in value to each cost type. 
4. Reconciling the previous items to determine total contract award in real time, 
for monitoring and managing CLIN ceilings 
a. The system determines the total obligated value of the contract via the 
sum of all CLINs. 
b. The system also has a total budgeted contract value that is the sum of 
all the fund cites associated with the contract. 
c. The contracting officer can set ceilings on the global or contract level 
or via the CLIN level with configurable options to prevent new work 
until a review, or to alert users. 
d. While ceilings can be placed at the contract level, fund site and ACRN 
specific ceilings can be positioned to allow flexibility based on account 
or appropriation. For example, setting a threshold or time limit of 
money for 70% and a time limit for the first fiscal year of funds. 
5. Warehousing large volumes of ancillary data electronically in an easily 
accessible format 
a. Reporting on these changes are mission critical. As explained earlier, 
the data structure allows the user to investigate several avenues of 
the model. 
i. Transaction layer, elemental view: a user can look at 
task/technical instruction level or task order level on each 
CLIN 
ii. Funding layer, macro view: a user can look at transactions 
against the funding instruments associated with each 
CLIN/SLIN 
iii. Change layer, contract view: a user can view all the 
transaction, changes, and activities on the contract 
iv. Project layer, program view: a user can see all deals and their 
transactions associated with a project. The following section 
will explain projects. 
b. Most importantly, the data presented is contextual, easy to read, easy 
to access, and easy to comprehend. 
Large Program Management and Concurrent Modifications: The Bigger Picture 
The bicycle model with a single contract to manage, while capable, is limiting in 
potential. When the context of contract management is adapted to a more extensive 
program view, the bicycle model provides the ability to manage large numbers of changes. 
A new construct is introduced called a project. 
The traditional definition of a project is temporary in that is has a defined beginning 
and end in time, and therefore defined scope and resources (Project Management Institute, 
2018). A project, as described in this paper’s context, is set as a data container for 
acquisition outcomes, funding, and managing users. A project can form a base unit to create 
the basis for the program. More importantly, the project is a container for program funding. A 
project is a central point for all procurement actions, from creating purchase requests, 
generating a request for contract change, managing contract tasks and line items, and 
tracking expenditures. 
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How does the system tie a program objective, program element line of account, 
contract, managing users, managing funding, and tracking changes? Projects are the 
answer. They exist to categorize, organize, and structure the data. The following graphical 
example is a simple, fictional naval maintenance program structure guide.  
 
Figure 7. Project-Based Approach With the Bicycle Model Included 
This example represents a complex organization with two functions: construction and 
maintenance. Each has funding appropriated with assigned program staff. Under the 
maintenance project is a child project for all activities at a particular shipyard. Under the 
shipyard project are projects for surface and subs, while further down is nuclear and non-
nuclear. Below the nuclear class are the class of subs and finally under that, the actual sub 
itself. On that particular sub exists the various sections of the sub and at the root exists the 
various contracts supporting the serious projects. At last, the elemental level is the contract 
itself (see Figure 7). 
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By choosing the level and grouping elements, users have varying control on how 
many contracts can be modified at the same time, whether at the series level, the actual 
sub, or subclass level. The bicycle model itself is a small but important part of a larger 
program structure picture. This would be total visibility to support change management not 
only at the contract level but at the program level as well—in other words, CCM real time 
situational awareness. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the process known as concurrent contract modification and 
proposes a solution to automate it. While CCMs are not inherently disallowed, they do 
present a significant contract logistical and administrative problem resulting in challenging 
outcomes. The larger projects become, the more difficult it is to track, administer, and 
document proposed changes and their impact on planning, cost, program management, and 
delivery. Without an efficient means toward managing incoming changes, gaining any 
tangible and accurate reporting on project outcomes proves significantly challenging, if not 
impossible. 
This paper proposes a new approach to contract change management, utilizing a 
software tool designed for ground-level operations that scale up to contract and program 
responsible stakeholders. Instead of relying on the output of contract writing systems, this 
system should be used to manage the execution of the many related contracts under a 
single project with shared sources of funding. Focusing and bringing an automated 
infrastructure and a process for contract change management will allow for greater insight 
and accountability at program execution levels. In the case of the Navy, at the Regional 
Maintenance Center or shipyard level.  
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Abstract 
Acquisition programs increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating and 
using digital assets throughout the lifecycle. Model-centric practices have matured, yet in 
spite of sound practices there are uncertainties that may impact programs over time. The 
emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive technologies, threats, 
changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced 
training hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within model-centric acquisition 
programs, potentially jeopardizing program success. This paper presents ongoing research 
that seeks to provide program managers with the means to identify model-centric program 
vulnerabilities and determine where interventions can most effectively be taken. Cause-
Effect Mapping (CEM), a technique developed at MIT, is employed to examine cascading 
effects between emerging perturbations and terminal outcomes. Research begins with 
literature investigation and gathering results of past studies of relevance, including studies of 
model-centric environments and transformations from a traditional to model-centric 
engineering paradigm (sometimes referred to as the digital engineering paradigm), recent 
workshop findings, and related work on vulnerability assessment that may have implications 
for this work. The results are used to refine the CEM and analytic approach to develop a 
reference model for vulnerability assessment of model-centric programs. Usability of the 
resulting model is tested with selected research stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
In a world where engineered systems are rapidly increasing in complexity, scale, and 
interoperability, there is an urgency to transform traditional practices. Digital transformation 
changes how systems are acquired and developed through the use of model-centric 
engineering practices and toolsets. While offering great benefit, new challenges arise from 
both technological and socio-cultural dimensions. This drives the need to examine and 
address vulnerabilities not only for products and systems, but also for the model-centric 
environments necessary for their acquisition and development. Ongoing research 
investigates the use of Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) as a mechanism for better enabling 
program managers and system engineers to anticipate and respond to programmatic 
vulnerabilities as related to model-centric environments. A Reference CEM for model-centric 
enterprises is generated based on gathered research findings and used for discussion with 
subject matter experts. Information on uncertainties and leading indicators is collected. 
Analysis is performed to consider the cascading vulnerabilities and potential intervention 
options. 
Motivation 
Acquisition program management is grounded in management science and a sound 
set of practices evolved over decades; however, new challenges arise as acquisition 
becomes increasingly model-centric. Increasing availability and use of model-centric 
approaches and enabling technologies is transforming engineering from documentation-
centric to model-centric. While good practices have emerged to support the shift to model-
centric program acquisition, such programs experience perturbations over their lifecycles 
that introduce new vulnerabilities that may lead to cascading failures. For instance, 
perturbations may be caused by policy change (leading to IP disagreements), economic 
factors (leading to training cuts), or disruptive technology (leading to outdated 
infrastructure). Early detection and intervention of vulnerabilities can mitigate disruptions 
and failures. The research seeks to contribute to the vulnerability assessment state of 
practice for acquisition programs, both public and private, that increasingly depend on digital 
assets and model-centric environments.  
Background 
The following subsections describe model-centric engineering; vulnerability, hazard 
and risk analysis; cause-effect mapping; and programmatic vulnerabilities.  
Model-Centric Engineering 
Acquisition program management is grounded in management science and a sound 
set of practices evolved over decades; however, new challenges arise as acquisition 
becomes increasingly model-centric. Baldwin and Lucero (2016) state, “The DoD sees value 
in adopting digital engineering design and model-centric practices, enabling a shift from the 
linear, document centric acquisition and engineering process toward a dynamic digital, 
model-centric ecosystem. ”  
The systems engineering field is going through a period of significant transformation 
(Peterson, 2017). Advances in computing, digital workflows, and multidomain-multiscale 
models are leading to new concepts and approaches for model-centric engineering 
(Piaszczyk, 2011; Reid & Rhodes, 2016; Glaessgen & Stargel, 2012; Puckek et al., 2017; 
West & Pyster, 2017).  
Model-Centric Engineering (MCE) has been defined as “an overarching digital 
engineering approach that integrates different model types with simulations, surrogates, 
systems and components at different levels of abstraction and fidelity across disciplines 
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throughout the lifecycle” (Blackburn et al., 2017). MCE involves using integrated models 
across disciplines, subsystems, lifecycle stages, and analyst groups. It uses models as the 
“source of truth” to reduce document handoff and allow for more continuous evaluation. This 
reduces communication time and rework in response to requirement changes. While many 
engineering organizations are applying various aspects of MCE (Glaessgen & Stargel, 2012; 
Kellner, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015), implementation is not without its difficulties. 
Enhanced infrastructure and new leadership capabilities are needed. Increased connectivity 
means the danger of improper access is heightened. Even with sound MCE practices in 
use, there are still many challenges that remain. Efforts are also ongoing to identify 
inconsistent policies in an organization using model-based tools (e.g., Krishnan, Virani, & 
Gasoto, 2017; Virani & Rust, 2016). 
Most discussions of MCE focus on engineering practices and methods to overcome 
implementation difficulties. In any system, however, engineering is only a piece of the 
problem. Numerous human factors, business concerns, and organizational issues exist. The 
design and development of a system exists itself inside a sociotechnical system. Program 
managers and system engineers must learn how to identify and address programmatic 
vulnerabilities that pose threats to schedule and budget. Current program managers have 
significant experience with modern engineering processes. They can use this experience to 
identify and mitigate such vulnerabilities. Minimal experience exists specific to MCE and 
model-centric environments, however. This fact, coupled with the increased integration of 
models, means that emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive 
technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions 
(e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within MCE 
programs, potentially jeopardizing program success. New tools are needed to enable 
program managers to readily identify model-centric program vulnerabilities and determine 
where interventions can most effectively be taken. 
The Defense Acquisition Glossary defines a program as “a directed, funded effort 
that provides a new, improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system, or 
service capability in response to an approved need.” In this paper, this definition of program 
will be used. A project, on the other hand is acknowledged as being synonymous with 
program in general usage, but more specifically defined as “a planned undertaking having a 
finite beginning and ending, involving definition, development, production, and logistics 
support (LS) of a major weapon or weapon support system or systems. A project may be the 
whole or a part of a program” (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). 
Vulnerability, Risk, and Hazard Analysis 
Numerous methods for analyzing vulnerabilities, risks, and hazards exist. These 
three interrelated terms have different definitions depending on the field and on the method 
of analysis. In this paper, a hazard refers to a system or environmental state that has the 
potential to disrupt the system. Examples include the existence of an iceberg at sea and 
tired operators. Hazards may not result in system failure, partly depending on the design of 
the system.  
A vulnerability is the means by which the hazard might disrupt the system, thus it is 
through the vulnerability that the system is susceptible to the hazard. Vulnerabilities are best 
expressed as the causal series of events connecting a hazard to system failure. This is a 
generalization of common, field-specific usages of the term. MITRE’s Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database defines a vulnerability as “a weakness in the 
computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and some hardware components (e.g., 
firmware) that, when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR 
availability” (The MITRE Corporation, 2015). In this definition, the same components can be 
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seen: some structural means or “weakness” that can result in system disruption or “negative 
impact” if a hazard is present or the vulnerability is “exploited.” For example, the infamous 
Spectre security vulnerability is described by CVE as “systems with microprocessors utilizing 
speculative execution and branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of 
information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis” (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2017). This is a neat summary of the hazard (an attacker), the means (side-
channel analysis using speculative execution and branch prediction), and the disruption 
(unauthorized disclosure of information). 
Risk is a measure of the probability of a system disruption and the consequences of 
that disruption. It is commonly expressed with just a statement of those two components 
(e.g., 1.25 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles). Risk can also be expressed as a 
multiplication of likelihood and consequence and can include other components such as 
detectability. 
Common means of analysis include Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA); Failure Modes, 
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA, though sometimes reduced to FMEA); Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA); and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
FTA is a deductive, top-down analysis method where a failure mode is identified and 
all the possible causes of that event are laid out in sequences until the exogenous hazards 
are reached. Logic gates are used to connect the various hazards and intermediary events. 
An example FTA may be seen in Figure 1. Probabilities may be assigned to each hazard 
and thus a cumulative probability of the failure calculated. FTA is thus quite proficient in 
investigating the cause of failures afterwards, but is limited in its ability to identify all possible 
hazards. Additionally, it is somewhat limited by its arbitrary stopping point (i.e., where one 
chooses to define an event as an exogenous hazard).  
 
Figure 1. Simplified Fault-Tree Analysis of the Sinking of the Titanic 
ETA is essentially an inverted FTA. Instead of starting from a failure and working 
backwards to a hazard, a hazard is selected and logic gates are used to assess potential 
consequences. This method is useful for predicting potential failures rather than determining 
the cause of an existing failure. It suffers from some of the same limitation as FTA. 
Additionally, it fails to examine the consequences of multiple concurrent hazards. 
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FMECA is an inductive method, similar to ETA, that seeks to tabulate all possible 
failures and then assess their severity, probability, detectability, and criticality. It excels at 
thoroughness but suffers from an inability to easily access multiple failures simultaneously. 
Additionally, its tabular format can be difficult to read. An example FMECA can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Portion of an FMECA  
(Tague, 2004) 
STPA takes a rather different approach and conceptualizes systems as control 
loops, as can be seen in Figure 3. The goal of STPA is to avoid focusing on exhaustively 
tabulating all vulnerabilities and attempting to quantitatively calculate probabilities. These 
can be difficult to do accurately for a system of any significant size. Instead STPA attempts 
to ensure that appropriate monitors and controls are in place for each component of the 
system (including its operators) so that any hazard is detected and addressed before it can 
cause a failure. In this way, it seeks to eliminate vulnerabilities while relying primarily on a 
qualitative, rather than a quantitative, assessment. 
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Figure 3. Example STPA Diagram 
(Leveson, 2013) 
Most vulnerability analysis methods fail to directly grapple with the problem of blame 
(though STPA does). Humans, engineers and program managers included, have a tendency 
to assign blame for a failure to someone or something other than themselves. FTA, ETA, 
and FMECA can enable this by allowing for an arbitrary “stopping point” (i.e., where the 
previous step in the causal chain is deemed the initiating hazard). In the Titanic FTA 
presented in Figure 1, for instance, why did we stop deconstructing the causes there? Were 
the designers of the rudder actually at fault? Or were the engineering standards poorly 
written? Were the owners of the boat at fault for installing too few lifeboats or should the 
government set a minimum required number of lifeboats? By adjusting the bounds of the 
analysis, it is easy to place blame on whomever the analyst desires. 
STPA avoids this by (a) not assigning a specific “cause” of a failure and (b) by having 
every part of the system responsible for monitoring the other parts. Despite this, as the 
creators of STPA themselves acknowledge, the method has been criticized for its lack of a 
neat, one-page explanation of the causes of an accident (Leveson, 2013). 
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Cause-Effect Mapping 
Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) captures some of the benefits of STPA while still 
presenting distinct cause-effect paths. CEM has previously been applied to a case study of 
a Maritime Security System of Systems (Mekdeci et al., 2012) and to a supply chain case 
(Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). It consists of a mapping of causal chains that connect an 
exogenous hazard to a system degradation or failure, termed a terminal event. Each chain 
represents a vulnerability, sometimes called a vulnerability chain in order to emphasize that 
vulnerabilities are not discrete events. Terminal events are broadly defined and include any 
form of value loss. An example CEM (that lacks intervention points) can be seen in Figure 4. 
Similar to FTA, CEM is easily read in either direction, but it also allows for the simultaneous 
consideration of multiple failures and multiple hazards.  
The hazards are external to the perspective of the defined user, and are thus 
sometimes called external triggers. An intermediary event is any unintended state change of 
a system’s form or operations which could jeopardize value delivery of the program.  
A CEM is not created for a system, but for a specific class of decision-maker. The 
hazards (referred to as “spontaneous events”; Figure 2) are exogenous from the point of 
view of the decision-maker that the CEM was made for. In this way, CEM avoids the 
aforementioned “blaming someone else” problem by making all hazards exogenous. The 
decision-maker only has control over the intermediary events. While she may not be at fault 
for any of the vulnerabilities, it is still her responsibility to address them. 
CEM is fundamentally a qualitative analysis method, though it can be readily adapted 
into a quantitative form, by adding probabilities of transition to each intermediary. CEM 
provides immediate insight into which parts of the system warrant more detailed modeling. 
For instance, it may be useful to determine the likely time required for a specific vulnerability 
to complete. CEM enables classification of different vulnerability chains (by terminal event, 
by triggering event or type of triggering event, or by intermediary event). Additionally, it 
allows immediate identification of potential intervention points at intermediary events where 
multiple vulnerability chains intersect.  
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Figure 4. Example CEM of a Supply Chain 
(Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) 
Programmatic Vulnerabilities 
Programmatic vulnerabilities differ from technological system vulnerabilities in a 
number of ways. Programmatic vulnerabilities tend to be more people-oriented, involving 
politics, economics, incentives, social interactions, and the like. They tend to be much less 
thoroughly studied, assessed, and understood, both in academia and in practice. Over the 
course of this study, a series of interviews was conducted with system engineers and 
program managers from a variety of fields, including defense, aerospace, manufacturing, 
and semiconductors. These interviews sought to provide insight into the following questions, 
in the context of a model-centric enterprise: 
1. To what extent are program managers aware of programmatic 
vulnerabilities? 
2. How do program managers conceptualize these vulnerabilities?  
3. How do program managers respond to these vulnerabilities? 
4. What vulnerabilities are present in MCE programs? 
5. What cybersecurity vulnerabilities does MCE pose? 
The first three questions provided some useful information regarding the status quo. 
Across all these industries, several facts were clear. First, many, if not most, programmatic 
vulnerabilities appear to be triggered by exogenous hazards beyond the control of the 
program manager. Some, such as poor scope or inadequate budget, are sometimes present 
before the first program manager joins a program. In general, program managers are at 
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least aware of the potential for these hazards and in some cases can even see them 
coming. There was some variance in responses to these hazards, however. Some program 
managers attempt to do things like preemptive padding of a schedule using a multiplicative 
factor based on experience. Others used their own spreadsheets and tools for estimating 
the “real” schedule or cost (that is, the schedule or cost that would result from a potential 
hazard becoming real). Little to no formal risk or vulnerability assessment would take place, 
however, and responses tended to be reactive rather than proactive, contributing to the 
“program management via crisis management” paradigm. In general, the perception by 
interviewees was that program managers rely heavily on expertise, rather than on formal 
education. While some, such as the INCOSE PM-SE Integration Working Group’s Strategic 
Initiative, seek to directly address the exogenous hazards and others seek to provide risk 
registries that contain programmatic risks (Hall, 2018), there is a real need for easy to use 
tools for program managers to improve their ability to assess programmatic vulnerabilities 
and respond to them. The fourth question was intended to supplement and corroborate a 
Reference CEM, as discussed in the following section. 
CEM for Model-Centric Programs 
In this research, an objective was to develop a high-level cause-effect map for 
model-centric programs to serve as a reference for use by program managers. The intent is 
for this CEM to serve both as a standalone resource for such program managers, as well as 
a basis for organizations to construct their own, program-specific CEM with added detail. 
Additionally, this research sought to document the general steps to create and use CEM in 
general, as well as to conduct some initial usability testing of the usefulness of the 
Reference CEM. 
Generating the CEM 
Generating a CEM can be done in different ways and to different levels of 
granularity, depending on the need of the stakeholder. This process can be done with 
groups, such as project teams, as well as individually. The general process is as follows: 
1. The stakeholder herself lists potential hazards posed to the program. 
2. She then traces the consequences of each of these hazards through the 
intermediary events to the final terminal events. 
3. The process is then done in reverse: She looks at the terminal events, adds 
in any that are still missing, and works backwards on how they might come 
about. 
4. She then examines the causal connections between each intermediary event 
to see if there are any additional connections not previously noticed. 
5. Finally, she consults lessons learned databases, case studies, and other 
experts to generate additional hazards, intermediary events, causal 
connections, and interventions, as well as to verify existing ones. 
The Reference CEM shown in Figure 5 was generated through a combination of 
methods. At this time, there is little literature on programmatic vulnerabilities posed by MCE. 
Most negative case studies, that is, those that depict failures (Software Engineering 
Institute, 2007), and lessons learned databases (NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, n.d.), 
are from prior to the rise of MCE and thus deal with general vulnerabilities. Existing case 
studies that directly deal with MCE tend to be more positive, likely due to the rising 
popularity of the paradigm (Conigliaro, Kerzhner, & Paredis, 2009; Maley & Long, 2005; 
Martz & Neu, 2008). As a result of these, extrapolations from extant vulnerabilities had to be 
made, along with hypothetical inversions of the positive instances of MCE. Additional 
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vulnerabilities were contributed by group brainstorming during the in-class activity discussed 
further in the section titled Usability Testing. All of these were supplemented and confirmed 
by the same interviews discussed previously. 
The higher level of detail in the upper portion of the CEM, which includes issues such 
as training, misunderstood model assumptions, and level of trust in the models, represents 
the increased degree of concern that interviewees had about these issues. In general, the 
domain of aligning culture and expertise with well-designed and well-documented toolsets 
was of high priority. Failure to accomplish this had led to significant problems in past 
projects, but is viewed as a surmountable difficulty moving forward. 
Using the CEM 
Vulnerability analysis methods are most commonly applied either to the design or the 
operation of an engineered system. This is usually done to improve its design or investigate 
a failure. However, these methods can also be applied to the program itself. Instead of 
hazards such as “relief valve failure” and “solar flare” instead we have “hiring freeze” and 
“unexpected technological hurtle.” It can be difficult to assess likelihoods for such hazards, 
but even qualitative analysis can be useful. Similarly, terminal events are not “nuclear 
meltdown” or “loss of communications” but instead “schedule delay” or “failure during 
verification/validation.” 
CEM in particular can be used to assess vulnerabilities in multiple ways and by 
different individuals. Four uses are described as follows: 
(A) By a Program Manager: Assessing potential future vulnerabilities and 
planning possible interventions 
(B) By a Program Manager: Determining specific vulnerabilities to address in 
response to the presence of a specific hazard 
(C) By the Program Organization: Changing program processes to mitigate or 
eliminate vulnerabilities 
(D) By Researchers: Organizing and classifying vulnerabilities into various 
categories or types 
All of these start with the creation of a CEM for the organization’s standard program 
process or for a particular program. Once this is completed, additional steps can be taken, 
including 
1. Identifying notable intermediary events and potential intervention points 
2. onducting more detailed modeling of specific vulnerability chains 
3. Classifying vulnerability chains to enable future study and potential mitigation. 
While a program manager would be well-served by the creation of a CEM specific to 
their own program, there is some benefit in using a Reference CEM for model-centric 
programs in general. Such a Reference CEM can be seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Reference CEM for Model-Centric Vulnerabilities (Preliminary)  
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Use (A) is most relevant for novice program managers or program managers using 
MCE for the first time. A senior program manager or team of program managers creates a 
CEM for their organization’s program process. This CEM can then be provided to the novice 
for study and reference. The program manager can then learn what can go wrong and how 
to intervene. In this case, the CEM could be tied to a Lesson’s Learned database, such as 
NASA’s Lessons Learned Information System (NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, n.d.). 
This enables concrete examples and consequences to be linked to each vulnerability. One 
of the important factors here is that the CEM does not just present potential interventions, 
but it also places them in the appropriate part of the causal sequence. This enables the 
program manager to not only know how to intervene, but at what point. 
Use (B) is relevant to all program managers, regardless of level of experience. Once 
a hazard manifests, the program manager examines the CEM to assess potential 
consequences and options. He can then respond quickly to head off any cascading effects. 
This may require additional analysis of a specific vulnerability chain or an individual 
intermediary event. System dynamics is a method particularly useful for this due to the 
preexisting models of many organizational phenomena (Rouwette & Ghaffarzadegan, 2013). 
For instance, Attrition, Reduced Model Training, and Less Model Expertise can be modeled 
by adapting the rookie fraction model shown in Figure 6 into the more MCE-relevant model 
shown in Figure 7. In this model, it is apparent that a hiring freeze (which would set the 
“Growth Rate” variable to zero) has no immediate impact, as rookies will continue to develop 
into experienced employees and model expertise will continue to accumulate. Overtime, 
however, the dearth of new rookies will result in fewer experienced employees, increasing 
the error rate. These kinds of long-term, indirect impacts are likely to become more common 
with increased use of MCE.  
Use (C) is the traditional use of vulnerability assessment methods: to improve a 
design or investigate a failure. The program organization can change policies or create 
infrastructure to either mitigate or wholly eliminate certain vulnerability chains. For example, 
if the organization elects to only use modeling software produced in-house, the three 
hazards in the “Software Changes” grouping of Figure 5 are no longer relevant. Such a 
change could be costly though or even introduce new vulnerabilities, so careful analysis is 
necessary. In this use, the CEM is a visual representation of a risk registry, tabulating all 
possible hazards to the program and mitigation choices made (Hall, 2018).  
In Use (D), CEM is used to organize and classify vulnerability chains. Two obvious 
classifiers are terminal events and hazards. Which is used to organize a CEM depends on 
whether the user wants to examine the causal chains forwards or backwards. Beyond this, 
however, more complicated classifiers are possible. As can be seen in Figure 5, external 
triggers that result in similar vulnerability chains are grouped together. By “similar,” we mean 
that these vulnerability chains either involve many of the same intermediary events or that 
they involve the same part of the program. For instance, most of the intermediary events 
involving model curation and trust are located close to one another in the center-top of the 
figure. Once these groupings have been identified, they can be considered together, such 
as the “Belt-tightening” grouping, and common means of intervention considered. 
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Figure 6. System Dynamics Model of Employee Training Rate 
(Adapted from Sterman, 2000) 
 
Figure 7. System Dynamics Model of Accumulated Modeling Errors 
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Usability Testing 
While several potential use cases were proposed in the previous section, due to the 
scale, duration, cost, and uniqueness of major MCE programs, it is difficult to systematically 
test the utility of either the Reference CEM or of using CEM in general. Some simple 
usability testing was explored in the interviews with experts. Usability was also considered 
through analyzing the results of a scenario-based exercise on vulnerability analysis that had 
been generated in a graduate class activity involving techniques for investigating 
enterprises. 
The classroom activity involved approximately 40 students from various 
backgrounds, most having prior experience in either industry or the military as systems 
engineers and/or program managers. The students were randomly divided into six groups of 
5 to 7 students each, and each group was provided with the same “context” for the activity, 
as follows: 
You are a project manager for a vehicle manufacturer. Your current project is 
designing a lightweight troop transport vehicle for the U.S. military. It has a 
variety of high-tech components, including encrypted radio and satellite 
communication systems, an explosives detector, and night vision cameras. 
The design and testing process will take multiple years. Your company 
considers this a major project in terms of the resources put into it, the 
revenue received for it, and the potential for future military contracts. The 
military, as part of the contract, specified that the design and production 
process should predominately rely on models (sometimes called model-
centric engineering) rather than written specifications. 
Each group was provided with one or two selected external triggers or hazards to 
respond to. They were asked to discuss and record the potential negative impacts these 
hazards may have on the engineering environment and how they might act to mitigate these 
consequences. The hazards provided were as follows: 
1. An unrelated military project (at another company) to design a next-
generation missile defense system has ended up in the national news. That 
system has gone significantly over budget, has been repeatedly delayed, and 
still looks like it is a long way off from being completed. Public accusations of 
mismanagement and waste are being made, including frivolous travel and 
lavish company events. Congress and the Department of Defense are now 
carefully scrutinizing all other major projects for potential mismanagement or 
waste, including your project. 
2. After recent elections, there is significant political pressure on Congress to 
reduce federal spending. As a result of this, they are making significant cuts 
to many agencies and programs, including the military. The decrease in 
government spending is likely to impact your company’s other projects and 
may impact yours as well. 
3. Government intelligence officials inform you that your company, and perhaps 
even your project, is likely to be the target of cybersecurity attacks based out 
of another nation. 
4. This is your first project of this type (your prior experience was in designing 
civilian vehicles). You now have to choose whether your project will use the 
set of modeling software that you are accustomed to from the civilian projects 
or use another set that is more commonly used on military projects, but that 
you are unfamiliar with. 
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5. A recent economic downturn, coupled with a government that is cutting back 
on its military spending, has resulted in your company declaring a hiring 
freeze for an indeterminate amount of time. 
6. Another project at your company is threatening to miss its deadlines. In order 
to get it back in line, its project manager is requesting that personnel from 
other projects, such as yours, be reallocated to hers. 
7. The design requirements from the military that you are currently working with 
were put together with the idea of using this vehicle in a currently ongoing 
conflict. However, U.S. involvement in this conflict is winding down and the 
military is currently unsure where this vehicle will be used in the future. The 
context (and thus the requirements) may change during the design process. 
Furthermore, your models were created with the current context in mind. 
8. A recent economic downturn, coupled with a government that is cutting back 
on its military spending, has resulted in your company providing incentives for 
early retirement to the more experienced, higher paid employees. You have 
no intention of retiring early yourself, but some of those working on your 
project might accept the offer. 
9. In order to minimize rework and redundancy, your company has recently 
started an initiative pushing for increased reuse of components, designs, and 
models from one project to another. Your previous project also involved a 
night vision camera, but in a very different application context. 
10. A particular piece of simulation software that your company has used on 
similar projects in the past is licensed from another company. The license 
contract is up for renewal soon and the price might go up significantly. You 
are uncertain if your company’s executives will approve the license renewal. 
After a period of 20 minutes, the students were taught about causal chains and use 
of the CEM reference model as a technique for investigating enterprise vulnerabilities. Each 
group was instructed to re-write the previously identified vulnerabilities and interventions as 
causal chains and map them on the provided CEM (Figure 8), as well as coming up with 
new ones. After another period of 20 minutes, their results were collected, a group debrief 
was given, and students shared general feedback on the class activity. [Note: The CEM 
presented in Figure 8 is similar to that in Figure 5 but not identical, as knowledge gained in 
interviews and usability testing has since been used to further develop the CEM.]  
Several useful pieces of information could be garnered through analyzing the 
documented results of the class activity that had been conducted. In the out-briefing 
material, the participants expressed unanimous agreement that using CEM and 
conceptualizing programmatic vulnerabilities as causal chains was helpful, though the 
perceived degree of usefulness varied from “slightly” to “extremely.” Additionally, team out-
briefs reported on four primary forms of how the CEM helped in their assigned scenario in 
the class exercise: 
1. Identifying high priority intervention points: (70%) 
2. Identifying new vulnerabilities: (55%) 
3. Understanding the causal path / Reframing the concept of vulnerabilities: 
(45%) 
4. Understanding interrelationships between vulnerabilities: (40%) 
The relative importance of this first point was corroborated by the group outputs that 
were generated. It was clear that in this instance, when provided with a Reference CEM, the 
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groups tended to focus on identifying where and how to intervene in the vulnerability chains. 
During the first round (without the CEM), most of the groups had presented their 
vulnerabilities and interventions as unordered lists of short phrases, typically unpaired (i.e., 
vulnerabilities were not matched with interventions). These short phrases were typically 
isolated events such as “team feeling more cautious” and “reputation damages.” The 
ultimate outcomes of these were assumed rather than explicitly stated. Once the CEM was 
introduced in the second round, the matching of interventions to vulnerabilities appeared to 
become much more clear, and most groups also identified additional interventions. 
 
Figure 8. Reference CEM Used as a Basis for Usability Testing   
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Future Directions 
Digital engineering is transforming the systems acquisition process (Zimmerman, 
Gilbert, & Salvatore, 2017), including the model-centric techniques and toolsets. Enterprises 
face new challenges in this transformation, including potential for new vulnerabilities within 
model-centric enterprises. While vulnerability analysis of products and systems is 
performed, examining vulnerabilities within an enterprise is less common. Vulnerability 
analysis of the enterprise becomes increasingly urgent given increasing complexity and 
interconnectivity in model-centric environments used to make system decisions. The interim 
outcomes of this research, including expert interview results, show the potential benefit of 
cause-effect mapping techniques and availability of a reference map for model-centric 
program vulnerability analysis. Additional expert interviews are planned with an expanded 
set of stakeholders. 
Insights into usability were also gained through analyzing a data set that had been 
generated in a classroom setting. Accordingly, the results should be viewed as purely 
exploratory, but there appears to be good justification for future research to include 
conducting a controlled human-subjects research experiment (similar to the scenario-based 
exercise used in a classroom setting). Additionally, an important future research activity is to 
evaluate the Reference CEM on a pilot project in a real world model-centric engineering 
program. Further development of the Reference CEM is planned for next phase research, 
including more extensive investigation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities resulting from model-
centric practices and infrastructure.  
Conclusion 
Acquisition programs increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating and 
using digital assets throughout the lifecycle. Model-centric practices have matured, yet in 
spite of sound practices, there are uncertainties that may impact programs over time. The 
emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive technologies, threats, 
changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced 
training hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within model-centric acquisition 
programs, potentially jeopardizing program success. Ongoing research has led to a 
preliminary CEM Reference Model that aims to provide program managers with a means to 
assess, prioritize, and mitigate model-centric vulnerabilities. Usability testing of the reference 
model has shown positive benefits for practical use in assessing vulnerabilities of model-
centric programs. Anticipated results are empirically-grounded vulnerabilities of model-
centric programs and a cause-effect mapping reference model for identifying vulnerabilities 
and interventions. 
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